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PRINCIPLES OF RURAL-URBAN SOCIOLOGY

BY
PITIRIM SOROKIN
AND
CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

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PREFACE

This book is in some degree a concise summary of another, much larger and much more fundamental three-volume work, *Source Book in Rural Sociology*,[1] prepared by the authors jointly with Dr. Charles J. Galpin under the auspices of the United States Department of Agriculture and the University of Minnesota. When the total manuscript of this present study was ready it was so long that it could not be published in one volume. If there had not been the prospect of the publication of the above three-volume work the authors would have published this present study in its full form. Since there appeared this opportunity to compose a new, and a still more monumental work, the authors found it advisable to cut out several parts of this volume, to take away a great number of statistical tables, figures, notes, and other data, and to make the work available for students and general readers who are interested in rural sociology. This means that the conclusions of the book are based on a much more extensive body of evidence than is given in this volume. This also means that the reader who desires to pursue the evidence more fully, as well as to study the problems treated in the book in greater detail and to have knowledge about many other problems not touched here, may refer to the above monumental work, which, in our hopes, is going to be a very exhaustive study of the major portions of the entire field of rural sociology. These volumes will include translations of the more important sources which are of interest to rural sociology. The reasons for this abbreviated manual are two in number: first, it gives students and the public a volume which is accessible in size and price; second, it differs considerably from the existing texts in its character, composition, materials, method, and conclusions. We believe that these reasons are sufficient to justify its publication.

In five respects this volume differs from existing texts in rural sociology. First, it tries to be a rural *sociology* and not a mere collection of various data pertaining to aspects of rural life and rural communities. A reader who becomes acquainted with what we understand by sociology and rural sociology will not fail to note that the problems discussed in the book represent a systematic realization of the definition of rural sociology given in the first few chapters of the book. This explains why we do not have special chapters, for instance, about standards of living, number of churches, number of

[1] To be published by the University of Minnesota Press in 1930 or 1931.

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houses with and without running water, and so on. A mere description of such phases of rural life does not belong directly to sociology but to economics, or home economics, or what not. It is certain that we use such data extensively but not, so to speak, for their own sake: they are taken and used in intercorrelations with other social phenomena and serve only as "bricks" for the construction of more complex, general and sociological formulæ of functional relationships and interrelationships.

Second, the book does not try to "preach" and does not bother itself with any evaluation of what is good and bad in rural life. We are convinced that such preaching is not the task of science at all, and that, when the facts are carefully studied, evaluations and practical conclusions are very easily reached by any intelligent reader. Likewise, the book does not stress "the sympathetic attitude" of the authors regarding rural life. Although both authors were born and reared, one in an entirely rural part of Northern Russia without even a small town, and the other in a village of 300 population in Missouri; although both of them are from the farmer-peasant class and for this reason should have such an attitude; nevertheless, they think that this is a personal matter and is to be particularly apprehended, as a possible source of pro-rural bias, in such a writing as this.

Third, the courses in rural sociology in this country (in other countries such courses hardly exist) have been dealing almost exclusively with American data and have not touched the data of other countries. This present book tries to base its conclusions on the existing data of almost all countries. From the definitions of sociology and of rural sociology given in this book, such procedure is quite comprehensible. In order to find whether a certain correlation is valid, and the extent of its reliability, variability, and uniformity, an investigator is obliged not only to study a few local districts or a single country, but all countries where the information exists. Only after this is done, is it possible for the social scientist to free himself from those common fallacies such as the elevation of somewhat incidental local relationships to the rank of an universal formula; of a particular result found in one place or period into "a general law"; or of a highly variable and "unstable" relationship into "a rigid uniformity." Shall we add that sociology (including rural sociology) is full of such "generalizations" which represent factually but erroneous simplifications and disfigurations of reality? The subsequent chapters show how numerous such errors are in all fields of rural sociology and how necessary it is, before making a generalization, to check the hypothesis attentively on the basis of existing materials in all countries. This explains why we have tried to use the available data not only of the United States, but of practically

all European countries where the respective information exists and was accessible to us.

Fourth, several problems which have already been well studied and in which the conclusions reached are relatively certain, are only briefly summarized: we did not wish to repeat uselessly what has already been well ascertained. The problems, which are still "dark" and concerning which existing conclusions are very uncertain, are analyzed more painfully and are given more room in the book. Such an "exterior disproportion" in the distribution of the materials is "an inner proportionality" which advisability is rather evident and needs no defense.

Fifth, for those who like "all embracing, clearly cut, and sweeping generalizations," easy to remember and thrilling in their universality, simplicity, and "rectilinearity" this book may appear somewhat disappointing. It shall certainly be disappointing for those who think that a good text shall give only "ready-made conclusions" presented in such a manner that they may be swallowed pleasantly by a student with the least mental effort on his part. Instead of this, the book dissipates many sensational formulæ as false; it gives few, if any, "thrilling generalizations"; it furnishes nothing for "newspaper sensations"; it even surrounds the few given formulæ with many reservations and limitations; it shows that the reality studied is something very complex and far from being "rectilinear." We are aware that in the present age of "humanizing of knowledge," these characteristics are out of fashion and are not so attractive psychologically as "enthusiastic rectilinearity" or "entertaining simplicity." Nevertheless, we are convinced that a scientific text is not a "detective story"; and that a student of any science must take some pains to learn it; and that in order really to learn it, he must think for himself and be able to do it properly. He must be well acquainted with not only a few and onesided or incidental cases, which illustrate ready-made opinions, but with nearly all of the essential body of existing data for the field discussed, with their complications, contradictions, difficulties of interpretation, and doubtful "holes." All this requires some mental effort and is often tiresome. It calls forth the student's own thinking. And yet, only when these conditions of learning are present, is "the learning not a labor lost." Only then may a student begin really to think scientifically and for himself; only then may he pretend that he really knows something in the field. On the contrary, university and college education amounts to nothing but a cultivation of pseudo-scientific ignorance, however pleasant it may be. Such are our excuses for the "uncomfortable" characteristics of this book. We are not writing a "best seller" but a scientific study. Science must face reality with all of its uncomfortable complexities.

We may add finally that much of the data presented here is simplified to the extent of presentation at their face value. Many conditions and minor qualifying conclusions may be made for each point. But we have chosen not to overburden the book with these minor qualifying conditions and conclusions. These are well known to the authors; they were in mind when the major conclusions were given; and are always covered in detail in the references given to each body of data; but they are omitted from this text because we did not wish to overburden the reader or lengthen the text. This is a pedagogical practice and not a series of oversights or any indication of a lack of careful analysis by the authors. Further, we have omitted references to second-hand studies, and to other studies not bearing directly to the point. We have preferred to go directly to the primary sources, to make our own interpretations and not to make a false show of erudition by any padding of references.

Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, and 27 were written by the first of the authors; chapters 9, 10, 11, 12, 23, 24, 25, 26 were written by the second; the remaining chapters 3, 14, and 19 were written by both authors. In spite of the fact that the book is written by two men, in its character it is organically one book: the congeniality of the leading ideas of both authors; similarity of the approach to the study of rural phenomena; mutual criticism and mutual help in writing of the chapters alloted to each of the authors; all have made the book an organic whole with the same plan, the same approach, and the same type of analysis in all chapters. Whatever may be the other defects of the book, it is certainly free from the shortcomings which arise out of the mechanical binding into one volume of two different works by two different authors. Therefore, both authors bear the responsibility for all parts of the book.

In conclusion it is our great pleasure to acknowledge our indebtedness to a person who generously granted $500 for aid in the preparation of the manuscript of the book but who preferred to be unknown to the public. Among many other persons who have helped the writers in various ways, the name of Eduard C. Lindeman deserves special mention. We are indebted to Professor Howard W. Odum and Henry Holt and Company for the permission to use the parts of this volume in the above-mentioned more inclusive work. We express our gratitude to Dr. Charles J. Galpin, Deans Guy S. Ford, Walter C. Coffey, and J. B. Johnston for their kind co-operation which enables the composition and publication of *The Source Book in Rural Sociology* and which made possible the abbreviation and publication of this manual.

P. A. S.
C. C. Z.

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

DEFINITION OF RURAL AND URBAN SOCIOLOGY

1. General Sociology as a Science. This book is a treatise in Rural, and to a less degree, in Urban Sociology. A wide difference in understanding of the character of sociology and, in addition, "Rural" and "Urban" sociology makes necessary at least a brief outline of what is understood by these terms in this book. Otherwise, the character and the construction of the book may appear somewhat unclear and incomprehensible. This is more true because the existing definitions of Rural and Urban Sociology are far from being satisfactory or clear.

Following the classification by H. Rickert and W. Windelband of sciences into those that are *individualizing and those that are generalizing*, we regard sociology as a *generalizing* discipline among other social disciplines. In any social phenomenon, be it a person, a society, a religion, and educational institution, or a social relationship, sociology is interested in those characteristics which are not unique or unrepeated in time and space. It concerns itself only with those which in a given phenomenon or relationship are common to other phenomena of this same type. In other words, it deals with characteristics which are repeated in time or space or which are constant for a given class of social phenomena no matter in what society or at what time. In this respect, the position of sociology in regard to social phenomena is similar to that of physics or chemistry in regard to the physical and chemical phenomena studied by them. Like those generalizing sciences, sociology is not interested in any social relationship or phenomenon which is unique in time or space. It is not its business, for instance, to describe in all its uniqueness, individuality, and peculiarity either the Roman Society of the second century B.C. or the origin and development of Christianity or Buddhism or any other phenomenon with such peculiarities that make it unique in human history. Neither would sociology describe Napoleon, Abraham Lincoln, or Kant as unique personalities. It does not deal with any political, economic, juridical, or other social institution as a unique fact in history. General history and various special histories and other descriptive and individualizing social and humanistic sciences are performing such tasks. General sociology concentrates its attention only on those traits and relationships of various social phenomena which are common to *all special forms of social*

phenomena (economic, religious, juridical, vital, etc.). Since these are common phenomena, they are repeated in various societies and at various periods. They are constant characteristics to all varieties of social phenomena. Because of this generalizing trait, sociology differs sharply from all historical, individualizing, and purely descriptive social sciences.

From the generalizing social sciences like economics which also try to concentrate their attention on the discovery of "laws" and "uniformities" that are relatively constant and repeated in time and space, sociology differs radically. The difference is, as was clearly shown by Pareto, that *economics or such sciences do not take the real-complex-man and the real-complex-conditions in which men live, act, and interact, but intentionally simplify man and his conditions and relations.* For instance, classical and even contemporary economics postulate the *economic man* as a mere incarnation of rational purchasing and selling; and the economic environment in which such economic men are supposed to be acting and interacting so as to create the phenomena of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of economic values is again purely hypothetical. The men and the environment are simplified methodologically so there is nothing other than the above economic and egotistical men and their relationships determined only by economic motives. Only through such a simplification of conditions can economics formulate many uniformities which are valid for such postulated economic men and their economic society. In a similar manner, political and religious sciences, if they were a little better developed and their theories better organized and stated, would have been obliged to postulate correspondingly *homo-politicus* and *homo-religiosus*. Such characters would be hypothetical and similar to *homo-economicus*. All these postulated "homines" and the societies created by them are not real. The corresponding generalizations would be applied very little to the real dynamics of social phenomena. They would be but scientific abstractions (men, relations, and laws). The generalizations would apply only if the human beings were pure "economic men" or "pure political men" or "pure religious men," as postulated. Such postulation and hypothetical simplification of conditions is necessary for an analysis of many phenomena and is justified and productive. On the other hand, even the classical economists did not think that real men were as simple and axiomatic as postulated. Adam Smith understood excellently that real man was something much more complex than the economic man. He understood that real human behavior was influenced not only by purely "economic motives of economically egotistic man" but by many non-economic motives which interfered, and very often shaped man's behavior in

a form entirely different from what it would have been had the man been only the economic man. The same may be said of the generalizing political or religious sciences, as outlined above. Their postulated men and relationships could be valid only within the simplified hypothetical conditions. The real man is much more complex than the postulated *homo-politicus* and the real social phenomena and social relationships are quite different from the supposed hypothetical conditions of those sciences.

It becomes evident that, side by side with such special, and also somewhat generalizing, sciences, there is a logical necessity for the existence of a science which, taking into consideration the conclusions of the above sciences, at the same time, tries to formulate uniformities and constant relationships in the field of social phenomena without artificially removing their real complexity. Such exactly is the task of sociology. *It does not postulate any one-sided and simplified homo-economicus or homo-politicus. It deals with men and their relationships in all their real complexity. Homo-sociologicus is a composite homo who in part is homo-economicus, in part homo-politicus, in part homo-religiosus, in part homo-æstheticus, and so on.* Sociological man is partly egotistical and partly altruistic; he is moved by economic, by political, by religious, and by many other motives. *Social relationships of such sociological men are far more complex than those postulated by the above special sciences.* These real relationships are shaped under the influence of economic, and political, and religious and multitudinous other forces. The data given by economics and other similar sciences, with their simplified and isolated hypothetical conditions, help a great deal in the understanding of the real behavior and the real relationships of the real *homo-sociologicus* (because in part he is *homo-economicus*, *homo-politicus*, and so on, and the laws of these sciences help to understand a part of the nature and relationships of the composite *homo-sociologicus*). On the other hand, the data of each of those special sciences are insufficient to disentangle the real nature of man, his behavior, and relationships, and the movement of social phenomena because they are dependent on many other conditions not studied by each of these sciences. *This makes necessary an intercorrelation of the factors studied by each of these sciences which leads to the intercorrelation of various forces, conditions, and factors operating in man's nature, behavior, and relationships and through those to social phenomena generally.* What are the relationships between poverty and health; death-rate and stature; business cycles and criminality; forms of religion and forms of economic organization; forms of political régimes and forms of distribution of wealth; between health and morality; social mobility and forms of arts and family. These are samples of thousands of "the intercor-

relations" which go beyond any existing special social sciences, and which take man as the above complex and composite *homo-sociologicus* and view his behavior, relationships, and social phenomena as highly complex and intercorrelated.

Through the above differences between *homo-sociologicus* in real social relations and the one-sided and simplified *homo-economicus*, *homo-politicus*, and so on, the standpoint of sociology differs sharply from those of these special social sciences. The cleavage is quite clear theoretically. As a practical matter many sociologists often study and produce valuable researches of a purely economic or political nature and many economists have been busy with a purely sociological problem in the above sense of sociology. But this is a problem of "hobbies" of various scholars and not of the object-matters of various sciences. This realistic approach is the second important characteristic of sociology.[1]

Special sociologies, devoted to a generalizing study of a special type of social phenomena (but not unique and simplified) try to concentrate their attention on the traits and relationships which are common, repeated, and constant to all concrete variations of this special class of social facts or relationships. They also study these social facts in their interdependence with other facts or conditions. For instance, a sociologist may study Napoleon, Lincoln, Cæsar, Darwin, Newton, and other prominent men. But all these prominent men are important for his study only as specimens of a social class of leaders. In his study of these men, the sociologist would concentrate not on the purely unique traits, relationships or conditions of Napoleon, Cæsar, or Hannibal but only on those which are more or less common to all great military leaders and which therefore are "constant" or "correlated" with the social type "military leader" or leadership generally. The same may be said of special sociological studies of religion, revolutions, criminality, or any special class of social phenomena.

Thus the principal tasks of general sociology are as follows: First, it attempts to describe the constant and universal characteristics and relationships common to all varieties of social phenomena and social relationships (economic, religious, juridical, scientific, and so on). Second, it attempts to formulate the relatively constant and repeated functional relationships or correlations which exist between social phenomena and the non-social environment (geographical, biological). This non-social environment is the matrix in which any social phenomenon appears and changes and through which it

[1] See in detail this in Pareto, V., *Traité de sociologie générale*, Vol. ii, 2009–2024; Sorokin, P., *Sistema soziologii*, Vol. i, pp. 16–36; Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 37–38, 760–761.

is conditioned. Further, these social phenomena in their turn influence and condition the non-social environment. Third, it attempts to study and formulate the relatively constant and repeated in time and space functional relations and correlations which exist between various kinds of social phenomena studied by all special social and humanistic sciences. For instance, attempts are made to find if there are any functional relations between religion and economics, between vital processes and business cycles, between the density of the populations and types of political organizations and between science and forms of sculpture or architecture. The same is to be said about constant trends and cycles in changes of a given social phenomena in time. If in the time process, a phenomenon A shows a definite and constant trend of a certain type (A, A+1, A+2, A+3, . . . A+n) or if in its change there is a repetition of cycles (A^1, A+C; A^2, A+C; A^3, A+C; A^4, A+C; A^n, A+C), such constant trends or rhythms represent either a constant or repeated trait of a social phenomenon, and, according to the definition, belong to the study of sociology. In short, the attempt is to find out how and to what extent each special form of social phenomena is conditioned by other forms and the closeness of their dependence or independence. In other words, sociology studies and formulates functional relations between various forms of social phenomena, each of which is separately studied by a special social science. Schematically, the above three purposes of sociology may be expressed in the following way: Let *A* mean the totality of social phenomena composed out of varieties *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, . . *n* (the social relations—economic, demographic, religious, scientific, artistic, and so on). Let *B* mean the totality of biological conditions and environment amidst which and on the basis of which exist, originate, and develop these social or superorganic phenomena (A). Let *C* mean the totality of cosmic or geographic (inorganic) environment which surrounds any human society and serves as a scene and inorganic "place" for its existence and activity. Then the task of sociology is, first, to describe and analyze the characteristics and relations common to all varieties of social phenomena (*a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, . . ; *n*) second, to describe and formulate the relations which exist between *A* and *B* or *A* and *C* (to what extent social relations, organization, and processes are conditioned by race, sex, flora and fauna, and to what extent these biological phenomena are conditioned by social phenomena); and third, to find the functional relations between various components of social phenomena (between *a* and *b*, *a* and *d*, *b* and *n*, *c* and *e*, and so on). Not one of these tasks is studied by any special social science; not a single special discipline is busy with the above problems. It is true that, incidentally, special sciences often touch a part of these prob-

lems (the economists study the influence of the density of population on production and distribution of necessities) but this only means that in such a case they go beyond their special field and become sociologists (as a sociologist may be busy at times, with the investigation of a problem in economics, or political science and so on).

The above briefly outlines the essentials of sociology as a science and makes clear the boundary lines which separate its field from those of other sciences. The fact that in all the above fields sociology is interested primarily in the traits and relations which are relatively constant and repeated in time and space, does not necessarily mean a dogmatic assumption that such absolutely constant relations exist everywhere. It is the task of sociology to find out whether they exist, and where or in which fields they appear; further, what degree of constancy and of variability exist in each sort of functional relations between either the social and the non-social phenomena or between various kinds of social phenomena. Sociology remains within the field outlined equally when it proves that such and such relations are constant and have quite an insignificant degree of variability in time and space, or when it proves that such and such relations are very variable and have such and such coefficients of variability. In either case it still remains a generalizing and not an individualizing science because these latter are busy only with unique objects and do not care about the degrees of variability which are displayed by all phenomena similar to this unique object.[2]

2. Rural Sociology as a Special Sociology. Since Rural Sociology is a special branch of sociology, its tasks in its specific field are practically the same as those of general sociology. Correspondingly, the fundamental task of rural sociology is to describe the relatively constant and universal traits or relations of the rural social world as distinct from the non-rural or urban social universe. In this description, rural sociology, like general sociology, concentrates its attention not at the traits which are peculiar to a given rural aggregate at a given time, but at the traits and relations which are typical for rural social world generally as distinct from urban social phenomena generally. In other words, rural sociology describes the rural-urban differences which are repeated in time and space and, in this sense, are constant characteristics of the rural in contradistinction from

[2] See the development of the above concept of sociology in the works: Rickert, H., *Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriefsbildung;* Windelband, W., *Præludien,* essay on Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft; Xénopol, A. D., *La théorie de l'histoire;* Cournot, A., *Traité de l'enchaînement des idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire;* Tschuproff, A. A., *Essays in the Theory of Statistics* (Russian); Pareto, V., *Traité de sociologie générale,* Vols. i, ii; Petrajitzsky, L. *Introduction to the Theory of Law and Ethics* (Russian); Sombart, W., *Soziologie,* Introduction; Sorokin, P., *The Sociology of Revolution,* Chap. i; Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 37 ff., 760–761.

the urban social phenomena. On the other hand, rural sociology, in difference from agricultural economics and home economics, "rural political science," and any special social sciences dealing with rural problems, does not artificially isolate one side of the phenomena from others, and does not treat the objects studied as though they were "independent" from all other forces, factors, and conditions. It studies them in their complexity, intercorrelations, and interdependence with other phenomena. Through these two characteristics, rural sociology becomes different from farm management, agricultural economics, and any special science dealing with one aspect of the rural social universe. Rural sociology concerns every field in which the rural and urban social phenomena show or may show any tangible typical difference. Are the populations of the rural and urban aggregates different and if so, in what consists these relatively constant differences? Are the relationships between the social and the non-social phenomena (geographical and biological environment) the same in rural and urban aggregates? If not what are these relatively constant differences? Are the correlations between various kinds of social phenomena the same in the rural and urban social aggregates? If they show a difference, in what does it consist? In brief, rural sociology must study and formulate all the important—and at least relatively constant—differences in any field of rural and urban social phenomena.

The second fundamental task of rural sociology is "to explain" these differences or the specific traits of rural social phenomena. The explanation would consist of an indication of the factors responsible for these differences, or in the establishment of the functional correlations between such and such specific differences and such and such "independent" or "dependent variables." If general sociology were well developed the "explanatory" work would have represented a mere application of the causal or functional formulas of general sociology to a given problem of rural sociology. The formulas of general sociology in their application to the rural phenomena would have played the rôle of algebraic formulas in their application to given problems of arithmetic. In those cases where general sociology presents formulas and well defined social laws, the interpreting part of rural sociology represents nothing but an application of these formulas to the rural problem. Unfortunately, however, general sociology in many fields does not have, as yet, such more or less well tested and valid generalizations. For this reason, in many problems of rural sociology, an investigator is forced to make an original analysis and, single-handed, to find the factors responsible for a given difference or to establish new correlations as yet unknown to general sociology. In this form, if the new correlation is valid, a rural sociol-

ogist not only solves his own problem but also enriches general sociology. Such material relationships are often found in the general and special branches of any science. General biology helps its special branches (botany or zoölogy) and the progress of these branches enriches and improves general biology.

The above two fundamental tasks of rural sociology practically exhaust its field and contents. They embrace any particular problem of rural sociology. Many believe that the practical advice regarding the improvement or reconstruction of "rural life" is the chief purpose of rural sociology. But this task logically lies far beyond the field of rural sociology as a theoretical science. It belongs to *an applied rural social technology.* It is evident that such a rural social technology can be efficient or "scientific" only when we have developed a really scientific theoretical rural sociology and other related sciences (chemistry, biology, botany, agricultural economics, and so on). All these and many more are an indispensable basis for any applied technology, including the rural social technology. Without the development of the theoretical rural sociology there can be no "scientific rural social technology" in so far as it tries to improve the social aspects of rural aggregates and rural life. Without it there can be only such blind and often objectively harmful "clamor" and "reforming" which is so loudly proclaimed *urbi et orbi* by crowds of incompetent "reformers" and "ignoramuses."

The above outlines the tasks, objectives, and contents of rural sociology as a science. In order that the description may be clear, it is necessary to dicipher what is meant by "rural" and "urban" types of social phenomena. Such a descripiton is the starting point in the realization of the first fundamental task of rural sociology. We turn therefore to the definitions of the "rural" and "urban" classes of social phenomena.

PART I

THE RURAL WORLD AND THE POSITION OF THE FARMER-PEASANT CLASS IN THE "GREAT SOCIETY"

CHAPTER II

DEFINITION OF RURAL AND URBAN WORLDS

"Simple" and "Compound" Types of Definitions. "The city and the country!" It seems nothing can be simpler than a definition of the urban and the rural aggregates. And yet, when a serious attempt is made to define them it meets many obstacles. Neither the size of a community, nor the density of population, nor official qualification of some communities, as "the city" or "town," and others, as "village or open country," nor any of these usual criteria are sufficient by themselves to give a sound and scientifically acceptable definition of the city and the country, or of the rural and urban social world.[1] If for statistical and other practical purposes, it is necessary to take either size or density as a criterion of rural or urban societies, neither statistician nor others may think that such a single criterion really expresses and describes all the essential characteristics of both social worlds and that their differences consist only in the size or density or official qualification. This means that an adequate definition of these complex phenomena must indicate not one trait of difference but *several* traits which are specific for each of these societies and in which they differ from each other. Rural and urban societies and their differences are undescribable in terms of *one* characteristic, and require a definition which combines several typical traits. The case is similar to the chemical composition of many objects which cannot be described in terms of oxygen or hydrogen or any single chemical element. These generally require a formula much more complex in character and which contains three or more chemical elements in a definite combination, for instance H_2SO_4.[2]

Such a "compound definition," through its indication of several specific traits, although it appears to be more adequate than the "single trait definition," may also have its minuses or bad points.

[1] See a survey and analysis of various definitions of the city and the country in Maunier, R., *L'origine et la fonction économique des villes*, Part I, pp. 34 ff.; Sombart, Werner, *Der Moderne Kapitalismus*, 3rd Edition, Vol. I, Chap. 9, pp. 124 ff; Weber, A., *op. cit.*, Chaps. I, III; Bowley, A. L., "Rural Population in England and Wales, a Study of the Changes of Density, Occupations, and Ages," *Journal of R. Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXVII, pp. 597–645, 1914; Wilcox, W. F., "Redefinition of City," *Proceedings of American Sociological Society*, Vol. XX, pp. 97–102, 1926; Coletti, F., *La popolazione rurale in Italia*, pp. 7–10; Anderson, N. and Lindeman, E. C., *Urban Sociology*, Part I.

[2] Compare Sombart, W., *op. cit.*, pp. 127–129. Following his methods, it may be said that the concept of the city in the sociological sense is undescribable in "one-characteristic definitions." Even Sombart's city in the economic sense is factually undescribable in such a form. He combines, at least, two characteristics.

It may be merely eclectic in its complexity and be only a purely "mechanical" unification in one formula of several traits which are not bound together by real causal or functional relations. Any such purely mechanical "piling together" of various unrelated traits in the "attic" of a compound definition is rather fruitless scientifically. Such a "compound definition" is only really scientific when it puts together several traits causally connected in reality. For these reasons a "compound" definition of the city and the rural community must not be "eclectic" but a logical unification of traits functionally correlated with one another.

One who intends to give such a definition must be ready to meet another difficulty. In reality the transition from a purely rural community to an urban one, whatever may be the definition, is not abrupt but gradual; from an open farm through a small settlement of agriculturists, a hamlet with a slight admixture of a few non-farming people, a village, a small town, to larger and larger towns and cities. Each step is associated with a proportionately decreasing agricultural population and an increasing of the proportion of the people engaged in other than agricultural pursuits. There is no absolute boundary line which would show a clearly cut cleavage between the rural and the urban community. Correspondingly, many differential characteristics of the rural and urban community would consist not so much in the presence of certain traits in rural, and their absence in urban communities, as much as in a quantitative increase or decrease of these characteristics or in their positive or negative correlation with "rurality" and "urbanity." Psychologically it is more satisfying when a difference between phenomena under consideration is entirely qualitative and is free from quantitative variations. These quantitative changes are always somewhat indefinite and relative. And yet, in many cases, even in the natural sciences, such a quantitative difference is unavoidable if one does not wish to oversimplify and conceal the reality. In physics the difference between light, X-rays, and "Cosmic" rays is practically only a quantitative difference in the length of the waves of these rays. And yet, such a difference is very important. In chemistry the difference between CO, CO_2, CO_4 is only quantitative. And yet, it makes the nature of these chemical complexes quite different. In causal or functional intercorrelations of two or more social phenomena we rarely find purely qualitative differences. Most of them are quantitative in the form of positive or negative correlation coefficients of various orders and closeness. In a similar manner our "compound" definition of the rural and urban community has many differential characteristics of urbanity and rurality which vary only relatively as shown by positive or negative correlations of a series of differential

traits with urbanity and rurality. For methodological reasons already indicated we must not be embarrassed by such mere "quantitative" differences. They have great cognitive value and are unavoidable if one does not wish to disfigure the reality and overlook many important traits.

Side by side with this necessity for demarcation by relative-quantitative-differential traits, in the case of a gradual seriation of the phenomena studied, science uses, almost invariably, another device of study, namely, *the typological method* in the sense already clearly outlined by Max Weber.[3] When scholars construct a type of an animal or a plant species, a type of race, a type of mind such as "introvert" or "extrovert," a type of society such as "Feudal, Capitalist, or Socialist," a type of economy such as "natural, money, or credit," a type of personality such as "conservative or radical" and so on, they all use, consciously or unconsciously, in a poor or a perfect form, the typological method. Through the classification of a complex and an uninterrupted series of phenomena into a few types or classes, they overcome the complexity of the concrete reality and give its important traits in the form of a few classes or types of phenomena. The same may be done in our definition of the rural and urban community. Side by side with the indication of the qualitative differences between them, and the increasing or decreasing, positive or negative, correlations of given traits with urbanity or rurality, we need to recur to the use of the typological method. In other words, we need to construct a type of urban and rural community. When such a procedure is carefully done, and the elements of each type are properly selected and backed by factual data, such a method proves itself highly productive and enriches our knowledge.

After these methodological remarks let us now turn to a description of the differential characteristics of the urban and rural community whose totality gives the type of each of these social aggregates. In accordance with the above characteristics of sociology we must study only such differences as are relatively constant and repeated in time and space.

I. Occupational Differences. 1. Rural society is composed out of a totality of individuals actively engaged in an agricultural pursuit, such as collection and cultivation of plants and animals, and the totality of their children—"a passive rural population"—whose age does not permit them to be actively engaged in any occupation but who being born, and living in a rural society, are marked by many of its characteristics.

[3] See about this and the universality of application of the typological method in all sciences in Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 719–724. Further references are given there.

(a) Its occupation consists primarily in the collection and cultivation of plants and animals (agriculture, horticulture, forestry, cattle-breeding, and to some extent fishing) but not in their transformation into various products of industry. Rural society does not usually transform grain into bread (other than for immediate consumption), meat into canned food, cotton into cloth, fruits into canned fruits, timber into the series of objects made from it, and so on. If transforming activities are to some extent also present in the activities of the cultivators, it never plays the rôle of the principal means of obtaining a livelihood, In this respect the rural population differs from all other populations engaged in other pursuits whatever they may be (industry, manufacturing, mechanical pursuits, transportation, professions, etc.). The transforming pursuits have been predominantly urban, since the appearance of the differentiation between rural and urban communities.

(b) Since the rural population is engaged in collection and cultivation of plants and animals, but not in that of metals and minerals, it differs from mining and similar pursuits.

(c) Since the rural population is engaged in cultivating and collecting the living gifts of nature, this means that it is in direct relationship with "nature and mother-earth" because "the mother-nature" is the only "creator or manufacturer" of plants and animals. Cultivation is no more than a facilitation or direction of the creative forces of nature. Such a direct relationship with nature, soil, or field, ties the rural population, speaking figuratively, to the abode of collection and cultivation. The field or forest and garden abodes cannot be transported; neither can they be cultivated from a far distance.

The above shows that the principal criterion of the rural society or population is *occupational*, collection and cultivation of plants and animals. Through it rural society differs from other, particularly urban, populations engaged in different occupational pursuits. In this aspect rural sociology is in the first place a sociology of an occupational group, namely, the sociology of the *agricultural occupation.* Such is the first and fundamental criterion of difference between the rural and other, and particularly urban, communities. From it follows a series of other differences between the rural and the urban communities, most of which are causally connected with the above difference in occupation. Let us outline the principal of these differences which have been more or less constantly and indissolubly connected with the rural and urban aggregates.

II. Environmental Differences. 1. *The nature of the agricultural occupation makes the cultivators work out-of-doors more than the nature of the majority of the urban occupations.* While the latter are predominantly "indoor" occupations, agriculture is predominantly

"out-of-door" work. For this main reason a cultivator is exposed more to the weather and climatic conditions, breathes cleaner and fresher air, and consumes more of the sunlight and various rays of the sun than an urban dweller. For the same reason he is exposed more to the fluctuations of various climatic conditions.[4] Further he is in a much greater proximity to, and in a more direct relation with, "nature,"—soil, flora, fauna, water, river, the sun, the moon, the sky, the wind, the rain, and so on—than an urbanite. The urban dweller is separated from all this by thick walls of vast and huge city buildings and the artificial city environment predominately of stone and iron. Whether an urbanite is "indoors"—in his factory, shop, office, church, library, theater, school, home,—or "out-of-doors" amidst the city streets and squares—he rarely is in contact with nature. He is, so to speak, "wrapped in a thick blanket of artificial culture." In his dwelling-room, apartment, or house; he is separated from nature by a long row of walls and other buildings. Sometimes he has to travel miles before he reaches out of the city circle to the country. Not a free wind refreshes him but a draft of the electrical fan; not the sunlight but the artificial gas or electric light greets his eyes; not a soil but a pavement is found under his feet; in place of the river or stream he has a channel, usually imprisoned in stone and iron and diluted with sewage, oil, and other products of the urban industry and population. Huge and tall buildings built out of stone and iron hover over his head, and together with a thick layer of smoke, steal the brightness of the sky and hide any view of the natural environment. The bits of his flora and fauna in the form of parks and zoölogical gardens are rarely seen and even then they are artificially "bobbed," and polished. The miracles and mysteries of nature are seen primarily in movies, theaters, from pictures in his papers and only once in a while on a picnic. Brick, stone, iron, and, for modern times, particularly paper-books, magazines, newspapers, manuscripts, and so on—such are principal components of the artificial environment of the city man. Quite different is the environment of a cultivator. If he lives on an open farm he is nearly all the time in the bosom of nature. If he lives in a small village or hamlet, he is in a similar condition. Only the thin walls of his farm-house or hut separate him from nature when he is indoors. While he is outdoors he is at all times amidst nature, whatever it may be.

2. Further, in other respects, *the nature of agriculture is radically different from almost all urban occupations.* Urban pursuits, especially now, represent a transformation of inorganic substances into other forms (manufacturing and mechanical pursuits); or organic sub-

[4] For proof of this see Engberg, R. C., *Prosperity and the Farmer*, Institute of Economics, 1927.

stances, but killed and dead, into something new and dead also; or deal with actions and reactions of other human beings (manipulations of commerce, trade, professional occupations, business of officials and so on). In all those urban occupations, two main types of determinism reign. One is that of a blind machinery whose behavior may be controlled and foreseen and the other is the impulses, volitions, fancies, and drives of human beings which are sometimes quite incomprehensible. Quite different are the occupational functions and activities of a cultivator. He grows living organisms. He deals with the mystery and processes of life which differ from the processes of inanimate machinery or the "fickle and fanciful" relations and actions of human beings. The cultivator cannot control the processes of nature to such an extent as a good mechanic can control the work of his machinery; neither can he change the natural processes with such rapidity as a skilful leader can change the activity of the subordinate masses. On the other hand, he knows that his efforts are not quite useless and sterile. He can, to some extent, influence the direction of the forces of nature toward the goal desired.

Correspondingly, in his everyday activities the cultivator is much more dependent on the elementary—partly regular, partly not—processes of nature while the city man depends upon, and is determined primarily by, the attitudes and activities of men and the artificial environment of the city.

III. Differences in Sizes of Communities. The nature of agriculture has hindered the concentration of the cultivators into large communities with many thousands of population. Even now, in order that an average-size peasant, farmer or cultivator family may secure the necessary means of subsistence through agriculture, several acres of farm land are needed. At the same time, the nature of agriculture has required that the cultivator dwell more or less permanently near the cultivated land. These facts and the existing means of transportation have not rendered it possible for the cultivators to live in communities of many thousands of population. Such an organization would require the cultivators to be separated by a considerable distance from their land. As a result, the cultivators have nearly always lived either on open farms, that is in the one household community, or, at the best, in small village communities rarely larger than a few hundreds of people.[5] Hence, there is and always has been *a negative correlation between the size of community and the per cent of the population engaged in agriculture.* Usually an

[5] The best and the most complete survey of the distribution of open farm and village types of agricultural settlements in various countries is given by Demangeon, A., in "La géographie de l'habitat rural," *Annales de géographie*, Nos. 199, 200, 1927.

increase of the size of a community above a few hundreds of population, finds the proportion of agriculturists rapidly decreasing. *This makes it comprehensible why statisticians have taken the size of community as a criterion of the city and the country.* In the statistics of the majority of countries, communities below 500, 1,000, 2,000, 2,500, or 8,000 (according to the country) are regarded as "rural," while those with population above these sizes are viewed as "urban."

Although there are predominantly agricultural communities with populations above 500 or even 1,000, and there are predominantly industrial communities with populations below 500 or 1,000, nevertheless, the above statistical criteria of the city and the country community serve fairly well. *Thus the third characteristic of the rural aggregates, in contrast to the non-rural groups, is the smaller size of the former in comparison with the latter.*

This is clearly corroborated by the fact that the agricultural population lives either on open farms or in small hamlets and villages and by the fact that the populations of the large communities have quite an insignificant per cent of the people engaged in agricultural pursuits.

In the United States in 1920 more than 99.5 per cent of the agricultural population either lived on open farms or in communities below 2,500.[6] In 1920 all cities of 100,000 and more population, had only from 0.1 to 0.5 of 1 per cent of their population engaged in an agricultural pursuit, including forestry and animal husbandry.[7] In England and Wales, according to the Census of 1921, for each 1,000 males of the age of 12 and over in London there were only 5 males engaged in agriculture, fishing, forestry, and gardening; in the "aggregate of urban districts" for each 1,000 there were 40 in agricultural pursuits and 3 in fishing; while in the "aggregate of rural districts" there were 309 males engaged in agricultural pursuits and 2 in fishing. Thus in spite of the great "disruralization" of England, the negative correlation between size of community and agricultural occupations exists there also, as in any country.[8] In Germany, in 1882, the per cent of agricultural population in the cities 100,000 and above was 1.4; in the cities 20,000 to 100,000, 3.4; in those from 5,000 to 20,000, 9.9; in the communities from 2,000 to 5,000, 26.3; in the communities of below 2,000, 64.5.

The same is true for Bavaria.[9] In Russia among all the "rural" communities with predominantly agricultural populations only 1.4 per cent in 1927 were larger than 2,000 population. More than 50 per

[6] *Census Monographs, VI,* Farm Populations of the United States, 1920, p. 37, Washington, 1926.
[7] *Fourteenth Census of the United States,* Population, 1920, Vol. IV, p. 131.
[8] *Census of England and Wales,* 1921, General Report, p. 94, London, 1927.
[9] *Statistisches Jahrbuch für den Freistaat Bayern,* 1919, pp. 29–30.

cent of such communities had a size below 100 population.[10] In Sweden for 1920 the communities below 2,000 population had 60.8 per cent engaged in agriculture, while communities 2,000 and over ("urban") had only 3.8 per cent similarly engaged.[11]

It is useless to give other data.[12] It is enough to say that the negative correlation between the size of community and the proportion of the populations engaged in agricultural pursuits holds for all countries, and practically for all times, since the appearance of the differentiation into agricultural and non-agricultural communities. The size and closeness of the correlation may fluctuate from time to time and from country to country, but it has existed as a constant phenomenon. Comparative smallness in size has been one of the characteristics functionally associated with the rural community.

IV. Differences in the Densities of the Populations. The fourth principal difference between the rural community and the non-rural, particularly the urban community, has been the *negative correlation between the density of population and rurality and the positive relationship between density and urbanity.* As a rule communities of cultivators have a lower density of population than urban communities composed out of the people engaged in manufacturing, mechanical pursuits, commerce, trade, professions, and other non-agricultural occupations. Since the urban communities are, as a rule, greater in size, it is natural that they have a greater density of population than small communities of agriculturists. And this factor is also *causally connected* with the nature of cultivation. As yet, it is not possible either for thousands of people [13] to secure the means of subsistence from a few acres or to carry on the cultivation of the land by families who live at a far distance. One or the other of the above would be necessary if the cultivators dwelt in large and densely populated communities. This is so evident that few representative figures are sufficient to illustrate the rule. While in London (1921) the density was 59.9 persons per acre, in the rural parts of England and Wales,

[10] *Recensement de la Population du 17 Decembre 1926,* Résumés abréges Population de l'U.R.S.S., p. 28, Moscow, 1927.

[11] *Statistisk Arsbok,* 1926, p. 21.

[12] For the previous years and centuries see Weber, A., *op. cit.,* pp. 314 ff. For the ancient cities see the papers of K. Bücher and others in *Die Grosstadt; Vorträge und Aufsätze zur Städteausstellung,* edited by Zahn and Jaensch; Sombart, W., *op. cit.,* Vol. I, erste Hälfte, 142 ff., pp. 131–133; Vol. II, zweite Hälfte, p. 623; Sée, Henri, *Les origines du capitalism moderne,* p. 17,

[13] According to Levasseur's computation, the average density of the population of purely agricultural areas has been from 10 to 50 inhabitants per square kilometer. According to F. Ratzel's computation, it has been fluctuating from 1.7 to 35 and in the areas with the most intensive agricultural technique, to 177 per square kilometer. According to the same authors, the density of the industrial and commercial communities exceeds these densities many times and often many hundreds of times. Levasseur, E., *La Population Française,* Vol. III, Chap. XII. See also Carli, F, *L'equilibrio delle nazioni,* pp. 96 ff.

there were less than 0.5 person per acre.[14] In Italy not only has the density of the rural communities been many times lower than in the urban centers but even the density of the suburban parts of the cities appears notably lower than within the city limits. In the United States in the whole country for 1920 there were 18 acres per inhabitant but, in 32 cities with populations of from 100,000 to 200,000, there was only 0.1 acre per person, and in all cities with 200,000 and more population there was only 0.07 acre per person.[15] A more detailed analysis of separate counties, for instance, Tompkins County, New York, gives purely agricultural communities 29 persons per square mile, less agricultural (towns) 556 and urban communities 4,559 persons.[16] In France, the average density of the rural areas in 1886 was below 40 inhabitants per square kilometer while for predominantly urban communities the density was 428 inhabitants.[17] In Russia the density of the rural communities is much below that of the urban center.[18] The same is true practically for any country and possibly for any time since the appearance of the rural-urban differentiation.[19]

This explains why many statisticians, especially now, try to make density the criterion for the division of urban and rural communities.[20] Although in itself the higher or lower density does not indicate many of the peculiar characteristics of the urban or the rural community and although it is not always necessary to signify that the community with a low density is agricultural and with a high density is necessarily urban, nevertheless it is one of the traits most certainly correlated with rurality or urbanity. Therefore, if by itself it is insufficient to show the characteristics of the city and the country community, in association with other criteria, it certainly is one of the important "symptomatic signs."

Not only is the urban population more dense in relation to the number of persons per unit of territory, but it also has a greater density in the sense that a lower per cent of its total number of households or families have "a structurally separate dwelling" (a house, flat, or room having separate access either to the street or to a common land-

[14] *Census of England and Wales*, 1921, General Tables, pp. 20, 22. See also Bowley, A. L., "Rural Population in England and Wales," *Journal R. Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXVII, pp. 597 ff., 1914.

[15] *Fourteenth Census of the U. S.*, 1920, Population, Vol. I, p. 31; and *Abstract of the Fourteenth Census*, pp. 87, 91. Even the density of population by states shows quite a tangible correlation with urbanization or industrialization. See the volume of the Census quoted, pp. 29, 45.

[16] Wilcox, W., *op. cit.*, p. 100.

[17] Levasseur, E., *La Population Française*, Vol. I, p. 422.

[18] See *Ten Years of Soviet Power in Figures*, pp. 32 ff. (Moscow).

[19] See Mayr, G. von, *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre*, Vol. II, pp. 62–65. Concerning the great density of the ancient cities in Rome and Greece, see Pöhlman, R., *Die Uebervölkerung der Antiken Grosstädte.*

[20] See, for instance, the quoted papers of A. L. Bowley and W. Wilcox.

ing or staircase).[21] The urban households or families are in a less proportion separated or isolated from other families even in their dwelling places. Such a situation represents one of the forms of greater density. This form is scarcely less important than the density measured by the number of persons per unit of territory. In some countries, the last aspect of density is manifested by the fact that the urban population has a less number of rooms per person than the rural population. This fact means the greater crowding or over-crowding in urban communities. Such, for instance, is the situation in England and Wales.[22]

In other countries, the form of density discussed either manifests itself by a lower percentage of the urban families in "a structurally separate dwelling" or by a higher number of families or persons who dwell in one building or dwelling place. In the United States, for instance, in 1920, there were 4.6 persons per dwelling in rural communities, and 5.7 persons per dwelling in urban communities.[23] If we take big cities the difference is still greater.[24] The same is true for Norway, Poland, Switzerland, England, and Wales, Canada, Belgium, Sweden, and other countries.[25] In England and Wales in 1921 the situation was as follows for specified types of communities.

Per Cent Distribution of Specified Type of Dwellings

	London	*Aggregate of Urban Districts*	*Aggregate of Rural Districts*
Dwellings occupied by one private family	61	88	97.6
Dwellings occupied by two private families	26	9	2.3
Dwellings occupied by three or more private families	13	3	0.1
Total	100	100	100.0

Thus with the transition from rural to urban, and in urban from smaller to larger cities, the per cent of households or families who occupy separate buildings decreases and the per cent who occupy one building or even one structurally separated dwelling together with

[21] See a good definition in the *Census of England and Wales*, 1921, General Report, pp. 34–35.

[22] *Census of England and Wales*, 1921, General Report, pp. 45–46. See also Newsholme, A., *Vital Statistics*, Chap. XXVI. In so far as known in other countries, the situation is either similar or the rural population has a number of rooms per person not generally lower than the urban. The opposite cases are exceptions rather than general.

[23] *Abstract of the Fourteenth Census*, p. 463.

[24] Weber, A., *op. cit.*, p. 416.

[25] *Statistisk arbok*, 1924, pp. 178–180, Oslo, 1925; *Annuaire stat. de la république Polonaise*, 1924, pp. 18–19, Varsovie, 1925; *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1925, p. 41; *Census of England and Wales*, 1921, General Tables, pp. 82–83, London, 1925; *The Canada Year Book*, 1925, p. 98; *Annuaire Stat. de la Belgique*, 1924–25, p. xxi. See for instance, *Statistisk Aarbog*, 1927, p. 29.

other families increases. It is evident that in the cases where family is separated from family only by a thin wall between two rooms or apartments on the same floor, or by the upper and lower floors, the density of the dwelling places is much higher than in the cases where each family dwells in a separate house, and each house is isolated from other houses by a space, which in the case of open farms is sometimes very considerable.

Without other evidence, we may safely conclude that the density of population measured either by the number of individuals per unit of territory, by the number of families per one dwelling or building, or by the number of families or individuals per one structurally separated dwelling is positively correlated with urbanity and with the size of urban community and negatively with rurality and the smallness in size of the community.

V. Differences in the Homogeneity and the Heterogeneity of the Populations. The fifth permanent difference between rural and urban communities is that *the population of the rural communities tends to be more homogeneous in its socio-psychical characteristics than that of the urban communities.* By homogeneity is meant, in the first place, similarity in acquired, socio-psychical characteristics, such as language, beliefs, opinions, mores, patterns of behavior, and so on. Whether the rural population compared with the urban, is more homogeneous racially, shall be discussed later. It is sufficient at this time to stress the socio-psychical homogeneity. City populations in this respect have always been "a melting pot" in which have been thrown together individuals of different nationality, religion, culture, mores, customs, conduct, and taste. In the course of this book we shall see that the city is a community of the coexistence of the most opposite and contrasting types of human beings: genius and idiocy; whites and negroes; healthiest and unhealthiest; multimillionaires and paupers; emperors and slaves; saints and criminals; atheists and ardent believers; reactionaries and revolutionaries. In all these and other respects, the city is a co-dwelling of the most heterogeneous and contrasting types of human personalities while the country community contains more "flat," homogeneous, and uniform types.

Two principal factors are responsible for this. First, *the urban population is recruited to a much greater degree out of migrants from widely differing areas.* The population of rural communities consists predominantly of individuals who were born and reared under the environmental patterns of the local community. The city population, recruited to a greater degree from individuals born and reared in different societies with different standards, must naturally exhibit more conspicuous socio-psychical dissimilarities in its population. Second, as we shall see, *there is a greater division of labor, greater social*

differentiation and stratification, and greater contrasts in standards of living and environment which surround the various members in the urban communities compared with the rural. Since the members of urban communities are surrounded by much more differentiated, stratified, and dissimilar conditions than in the country, naturally they will differ from one another more than the members of the rural community with its less differentiated, stratified, and more "even" environment. These two reasons are sufficient to make the proposition comprehensible and valid. The following few representative data show that the urban population is *really recruited in a greater degree out of migrants from wider areas than the rural.*

In the United States the proportion of native born of native parents systematically decreases and that of foreign born systematically increases as one passes from the open farms to larger and larger urban communities.[26] The situation is similar in other countries. For instance, in England and Wales the proportion of the people residing in England and Wales but born outside of the country (in Scotland, Ireland, British Dominions, Colonies, Dependencies, and in foreign countries) is much higher in London and the big cities than in the rural areas. In all these respects, "London takes a prominent place with a proportion in relation to its population more than double that of the country at large. In the city and in 20 out of 28 Metropolitan Boroughs the proportions are above normal. . . . "[27] In the Union of S. Africa, the per cent of foreigners was 0.74 in 1921 in the rural and 2.36 in the urban parts. It is a general rule that cities have a larger per cent of the foreign-born population than the rural communities. Not only in regard to foreign-born but to all persons born outside of the community of residence, there is a positive correlation between the proportion of such in the total population of a community and the size of the city. As a rule, rural populations contain a higher proportion of persons locally born than the urban population. Switzerland (1920) and Sweden (1910) show a marked correlation between urbanization or ruralization in the number of persons out of each thousand born out of the community.[28] The situation is similar for other countries.[29] The uniformity has been so conspicuous that

[26] *Farm Population of the U. S., Census Monographs,* VI, p. 96. Carpenter, N., *Immigrants and Their Children (1920), Census Monographs,* VII, pp. 22–23.

[27] *Census of England and Wales,* 1921, General Report, p. 151; see tables and figures there.

[28] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz* (1926), pp. 26–27; *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige* (1919), p. 45.

[29] See the data for Norway in *Annuaire Statistique de la Norvège,* 1924, p. 19; for France, Germany, and other countries the data for previous years are in Mayr, G., *op. cit.,* Vol. II, pp. 121 ff.; Levasseur, E., *op. cit.,* Vol. II, Chap. XVII, pp. 319 ff.; Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility,* Chap. XVI; Weber, A., *op. cit.,* pp. 259 ff. For recent Germany (1907) Müller, J., *Deutsche Bevölkerungsstatistik,* pp. 69 ff. Also consult the Statistical Yearbooks of various countries.

many years ago G. von Mayr formulated a "law" that the percentage of immigrants (that is of persons born outside of the community of their residence) in a population increases in the same ratio as the magnitude of the cities and in inverse ratio to the magnitude of rural communities.[30] Although "the law" in such a strict form has exceptions, and "the inverse ratio with the magnitude of rural communities" is by no means general, nevertheless it remains true that the population residing in cities, according to their place of birth, is attracted from more different and remote places and heterogeneous groups, than the population of the rural communities; and that this heterogeneity tends to increase with increases in the size of the city.

Such a heterogeneous origin of urban population naturally leads to a greater heterogeneity in socio-psychical traits compared with a rural population. This difference seems to have been permanent or constant.[31]

Similar results are given by the statistics of the percentage of foreigners in various occupations. As a rule, *the agricultural class has a lower per cent of foreign-born persons in its occupational population than the per cent of the agricultural population is of the total occupational population of the country.* For instance, in the United States the agricultural class composed in 1920 26.3 per cent of the total occupational population of the country 10 years of age and over, while only 12 per cent of the whole foreign-born population engaged in occupations were engaged in agriculture. On the other hand, within 100 per cent of the agricultural population, the foreign born composed only 9.2 per cent. Other occupations had much higher per cents: 34.8 in mining; 28.6 in manufacturing; 18.2 in transportation; 20.6 in trade; 16.8 in public service; 10.9 in professional service; and 22.9 in domestic and personal service. Only clerical occupations had a proportion of foreign born as low as in agriculture (8.6 per cent).[32] A somewhat similar picture is given by other countries.[33]

Is it to be wondered that in the same city factory, office, or other institution are found persons gathered together from the most different, and sometimes most remote, places. Of 1,200 working men in a cable factory in Berlin, only 8.7 per cent were born in Berlin; 88.6

[30] See his paper in *Beiträge zur Statistik des Königreichs Bayern*, Heft XXXII (1876). See also Bücher, K., "Zur Statistik der inneren Wanderungen," *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Statistik*, Vol. 23, pp. 1–13 (1887); Rauchberg's paper in *Statistische Monatschrift*, Vol. XIX; Ravenstein, E. G., "The Laws of Migration," *J. R. Statistical Society*, Vol. XLVIII, pp. 175 ff. (1885).

[31] Cicero calls Rome "a community built out of the union of all nationalities." Similar is Seneca's statement. See, about ancient cities from this standpoint, Pöhlmann, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 17 ff.; Maunier, R., *op. cit.*, Chaps. I–III. The book quoted, *Die Grosstadt*; Sée Henri, *Les Origines du Capitalism Moderne*, p. 16.

[32] Carpenter, N., *Immigrants and Their Children*, pp. 272–273.

[33] *France, Annuaire Statistique* (1910), pp. 12–15.

per cent came from the most different places of Germany, and 2.65 per cent from abroad. In a Bavarian factory (1908) 47 per cent of the workers came from a distance less than 10 kilometers; 11.3 per cent from 11 to 30; 9.2 per cent from 31 to 100; 12.4 from 101 to 400; and 13.4 from 400 and above. And a similar picture is given by practically any city factory,[34] shop, office, or institution. People recruited from the widest and most different areas, with different populations, are "put in one bed" in the city. They live, dwell, work, and interact side by side. In the rural communities such "putting into one bed" of strangers drawn from widely separated areas and groups, takes place in a much lower degree. As a rule, this degree is less, the smaller and the more agricultural is the community.

Greater homogeneity of the agricultural class is evidenced also by the fact that *it is the one class more than any other big occupational class which is closed to the infiltration of members of other occupations*; *it is recruited from the children of farmers and peasants to a higher degree than the population of any big occupation is recruited from the children of fathers in the same occupation.* In this sense, agriculture is factually the most caste-like occupational class. From generation to generation it is filled principally by the children of agriculturists and in quite an insignificant degree by children of fathers engaged in non-agricultural pursuits. It is apparent that in connection with the rural "exodus" a part of the children of farmers and peasants shift to other occupations. In this sense the doors of the agricultural occupation are open for emergence, but they are practically closed for entrance to all whose fathers are in other than the agricultural occupations. Thus from generation to generation the farm population is filled with the children of farmers and husbandmen to a much higher degree than any other big occupational class. Existing studies show that from 82 to 94 per cent of the farmers have come from the farmer family. This means that the agricultural class is more homogeneous even from the purely occupational standpoint than practically any big occupational class of the city.[35] Bavarian statistics also show that of those who were born in the city and reside in the

[34] See other numerous citations in Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility*, pp. 386 ff.

[35] See the data in Kumlien, W. F., "What Farmers Think of Farming," *S. Dakota Agric. Exper. Station, Bulletin 223*, April, 1927, p. 11; Zimmerman, C. C., "The Migration to Towns and Cities," *Amer. Journal Sociology*, Vol. XXXII, p. 451; Quoted report No. 3 of the Ohio State University, p. 17; Young, E. C., "The Movement of Farm Population," *Cornell University Agr. Exp. Sta.*, Bull. No. 426, pp. 88–89; Gillett, R. L., *A Study of Farm Labor in Seneca County, N. Y.*, Bull. 164, p. 59. Among those who go from the city back to farms the per cent who had previous experience in farming or were brought up on farms and in rural communities is also high. A study by the U. S. Dept. of Agriculture shows that out of 1,166 persons of this type only 155 or 13.3 per cent had never had previous farm experience; *U. S. Department of Agriculture, Analysis of Migration of Population to and from Farms*, p. 9, Washington, 1927.

rural parts only 2.4 per 100 were engaged in agriculture, while in other occupations located in rural parts the proportions were much higher (from 7.5 to 20.6).[36] It is probable that other studies would yield similar results. In European countries the proportions of agriculturists among the fathers of the agricultural population are possibly still higher.

Comparing these proportions with those for other occupations leads to the conclusion that non-agricultural occupational classes are recruited to a much higher degree from children whose fathers were in other and heterogeneous occupational pursuits. Numerous studies, the details of which are given in Sorokin's *Social Mobility*, show the occupations which furnish recruits to the different urban occupational classes whether major or minor subdivisions (professions, clerical, business, executive positions, government service, building, metal, clothing, printing, clay, textile, leather-trades, skilled and unskilled trades, woodwork, manufacturing, etc.). There was not a single occupational class whose members were recruited from the children of fathers in the same occupation in 80 per cent of the cases. The highest were a few cases of 60 per cent either in America or in various European countries. The majority of the occupations give proportions much lower—from 2.7 to 40 per cent.[37] These figures do not even remotely approach the above proportions of fathers of farmers who were farmers. Although the above data are fragmentary, nevertheless their consistency in that all have yielded a very high proportion of recruits of the agricultural class from the children of that class, and the same for their wives, gives the conclusions drawn a high probability.

Its validity means that the agricultural class is more homogeneous even from an occupational standpoint than any other occupational class. The urban classes may be compared to hotels entered by children of the most different occupational classes with different occupational mores, customs, traditions, forms of thinking, and conduct. The agricultural class, on the contrary, may be compared to a private home with doors easily opened outward to other homes (occupations) but almost closed for those who belong to other occupations and who try to enter and become permanent dwellers. Only from 6 to 18 per cent of the whole agricultural population are composed out of the newcomers from other occupations. As a result, in

[36] *Statistisches Jahrbuch für Bayern*, 1919, p. 33.

[37] See the data and tables in *Social Mobility*, pp. 428–440; this reference covers practically all studies in this field; for the sake of brevity the table and figures are not reproduced here. It is curious to note that even among the group of agriculturists in Rome, the proportion of fathers who were agriculturists was 67 per cent, while the totality of various occupations, studied by Corrado Gini, give an average per cent of only about 24.

regard to traditions, beliefs, mores, customs, conduct, the agricultural class shows much greater homogeneity because it is "contaminated" less by the infiltration of heterogeneous occupational newcomers.

VI. Differences in Social Mobility. The next constant difference between urban and rural populations is that *the urban has been more mobile, than the latter.* Urban populations on the average shift more often from place to place, from occupation to occupation, from poverty to riches and *vice versa*, from slaves to masters and *vice versa.* In brief, it has a greater horizontal and vertical mobility than the rural population.[38]

Territorial Mobility. Let us first discuss territorial mobility. Viewed from the standpoint of territorial mobility, urban populations may be compared to a fast river in which the particles of water move intensively, coming from new and remote areas and incessantly going out to new and remote places. These particles are always moving to and fro, within the path of the river, and in this and in that direction. The rural community may be compared to a pond with tiny streams of influx and outflux, and with the particles relatively stagnant and immobile. As a result, urban communities are stamped with a much more intensive metabolism and change their population much more rapidly than the rural communities.

This greater territorial mobility of urban compared with rural populations, is manifested, first, in that, on the average urban populations more often change their residence, room, hotel, flat, or house within the city; second, in that a less proportion of the population of the city remains within the community for life or for many years and a greater proportion shift to other communities, and from community to community, than in the rural population; third, that the average mileage covered by the city dwellers per head of population in a given unit of time is greater than that per head of a rural population; and fourth, that the pulsation of daily influx and outflux of the population in cities is much more intensive than in rural communities.

The first evidence of the greater territorial mobility of the population of urban communities is the data given above concerning the proportion of migrants and of natives born within the community of residence in the rural and urban districts. It has been shown that urban populations have much higher proportions of persons born outside of the city or community and much lower proportions born within the city or community than rural communities. In addition, it has been shown that the attraction of the migrants by cities extends over much wider areas than for rural communities. These data are a direct corroboration of the statement that urban populations have

[38] About the concept, forms, and other essentials of social mobility see Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility,* Chap. VII and *passim.*

greater territorial mobility. Furthermore, they are corroborated by a series of other relevant data.[39] In the United States the per cent of the people who were born in the division of their residence was in 1920 in rural parts 81.8, in urban parts only 66.0. A series of microscopical studies will stress this point still more conspicuously. They show that the proportions of farmers born in the place of their residence—in the same area, county, or even on the same farm—is still higher than the above figures for the rural communities of the United States, and that the proportions for farmers are greater than for other people residing in the same township, but engaged in other than farm-

PERCENTAGES OF FARM FAMILIES WHO HAD ALWAYS LIVED ON SAME FARM, IN THE SAME AREA AND IN THE SAME COUNTRY. (UNION AND VAN VERT TOWNSHIPS, OHIO.)

Always lived in	*Farmers*		*Non-farmers (Teacher, Minister, Storekeeper, Garage Owner, Freight Agent, Mail Carrier, Drug Store Keeper, and so on)*
	Owners	*Renters*	
Same county	87	76	71
Same area	68	57	59
Same farm	31	35	21
Total	100	100	100

ing occupations. Typical studies give the following results: 80.3 per cent of farm operators of Seneca County, N. Y., were born in the same county; 89.2 per cent in the state of residence, and only 1.9 per cent were born abroad. Of 2,072 men and 1,588 women born and brought up on New York farms, 74 per cent of the men and 70 per cent of the women reside in the county of birth; 92 per cent of men and women reside in the state of birth; 99 per cent in the United States and only 1 per cent abroad.[40] Somewhat similar are the results received in Nebraska, Indiana, Ohio.[41] On the other hand, the Ohio Rural Life Survey showed that the average number of years farm operators lived in the same community was from 14.1 to 35 years.[42] In South Dakota it was for owners 26.9, tenants 18.4. The figures may fluctuate from country to country, from place to place, but, as a rule, territorial

[39] *Abstract of the Fourteenth Census*, p. 296. In all divisions of the United States the data are similar without exception whatsoever.

[40] See *The Ohio State University Rural Sociology Mimeographs, No. 3;* "Movement of Open Country Population in Two Townships of N. W. Ohio," pp. 6, 8; Columbus, Ohio, 1928, by C. E. Lively; Gillett, R., *A Study of Farm Labor in Seneca County, N. Y.*, p. 64; Young, E. C., "The Movement of Farm Population," *Cornell University Bulletin*, 426, pp. 25–28, 1924.

[41] See Rankin, J. O., "The Nebraska Farm Family," *University of Nebraska Bulletin 185*, p. 20.

[42] Vogt, P., *Introduction to Rural Sociology*, p. 138; Kumlien, W., *op. cit.*, p. 9. It is also characteristic that 91 per cent of the landlords of farms in the United States, were living in the community where were their farms or in the nearest community. *U. S. Agriculture Yearbook*, 1923, pp. 534–535.

movements of the rural population, from country to country, state to state, community to community, are found less intensive than the movement of the city population. Data for France show the same lower territorial mobility. We have already seen that the per cent of foreigners is lowest among the agricultural occupation of France in comparison with other occupations.[43] It seems clear that in rural communities and agricultural occupations much greater proportions of the population are born in the division of residence than in other occupations. Much less proportion moved to other divisions of the country and engaged in the same occupation or stayed in rural areas and correspondingly a much less per cent of the rural population is composed by the newcomers from other divisions of the country or from abroad.

A similar picture is given by the statistics of emigration and immigration. Here are representative samples given by the statistics of Belgium and Sweden.

Per 1,000 population in specified Belgian and Swedish communities there were the following number of emigrants and immigrants:

	Belgium (1925)		*Sweden (1925)*		
Communities	*Immigrants*	*Emigrants*	*Immigrants*		*Emigrants*
25,000 and more	11.14	6.33	Rural	0.64	1.89
5,000 to 25,000	6.12	4.96	Urban	1.28	2.17 [45]
2,000 to 5,000	3.09	3.06			
Less than 2,000	2.41	3.05 [44]			

The meaning of the figures is so clear that they make any comments unnecessary. These data, and the data given above in connection with the heterogeneity of urban population compose the first series of corrobations of the statement concerning less geographic mobility of rural populations.

A series of other data also support the proposition. Many historians have found that since the growth of the cities in the Middle Ages the city population, especially the commercial class, "were more mobile by reason of the exigencies of their profession," than rural population.[46] R. Livi found, in his classical study of the Italian soldiers, that the rural population is the most sedentary in comparison with the professional, commercial, and other big urban occupational classes.[47] E. Huntington found that among the notables in the Amer-

[43] *Annuaire Statistique de la France,* 1910, pp. 11–13.
[44] *Annuaire Stat. de la Belgique,* 1924–25, p. xlvi, Bruxelles, 1927.
[45] *Statistisk Arsbok,* 1926, p. 56. The data are similar for a series of years. See the *Arsbok* for 1927, p. 75.
[46] Boissonade, P., *Life and Work in Mediæval Europe,* p. 192.
[47] See Livi, R., *Antropometria militare,* Vol. I, pp. 45–51, Vol. II, pp. 87–91, *et passim* Roma, 1896, and 1905.

ican *Who's Who*, the farmer-notables have a lower index of migration (.72) than the notables of any other occupation (these other indices range from 1.09 to 1.74).[48]

On the other hand, studies of several cities have shown a high degree of territorial mobility of the populations. For instance, in Columbus, Ohio, only 58.6 per cent of the registered electors of 1917 re-registered in 1918; the difference being due principally to territorial shifting of the electors. Similar data are given for the members of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce. About 50 per cent of them in 1920 had been members less than two years. This was due principally to the fact that they were only so long in Seattle.[49] A. Joy's study has shown again that in his sample the heads of agricultural families move less than any other occupation. The per cent of the heads of the family who had never moved from the place in which they were at the time of marriage is: for agricultural families 55.6; for professional 31.4; for trade 46.8; for manufacturing 40.6; for clerical 44.4; for public service and transportation 33.3; in brief all occupations moved more than agriculture.[50]

Without adding more data of the above type [51] we may safely conclude that a greater territorial mobility of the urban populations compared with rural is pretty certain. However, in view of the importance of this thesis, it is advisable to present briefly a series of other evidences which show some specific sides of the phenomenon, and which, besides, are useful for an analysis of several other important problems of rural-urban sociology.

The first evidence arises from the nature of the work of the agriculturist compared with the urbanite. The agriculturist cannot travel long distances. Trips to neighboring farms, villages, or towns, and rarely to distant places, are all his business requires and permits. Agricultural laborers are more migratory with their trips for seasonal work to other places and sometimes, as is the case in Poland and Russia, even to foreign countries. But the season being over, they re-

[48] Huntington, E., *The Pulse of Progress*, Chap. III.

[49] McKenzie, R. D., *The Neighborhood*, p. 160, 1923.

[50] Joy, A., "Note on The Changes of Residence," *Amer. Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 617.

[51] Quite consistent with this proposition is the low territorial migration of the population of little urbanized and predominantly agricultural countries, like India, or partly China and Russia. More than nine-tenths of the Indian population has been residing in the districts where they were born (according to the census of India). "Even of those who were enumerated elsewhere, the great majority were found only a very short distance from their original home and were not emigrants in the ordinary sense of the term." Emigration abroad from India is practically nil. Out of more than 300,000,000 population the yearly emigration abroad was in 1909 11,644; in 1919, 221; immigration to India in 1909 was 6,909; in 1919, 3,783. Similar is the picture for China, Tibet, and Russia, when they are in normal-non-revolutionary or non-catastrophic conditions. See *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. I, pp. 4 or 8, 497; *Stat. Abstract for the United Kingdom Relating to British India*, p. 203.

turn back to their permanent place of residence. Besides, only an insignificant proportion of them go for such long distances. To this it may be added that usually their labor is contracted for a year or several years, and they stay at the same place for a long time, except the casual (unskilled migratory) laborers who are mostly a class of hoboes partly of urban origin and properly do not belong to farm laborers. Quite different are the occupations of professionals, salesmen, tradesmen, financiers, insurance agents, employees of transportation, officials, and various employees and laborers of industry, all of whom are predominantly urban. The very nature of their occupations requires a great deal of territorial mobility or traveling. In the first place, because they are not rooted to their place, and because they are mere employees and laborers, they try to shift to a new place as soon as the conditions appear more attractive. In the second place, salesmen, many professional groups (teachers, physicians, actors, showmen, officials, merchants, engineers, lecturers, military men, various commercial, business, transportation, and industrial agents and so on) must move and travel because it is demanded by the nature of their occupation: an incessant mobility is necessary for success in their business and is unavoidable. In the third place, the conditions of employment are less stable in those occupations. Business cycles with their depressions and lay-offs, and more intensive fluctuations of demand and supply of labor in those occupations and in various regions as well as many other factors incessantly create unemployment or over-supply in one place or institution, and employment or greater demand in another. These force the employees and laborers to leave the places of prevalent unemployment and shift to those where the chances for finding work are better. Hence there is an intensive territorial shifting of employees and laborers in urban occupations.

A second line of evidence, which is at the same time an explanation of the lower territorial mobility of the rural populations in comparison with the urban ones, is suggested by the nature of agricultural occupation and its satellites. It ties a farmer or peasant to the land. The land cannot be moved or taken to a new place. On the other hand, as long as the agriculturists remain agriculturists they cannot easily shift from place to place, or from farm to farm, because a long time and much work is necessary to start a new farm, prepare and organize and to learn to manage it successfully. If not juridically then factually they *ad glebæ adscripti sunt* and must stay for life or many years on the same farm. This is true for a farmer-owner as well as for a farmer-tenant. On the other hand, the nature of the argicultural occupation leads to, and is correlated with, the fact that among *agricultural occupations we find a higher per cent of owners of*

immovable property (land and houses) and independent managers of their business and a lower per cent of immovable-propertyless laborers or employees and laborers generally, than among the manufacturing, mechanical, and mining pursuits (which compose the bulk of the urban occupations) or in the whole occupational population of a country. Other urban occupational classes, such as trade, clerical, domestic service, public service, and professions, may have a proportion of proprietors or independent managers of their business among their occupational population as high as in agriculture. But the proprietors in these cases are not so much the owners of immovable as movable property, and as such they are not tied to one place and can shift from place to place much easier. Such a large urban occupational class as the clericals is not generally a proprietor of the offices and institutions in which its members work and is, on the whole, not an employing but an employed class. In its nature it is a proletarian class. The same is to be said of the class of public service and to a considerable degree of the professions: the bulk of their members do not own the buildings or institutions (churches, hospitals, schools, governmental offices and institutions, theaters, and so on) in which they work or are employed. For this reason they are not *adscripti* to their place of employment and can shift easily to new places or communities. If they have property, as a rule it is movable (money, bonds, shares, and so on) and as such does not hinder shifting and may be easily transferred to a new place.

These principles also remain valid in the cases when the bulk of the agricultural class, as in Russia, does not have private property rights in the land cultivated but have "community ownership of land (*obschina, mir*), which does not permit the selling or buying of the land by an individual member of an agricultural community. This ties a peasant to his community much stronger than in the case of individual land owning. Because the land cannot be bought or sold, a peasant who leaves the community in which he was born or to which he belongs, has little chance to buy or to acquire land elsewhere, except the few avenues given by colonization and for buying the land belonging to the nobility or the non-peasant classes. These avenues may be used only by a small per cent of the peasants. With corresponding changes, the same may be said of other countries (such as India and China) where this community land ownership has existed, or even of past times when serfdom and villainage existed. Although a serf or unfree cultivator did not own the land cultivated by him, nevertheless juridically (*ad glebæ adscripti sunt*) and factually, he was tied to his lord's land and to his allotment much more than the free city populations of that time or rural and urban populations now under our conditions of personal liberty and individual

proprietorship. What has been said of the farmer-peasant owner may be said also of the farmer-peasant tenant because factually tenancy ties a man to his land almost as much as farm-ownership. The data which show that the farmer-peasant class has really the highest per cent of owners of unmovable property and independent managers of their business and the lowest per cent of the laborers and employees than any big occupational class in the city will be given in the next chapter (see Chap. III).

These factors—the nature of the agricultural business which ties a man to his land, and a higher per cent of owners of immovable property (lands and houses) and independent managers of their business among the agricultural class in comparison with the bulk of the urban occupational classes—make the lower territorial mobility of the rural population easily comprehensible.

In the above analysis we have been dealing principally with the intercommunity territorial mobility of the populations studied. Let us now glance at the territorial shifting of the population of rural and urban communities *within the community itself and its adjacent places.*

No statistical proofs are necessary for claiming that it is much greater in urban than in rural communities. Take, in the first place, changes of the *place of habitation. An enormous part of urban populations, which dwells in rented rooms, flats, apartments, hotels, and houses, is in a state of incessant shifting from one rented room to another, from one flat to another, and from one hotel to another.* The length of time during which this part of the population stays in the same room, apartment, or hotel is not to be computed in units of years, but in months, weeks, or even days. The very fact that furnished rooms, flats, or hotel rooms in cities are rented, as a rule, by day or week testifies to the fact that an enormous part of the population stays in these dwellings for short periods of time—only a few days, a few weeks, a few months, and rarely a few years. Only a small portion of the urban population stays at the same place of dwelling for several years. In rural communities, the situation is rather reversed. As a rule, rural families, especially in Europe, stay in the same community, often in the same house for generations, not to speak in terms of days, weeks, months, or years.

A few studies made in America give the following samples: In three counties of Ohio, the average number of years lived by farm owners in the *same community* was from 31.8 to 35 years, by tenants from 14.1 to 23.3 years.[52] The average number of years lived on the *same farm* in townships of New York state was for farm owners 9, for cash tenants 6, for share tenants 2, for hired men 0.3 years.[53] Ac-

[52] Vogt, P., *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[53] Young, E. C., *op. cit.*, pp. 72–73.

cording to the Fourteenth Census of the United States only 10.6 per cent of farm operators lived less than one year on the same farm; 14.4 per cent from 1 to 2 years; 22.4 from 2 to 4 years; 17.4 from 5 to 9 years; 35.1 per cent ten years and more. Thus 52.5 per cent of all operators were found staying on the same farm more than five years.[54] According to the data for the whole United States the average number of years on the same farm in 1920 is for owners from 9.2 to 14 years; for various tenants from 2.6 to 8.6 years.[55] Other data are similar.[56] In South Dakota the owners studied were 17 and 18.8 years on the same farm, and tenants 4.8 and 4.3 years.[57] In Nebraska for the ten years 1911 to 1920, only 64.9 per cent of the farms changed their operators.[58] On the other hand, E. C. Young showed that a considerable per cent of farms remain in the same family for more than one generation.[59]

From these and similar data, we must conclude that the farm-owners stay often on their farms for life, and at any rate for many years. The tenants also stay for years. There is more shifting among the farm-laborers. But again, shifts by farm occupants are, as a rule, from one farm to another in the same community or for a very short distance. This is providing they do not migrate to town. There are many reasons to think that in Europe the shift of peasants and farmers from farm to farm, is still less.

These data show that rural mobility within the local communities is very low compared with the shifts of the urban population from room to room, from flat to flat, from hotel to hotel, and from house to house.

If in the city "home" means a "parking place over night" or one which is changed after a few nights or weeks to another "parking place," in the rural communities "home" generally means a permanent place. Sometimes these rural homes are saturated with the life and activities of several generations of the same family. A scarcity of rooms or houses "for rent" in rural communities, a lack of hotels, and a high per cent of owned houses, makes such a thing possible, even necessary. Without further evidence we may say that "intra-community territorial mobility" measured by shifting of the place of dwelling is much greater in the city than in the rural community.

[54] *Fourteenth Census*, Agriculture, p. 9.
[55] *United States Agriculture Yearbook*, 1923, p. 593.
[56] See Stewart, C. L., "Farm Occupancy, Ownership and Tendancy," *Bureau of Agr. Econ., United States Department of Agriculture*, April, 1923; Brannen, C. O., "Relation of Land Tenure to Plantation Organization," *United States Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 1269*, p. 46, 1924.
[57] Kumlien, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[58] Rankin, J. O., *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20.
[59] Young, E. C., *op. cit.*, p. 79.

The same may be said for the *territorial, short-distance, daily movements of urban and rural populations.* As a rule, urban populations, especially now, dwell in the sections of the city or its suburban areas which are at a considerable distance from the place of work. Hence, the necessity of daily movements from the place of residence to that of work. Besides, the work itself and other conditions of a considerable portion of the urban population are connected with the necessity of "rushing" from one part of the city to another. Hence, the incessant "throbbing" of the city with the rushing crowd, the incessant streams of thousands of people moving by cars, street cars, taxies, elevated, subways, on, over, and under the ground of the city. Hence the pulsation of the city with ebbing and flowing waves of the population by day and night time. Everything and everybody is in a state of movement in the city all the time. To give an idea of only the daily "ebbs and flows" of the population in the city, the following figures of the day and the night population of the City of London may be cited. The population which works regularly in the city and which does not embrace the casual persons who enter its area for various other purposes was for 1921, 436,721 in the day time. The night population was only 13,709. Thus 423,012 or 3,085.7 per cent of the night population flows every morning into the city from suburban and other parts of London and goes out of it every evening.[60] This shows the enormous "innercommunity rushing" typical of cities. In rural communities, there is nothing even remotely similar to that "mad rushing" and mad mobility. The surroundings of open farms and the streets of an agricultural village are quiet; no rushing crowds, no rushing and incessant streams of people; no hurry; they remind again of the quiet pond compared to the mad "waterfalls" of a city. Besides many other effects, such mad mobility of the city population requires from its members special quick adaptive responses in order not to be crushed in the mad currents of the population. In a rural community such quickness of self-protective responses is unnecessary.

The totality of evidence given here makes it quite certain that the territorial inter- and intra-community mobility of the city population has been and is incomparably greater than that of the rural communities. This proposition appears to be valid for the past and the difference seems to have been constant since the differentiation of the city-country communities.[61]

[60] *Census of England and Wales, 1921,* General Report, p. 193. See there many other interesting data and details.

[61] In the past the rural German mark, or the Slavic village, or the rural "hundreds" were almost absolutely closed. The people born in them generally died in the same community and in the same house where several generations of their forefathers died. See Maurer, G. S. von, *Geschichte der Dorfverfassung,* 2 vols. 1865–77; Vol. I, pp. 313–327; 39; Houet, A., *Zur Psychologie des Bauerntums,* pp. 143–167.

Comparative Interoccupational Mobility. A mass of evidence also suggests that the same correlation is true and valid generally in regard to shifting of the populations from occupation to occupation. Although the data for this point are not plentiful as in the case of territorial mobility, nevertheless it is possible to claim that *agricultural population remains agricultural longer or changes its job on the average less frequently than the bulk of the urban population.* In other words, on the average, urban populations are less "rooted" to an occupation than the population engaged in agriculture. The statement is reasonably certain in regard to that part of the agricultural class which has been seriously engaged in agriculture. It is less certain, but is probably true also in regard to the whole population engaged in agricultural pursuits, including the part which composes the migrants from agricultural to a non-agricultural occupation.

Let us discuss the problem, in the first place, in the aspect of "intergenerational" shifting of occupations from the fathers to their children. The intensiveness of intergenerational shifting of occupations may be measured by the per cent of the children of a given occupation who follow their fathers' occupation. The higher is the per cent of the children who "inherit" the fathers' occupation, the lower is the index of occupational mobility by generations. In so far as that part of the agricultural children who remain in their fathers' occupation is concerned or the part which does not belong to the surplus of the rural population migrating to the city, we have already seen (see above, p. 26) that inheritance of the fathers' occupation is true to a higher degree than any other large occupational group. In regard to this part the principle seems valid. It is less certain in regard to the whole agricultural population, including the part which migrates to the cities. Nevertheless, as far as existing data show, the proposition is valid even in this aspect of the agricultural population. In other words, in spite of the intensive "exodus" at the present time from the agricultural occupation, the per cent of the children who "inherit" their fathers' occupation in agriculture is one of the highest among all the large occupational classes.[62]

Thus, in so far as these figures show, the inheritance of the agricultural occupation from fathers to sons (or interoccupational immobility from generation to generation) is higher practically than in any other large occupational class. And this is in spite of the "rural exodus." The explanation of this contradiction is probably that although a part of the children of farmers incessantly leave agriculture and enter other occupations, the remaining, and much greater part stays in agriculture. This part is still much greater than the

[62] Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility*, p. 416. See there other data and references; *The Ohio State University Mimeograph No. 3*, already quoted, pp. 17, 35.

proportion of children in other occupations who inherit their fathers' occupation status. The data are fragmentary and need to be completed by a series of larger studies. Nevertheless, in all probability, they reflect the reality more or less correctly. If the conclusions suggested be true then the data testify that although the present time is a period of a very intensive "exodus" from the agricultural occupation, the agricultural class, nevertheless, still remains the class with the lowest index of interoccupational shifting from generation to generation. In other words, it remains the class with the highest inheritance or continuity of occupation from generation to generation. This proposition is probably valid in application to the whole agricultural population, and is reasonably certain in regard to that part of it which remains in agriculture and does not go to the city.

Let us glance now at the intensiveness of interoccupational shifting of various occupational classes *within the life of one generation.* Do the members of the agricultural class change their occupations more often than the members of predominantly urban occupations? It is not the desire at this place to enter into a discussion of the many difficulties of measurement of the relative intensity of occupational shifting by various occupational classes. It may be said simply that in so far as the incomplete and fragmentary statistical and other data show, the question is to be answered rather negatively. The information at hand rather suggests that all in all the agricultural class changes its occupation more rarely than the other large occupational classes, or that the interoccupational shifting in the life-span of one generation of the agricultural class is somewhat lower than that of almost all other large occupational groups.

The principal proofs which force the acceptance of the proposition follow.

First—a series of extensive data supplied by statistics of labor turnover in industry and of changes of occupation in various countries and various occupations bear out the conclusion given above. On the average, a labor turnover of 100 per cent in a year, that is, theoretically a change of the whole number of employees and workers on the pay roll of an industrial enterprise in a year, is regarded rather a conservative turnover in industry of the present time. A turnover of 200 per cent is not rare; it sometimes rises to 400 per cent.[63] From 30 to 50 per cent of the workers in manufacturing change their job and their place of work at least once in a year. Only a relatively insignificant per cent remains on the pay roll of the same institution

[63] See the data and literature in Brissenden, P. F., and Frankel, E., *Labor Turnover in Industry;* Lescohier, Don, *The Labor Market,* Chap. IV; Willitts, J. H., "Steadying Employment," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* May, 1916; Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility,* pp. 394 ff., 424 ff. See there other sources.

for several years. Dr. M. Elmer's study of clerical and secretarial women workers showed that 14.2 per cent of them remain in their occupation less than 6 months; 28.2, 6 months to 2 years; only 24.1 per cent over 5 years. Dr. L. D. Coffman's study of teachers gave 2 as the median number of years of teaching for teachers of rural schools and from 6 to 12 for those of town schools.[64] It is evident that such conditions are impossible for farmers or peasants, whether they be owners or tenants, and they are uncommon even among the bulk of farm-laborers. No farm or agricultural business could be managed under such intensive shifting of farmers, peasants, renters, or laborers.

That the conclusion is not purely speculative is supported by the fact that even those who leave farms and go to other occupations do so, as a rule, after several years of farming. The investigation of the U. S. Department of Agriculture already quoted concerning 2,683 farmers who migrated to cities shows that 15.0 per cent of them were on farms from 0 to 4 years; 18.8 per cent from 5 to 9 years; and the remaining 66.2 per cent more than 10 years.[65] Thus even for this migrating part of agricultural population, the time of staying in agriculture is to be measured not by units of days, weeks, or months, as is the cases of labor turnover in industry or in many other urban occupations, but at least by units of years and even tens of years. The same conclusion is witnessed by the fact that the average age of the farmer children who migrate to the cities is from 18 to 25 years old.[66] This means that they stay in agriculture many years, before changing their occupations.

If such is the situation with the migratory part of the agricultural population, it is evident that the part which stays in agriculture has a still much lower rate of a change of occupation. This is confirmed by the average number of years spent in farm labor by farm-owners. A South Dakota survey [67] has shown that farm-owners (average age 50) had been farming on the average 22–23 years; and tenants (average age 41) 14.4–18 years. This is practically the whole working life. Data of other surveys are similar. The data of the United States (1915–1920) show that the farm-owners who passed the stages of hired labor and tenancy stayed in the first stage on the average 5.8 years; in the second 8.9 years; generally ownership of a farm is connected with farm-work during many years because the average age of becoming a farm-owner for all categories is 38 years.[68] Whether

[64] Coffman, L. D., *The Social Composition of the Teaching Population*, pp. 28 ff., N. Y. 1911; Elmer, M., *A Study of Women in Clerical and Secretarial Work*, p. 16, 1925.

[65] *Analysis of Migration of Population to and from Farm*, p. 20.

[66] See studies of Zimmerman, quoted, p. 454; Young, p. 37; *Ohio University Mimeograph No. 3*, p. 20. See further chapter about Migration.

[67] Kumlien, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[68] "Farm Ownership and Tenancy," *U. S. Agriculture Book, 1923*, pp. 556–557.

they were the sons of the farm-owners, tenants, or hired men, before becoming the farm-owners they had been in agricultural occupations years and years (as a rule not less than ten years). After becoming owners they naturally would stay in it years and years more, many to the time of retirement or death.[69]

As to that part of the agriculturists who have become owners or tenants and are involved in considerable financial expenses for settlement on farms, all the evidences show that it is probably one of the classes which shifts least from occupation to occupation. In America and particularly in Europe, the class which farms until death or retirement factually are farmers for life. Ashby and Jones' study quoted shows that among present farmers in Wales "about 88 per cent have been in a farming occupation during the whole, or practically the whole of their working lives." [70] The situation in other European countries is similar. A census of changes of occupation in Austria for the period between the end of 1907 and the end of 1910 showed that in this period of three years, 9.31 per cent of the total occupational population actively engaged changed its occupation. For the principal classes the per cent of the change was as follows:

Agriculture and forestry	8.64
Manufacture and handicrafts	19.68
Trade and transport	13.74
Public service, professions, and without any definite occupation	14.56
Military class	84.25
Servants	15.53 [71]

Thus the agricultural class is the least mobile in changing occupations of all classes. We do not have similar census of occupations for the United States. The only analogous data at hand are those published by Louis I. Dublin and R. J. Vane about the shifting of occupations by policyholders of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.[72] The period was from the moment of issuance of the policies to the death of the policyholders. This length of time is somewhat indefinite because the number of years between these limits differs probably for various individuals and groups. For this reason, plus the fact that only a few farmers were included in the study (162) the results are very uncertain. Nevertheless, the per cent of farmers who were at the moment of death in the same occupa-

[69] See the actual data in Spillman, W. J., "The Agricultural Ladder," *American Economic Review*, Vol. IX, Supplement, March, 1919, p. 172; Galpin, Charles J., and Ely, R. T., "Tenancy in an Ideal System of Landownership," *Ibid.*, pp. 180–212; the quoted studies of Zimmerman, R. Gillett, Young, C. E. Lively, Kumlien, and others.

[70] Ashby, A. W., and Jones, J. M., *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[71] Hecke, W., "Die Zahlung des Berufswechsels in Osterreich," *Allgemeines Statist. Archiv.*, Band 10, pp. 689–690, 1916–1917.

[72] Dublin, L., and Vane, R., "Shifting of Occupations Among Wage Earners," *Monthly Labor Review*, April, 1924, pp. 137–138.

tion as at the issuance of the policy (41.9) was not below the average for all predominantly urban occupations (41.5).

To sum up: in so far as that part of agricultural population is concerned which does not compose "the rural exodus," it is reasonably certain that its rate of occupational shifting in the life of several generations, as well as in the life-span of one generation, is lower than that of almost all big occupational classes of urban population. It is reasonably certain also that farmers are recruited from the agricultural class to a higher degree, and from other than the agricultural class to a lower degree than any other big occupational class of the city, is so self-recruited. This means that rural life is "rooted" to an occupation and to land more than any big urban occupational population. In so far as the whole agricultural population is concerned, including the part which migrates to other occupations, it is also probable, though not so certain, that its occupational mobility—intergenerational and within the life of one generation—is lower than those of almost all urban large occupational classes. Thus, not only in regard to territorial shifting, but in regard to occupational mobility, the population of the agricultural class is less mobile and more "rooted" than the population of the city.

Other Forms of Mobility of the Urban and Rural Populations. Without pretending to prove the proposition here, but as a mere hypothesis, it is possible to contend that in respect to other forms of mobility, climbing and sinking along the economic ladder, from poverty to riches and *vice versa;* promotion and demotion up and down social and political ranks, from slave to master and *vice versa*, from subordinate to governing positions, and *vice versa*, from low to high social positions and *vice versa;* and in all forms of social "ups" and "downs" the city population is more mobile than the population of the rural and agricultural class. The principal reasons for the proposition are as follows:

First, all the institutions which serve as channels of the vertical circulation (social promotion and demotion) of individuals in a society, the universities, churches, centers of financial and economic power, army headquarters, centers of political power, headquarters of arts, sciences, literature, parliaments, influential newspapers,[73] emperors' courts, and other "social elevators" are located in cities but not in the country. A man who remains in a rural community and does not go for a time at least to the city, practically does not have any chance to become prominent, to climb to high social positions, or to be demoted from high economic, political, social, artistic, scientific, or literary positions to lower ones.

[73] See about the channels and machinery of social circulation of individuals in Sorokin's *Social Mobility*, Chaps. VIII, IX, and pp. 494 ff.

Even if in a few cases a man, while staying in the country has succeeded in making money or doing something prominent, such a man, in order to become really prominent, (famous, influential, noble) has to secure the sanction of the city. A rich peasant is still only a peasant; a wonderful country poet, without the sanction of the city press and the city, is still only the poet of "his neighborhood," and not known to the world. [74]

Since the rural community does not have these "elevators" of rapid social circulation, it is natural that a rural dweller cannot use them, as long as he stays in the rural locality. For this reason he cannot have the same opportunity for shifting from one social status to another. Farmers and peasants may be compared to persons in a house without a ladder or an elevator. They cannot move "up" and "down" like persons in a house with many elevators. Only when a ruralist goes to the city may he step into these elevators. But going to the city means leaving the rural community and agriculture either temporarily or permanently in order to become an urbanite. Those who remain in the country continue to be without "elevators." For this reason they cannot be as mobile in their vertical circulation as the urban population. These considerations are sufficient to make the proposition probable.

The above discussion of the relative amount of opportunity for vertical circulation in city and country is not a denial that rural districts do not have their own social ladders. The agrarian ladder, from hired man to tenant, part owner, full owner, and landlord as well as the fluctuations in status of large groups of agriculturists, operates in the country. It is an agency for social testing and selection of farmers and peasants and operates in a manner similar to the urban social ladders. But in this section, the discussion is directed to those large avenues in social circulation which lead to great positions of prominence in a society. These are urban phenomena because the agencies for rising and falling are to be found in cities. A farmer or peasant may climb the agrarian ladder but he is still a farmer or peasant and has made relatively little progress toward climbing the urban social ladder. On the other hand, an urbanite who successfully climbs the urban social ladder has, at the same time, climbed the rural social ladder. He may buy an estate or country home and immediately become an absentee landlord or full owner of land. His king may give him a rural estate, with all its social position. His legal or political ability may place him in the legislature or congress, where he may assume the position of leader and champion of the wishes of the rural constituents. *Climbing the urban social ladder*

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 494.

automatically gives one a position on the rural social ladder. The reverse is not so true or general.

A second reason for the less intensive vertical mobility of rural population is that the social pyramid or stratification of the rural community, as we shall see further, is much lower or not as high than that of the urban community. Speaking figuratively, rural communities do not have skyscrapers and have only a few stories in their social building made by economic, political, and occupational stratification. For this reason there is much less chance to rise and fall a great distance in the vertical direction. As a result, the rising and falling is much shorter than in the urban community.

A third reason is that in the city populations, the differential fertility of the upper and the lower classes is far greater than in the rural populations. As a result, the dying out of the upper classes proceeds quicker and incessantly creates a "vacuum" within the upper positions which are to be filled and which could be filled only by climbers from the lower classes. This calls forth an incessant vertical current of mobility in the city populations. In the rural populations this cause of mobility is practically lacking.[75]

A fourth reason for the difference in intensity of vertical circulation is that the dissimilarity of parents and children in their biological and socio-psychical traits in the city is perhaps greater than in the country. This is partly due to the greater racial heterogeneity of the urban population and to cross-marriages, as well as to greater differences in the environmental conditions of two generations and various parts of the same generation. The general theory of social mobility is, that other conditions being equal, the greater dissimilarity between parents and children is associated with greater vertical mobility.[76] Since the racial composition of the city population is more heterogeneous, and the chances of interracial cross-marriages greater, and since the environment of fathers and sons on account of faster change in the city differs more, the dissimilarity of the fathers and the children is probably greater. As these are so, the greater must be the mobility in the city.

Finally, every change in the social environment is one of the factors of vertical mobility.[77] There are not doubts that this change goes on much quicker in urban communities than in rural ones. For this reason, the equilibrium of the social placement of individuals in the city, is more strongly and incessantly upset and requires a "redistribution" of individuals in various strata of the urban social pyramid

[75] See about the differential fertility as a factor of vertical mobility in Sorokin's *Social Mobility*, Chap. XV.

[76] See *Ibid.*, pp. 360 ff.

[77] See *Ibid.*, pp. 366 ff.

more urgently. Hence, the necessity of a more intensive vertical social mobility in the city.

These considerations make it comprehensible that urban populations must be and have been more mobile even in the sense of vertical circulation.

This above totality of facts and considerations makes the proposition of a more intensive territorial, occupational, economic, and vertical mobility of urban populations compared with rural rather probable. The rural community is similar to calm water in a pail, and the urban community to boiling water in a kettle. In the rural areas, the members are more strongly attached to their social status; in the urban they are shifted from one status to another more often and more easily. Stability is the typical trait for the one; mobility is typical for the other.

From country to country, and from period to period these differences change in their concrete forms and in their tempo and force. But in spite of this, the relative difference in mobility seems to remain constant between typically rural and urban communities.

If the process of "urbanization" is continued, and the present trend of smaller and smaller differences between the city and the country progresses, the difference in mobility, like all other differences, is doomed to disappear also. But when this happens, if it happens, it would mean only that the very division of communities into rural and urban is over, and not that the trait studied was wrongly interpreted as a differential trait between the city and the country.

VII. Differences in the Direction of Migration. The seventh fairly permanent and constant difference between rural and urban communities is the direction of the rural-urban migration of the population. With the exception of catastrophic periods in the life history of a country, and since the appearance of rural-urban differentiation, the currents of the population going from the country to the city or from agricultural occupations to predominantly urban occupations has always been stronger and carried more population to the city, than the migratory currents from urban to rural communities. Like water which flows naturally, from a higher to the lower level, population generally flows naturally from rural to urban centers and from agriculture to industries and other urban occupations. Rural communities have been the centers of production of a surplus of human beings, and the urban communities the centers of their consumption. This is an important diagnostic trait, which practically has been permanent in the history of mankind. Only when, owing to various causes, a whole country entered a period of disastrous and catastrophic period of economic, political, moral, mental, social decay, and disorganization, has there been a termina-

tion of this "exodus" from country to the city and from agriculture to urban occupations or a greater powerfulness of the migratory current from the city to rural parts and from urban to agricultural occupations. The end of the Roman Empire and the beginning of the Middle Ages, or the years from 1917 to 1922 in Russia are examples of these catastrophic periods. In such periods "industrial economics (as in Rome) received its death-blow with that of the towns which had been the home of the Græco-Roman Civilization." [78] Details of this process will be given further; here it is necessary to stress only the very fact of the prevalent direction of migration toward the city in normal, or particularly prosperous periods of a development of a given society.

This phenomenon means *one-sidedness* of population migration. It means that normally rural communities and agriculture more willingly permit their members to leave the community and the occupation than entrance by people from cities or other occupations. In this sense, the positive development of a society is associated with a growth of urbanization and the prevalence of the cityward migration over the reverse; the periods of social catastrophies are correlated with "ruralization" and a greater prevalence of the countryward migratory current. In subsequent chapters the process will be discussed in all substantial phases.

VIII. Differences in Social Differentiation and Stratification. The eighth relatively constant difference between urban and rural communities is that the urban are marked (in each given country and at each given period) by a *greater social differentiation and social stratification.* Speaking figuratively, the city represents a social body with a much greater specialization of the functions of its members and a social structure much more stratified and pyramided than the body and structure of a rural community.

A greater social differentiation of the city, in its human material as well as in its non-human components, is manifested, in the first place, by a greater division of labor among its members, than among the rural class. To see this, it is enough to glance at a table of occupational statistics. Even contemporary occupational statistics enumerate only about ten subdivisions of agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry. At the same time, they contain several hundreds of subdivisions for the other gainful occupations which, as a rule, are located principally in urban communities. [79] We know that the transi-

[78] Boissonnade, P., *Life and Work in Mediæval Europe*, p. 26; see there a vivid and typical description of the catastrophy followed by reverse migration from the city to the country, by disappearance of the cities, industry, and the whole of the urban civilization. A similar phenomenon happened in Russia in 1917–1922 and in the periods of decay of many ancient countries.

[79] See for instance *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1925, pp. 48–56. The same is true of any classification of occupations and occupational statistics.

tion from a simple to a complex society has consisted in the increase of division of labor, and in specialization of technical functions.[80] Transition from a rural to an urban society represents just such a transition from a relatively simple to a complex society. For this simple reason, it is certain that division of labor in the cities is much greater than in rural or agricultural communities. As early as 1890 there were at least 557 different occupations in Leipzig. These in their turn could be subdivided into a series of subclasses.[81] In contemporary large cities and in manufacturing and other urban occupations, the division of labor has progressed still more than in Leipzig by 1890, and led, in modern industry, science, trade, and so on, to an excessive specialization. It is hard to find any rural, particularly agricultural, community in which there is even a remotely similar division of labor, or even one hundred various occupations or various occupational functions. Divide and subdivide the whole agricultural occupational population and you would not be able to find such a large number of various occupational classes within the whole class. The members of an agricultural class may still be compared to that of an encyclopedist, who talks or writes about everything with equal familiarity. If we take the few representatives of other occupations who dwell in rural communities, they also are much less specialized than their colleagues in the city. The rural teacher, physician, minister, and shopkeeper, are also "encyclopedists" in comparison with their specialized fellows in the city (specialized teachers, doctors, ministers, merchants, and so on). All this is so obvious that there is no reason to insist upon it further.

What has been said regarding the division of labor may be said of other forms of social differentiation in the city and the country. With a few exceptions we may say the population of the city is more differentiated in religious affiliations, in political sympathies, in ideologies, in tastes, in mores, in national affiliations, and in brief in any phase of social life. In cities, and especially in the larger cities, side by side, there live and interact the members of the most various religions, political factions, nationalities, associations, occupations, language-groups, clubs, gangs, and so on. And for satisfaction of the needs of each of these various and differentiated groups, there exist special groupings, institutions, and organizations. As a result, the whole urban community represents a body differentiated in thousands of directions and into thousands of various "organs" and "tissues." The rural community, in this respect, is much more uniform, undifferentiated, and unspecialized. Correspondingly, its mem-

[80] See Spencer's formula of evolution; Durkheim's and G. Simmel's monographs about social differentiation.

[81] Petrenz, O., *Die Entwickelung der Arbeitsteilung in Leipziger Gewerbe*, p. 89.

bers are more similar to one another in all these respects. And the organs, institutions, agencies, associations, and clubs into which a rural community is differentiated are much less numerous, and the human personality is much less specialized.

The same may be said regarding *social stratification* in the city and the rural community.[82] Urban skyscrapers compared with the flat, one or two storied, rural houses symbolize the greater social stratification of the cities. Whether we take economic stratification, the distance from the richest to the poorest measured by the amount of wealth or income; or occupational—inter- and intra-stratification—the distance from a president of a big corporation to its office boy or a common laborer; or the distance from the highest position of the most envied occupation to the lowest position of the worst or most undesirable occupation; or socio-political stratification measured by the distance from the highest socio-political rank to the lowest; in all these respects and in many others, the urban community is much more stratified and exhibits incomparably greater contrasts than the rural community.

The above proposition is so evident that it is scarcely necessary to present evidence for its corroboration. Some of them, however, may be mentioned. That economic stratification of the city population is greater than that of the country population is witnessed by practically all studies of the distribution of wealth and income (see the data and evidences in Chap. III). The income of farmers and the agricultural class is more even. Farm millionaires or even operators with several hundreds of thousands of dollars annual income made in agriculture are practically unknown. Such income classes are urban classes.[83] The economic contrasts of multimillionaires and beggars is a city and not a country contrast. Conspicuous standards of living, whether extremely wasteful or very miserable, are to be found primarily in cities and not in rural communities. The most luxurious palaces and the "slum habitats" are city but not country contrasts. The occasional luxurious country estates, as a rule, belong to city men and in no way are a part of a community of rural people. In brief, the distribution of income within the farmer and peasant class is much more even and free from excessive contrasts than is the case in the city.[84]

The same is still more true in regard to occupational and socio-political stratification. Even in the contemporary occupational ladder in agriculture we still have a very simple and short ranking:

[82] See the concept, forms, and analysis of social stratification in Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, Part I.

[83] If sometimes an exceptionally rich landowner is found, as a rule, he is an absentee-owner and dwells most of his time in the city and is a city farmer.

[84] See next chapter.

farm-laborer, tenant, and owner. One may add a few further subdivisions like foreman, or part owner and landlord. But this exhausts the ranking within the agricultural population. In a similar way, the rural ministers, teachers, merchants, artisans, do not have long hierarchies: as a rule, they are embodying in their own persons all the ranks of the occupational hierarchy represented in a rural community. Compare with this any large occupational class of the city. The pay rolls of large corporations represent dozens of various ranks beginning with the president and passing through several and numerous subordinated ranks and ending with the common laborers. The whole is a many-storied skyscraper before us. The same is true of almost all occupations in the city. It is there that we find the long ladder of church ranks and the long ladder of army and official ranks. The city is the place where various long rows of titles, graduations, ranks, rules of precedence, and so on are found. The city is the location of the highest authorities in all fields and at the same time, the most disinherited subjects in all fields. In brief, the social pyramid of a city, as a rule, is much higher than that of a rural community of the same society and time. In this sense the city is the abode in which are located the greatest contrasts of social differentiation and stratification. It is the place where, side by side, exist the bearers and incarnation of genius and idiocy, of unlimited power and depravity, of wealth and poverty, of luxury and starvation, of hard toil and indolence, of virtue and licentiousness. It is a real *coincidentia oppositorum* or the place of the coexistence of the greatest contrasts and contact of people of the most opposite social status, standards, capacities, occupations, religions, mores, manners, and what not. Again and again we see this characteristic of great contrast which stamps the city in its every phase; in its architecture, in its material culture, in its racial characteristics, its vitality, mind, intelligence, morality, wealth, manners, virtue, and in every important phase of the city and its population.

IX. Differences in the System of Social Interaction. The ninth principal and constant difference between the aggregates studied is a quantitative and qualitative difference in the system of social contact or interaction of the members of both communities. Since the rural communities are less voluminous, less densely populated and the population is less mobile, it is to be expected that the number of various persons whom a cultivator meets, and with whom he enters into an intentional or unintentional, long or short, intensive or extensive contact and the number of the contacts per individual must be much below that of an urbanite. In a city one cannot avoid the multitude of people with whom he has to rub shoulders every day in the streets, elevators, subways, offices, apartment houses, theaters,

factories, etc. In a city, unless one shuts himself within his room, one has to pass, see, meet, and interact with hundreds of people every day. There is no place for solitude. The occupational activities of most city persons go on not in solitude but amidst other people. Educational and recreational activities are carried on mostly amidst crowds, in schools, churches, theaters, clubs, dancing halls, pool halls, saloons, cafés, and so forth. Add to these the telephone, letters, newspapers, radio, magazines, and other indirect means of contact. There is no doubt that *from a purely quantitative standpoint the number of contacts per individual in a given unit of time is far greater in urban than rural life.* A cultivator especially when he lives on an open farm, meets a very limited number of people daily or annually. He works mostly alone or in company of the members of his household. In the city, to be amidst a crowd is something normal and unavoidable; on an open farm or even in a community of agriculturists, to be amidst a crowd is something exceptional. Only in rare church services, in a school, or at the relatively few meetings of various organizations of farmers or peasants, does a cultivator "rub his shoulders" with many people. In addition, the size of the crowds in rural communities, as a rule, is much smaller than the crowds of a city community. The number of letters received and sent by a farmer or peasant; the number of magazines and newspapers read; the number of telegrams and telephone messages received and sent; the number of theaters, movies, and plays visited; these and other indirect contacts, in all probability, are less numerous per capita in a rural than in an urban population. Although no valid statistical data can be given in corroboration of the above statement, on account of the non-existence of such data, nevertheless the authors contend that the number of face to face and indirect contacts per individual in a certain unit of time (day, week, year) in the city, is much greater than in a rural community. Further, the portion of time spent by an individual in solitude or away from a crowd in the city is much less than in the country. These contentions are rather self-evident and may be accepted as reasonably certain.

Other than this quantitative aspect, the system of contacts or interactions in rural and urban communities has a series of *qualitative* differences. The principal of them are as follows.

A. *The area of the contact system of a member of a rural community, as well as that of the rural community as a whole, is spatially more narrow and limited than the area of a member of an urban community and of the urban community as a whole.* By the area of a contact system is meant the extent of the territory in which are located the individuals and institutions with whom an individual or community is in contact. The larger the territory the larger is the social area of the

contact system. Notwithstanding the individual exceptions, as a rule, an inhabitant of a city, on the average, has a conspicuously larger area of contact system than a rural dweller. As we have seen, the urban population is composed in a much larger proportion, out of migrants from various places and countries. This one fact makes the area of their system of contact much larger than that of the rural population because the urban remains in contact with the persons where they were born and reared while the rural population does not have specific reasons for connections with far-away places and their inhabitants. Some write to their friends or relatives who have migrated to cities. But nearly all migrants leave contacts at the home community. Further as pointed out above, rural dwellers do not write as often as urban. In a much greater proportion, the rural populations stay at the place where they were born and reared. This naturally limits the area of their contact system with local people or neighbors, and a few from the near-by town. A few exceptions undoubtedly exist in which the "person of contact" of a rural man is located far away, but the number of such cases is "a drop in the sea" of similar cases in the city. Further, the urban occupations, trading, manufacturing, commerce, even professions and government, in their very nature are the occupations of "contact," "exchange," "interaction" with people and areas scattered and located in various directions far away from the city and from one another.

Since the urban communities originated through trade and exchange, and since they never have been self-sufficing and always have needed to exchange with other communities, "exchange, trade, and interaction" are the very soul of the city, and cause the bulk of its population to interact with individuals and groups scattered on a very vast area and in the most various localities. Although it is hard to prove this statistically on account of the lack of evidence, yet one feels justified in saying dogmatically that the area of the interaction system of one merchant company, political group, or newspaper and magazine editorial staff, in a contemporary city, is incomparably wider than that of several rural communities and their populations. In predominantly rural countries, such as Russia, India, China, the area of the contact system of the bulk of their rural population seldom exceeds a few dozen miles from their place of birth and habitat. In contemporary big cities, there are very few of the population who are not in contract with at least one person in a foreign country, not to mention many people in the remotest parts of the same country.

If a rural community or a city be taken as a unit, then the circles of interaction of each of such units, absolutely and relatively in proportion to the population, are almost incomparable. Look at the

maps of the railways, waterways, lines of telegraphs and telephones. They all tend to center around and in the city. Look at the map of the readers and subscribers of city publications, newspapers, books, magazines; at the map of consumers of manufactured values of the city industry; at the map of the migration lines of the city "errand" agents, salesmen, preachers, teachers, lecturers, instructors, actors, players, artisans, officials, engineers, organizers, bankers, and so on. Any contemporary city of even moderate size, not to mention the large cities, is connected factually with the whole world, from India, China, and the South Sea Islands to Europe, Australia, Japan, Russia, and Mongolia. Tens of thousands of conductors of interaction, through which the population of the city interacts with the world, are connecting every such city with the rest of the world. In the past, the area of the city contact system was not as large, absolutely, as now. But relatively, in comparison with the area of the contact system of the rural communities of that time, the city area was certainly incomparably wider than the rural area.

B. If the totality of the relations which compose the network of the interaction system of an urbanite and of a ruralist, be divided into two parts, face to face or primary relations, and indirect or secondary relations, then it is probable that *face to face relations occupy a less proportion of the whole interaction system of an urbanite than of a rural individual.* Readers of a city newspaper, book, or publication; listeners to the city radio speaker or singer; clients, buyers, and customers of city business enterprises or commercial houses; taxpayers, and subjects of the government located in the city; members of religious organizations whose headquarters and authorities are in the city; millions of individuals with whom the city institutions, agencies, and individuals are in contact; these rarely are seen, touched, heard, have shaken hands, or have had direct interaction with the corresponding other units of social contact. They are the "anonymous" public, whose reactions are felt only indirectly by the urban population. Each urbanite is a member of hundreds of such anonymous publics as well as an agent in creating them. The urban population comes in face to face contact with this anonymous public only in an insignificant part and very rarely. The same is true of the other relations of city people with one another. Only an infinitesimal part of the persons with whom an urban individual interacts, are personally known to him. The greater part of them are only "numbers," "addresses," "clients," "customers," "patients," "readers," "laborers," or "employees." As a rule, all are more or less unknown personally to the corresponding individuals. The very multitude of people with whom an urbanite is in contact; his own and their mobility; and the large area of his system of interaction make direct knowledge of this multi-

tude impossible for him. They remain for him kinds of "human abstractions," or mere special agencies for definite kinds of interactions. Their whole *Gestalt* or personality remains unknown. Hence, the extraordinary large place in the urbanite system of interaction occupied by the totality of indirect relations.

Somewhat different is the same aspects of the interaction system of the typical rural individual. He has relatively narrow area for his system of interaction; a limited number of individuals with whom he interacts; and a less number of indirect communications. All these lead to the fact that face to face relations (with his family, minister, teacher, neighbors, etc.) compose a much larger part of his whole system of interaction than of that of a typical urbanite. The human beings, with whom he interacts, are concrete in body and flesh. He touches, smells, sees, and hears them. For this reason, they are, in a less degree, abstractions for him than for an urbanite. And the whole living personalities or *Gestalts* of those with whom he interacts are known more thoroughly to him than is the case of the urbanite.

C. A slightly different aspect of the above means that the *interaction system of an urbanite is woven, to a greater proportion than in the case of a rural individual, out of impersonal and to a less degree out of personal relations.* Hundreds of persons met by the city dweller in subways or elevateds are only "passengers" to him and unknown beyond this trait; the same is true for hundreds of persons who eat in the same cafés; for hundreds who attend the same religious services, theaters, political meetings, scientific lectures, exhibitions, department stores, factories, offices, and so on. He knows little, if anything, regarding the personalities and biographies of the clerks in the shops he attends, the girls who connect his telephone lines, the post office clerks, icemen, milkmen, taxi drivers, delivery men, "bosses," and employees, and workers. Often the physicians, policemen, grocers, druggists, landlords, his colleages, and so on, are as little known to him. As a rule, they are not human personalities but only clerks, physicians, mailmen, icemen, drivers, writers, policemen, democrats, republicans, Methodists, actors—in brief, kinds of good or poor "robots" with whom he interacts as with a peculiar specialized "mechanism." His attitude regarding them is almost the same as to the mechanisms, automatic telephones, automatic restaurants, and automatic frigidaires, which tend more and more to replace these human "mechanisms." The very multitude of partners to urban interactions and the constant mobility and shifting makes it impossible for him to know their personality, their life, or their whole human *Gestalt.*

In a rural community the situation is different. The partners of interaction are limited in number and there is a prevalence of face to

face contacts, and a less mobility of individuals. All these condition the prevalence of "personal" relationship in interaction systems of the members of a rural community. On the first plane there are these well-known personalities, Mr. S. H. Smith, or Mr. M. E. Babbit, and Mrs. N. M. Jones; only on the second plane are there functions such as "farmer," "blacksmith," "grocer," or "teacher" in these Smiths, Babbits, and Joneses. This leads usually to a knowledge of the personalities of the partners of interaction, sometimes even to an understanding of their "undergarments." The whole system of rural interaction, its threads and network, are colored there by the daubs of "personal touch," "intimacy," and concreteness. This makes it comprehensible why, in the systems of interaction of rural populations, human beings are functioning as human beings, and their relations involve, to a greater degree, moral evaluations, emotionality, and positive or negative attitudes not only because of the good or poor performance of the occupational function of a robot, but because of his whole personality and the totality of his actions as a man. In the city, rarely is one interested in knowing the "undergarments" of the "robot" with whom interaction takes place; in a rural community this is generally the unescapable rule as outlined above.

D. In a similar manner, it is possible to claim that *in the totality of relations which compose the network of the interaction system of an urban individual, the part composed of casual, superficial, and short-lived relations, in contrast to permanent, strong, and durable relations, occupies a much more conspicuous place than in the interaction system of a rural dweller.*

One cannot remember, or seldom even wishes to continue contact with hundreds of the persons with whom elbows are rubbed in subways, streets, or the druggists, shop clerks, servants, and other human objects of daily interaction in cities. Thousands of contacts arise in this way and die or are forgotten in a few moments or seconds. The enormous mobility of urban populations makes it difficult for a long durability of even a few lines of interactions with a few men. As soon as such relations begin to form, either ourselves or our friends are shifted to a new place and in this way the majority of such relations are doomed to die. Different is the situation in a rural community. Since its population is more or less constant, and remains there for life or for many years, the bulk of relations which compose the interaction system of a farmer, are durable, long-lived, substantial, and solid. They may be friendly or inimical, good or bad, ugly or beautiful, but they stay, exist for a long time, and do not evaporate quickly as similar city relations. For this reason, they are deeper, less superficial, and involve the whole personalities of the interactors

and the interacted persons. The interaction system of an urbanite, in this respect, may be compared to telephone contacts with a multitude of people: the connection is made, a few words are exchanged, and few moments later the totality is disconnected and forgotten. The whole network of telephone lines in a city station changes every minute and is composed, at any moment, of a multitude of short-lived connections. The rural "social telephone system" is composed of permanent "private" lines which go directly from farmer to farmer, and often without the mediation of a central station, are used by each individual, so to speak, permanently. Lines are few but permanent and direct.

E. Since the area of interaction system of an urbanite is larger, the number of contracts is more numerous, the people with whom he interacts are more heterogeneous, *the relations are more flexible, less durable, and more impersonal; the whole network of his system of interaction is to be marked by greater complexity, greater plasticity, differentiation, manifoldedness, and, at the same time by greater superficiality, "standardization" and mechanization than the network of the interaction system of a rural dweller.* The first part of the statement may appear contradictory to its second part. Yet, such a contradiction is purely fictitious.

The greater complexity, manifoldedness, and plasticity of the interaction system of an urbanite follows from what has been said before. Contrasted with a farmer, an urbanite comes in contact with the most different people, rich and poor, white and negro, genius and idiot, representatives of aristocracy and of the subordinated classes, and the most different occupational and cultural groups. The "lines" of his system of interaction bring him in contact with all this variety of persons. For this reason, the system is manifolded, complex, and more differentiated compared with the rural system of interaction. An urbanite is more pressed to know "how to treat," act and react, each of these different "interactors," if he does not wish to fail in his purpose or to harm himself. He must acquire, in a greater degree, the ability to vary his "responses" according to the party with whom he interacts; he is pressed more urgently to learn how to treat a boss, an officer, a hired man, a plain person, and a highbrow; he sees and experiences different manners of action and reaction and sometimes is forced to follow them. Hence, the greater manifoldedness, differentiation, and plasticity of his interaction system. Being amidst an incessantly changing, highly variable, and heterogeneous "human river," he must be able to change his actions at any moment according to the circumstances. He cannot afford to be inflexible or rigid in his actions and reactions in regard to these heterogeneous people with whom he has to interact; on the contrary, he is doomed to fail-

ure. All these conditions are present to a much less degree in a rural community. The people there are more homogeneous; social differentiation and stratification are less developed; standards of living, manners, and mores are more uniform. Therefore, a countryman may have the same rigid and inflexible forms of interactions, actions, and responses, in regard to almost all with whom he interacts. His whole system of interaction is less fanciful, less complex, and manifolded. It is less differentiated or specialized. He treats almost all his neighbors and the individuals with whom he comes in contact in the same manner. He is not pressed to acquire a diversity of forms of treatment of various groups in various ways. He has, also, less opportunity for learning this diversity of behavior because he sees fewer patterns of manners, responses, actions, and treatments. In this sense, his system of interaction is less specialized, manifolded, and complex.

On the other hand, the impersonal, undurable, and superficial character of urban contacts makes impossible for the above variability, specialization, and manifoldedness to be real, deep, or "organic." Hence, the necessity for "standards" and standardized, half-mechanical, ready-made patterns in the processes of urban interaction. An urbanite treats differently his iceman and minister, his physician and grocer, his landlord and janitor. But this difference is that of ready-made standards and not a personal modification of behavior thought over and invented. An urbanite, in his variations of actions and reactions, may be compared to a victrola; he simply and half mechanically changes one standard for another (like one record for another). The standards generally do not touch the individuality. On the contrary, they would not be standards. All they touch is the totality of the most superficial, exterior, and impersonal traits. For this reason, the "yes, sir" of a hired man in the city does not mean at all any particular respect of the addressor to the addressed. It only means a standard address for the particular circumstances. This standard may be in complete disagreement with the real feeling of one party to the other. For the same reason, a physician in the city who takes care of a patient, a policeman, judge, taxi driver, minister, professor, official or writer, is doing his "job" without any particular feeling of sympathy or personal touch in regard to the other man. He merely interacts according to the prescribed standard or vogue or fashion. His personality is, so to speak, detached from his job and from the personality of the interacted persons. Individuals are mere "numbers" of different classes; and an urbanite treats them according to the standards for each class. But in each class, the individuals are only "numbers" and "addresses." In this sense the interaction system of an urbanite is superficial and quite mechanical.

it misses the most important thing, human personality and individuality, or man's "heart and soul." The rural interaction system is less diversified outwardly and has a less number of standards in application to various classes of people. But it is more individualized in regard to various individuals. It is more filled by an undetached emotional attitude called forth by the peculiarities of the individual interacted with. It goes more beyond the "social dress" of a man and comes closer to his heart, soul, or personality.

Summary. The above does not exhaust the differences between the urban and rural worlds but it is sufficient to serve as a starting compound concept for further analysis. Let us sum up the above important, relatively constant, and casually connected qualitative and quantitative chacteristics of the urban and rural worlds.

	Rural World	*Urban World*
Occupation.	Totality of cultivators and their families. In the community are usually few representatives of several non-agricultural pursuits. They, however, do not compose the proper object of rural sociology.	Totality of people engaged principally in manufacturing, mechanical pursuits, trade, commerce, professions, governing, and other non-agricultural occupations.
Environment.	Predominance of nature over anthropo-social environment. Direct relationship to nature.	Greater isolation from nature. Predominance of man-made environment over natural. Poorer air. Stone and iron.
Size of community.	Open farms or small communities, "agriculturalism" and size of community are negatively correlated.	As a rule in the same country and at the same period, the size of urban community is much larger than the rural community. In other words, urbanity and size of community are positively correlated.
Density of population.	In the same country and at the same period the density is lower than in urban community. Generally density and rurality are negatively correlated.	Greater than in rural communities. Urbanity and density are positively correlated.
Heterogeneity and homogeneity of the population.	Compared with urban populations the populations of rural communities are more homogeneous in racial and psychosocial traits. (Negative correlation with heterogeneity.)	More heterogeneous than rural communities (in the same country and at the same time). Urbanity and heterogeneity are positively correlated.
Social differentiation and stratification.	Rural differentiation and stratification less than urban.	Differentiation and stratification show positive correlation with urbanity.

	Rural World	*Urban World*
Mobility.	Territorial, occupational, and other forms of social mobility of the population are comparatively less intensive. Normally the migration current carries more individuals from the country to the city.	More intensive. Urbanity and mobility are positively correlated. Only in the periods of social catastrophy is the migration from the city to the country greater than from the country to the city.
System of interaction.	Less numerous contacts per man. Narrower area of the interaction system of its members and the whole aggregate. More prominent part is occupied by primary contacts. Predominance of personal and relatively durable relations. Comparative simplicity and sincerity of relations. "Man is interacted as a human person."	More numerous contacts. Wider area of interaction system per man and per aggregate. Predominance of secondary contacts. Predominance of impersonal casual and short-lived relations. Greater complexity, manifoldedness, superficiality, and standardized formality of relations. Man is interacted as a "number" and "address."

These fundamental characteristics, as has been shown, are all causally connected, or interrelated. As soon as one takes the agricultural occupation and the people engaged in it, he finds the other differences enumerated. The first "variable," so to speak, carries the others with it. In their totality, they compose the typical and constant "cradle" or "framework" within which rural and urban phenomena carry on. Since we now understand this typical urban and rural "framework" we may turn our attention to the typical "pictures" inclosed in each of these "frames." Our task now is to find out what are the relatively constant differences between, and typical characteristics of, "the picture" inclosed by the above "rural framework" and that in "the urban framework." What social phenomena are correlated with the above urban and rural variables? This means that after rural sociology finds "the framework" of the rural world, its task consists in a study of the sociologically relevant phenomena constantly and typically associated with the variables out of which this "rural framework" is composed. Do these differences in the phenomena which compose the "framework" of the rural and urban worlds exert a direct or indirect influence on the bodies, health, vital processes, mind, and psychology of the population living within each of these worlds? Are they correlated with some typical differences in the forms of social institutions, organizations, cultural and social processes given within each of these worlds? If such correlations exist and are valid, why and how are they possible? Such are the tasks of the future chapters of this book.

These tasks, in so far as they are concentrated on typical and constant differences, their correlation with the variables which compose

the framework of the rural world, and the intercorrelation of these social phenomena with one another, are exactly identical with the tasks of sociology generally and rural sociology particularly as outlined in the preceding chapter. By investigating these problems, rural sociology performs not only its own tasks, but, at the same time, makes a contribution to general sociology through this more detailed study of the correlations and intercorrelations of the variables which compose "the rural cradle" or "framework" with various social phenomena.

Let us turn now to a study of the details. We shall begin our acquaintance with "the picture" by a study of the farmer-peasant population as a social class, its place among, and relationships to, other social classes. This serves as a first step in the sociological study of the Rural Life and the Rural World.

CHAPTER III

THE STATUS OF THE FARMER-PEASANT CLASS AMONG OTHER SOCIAL CLASSES

Concept of Social Class. In the preceding chapter we have shown the substantial differences between the framework of the urban and rural worlds. The next step is to outline the position of the agricultural class among other social classes. When this is done, at least roughly, the fundamental characteristics of the farmer-peasant group as a social class will become clearer and the place and relationships of this class to the other principal social classes will be determined.

But why is such an analysis necessary? Is it not sufficient to say that the farmer-peasant class is engaged in agriculture, and through this *occupational specificum* to satisfy ourselves for a definition of this class? The answer is that such an occupational characterization of the farmer or of any other class is insufficient because it does not embrace all the important components of the given social class and leaves unmentioned many important traits correlated with a given occupational specificum. Further, its place among, and relationships to, other classes remain dark and incomprehensible. Such an analysis is necessary also to understand many important peculiarities of behavior and the historical rôle of a given social class. It is useful also for many practical problems. For instance, there have been many attempts to create "Farmer-Labor" parties in which the farmer and the industrial labor classes would be united and would try together to achieve a realization of their economic, political, and social desires. Such attempts are also not absent at the present moment. For instance, the Third International tries regularly to create an international union of farmer-peasant and industrial-labor classes. In almost every country there exist several "Farmer-Labor" parties which try to realize a similar union. If the substantial traits of both classes are similar, such attempts have some chances of success. If, however, the social positions of the industrial-labor and farmer-peasant classes are essentially different, the chances for such a union into one political party are much less. Also, the chances for antagonisms between these classes and for the alliance of one of them with "non-labor" groups against the other may be significant. The analysis of the class position of farmer-peasants may help to understand their attitude towards other classes and their lines of "policy"

in various historical periods. These considerations are sufficient reasons why a rural sociology cannot afford to omit an analysis of farmer-peasants as a social class.

The first necessity in such an analysis is a definition of the concept of social class. What is meant by it? In contemporary sociology there are no standardized and generally accepted concepts of social class. Many thinkers—Plato, Sallustius, Voltaire, Raynal, Guizot, Considérant, Godwin, E. Bernstein, D'Æth and others—have understood by social class the strata of the poor and the rich. The amount of wealth or the economic criterion is the basis for their class concept. However, almost all of them, contrary to their own definition, have talked and written further of the classes called "Aristocracy," "Industrial," "Agricultural," "Capitalists," "Nobility," and so on. This second use of "class" does not follow at all from their first definition. Other groups of thinkers, like Saint Simon, A. Bauer, Blondel, and others, have discriminated the social classes into the dominating, or aristocratic, or exploiting, or privileged and the subjugated, subordinated, exploited, or disfranchised groups. Their class definition is based on the criterion of political and social ranks or privileges. Like the preceding group, they also soon forget their original definition and inconsistently talk about the poor and rich classes, classes of capitalists, proletarians, etc. The third group of authors identify the concept of social class with that of occupational groups (for instance Turgot, and A. Bauer, partly, F. W. Taussig, Karl Bücher, G. Schmoller, and others).[1]

There is no doubt that each of these "social co-ordinates",—economic, occupational, and socio-political status, is a very important basis for the differentiation of a population into groups and is a very important characteristic for the social placement of individuals (or groups) amidst other individuals and groups. However, each one by itself is insufficient. Like chemistry, which is interested not only in a study of separate and simple chemical elements (oxygen or hydrogen, and so on), but also in that of the most important and typical combinations which they compose (for instance H_2O, H_2O_4, H_2SO_4), sociology is also interested in a study of simple and composite groups. Sociologists not only study various social groups according to economic, occupational, or socio-political lines of differentiation and stratification, but also the important and typical combinations which these three characteristics compose. This explains why, side by side with the above "simple" social classes ("poor and rich," "privileged and disfranchised," and occupational groups), we need to study the

[1] See a survey and analysis of the principal definitions of social class in Sorokin, P., *Sistema Soziologii*, Vol. II, pp. 283–306; see also additional literature in Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 542–543.

more important combinations which, at least, these three "elements" compose in "social chemistry." [2]

By social class, as the term is used here, is understood the totality of individuals whose occupational, economic, and socio-political status (rights, and privileges, duties and disfranchisements) are closely similar.

There is no need to say that each of these "social co-ordinates" is a very important factor in determining and shaping the behavior and relationships of an individual or of a group of individuals. It is certain that the economic position, wealth, or poverty, of a man exerts an enormous influence on his body and soul, his behavior and psychology, and his relationships and destinies. The same may be said of a man's occupation. It also applies in regard to his allegiance to a privileged or to a disinherited social position.[3] If each of these elements represents an enormous factor in man's behavior and relationships, still greater is the rôle of all three factors combined. Man's economic, occupational, and socio-political positions practically are responsible for the most of the traits of his "acquired" personality. Directly and indirectly three-quarters of such traits as education, manners, customs, beliefs, tastes, convictions, ideas, traditions, and so on, are decisively determined by these three statuses. The same may be said of any one group. Paraphrasing the old proverb, we may say: "Tell me what is the occupation, economic status, and the socio-political position of a person or of a group and I will tell you the principal peculiarities—behavior, psychology, antagonisms and solidarities, and other important characteristics—of the person or of the group."

Occupational Status of the Farmer-Peasant Class. Now let us ask what are the special characteristics of the farmer and peasant class, in the given meaning of the term and what are the relationships of this social class to other important social classes? A proper answer to the problem would represent no more and no less than a definition of the social position of the farmer-peasant class among other social classes, or its social place amidst the "Great Society." A concise "inventory" of the fundamental traits of the farmer-peasant class follows.

1. *Nature of Occupation.* In hundreds of forms, agriculture or the collection and cultivation of plants and animals, differs sharply from those of other big occupational classes, such as the occupations of the classes of capitalists, absentee-landlords, industrial laborers, and professionals. In this respect the farmer-peasant class is equally

[2] A systematic and detailed theory of elementary, cumulative, and compound social groups, their analysis and classification, is given in Sorokin's *Sistema Soziologii*, Vols. I, II.

[3] See Sorokin's *Sistema Soziologii*, Vol. II, *passim*.

different from all those groups and may not be thought of as particularly near or particularly different from any one of them. For this reason, it cannot be identified with any single one of those classes. In its essential parts, the nature of the occupation remains the same for all strata of the agricultural population: farm-owners, tenants, and laborers. The contrasts are much less than in the nature of the occupations of the upper and the lower strata in manufacturing, mining, trade or in many professions where the factual nature of the job of a boss (*e. g.*, Henry Ford) and his workers are quite different.

2. *Nature of Occupational Environment.* In its substantial parts this is also quite different from the occupational environment of all the other social classes. Here also, we may not say that the nature of the occupational environment of the agricultural class is more similar to that of the "industrial labor class" than to those of the capitalists or the professionals, or *vice versa*. In brief, in this point, the farmer-peasant class may not be identified or "solidarized" with any other big occupational class. Further, the occupational environment of the farm-owner and the farm-laborer is similar to a much higher degree than those of laborers and owners or bosses in other occupations.

3. *Psycho-Social Character of Occupational Functions or Work.* From this standpoint, any occupational work may be divided roughly into three principal categories: (1) *proprietorial* or managerial or independent *master's* work which consists in the performance of the functions of organization and control of an enterprise; this requires initiative, is mostly intellectual and connected with financial and other responsibility; liable to risk of loss and profit; (2) *qualified employees' work*, which is connected also with performance of organizing and controlling functions but under the control of a proprietor or the head of the enterprise and which, besides, is composed out of performance of many purely mechanical, subordinated, and purely manual functions; factually this stratum is intermediary between "the proprietorial" and "laborer's" work, various strata of employees being some nearer to the "proprietorial," some to "laborer's" work; (3) *laborer's work* purely mechanical, a mere execution of what is ordered and thought of by proprietorial and employees; mostly manual; does not require an exercise of either initiative, or any serious thinking; devoid of organizing and controlling functions; entirely subordinated.

In so far as farmer or peasant-owner and tenant work is concerned, it represents a mixture of all these three catagories of work: the bulk of them are masters, employees, and laborers at their enterprise. They exercise all these functions, they organize and control it and bear its financial and other responsibilities; at the same time, they are their own laborers; even when part of them have a few hired laborers, they themselves perform many purely manual and subordi-

nated functions of a laborer. Thus, in this respect, the bulk of the class studied occupies again quite a peculiar situation different from that of capitalists, employees, and laborers in other occupations. The entrepreneurial character of the work makes the farmer-peasant class similar to the classes of proprietors, capitalists, heads of various financial, industrial, professional, commercial, and even governmental enterprises and institutions, or with the "upper," organizing and controlling classes in the urban population.[4] But the fact that farmer-peasants are at the same time "their own laborers" either in 100 per cent or somewhat less, separates them as a class from "the proprietorial" classes of the city and makes them somewhat similar to the classes of urban employees and laborers. Such a peculiarity suggests that in their attitudes, conduct, sympathies, solidarities, and antagonisms, the farmer-peasant class, in so far as they are influenced by the status discussed, may not be identified either with the labor class or with the proprietorial upper class of an urban society. At one time the farmer-peasant class may join with the labor class; and at another with the proprietorial class. This means that the attempts to create a "Farm-Labor Union" has chances as great as "Farm-Capitalist Unions." Factually, history supports such an opinion and shows rather clearly (see further) that the farmer-peasant class has sometimes associated itself with labor, against capitalists, sometimes with capitalists and the proprietorial class against labor. Sometimes it has antagonized both of these classes.

Thus, in all the above respects, the occupational status of the farmer-peasant class is peculiar and different from that of the other big classes.

The Economic Status of Farmer-Peasant Class. In economic status, there are four important determining characteristics: (a) whether a man or a group is owner of the means and instruments of his occupational enterprise and activity and whether a man or a group owns some immovable property; (b) the amount of wealth and income; (c) the standard of living with its level and character from economic standpoint; (d) the nature of the income sources: (1) interests and profits, (2) rent, (3) labor wages. These four "co-ordinates" outline the essentials of the economic status of a man or a group.

1. *Proprietorial Status of the Farmer-Peasant Class.* In so far as farmer-owners and peasant-owners are concerned, they are proprietorial classes par excellence: the owners of their land, houses, and means and instruments of production. *The per cent of the owners within the whole agricultural population is higher than in any other large occupational pursuit (manufacturing, mechanical pursuits,*

[4] Compare Rice, S. A., *Farmers and Workers in American Politics*, Chap. II, N. Y., 1924.

mining, trade, transportation, and even in some countries professions). Further, the factual and juridical conditions of many groups of tenants, in many countries and at many historical periods, have been such that they hold practically to the status of a farmer-peasant owner.[5] These conditions include contracts of tenancy for a long period of years; restrictions of the rights of the absentee owners to expel tenants from the land; responsible management of the enterprise by the tenant with the whip of risk, profit, and loss; ownership of the houses, cattle, and other instruments of agricultural production by the tenants; and juridical "attachment" of the cultivators to the land (in case of the colonate, serfdom, and some forms of free tenancy). For these reasons, many groups of tenant-farmers and peasants are to be put also among the proprietorial class. Add to this, the fact that the agricultural class to an exceedingly high per cent, own their homes. The land and the home being kinds of immovable property, this makes the class studied especially proprietorial. Further, the proportion of hired laborers in the agricultural occupation is practically the lowest among all large occupational classes. Add to the above, the well-known fact that the bulk of the hired labor in agriculture is composed out of the members of the family or relatives of the farmer or peasant and that a high per cent of the non-related farm-laborers usually climb from this position to that of tenants and farm-owners. In this sense the farm-laborer is only temporarily attached to his class and has prospects of reaching the proprietorial stratum.[6]

When all the above facts are taken into consideration, it would appear certain that the bulk of the *farmer-peasant class is a proprietorial class par excellence.* In this respect, its social status is similar to that of the proprietorial classes in other occupations. In other words, the peasant-farmer class, in its bulk, is nearer to the classes of capitalists and owners of various enterprises than the classes of laborers and employees and clerks, who are not the owners of the enterprises where they work, who only sell their labor and receive wages or salaries, and who do not work with their own means and instruments of production. In this respect also, there is a very sharp difference between the labor class and the bulk of the farmer-peasant class. In so far as proprietorship is an important factor in behavior, solidarities, and antagonisms, the above suggests that the farmer-

[5] See Sombart, W., *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Zweite hälfte, p. 651.

[6] See Ashby, A., and Jones, J., *op. cit.*, p. 21; Leopold, M., *op. cit.*, p. 131; *U. S. Agriculture Yearbook, 1923,* pp. 527, 555–556. In North Carolina it was found that 27.8 per cent of the white owners had been croppers, and 38.4 per cent tenants. For the colored owners, 65.8 per cent had been croppers and the same proportion tenants. See *Economic and Social Conditions of North Carolina Farmers,* by Carl C. Taylor and C. C. Zimmerman. See also *Rural Changes in Western North Dakota,* Bulletin 214, North Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station, by E. A. Willson, H. C. Hoffsomer, and Alva H. Benton.

peasant class will not be united, for any great length of time, with the industrial labor class against the owning or capitalist class. Theoretically, such unions will last but a short time and may be replaced with the union of the farmer-peasant class and the urban proprietorial classes against urban labor or the rural class may antagonize both urban classes mentioned.

The following data show the validity of the above statements regarding the exceedingly high proprietorial character of the farmer-peasant class. That the per cent of owners, generally the owners of immovable property (land, homes), among the agricultural class is practically the highest among the big occupational classes may be seen from the following figures:

In 1920, in the United States the value of farm-property amounted to 78 billions of dollars and of this 85 per cent was in the form of land and buildings, that is, immovable property.[7] Further, the per cent of owners or proprietors and of employees and laborers who did not own property in the occupation in which they were engaged was as follows in 1920: [8]

Occupation	*Total Occupational Population*		*Owners, Proprietors, and Firm Members per cent*	*Employees and Laborers per cent*
	Per Cent	*Number*		
Agriculture	100	10,953,158	37.5, with tenants 60.6	39 [9]
Manufacture and mechanical pursuits	100	10,812,736	About 2.5	About 97.5
Mining	100	1,084,796	About 2.0	About 98.0
Trade	100	4,242,979	About 37 (including bankers, brokers, money lenders, officials, managers, retail dealers, undertakers, wholesale dealers, importers and exporters. This is a population considerably more numerous than the class of real proprietors)	About 63
Clerical	100	3,126,541	(Non-proprietorial occupation)	About 100
Transportation	100	3,063,582	1.4 (including managers of transfer companies)	About 98.6
Public service	100	770,460	(Non-proprietorial occupation)	About 100
Professional service	100	3,142,889	Unknown	Unknown
Domestic service	100	3,404,892	Unknown	Unknown

[7] *Fourteenth Census*, Vol. VI, Agriculture, Part 1, p. 18.

[8] Computed from *Abstract of the Fourteenth Census*, pp. 483, 490–496, 925, 1267.

[9] According to the estimate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, where the number of farmers is assumed to be identical with the number of farms, we have 73.2 per cent of farmers and only 26.8 per cent employees and laborers. See *Income in the United States*, Vol. II, pp. 61, 33, N. Y., 1922.

The figures in the table on page 67 give an idea of the situation in various countries.[10]

The farmer-peasant class has practically the highest per cent of owners of their enterprises and also has the lowest per cent of salaried employees and laborers. Besides the farm property is more immovable. A similar picture is given by figures as to the ownership of dwelling houses in rural and urban communities of the United States,[11] Norway, and Sweden.[12]

The data of other countries give a similar picture. The data of Bavaria, Germany, Norway, and Poland show that the per cent of the proprietors and independent employers in the total active occupational population is greater in the rural and the per cent of the propertyless and employed workers is greater in the urban communities.[13]

The results are similar if we take the population actively engaged in an occupational pursuit according to the nature of the occupation. As a rule, among the big occupational classes in practically all countries, the agricultural either gives the highest per cent of owners and independent persons and the lowest per cent of the employees and laborers, or at any rate, in all countries, it gives the highest per cent in the first category and the lowest per cent in the second category (laborers and employees) when all large urban occupations are taken together.

The proof that the farmer-peasant class is primarily proprietorial, shows this to be true not only now but for historical epochs. This must be stressed because of the prevailing ideas that serfdom was a dispossession of the land from the workers. The primary characteristic of serfdom, and the feudal system, was the payment of heavy taxes and dues to local manorial lords and feudal knights rather than to the state. The feudal system arose to supplant the weakened state organization which followed the decline of the Roman Empire in Western Europe. It did not gain headway in the Byzantine Empire on account of the strong state organization, which made its major purpose to check the attempts of the manorial lords and the Church in the various attempts to secure local autonomy over the peasants.

These manorial dues or feudal tithes were generally set by custom.

[10] Computed from the following sources: *Census of England and Wales*, 1921, Occupations, pp. 2–19, London, 1924; *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1926, p. 14; *Annuaire stat. de la Belgique*, 1924–35, p. 33, Bruxelles, 1927; *Statistisk Aarbog*, 1927, pp. 14–21; *Annuaire stat. de la republique Polonaise*, 1924, p. 25; *Annuaire statistique (de la France)*, 1910, pp. 11–14.

[11] *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1926, p. 42; Weber, A., *op. cit.*, p. 426.

[12] *Statistisk Arbok for Norge*, 1924, pp. 178–180; for Sweden see *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige*, 1926, p. 200.

[13] See *Statistisches Jahrbuch Bayern*, 1919, p. 30; *Statistisk Arbok for Norge*, 1924, p. 17; Krische, P., "Die Soziale Schichtung," *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, March. 1928, p. 17; *Annuaire stat. de la republique Polonaise*, 1924, p. 25.

PER CENT OF OWNERS AND EMPLOYERS, AND EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS IN THE TOTAL OCCUPATIONAL POPULATION OF EACH SPECIFIED OCCUPATIONAL CLASS

Country and Occupation Class	*Total*	*Employers and Independent Owners*	*Employees and Laborers*	*Workers on Own Account*
England & Wales. 1921				
All occupations (males)	100	4.9	88.8	6.3
Agriculture	100	11.7	76.6	11.7
Mining	100	0.1	99.8	0.1
Metal workers	100	2.2	95.5	2.3
Textile workers	100	2.2	97.5	0.3
Transport	100	1.1	96.0	2.9
Commerce, finances, insurance	100	15.5	61.5	23.0
Clerical	100	0.0	99.9	0.1
Professional	100	7.7	78.1	14.2
Mixed group	100	0.04	99.6	0.3
Germany, 1907 (both sexes)				
All occupations	100	23.1	76.9	In a different computation, excluding domestic members of the family, the per cent of the employees and laborers was as follows: [14]
Agriculture, forestry, etc.	100	25.3	74.7	36
Industry	100	17.5	82.5	82
Commerce, transport, innkeeping	100	29.0	71.0	67
Public service and professions	——	——	——	57
Belgium 1920 (both sexes)				
All occupations	100	30.4	69.6	
Agriculture	100	52.9	47.1	
Industry	100	2.4	97.6	
Commerce	100	21.2	78.8	
Denmark, 1920 (both sexes)				
Agriculture	100	82.4	17.8	
Industry	100	27.6	72.4	
Commerce	100	46.9	53.1	
Transport	100	20.6	79.4	
Poland, 1921 (both sexes) (Department of Polesie)				
Agriculture, forestry, etc.	100	96.0 *	4.0	
Industry, mining	100	68.0 *	32.0	
Commerce	100	89.0 *	10.8	
Transport	100	13.7 *	86.1	
Public service	100	17.1 *	82.3	
Personal service	100	9.9 *	90.0	
France, 1906 (males)				
Agriculture, forestry	100	46.0	36.4	17.6 (isolés)
Industry	100	12.2	69.7	18.1
Commerce	100	26.7	52.4	20.9
Professions	100	3.1	87.5	9.4
Domestic service	100	0	100	0

* Including helping members of families.

[14] Krische, P., Die Soziale Schichtung, etc., *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie,* 4 Jahrgang, Heft I, p. 17, 1928.

Attempts to make them arbitrary and to dispossess the peasants of local autonomy over their lands and personal property generally ended in revolution and the re-creation of peasant rights.[15]

A second reason for stressing this idea, is the prevailing notion in the United States and in some countries of Europe, that the "trend" of society is to dispossess the peasant and farmer from his land. This was the theory of Marx and Engels, as given in the *Communist Manifesto* and elsewhere. This idea of dispossession of the rural classes from the land has been expressed in the United States, not only among the rural sociologists and economists, but in the recent business men's report on agriculture.[16] This statement and belief, as far as the United States is concerned, is based on the statistics concerning the increase of farm tenancy. Let us discuss to what extent the opinion is true. Prior to 1880 no data on tenancy were presented by the census. Since that time it has increased from 25.6 per cent to 38.6 per cent in 1925.[17] This increase has caused some to picture the United States as a nation of landless farmers and the shibboleth "decline into peasantry" has gained considerable popularity in many circles. But a careful analysis by Leon E. Truesdell, of the U. S. Census Bureau, has shown that this increase of tenancy is mainly a reaction to frontier conditions under which prospective farmers could secure a piece of land at a nominal figure. This is no denial that other factors have also influenced it. As a matter of fact, the disappearance of the frontier has meant first an increase of tenancy and later a decrease. This is shown by an increase in the proportion of ownership farms in the eastern part of the United States and a decrease in the West—on the frontier. To quote Dr. Truesdell, "Specifically, in 23 states, containing slightly less than one-half the total number of farms, the number of tenant farms increased by 150,000 (between 1920 and 1925), while in the remaining 25 states the number of tenant farms decreased by about 142,000. The 23 states showing an increase in farm tenancy are nearly all in the West, while the 25 states showing a decline are nearly all in the East, except that the 3 Pacific coast states are included in this group. The net increase of a little less than 8,000 tenant farms, already noted, carried with it a change in the percentage of farms operated by tenants from 38.1 in 1920 to 38.6 in 1925."[18] We have several reasons to believe that

[15] For factual verification of these statements, see Henri Sée, *Histoire de Régime Agraire en Europe;* the work of P. Boissonade, already cited; Diehl, Ch., *Byzance;* and the numerous works of P. Vinogradoff, D'Avenel, F. Seebohm, and others.

[16] See Taylor's *Rural Sociology* for such a statement. It is to be found in numerous other works also. See *The Condition of Agriculture in the United States and Measures for Its Improvement, Business Men's Commission on Agriculture,* p. 64, 1927.

[17] *Statistical Abstract of the United States,* 1925, p. 593.

[18] For this discussion of Dr. Truesdell, see *Journal of Farm Economics,* 1926, October, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 443–450. See also his article in *Rural America* for February, 1928.

the rate for tenancy will stabilize itself in this country. There are no apparent unexplainable trends toward a landless proletarian rural class.

As far as Europe is concerned, only those who do not know anything about the present great Agrarian revolution may talk of such a trend. As a matter of fact, the eighty years which have passed since Karl Marx's prediction about the growing dispossession of the peasants from their land have not shown anything similar to it. On the contrary, and especially at the present moment, we have witnessed the enormous process of transference of the land of the big landlords into the hands of the peasantry in practically all European countries (Germany, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Esthonia, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Greece, and some other countries). During the past few years more than 125,000,000 acres of land, implements, and cattle were taken from the landlords and, either without any remuneration or one which was quite insignificant, were passed into the hands of the peasantry. At the present moment the real situation in Europe is such that there are only a few insignificant remnants of large estates in the hands of the owners other than the peasantry and farmers.[19] Large land-holdings have disappeared almost entirely. Under such circumstances there is no reason to talk about a trend in the dispossession of peasants from their land or of the increasing of the landless agricultural proletariat, or of the present landless peasant class. It has been, and is, especially now, particularly a proprietorial class.

2. *Wealth and Income of the Farmer-Peasant Class.* Though the class studied is proprietorial *par excellence*, nevertheless, the *average wealth and income of the whole class is not high. Compared with that of the city population it is, first, somewhat lower, second, more evenly distributed and free from the enormous contrasts of exceedingly rich and exceedingly poor, which marks the city distribution of wealth and income; and third, the average income (and wealth) of the farmer and peasant owners is much below that of the city proprietorial classes and is near to that of the urban labor classes.* Such are the principal peculiarities of the rural class in this respect.

In so far as the amount of wealth and income of a man or a group is one of the important factors in behavior, and social antagonisms and solidarities, the farmer-peasant class in this respect is much

[19] See a good account of the present Agrarian revolution in Europe in Schiff, Walter, "Die Agrargesetzgebung der Europäischen Staaten vor und nach dem Kriege," *Archiv für Socialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Heft 2, pp. 465–529, 1925. See also the data in Sombart, W., *Das Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus*, pp. 822 ff., 968 ff.; Manniche, P., "The Rise of the Danish Peasantry," *Sociolog. Review*, p. 36, 1928.

nearer to the urban labor class and much further from the upper proprietorial urban classes. In so far as this condition exists, it facilitates a solidarization of the rural class with the poor and the laboring classes of the city against the urban and rural wealthier classes. If, in other respects, the farmer-peasant class had been also similar to the lower urban classes, then a "farmer-labor union" on the basis of such similarities would have been strong and durable. However, we have already seen and shall see that in these other respects the class studied is nearer to the rich proprietorial urban classes than to the urban labor classes. This often interferes with cohesions based on the similarities of income and wealth of the farmer-peasants and the urban laborers and causes a deviation of the policy of the first class from that of the second.

Proofs concerning these characteristics of the farm income and farm wealth, contrasted with urban incomes and wealth, are certainly not lacking. The proportions of rural and urban incomes above $2,000 for the United States during the period 1910–1916 shows a range for farmers from 7 to 21 per cent, for non-farmers from 35 to 40 per cent. [20]

These figures show that on the average the non-farming classes had higher incomes. Of course, during the war there was an upward movement of farm incomes which placed more above the $2,000 mark, but if the table were computed on the $3,000 limit, all years would show a smaller percentage above for the farmers as a class. We cannot go here into the details of definitions of income or the validity of these figures. There are plenty of proofs as to the understatement of farm incomes, but in the main, the corrections would not disprove the point.

Further proofs are to be found if we compare the total estimated distribution of population filing income tax returns in the United States with the distribution of gross money receipts among Minnesota farmers in 1925 and 1926.[21] The comparison shows that the range of urban incomes is considerably above farm cash receipts or spendable income. Minnesota, as a state, is considerably above the whole United States in average farm wealth, if the southern states be considered, so we may say they more than represent the average size of the farm spendable income.

One of the most valid studies of the whole matter of distribution

[20] These data are from page 112, *Income in the United States*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Vol. I, 1921. No criticisms are given here of the validity of the figures. They could be doubled and still prove the point. For a criticism see Black, A. G., *Wealth and Income of Farmers in the United States*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1927.

[21] See National Wealth and Income, *Senate Document 126*, 69th Congress, 1st session, p. 194. As said above this does not represent a fair distribution of urban incomes; *Minnesota Bulletins 234 and 246*, by C. C. Zimmerman and J. D. Black.

of income is that by the Federal Trade Commission, dealing with the actual values of probated estates in rural, town, and city counties. The period covered is from 1912 to 1923. Twenty-four counties were visited, and all estates probated in these counties for this period were investigated. They were later divided into rural counties (9 with no town above 5,000), town counties (10 with cities of more than 5,000 and none over 50,000) and city counties (5 with cities over 50,000). These latter 5 included Savannah, Georgia, Topeka, Kansas, Washington, D. C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Fall River, Massachusetts. The following table gives the per cents of the total number of estates found to be of each size, and the total proportion of the total probated wealth found in estates of various sizes for the country, town, and city districts.[22]

Size Group for Probated Estates (Dollars)	*Per Cent of Total Number*			*Per Cent of Total Value*		
	Country	*Town*	*City*	*Country*	*Town*	*City*
Under 500	7.9	12.7	15.2	0.2	0.3	0.2
500–1000	8.4	10.8	11.5	0.4	0.8	0.5
1000–2500	17.0	20.1	20.1	2.1	3.6	1.9
2500–5000	16.3	18.9	17.2	4.2	6.7	3.6
5000–10,000	16.1	15.5	14.5	8.2	10.7	6.0
10,000–25,000	19.2	12.5	11.9	22.0	18.6	10.8
25,000–50,000	9.3	4.6	4.7	23.5	15.6	9.7
50,000–100,000	4.6	1.9	2.4	22.6	12.7	9.9
100,000–250,000	.1	.9	1.7	10.6	14.0	14.9
250,000–500,000	.1	.3	.5	3.9	9.2	9.6
500,000–1,000,000	*	.1	.2	2.3	5.2	8.7
1,000,000 and over	—		.1	—	2.6	24.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Less than 0.1 of 1 per cent.

This table may be taken as fairly representative, since it is based upon 43,512 estates in 24 widely separated counties, and covers a period of 11 years. This shows the following chief characteristics. The extremes of wealth are in the towns and cities. The even or normal type of distribution is to be found in the country districts. Estates under $500 comprised 7.9 per cent of those in the country, 12.7 in the towns and 15.2 in the cities. On the other hand, those above $100,000 comprised 1.2 per cent of those in the country, 1.3 per cent of those in town, and 2.5 per cent of those in the cities. But the extreme concentration in cities is brought out further by comparing the proportions of total probated wealth to be found in estates above $100,000 in the types of areas. For country counties it was 16.8 per cent, for towns 31.0 per cent, and for cities 57.4 per cent. The average

[22] Taken from Senate Document 126, *op. cit.*, pp. 59 ff.

value of the estates in city districts was $16,990, in town districts $10,070, and in country districts $13,950. The extremes were in cities. This makes the average higher. This same study shows that the proportion of the property that was *realty* compared with *personalty* was 50.6 in country counties, 41.9 in towns, and 30.6 in cities. The *personalty* or a more mobile property increases with urbanization.[23]

Some specific studies of incomes and expenditures have been made for Minnesota, and these permit some comparison of the averages of urban social groups with farmers.[24]

These Minnesota studies show that the sizes of incomes of farmers are, as a rule, nearer to those of the laboring classes in towns than the upper groups.[25]

What has just been shown for America is true for Europe. Studies made in Sweden between 1914 and 1920 show per unit of consumption, 1,002 crowns in the rural districts and 1,504 in towns.[26]

The same relative differences apply to Denmark, to Japan, to Great Britain, to France, and to Russia. We have the right to assume that this is a general correlation. Few samples illustrate the situation.

A careful study made in Sweden in 1920 gives information concerning differences in incomes and wealth of the population by occu-

[23] *Ibid*, p. 64.

[24] See *Minnesota Bulletins 234, 240*, and others. They are Experiment Station studies by C. C. Zimmerman in co-operation with J. D. Black and others of agricultural economics.

[25] For further data on the United States of America, see Spillman, W. J., "The Farmer's Income," *Circular 132, Bureau of Plant Industry, U. S. D. A.*, 1913; all the studies of the *National Bureau of Economic Research*, including the two special reports on agriculture; the studies by E. L. Kirkpatrick at Cornell and in the publications of the U. S. D. A.; Carver, T. N., *Readings in Rural Economics;* Spahr, Charles B., *The Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States;* King, W. I., *The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States;* Thomson, E. H., "Profits that Farmers Receive," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November 1913, (reprinted in Carver, *op. cit.*); Goldenweiser, E. A., "The Farmer's Income," *U. S. D. A., Farmers' Bul. 746*, 1916; Black, J. D., "Division of the Income between Landlord and Tenant," *Proceedings of the American Association for Agricultural Legislation*, December, 1919; Friday, David, "The Course of Agricultural Income during the Last Twenty-five Years," *American Economic Review Supplement*, 1923, March; Gray, L. C., "Accumulation of Wealth by Farmers," in the same *Supplement to the American Economic Review;* various U. S. D. A. Bulletins and studies and many others. For a good critical analysis see the unpublished Ph.D. Thesis of A. G. Black at Minnesota, *op. cit.* See also Hansen, Alvin, "Effect of Price Fluctuations on Agriculture," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 33, 1925.

[26] See *Levandskostnaderna Pa Lansbygen i Sverige*, vid Ar 1920, Gunnar Huss, director, Swedish Bureau of Labor; *Levandskostnaderna i Sverige*, 1913–14, Del. I, K. Socialstyrelsen; and *Livsmedlsforbrukningen inom mindre Bemedlade Hushall under Krisaren*, 1914 1918. See also *Statistisk Arsbok for Stockholms Stad*, 1914, pp. 275–281. This gives tables from the studies in Stockholm in 1907 and 1908 and compares them with the rural studies by Marcus Rubin in Denmark and with some other urban groups.

pation, rural and urban. The data were taken from the reports of taxable wealth and income. They are as follows:

INCOMES AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATIONS OF RURAL AND URBAN GAINFULLY EMPLOYED BY TYPE OF OCCUPATION FOR SWEDEN, 1920 *

(All figures are in Swedish Crowns)

Type of Occupation	*Average Capital (Per Person Gainfully Employed)*		*Average Income (Per Person Gainfully Employed)*		*Average Income Per Person in Families*	
	Urban	*Rural*	*Urban*	*Rural*	*Urban*	*Rural*
Agr., for., & Fishing	7675	5554	2016	1179	943	553
Industry	2888	1649	3149	2180	1511	891
Commerce & communication	7239	4723	4254	2909	2246	1252
Public service & liberal prof.	8148	3709	5274	3659	2817	1938
Domestic service	173	107	838	497	755	441
Widowed and retired	18,125	4035	4606	1863	1342	310
Total of all	6463	4135	3242	1441	1766	696

* Figures were computed from tables in *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige*, 1925, 1926, and 1927.

A further analysis of the rural and urban distributions of capital, from this same study, gives the following results. Of active population, 30.3 per cent of all in the country had some taxable property and only 16.2 per cent of those in the cities. Thus, more of the city populations were propertyless. However, those who did have property in cities had more. Out of every thousand who had some property in the rural districts, 585 had less than 10,000 crowns in value. For the cities, the comparable figures was 498. Only about 5 out of each thousand with property had more than 200,000 crowns in the country, compared with 44 per thousand of those having property in the cities.

The influence of family units is snown by the fact that of the males classes as "active" in the rural districts, 25.1 per cent had no fixed revenue compared with 12.7 in the urban districts. Corresponding proportions for active females was 59.8 in the rural districts and 27.1 in the urban districts. The corresponding average income per worker among the active population was 6,271 crowns for Stockholm, 4884 for other cities over 30,000 population, 4,106 crowns for cities under 30,000 and 2,463 for the rural districts. These last figures apply to males only. A similar distribution applies to the females.[27]

A similar study for Russia, gives the same correlation between

[27] *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige*, years cited.

urbanization and increase of incomes.[28] According to this study in 1923–24 the different social classes had a yearly per capita income (expressed in roubles): peasants 62.3; workers and employees 187.7; artisans and members of the liberal professions 225.6; tradesmen 311.1; other city population 226.1; average for the country being 89.9 roubles.

The same study for Russia brings out the differences in distribution of wealth in rural and urban districts. The urban incomes were concentrated at the bottom and spread out at the top. This appears, in spite of the attempts of the Soviet government to destroy the high income classes and improve the economic conditions of the poorer working men. Further studies, summarized in the above-mentioned article and elsewhere, find that the differences in rural standards of living and incomes vary much less than in the city.[29] The data given are sufficient to bear out the statements given at the beginning of this paragraph.

3. *Standards of Living of the Farmer-Peasant Class.* If the standard of living of the rural classes are to be judged by the general measures used as indicators of the way people live, *the rural groups have a lower standard than the average of the urban classes.* The proportions of the budget used for non-physiological expense average less in the country. It is generally assumed that the proportion of the budget spent for items other than so-called basic necessities is the best index of the level of living. Whether or not this is a proper standard cannot be decided here. But the facts are that the proportions spent for non-physiological expense is smaller in the country than the average of the urban groups, and the rate of increase of this non-physiological group with increase of incomes, is generally slower in the country. Further, the standards of living of the rural population and its various groups (owners, tenants, croppers, and laborers) are more homogeneous than those of the urban classes. The urban standards of living and the various social classes are differentiated by their "conspicuous and wasteful consumption." Judged by these same measures, *the rural standards of living are much nearer to those of the lower city classes than the upper, especially the professional and upper proprietorial groups.* In so far as the standards of living are also an important factor in the attitudes and social relationships of a group, the rural classes are much nearer to the laboring than to the upper classes in cities, if savings for the future be omitted from consideration. This gives the farmer-peasant class more solidarity with the

[28] Litoschenko, L. N., "The National Income of the Soviet Union," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* November, 1927, Vol. 42, pp. 70 ff.

[29] Some of the data are given in *Ten Years of Soviet Power,* Publication of the Russian Soviet Government, 1927. These deal with ranges of food consumption (in English).

lower than with the upper urban classes in the so-called class struggle. However, other factors enter into this inter-class solidarity which partly annul the effect of similarity of standards of living. The rural standards of living or household budgets have their own peculiarities, which differ generally from urban standards of living. These peculiarities of the rural budget and standard of living are as follows: *The rural living is secured more from nature and less through the market place.* This is especially true for items of food, household, and fuel. Much of each of these items is secured by the spare time of the farm family. In a great many cases this spare time of the family, such as the labor of the women and the children and, after hours, of the head of the household, has little, if any, market value. If it were not used for the purpose of gardening, gathering the fuel, or fixing up the house it could hardly be sold or marketed, even through increased farm production, as a rule. Further, the items such as garden produce and fuel have also little market value, because, if not consumed, they could not be sold. *The living and the business of the farm are an undifferentiated unit, so that they may be separated only in a most arbitrary and unrealistic manner.* This means that the spendable income of the farmer-peasant class is first of all distributed between the business and the living before the items of living are given separate consideration. Such is relatively not true for the urban classes, where the business and the home are much more widely separated. This is illustrated by the old adage among farmers that "a good barn will build a good house quicker than a good house will build a good barn." Due to this combination of business and living, and to numerous other factors such as the family mores and others, *farmers have a stronger sense of the future than the average of the urban population. Much more of their incomes is saved and invested for the future.* The result is, that with even smaller incomes, the incidence of community and state support in old age is much less among the rural classes. The poorhouse, widows' pensions and old-age allowances are urban phenomena and primarily supported for urban groups. *The rural environment which determines the distribution of the budget and the standards of living is considerably different form the urban environment.* The rural classes adjust themselves to this environment, and therefore may not be judged by urban standards. Neither may urban people be judged primarily by rural standards. A good illustration is the matter of clothing. Less variety and more work clothing is required in the country. The work clothing is of standardized articles which have not been affected by style prices. There are other differences in the needs for clothing. As a result, the two groups may not be fairly compared with each other according to the amount or proportions of the budget spent for clothing. Of a similar nature are

recreation expenditures in towns. Urban recreation must be purchased to a greater extent, and the greater spare time each day, coupled with the monotony and debilitating influences of urban life, undoubtedly requires more. The same standards of expenditure or attendance at commercialized recreation may not be fairly applied to both groups. Another illustration is in the matter of food consumption. The rural classes need more food because of the greater expenditure of physical labor and the outdoor life. They ingest more, and it is of different quality. The American rural classes as a rule consume more bread, poultry products, dairy products, and vegetables in the course of a year. The American urban classes consume less food, and it is of a different quality. They are generally said to secure more of a variety, although this variety is oftentimes secured at the cost of the real caloric and vitamin value to the food. In this respect, we must differentiate the upper and lower urban classes, because the upper classes approach much closer to, and, as a rule, surpass, the rural classes in their food standards. We are not sure that the peasant class in all countries eat better or more food than urban, middle, and even the laboring class. These statements apply for certain only to the United States.

On the basis of the above statements, we are justified in saying that the attempts to apply urban standards to rural families, as far as living is concerned, are not always justified. Ernst Engel made a study of budgets in Europe during the latter half of the last century and stated his four principles of the distribution of the budget as follows:[30]

1. As the family income increases, a smaller *proportion* is spent for food.

2. The *proportion* for clothing remains approximately the same.

3. The *proportion* of expenditures for rent, fuel, and light remains invariably the same.

4. The *proportion* of expenditures for cultural wants rises constantly.

Since the time of Engel, it has become the custom among students of family budgets to seek for these principles and comparatively few other generalizations. There has been a deluge of comparisons of rural and urban living based on the assumption that rural budgets should be evaluated by these comparisons and principles. Studies since the day of Engel have shown that the primary characteristic of Engel's laws (the primary competition in the budget is that a competition always exists between physiological and non-physiological expenditures and an increase of income sees the non-physiological

[30] See *Die Lebenskosten*, *op. cit.*, for the last and most comprehensive study of Engel's. F. Leplay originally suggested the basis of this set of generalizations.

type increase most rapidly) hold for the laboring, clerical, and some of the other salaried groups in society. But recent studies made by Zimmerman at Minnesota show that this is not the primary type of competition in the budgets of the upper professional, and both lower and upper business groups in society. Neither is it the primary competition in the budgets of farmers, especially those farmers who are operators, which includes the majority. If we are to agree with the writers who assume that farmers have low standards of living because they do not, as a rule, behave according to the exact principles as stated by Engel, we must also say that the upper professional and business groups of society have low standards of living. *These upper urban groups increase the investment expenditures much faster than the so-called cultural expenditures. Such is also the primary characteristic of operating farmers.* Now let us give some proofs of these various statements.

E. L. Kirkpatrick gives some comparisons of distribution of expenditures which show that the cultural expenditures of farmers are somewhat near that of laborers, and consequently on the whole lower than the average of all city families. His data are as follows:[31]

Comparison of Percentages of Total Expenditures Used for Different Items by New York Farmers and American Wage Earners. *

Item of Expenditure	*U. S. Department Labor Study of* 1890–91	1918–19	*Noble's Study of Groton, N. Y. Laborers, 1919*	*Kirkpatrick's New York Farmers,* 1920–21
Food	41.1	38.2	41.7	39.2
Rent	15.1	13.4	13.1	12.0
Clothing	15.3	16.6	11.3	13.8
Fuel and light	5.9	5.3	6.8	7.4
All other purposes	22.7	26.4	27.1	27.7

* The U. S. Department of Labor studies are to be found in *Seventh Annual Report* and the *Bulletin for August, 1919;* Noble's study has since been published as *Cornell Agr. Exp. Sta. Bul. 431.* In the same table Kirkpatrick gives other data for the works of Eden, Engel, Leplay, and others, but they concern laborers relatively pauperized and covering a period of 50 to 100 years earlier, so the comparison is omitted here.

This table shows, according to Dr. Kirkpatrick's calculations, that laborers and farmers are not far separated in many respects in their standards of living. Some computations for Minnesota show that it would cost about $4,300 for the upper 10 per cent of the farm families to live as well in Minneapolis or St. Paul as they were living on the farms.[32]

At the same time the upper business and professional families in the villages and towns of the state (the upper 14 per cent) spent $5,332

[31] *Cornell Experiment Station Bulletin 423,* p. 39; *U. S. D. A. Bul. 1214.*
[32] *Minnesota Bul. 240,* p. 15.

and $5,698 respectively for their living.[33] These data are sufficient to show that in many respects, the standards of living of the farmers as a class approaches closer to that of the wage earners than the upper classes in urban society.

In another sense of the word standards of living, the rural classes approach closer to the upper groups. That is, *in the proportions of the budgets used for savings, investments, and the future.* For Minnesota, it was found that in 1927, 41 per cent of the income of the upper business groups was used for this purpose compared with 6 per cent among the common laborers. Minnesota farmers invested 17.4 per cent of their total cash receipts for the years 1925 and 1926. If the portions of the receipts used for producing the incomes be deducted, farmers were found to save and invest from 15 to 35 or an average of 27 per cent of their net spendable incomes, even if payments of interest for use of capital and loans be omitted. None of the laboring groups used more than 16 per cent of their net spendable incomes for purposes of savings, yet the lowest income group of farmers used about that much. The results of more than forty best studies of incomes and expenditures in various countries give similar pictures and bring out the same relative factors in the standards of living of the rural and urban classes. This remarkable uniformity of the results discussed entitle us to claim that the phenomenon discussed is general and typical.[34] These studies show that farm spendable incomes increase at a faster rate than either physiological or non-physiological expenditures. Such is not true for any of the lower groups in cities. Neither is it true for the rural laboring groups included in this study. For these lower urban classes in cities, the non-physiological expenditures increase faster than either spendable income or physiological expense. These groups spend their incomes for present consumption to a greater extent. A corollary to this is that physiological expense increases at a slower rate than spendable incomes among laborers. This is just a statement of Engel's laws of expenditures in other terms. The urban upper and middle classes save much of their increased incomes similar to farmers.

The same phenomenon appears in the distribution of expenditures by age groups in cities and on farms. The table on page 79 based on the same Minnesota data shows the proportions of the budget used for investment purposes for the different age groups of farmers and laboring and upper classes in the towns and villages.

[33] *Minnesota Bul.*

[34] In view of a complexity of the figures and enormous number of references no actual figures and references to the sources of these studies are given here. They are given in detail in Zimmerman, C. C., and Black, John D., *Minnesota Experiment Station Bulletin No. 246*, 1928, appendix.

PROPORTIONS OF THE FAMILY BUDGETS USED FOR INSURANCE, SAVINGS, INVESTMENTS, (INCLUDING REINVESTMENTS IN THE BUSINESS)

Age Groups of Heads of Households	*Farmers*	*Laboring Families*	*Salaried and Business Class*
Less than 30	11	19	27
31–35	17	12	21
36–40	18	12	27
41–45	22	11	21
46–50	17	12	25
51–55	18	15	30
56–60	18	5	31
61 or more	19	15	30
Total	18	13	27

The two characteristics of farmers are similar to the upper groups. First, *there is some tendency for the proportions invested to increase with age.* This is not true of the laboring families. (This table includes all grades of wage-earning families from unskilled to skilled.) Second, *the proportions invested by the farm families are large.* The farm investments would be larger yet if their proportions were computed on the basis of net spendable income rather than gross cash receipts.

The following conclusions are suggested. The situation to which the farm budget is adjusted is different from that of the city classes. The rural groups are relatively similar to the lower urban groups in their consumption of material goods of the present. They are similar to the upper classes in their savings for the future. All these conclusions are especially evident from the comparisons of laborers, farmers, and salaried and business classes in Minnesota.

This "sense of the future" as indicated by savings and investments, is brought out by the proportions of persons from the various groups supported by the state in old age. It is a well-known fact that farm groups have a greater proportion of aged persons than city populations. In spite of this, fewer of them are given poor law relief and state aid. Of course, family organization and integrity are factors in this. But savings is a main factor. The fear of the "poorhouse" is a prominent attitude among rural groups. The details in proof of this are numerous and will be given further. Here it is enough to mention this fact as an additional evidence of the point discussed.

The fact that the *rural standards of living come more from nature and less from the market places* is so obvious it hardly needs verification. We have already quoted the Swedish study which showed 39 per cent of the incomes of the wage earners and tenants was in kind rather than in money. Data from about 10,000 farm families in the United States between 1913 and 1922, furnished by H. W. Hawthorne,

show the value of the family living from the farm was 38 per cent of the total value and 66 per cent of the value of food, imputed house rent, and fuel. It increases rapidly with size of farm and the size of the family. There were no differences between the tenants and the owners in this respect, except in "house rent, "which means to say that tenants raise as much food for themselves as owners, but owners have better houses.[35]

This brings out the further principle that the *rural families improve their standards of living, not only by their ability to make more money, but as well as by their joint ability to make money and use spare time and the natural environment of farm life for additional food and supplies and other economic or psychic "goods."* The Minnesota studies show that the value of the home-produced food among Minnesota farmers is rather greater than the value of the purchased food.[36]

The materials presented here corroborate the generalizations concerning the farmer-peasant standard of living and outlines its characteristics and peculiarities. The data show that from this standpoint the class studied occupies again a peculiar position, partly like those of both the labor and the upper urban classes and partly different from those of both urban groups.

4. *The Nature of the Income Sources of the Farmer-Peasant Class.* Economists generally divide the nature and sources of income into wages and salaries, interest, rents, and profits. Wages and salaries are the sources of incomes of the laboring classes and employees, interest and profits of the capitalists and enterprisers, and rents of the landlord class. Whatever may be the classification of the nature of income, one thing is clear. The farmer-peasant class (with the exception of hired farm labor) has quite a peculiar position, which is different from all other social classes. *The income nature of the rural class studied represents a combination of almost all of these kinds of income:* in part, it is a wage for their own labor; in part, it is a profit from their enterprises and interest on the money invested; and finally, in part, it is a rent for their own land and immovable property. In brief, the income nature of the farmer-peasant class is a composite. As a rule they receive almost all categories of income.

This means again, that, from this standpoint, the farmer-peasant class cannot be identified with any of the large urban social classes. Its economic interests are not entirely different from any of the other classes but, at the same time, are not entirely similar to any of them. In political activity, this is likely to lead to temporary solidar-

[35] See *U. S. D. A. Bulletin No. 1338* for a comprehensive study and bibliography. See also Rankin, J. O., *Nebraska Bulletin 219;* Kirkpatrick, E. L., and Sanders, J. T., *U. S. Department Bulletin 1382;* Kirkpatrick's study, *Department Bulletin No. 1466;* and Thaden, J. F., *Iowa Bulletin No. 238.*

[36] See *Minnesota Bulletin No. 246.*

izations of this class with any one of the other classes and to a possibility of antagonism to all urban classes, as a whole, according to the circumstances. A factual historical verification of this proposition seems to justify the statement.

On the basis of some of the Minnesota and other studies the following conclusions may be drawn about the sources of farmer-peasant income and that of other economic groups. Farmers made a living by selling products, working on the roads for wages, working on other farms (or children's wages) and from investments. These sales of crops represented wages, expenses, profits on investment and interest. Just how farmers' incomes should be divided between these items, no one has been able to compute with any degree of exactness. The fact remains that the farmers' incomes are a composite of all types and may not be divided without a number of assumptions which are practical guesses.

As to the matter of ownership by farmers of property other than in agriculture from which they receive incomes, the estimates by L. C. Gray for 1920[37] show that the amount of non-agricultural property (cash and bank deposits, stocks and bonds in urban enterprises, real estates, etc.) was more than 7.5 billions of dollars.

The data for Switzerland and Denmark give similar results.[38]

All types of agriculture involved family labor, hired labor, the purchase of capital goods, and other costs of exploitation. This distribution of real costs of operation (plus the imputation of family labor) gives a real index to the general nature to the agricultural income and its diverse sources of origin.

Thus all the essential aspects which characterize the economic status of a group—1, its proprietorial or non-proprietorial character in regard to means and instruments of production; 2, amount of wealth and income; 3, standard of living, and 4, the nature of the sources of income—unanimously show that the class studied occupies a position dissimilar from all urban classes. In some parts it is nearer to the urban labor classes, and in others, to the urban proprietorial and upper classes. In some respects it is different from all of them. This suggests that the economic interests of the farmer-peasant class cannot be identified with those of any of urban classes. In so far as economic status and interests of a class influence its lines of policy, its social solidarities and antagonisms with other classes, the farmer-peasant class cannot be expected to solidarize consistently either with the labor or proprietorial urban classes. According to the circumstances it may join any of these groups against the other; and may be

[37] Gray, L. C., "Accumulation of Wealth by Farmers," *American Economic Review*, Supplement, March, 1923, p. 175.

[38] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1925, p. 104. *Stat. Aarbog Danmark*, 1926, p. 55.

against all urban classes. A similar result was given by the analysis of the occupational status of the farmer-peasants. The identity of the results in both cases only increase their validity.

The Socio-Political Status of the Farmer-Peasant Class. For a characterization of the socio-political status of a social class the following features are especially important: first, the degree of socio-political stratification within the class studied; second, the comparative totality of rights and disfranchisements of a given class and other social classes; third, the principal peculiarities, both juridical and factual, of the status of a given class. Let us glance at the rural class from all these standpoints.

1. *Socio-Political Stratification Within the Farmer-Peasant Class.* In the foregoing discussion, it was indicated that the *rural population is economically and occupationally less differentiated and stratified than the urban population. This seems to be true also in regard to its socio-political stratification.* If we exclude wealthy landowners from the class studied, the mass of the agricultural population, as a rule, has approximately the same amount of rights and duties. In regard to civil, constitutional, criminal, and administrative rights and duties, there is not much difference between farmer-peasant owner and the farm-tenant and laborer. The differences are concerned principally with the rights and duties connected with domicile (a part of the laborers who reside in a given locality only a short time for this reason are often prevented from voting) and ownership (in some countries for active participation in elections and in local government, one is required to be an owner of property in a given locality). On the other hand, the conditions of domicile and ownership put on the permanent residents and land-proprietors of a locality additional duties and taxes from which the farm-laborers and shifting population are free. These are the major differences. In other respects, such as almost all the processes of civil, criminal, processual, and constitutional law, there is no tangible difference between the upper and the lower strata of the agricultural population. Even in regard to various governmental positions of an agricultural community, in so far as these positions are "local" and dependent upon or elected by the rural population, the positions give very moderate rights to their holder. For this reason they do not "elevate" the official rural class (positions of sheriff, coroner, members of local peasant court, heads of local peasant self-governmental institutions such as the Russian "volostnoi starshina," village policeman, village clerks, and so on) much above the socio-political status of the mass of the agricultural population. There is nothing even approximately similar to the great social distance which separates the upper class of officials in the city from the total urban population (status of the

governors, kings, presidents, mayors, judges of supreme courts, ministers or secretaries of departments, popes, metropolitans and bishops, and other supreme authorities). If sometimes such a high official visits or resides in a rural community, as a rule, he comes from the city, and is appointed by the central government. For this reason, he does not belong to the rural population. Not only in the past, but even now, the height of the urban social pyramid is much greater than that of the rural. As a rule, the latter has always been less stratified and more "equal" in its socio-political status than the urban population. This means that "contrasts of the upper and the lower classes" within the rural population are less conspicuous than within the urban. For this reason, the class-struggle, in so far as it is due to differences in socio-political status, between various strata of farmer-peasant class (with the exception of the stratum of big landowners) has been more moderate than between various strata of the city population.

2. *The Socio-Political Status of the Farmer-Peasant Class in Comparison with that of Other Classes.* If we exclude the stratum of big landowners from the rural class, the stratum which according to its origin, residence, and other essential characteristics, has always been urban, then, as a rule, *the whole socio-political status of the farmer-peasant class has always been much lower than that of the whole urban population and especially the upper urban classes.* The totality of rights and privileges of the rural class has been, and still is, below that of the urban population. The totality of various disfranchisements has always been greater than for the whole city population. Privileges and rights in regard to suffrage and voting in this or that form, have been extended to the rural class later than to other classes and have had more limitations than for the bulk of the city population.[39] In various forms this remains up to the present time. The same is true in regard to many civil, criminal, processual, and administrative rights of the rural classes. For instance, after 1861 in Russia, all urban classes had the right of private ownership of land; the bulk of the peasant class did not have such a right and lived up to 1906, under the régime of "community-land ownership" (obschina). In a similar way, while long ago other classes were exempted from punishment in the form of whipping, the peasant class was exempted from it only in 1905. While there were no special courts for the other classes, a special court existed for the peasant class up to the eve of the last Revolution. Similar limitations and disfranchise-

[39] Even now in many countries, large portions of the peasant population do not have many of these rights and have a series of restrictions of various types. A typical example is given by Soviet Russia, where the vote of an urban laborer counts several times more than a vote of a peasant.

ments have been existing for the farmer-peasant class in many other countries. In the countries where such juridical limitations were abolished, the factual socio-political status of the rural class has been, nevertheless, always somewhat below that of the urban population. Indeed, in regard to taxes, military, and other duties, the farmer-peasant class has been loaded no less, in many cases even more, than the urban population. In regard to the share of the national income, to rights or factual possibilities for having various social services (number of hospitals, schools, churches, theaters, telephone, roads, and so on), or to various protective laws which would defend their interests as producers and as an economic class, in these respects the "privileges" of the rural class have always been more limited than those of the bulk of the urban population. There are reasons to believe that in all these respects the farmer-peasant class has always been "robbed" or "exploited" (consciously or unconsciously) by the city populations since the time of the emergency and the growth of the cities. The same is to be said about factual representation in the government and the political influence of this class in all democratic countries. As a rule, the class has been represented in parliaments, governments, congresses, or the supreme and governing bodies below its proportion in the total population. Its interests have been defended, as a rule, very inadequately in the politics of the countries, and more than often have been sacrificed in favor of various urban groups and classes, including the urban labor class. Only very rarely and for short periods of time has the class succeeded in having a share of political influence and political status somewhat approaching that of the urban population. But such periods have been rare and short-lived. They are more than counterbalanced by the times in which the city exploitation of the rural class was exceedingly drastic, and the cities openly and frankly played the rôle of a parasite living almost entirely at the cost of the rural population. An illustration is the forcible taking of agricultural products and giving nothing in exchange except bullets, punishment, execution, and imprisonment of the farmers and peasants who tried to oppose, as in the case of the cities of Soviet Russia for these past few years.

In so far as such inequalities are always resented by any group, the privileged position of the cities naturally has been resented by the rural class. Sometimes this resentment has been shown mildly in tones of complaint, but sometimes in the form of acute revolts against cities generally. In so far as the political status of the farmer-peasant class has been discriminated against, this class has been antagonistic to the city population generally. In regard to the nearness of the socio-political status of the rural class to various

urban classes, it is evident that its position is much nearer to the lower (particularly the urban labor classes) because their political status has been relatively more similar to the farmer-peasant status than that of the upper urban classes. In so far, it is natural that this similarity, in many cases, has determined a more solid joint policy by farmer-peasants and urban laborers directed against the privileged urban classes including the class of big landlords. If, in other respects, there were no important differences and conflicts of interests between these two classes (the lower urban and the rural), the lines of their policies might have been quite consistent and uniform against common foes and enemies. In view, however, of the existence of a series of important differences in occupational and economic status between the urban labor and the rural class, and in view of many conflicts between these classes, even in the field of political interests the relative similarities and solidarities just discussed are often smashed by the interference of these conflicts and differences. Such in essentials is the comparative position of the rural class in regards to political status.

3. *The Peculiarities of the Socio-Political Status of Farmer-Peasant Class.* Concrete peculiarities are rather various and numerous, according to the country and the historical period. Their characterization cannot compose the topic for a sociological work. But among them, one particular characteristic always has been present, namely, an inadequate political organization of the class studied which has rendered it incapable of defending its interests and rights successfully, and of putting itself at an equal level with the urban population. In spite of enormous numerical and potential preponderance, especially in the past and in predominantly agricultural countries of the present, the rural part of a country was and is generally ruled by the urban part whose population may be an insignificant minority in comparison with the rural population. This, of course, has been due not so much to any particular superiority of the urban or stupidity of the rural population, as to a series of circumstances connected with urbanity and rurality. Some of the chief factors have been the wide scattering of the rural population over the territory, weak contacts with other rural communities, low densities of population, and a lack of concentration within the rural population of wealth, weapons, and other "means of influencing" the opposing groups. These have rendered impossible an efficient centralized and quick organization of the cultivators in various "fighting" and "defending" military, political, and influential units or associations. As a result, numerically weaker city communities, with their concentration of population on a relatively small territory, with the possibility of efficient and centralized military and political machinery, not to

mention the concentration of wealth, press, preachers, teachers, military leaders, and other "forces" necessary for efficient organization, have dominated the countries. The urban groups exert a political influence quite disproportionate to the proportion of urban population. This peculiarity remains up to the present time, in spite of several attempts to eliminate it on the part of the farmer-peasant class and its leaders and in spite of radios, telephones, new means of transportation, and other recent devices, which, to some extent, help the farmer-peasant class in elimination of the above sources of its political weakness.

4. *Statistical and Historical Verification of the Previous Generalizations Regarding the Socio-Political Status of the Farmer-Peasant Class.* The characterization of this status given above is, in its substantial parts, well supported by historical and contemporary data. The inequality of the rural population, its disadvantageous position in comparison with urban population and the antagonism of city and country people, has gone on conspicuously throughout history since the moment of appearance of cities up to the present day.

a. The very origin of the city, whether in the Ancient East, Greece, and Rome or in Medieval Europe, already presupposes the intentional or unintentional acquirement of advantages by the city at the cost of the country. In this sense there was an exploitation and inequality between socio-political status of the rural and the urban populations. The first cities were everywhere predominantly "Consumption Cities" (in the terminology of W. Sombart), which did not procure their living from their own products, of which there were none, but procured it (from the country) on the basis of some juridical title (taxes, rent, appropriation, etc.) without giving material or economic equivalent to the country. The first urbanites were predominantly "Consumers" (landlords, kings, princes, priests, military men, etc., and their servants) who derived their means of subsistence—through coercion, force, or milder methods—from the agricultural population giving little or no economic equivalent.[40] *Therefore "urbanocracy" or the socio-political domination of the city over the country, and the various ways of expansion and maintaining the economic and political domination of the city and its exploitation of the country, appeared with the appearance of cities.* In regard to the country, the urban inhabitants composed a solid unity which egotistically in various ways—compulsory taxation, direct robbery, confiscation, regulation and control of agricultural work and its produce, transportation, distribution, consumption, importation into cities, exportation to other places, conditions of bartering in agriculture produce,

[40] See Sombart, Werner, *Der Moderne Capitalismus*, Band I, erste Hälfte, pp. 142 ff.; and 180 ff., 1919; Sée Henri, *Les Origines du Capitalisme moderne*, pp. 34 ff.; 1926.

and so on—established their privileged position of domination. Often they treated the agriculturists as a conquered people.[41] Even when "trade and commerce" between the city and the country was carried on in less coercive forms, factually the balance was almost always in favor of the city. This led and permitted the cities to accumulate wealth, and through such an accumulation to increase their domination still more.[42] Later on, when the cities became seats not only of commercial, but financial and industrial capitalism, the relationship became somewhat better and domination and exchange of economic goods was not so rude and compulsory. Nevertheless, "the equality of the socio-political status" of rural and urban people has not been realized completely, yet.[43]

Shall we wonder, therefore, that almost simultaneously with the appearance of the cities, there appeared complaints against the city, and antagonism between them. Hesiod's *Works and Days* in ancient Greece (about the VIIIth century B.C.) is a sample of such a complaint.[44] The disturbances of that period, in part, at least, had the character of a struggle between the rural and urban people, especially between the rural classes and the noble landlords who had enormous amounts of land concentrated in their hands. The old Egyptian *The Complaints of the Peasant* bears also some traces of this antagonism.[45] In the history of Rome and Greece, the antagonism and domination of the city over the rustics goes throughout sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker.

Although "the economic prosperity of the Roman Empire rested" on the tillers of soil, their "toil and travail never brought them any share either in the civilized life of the cities or in the management of local affairs." [46]

In the period of the Roman Empire as well as earlier in Syria, Egypt, and other Roman provinces "the rustic peasant population is constantly represented as a poor and oppressed class, ground down by rich lords who were the landowners of the city. At the first opportunity the peasants were ready to show their hatred of their oppressors." [47]

The peasants' petition made by a certain Aurelius Eclectus, depicts a situation which probably was more or less common throughout most of Roman history: "We are atrociously oppressed and

[41] See Sombart, W., *op. cit.*, Chap. VIII.
[42] *Ibid.*, Chaps. IX–XI; Sée, H., *op. cit.*, pp. 35 ff.
[43] See Sombart, W., *op. cit.*, Vols. I, II, III, *passim.*
[44] See Halliday, William R., *The Growth of the City State*, pp. 85 ff., Boston, 1923.
[45] See the story in Erman, A., *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians*, trans. by A. M. Blackman, pp. 116–131, London, 1927.
[46] Rostovtzeff, M., *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, p. 451. See also Frank, Tenney, *An Economic History of Rome*, pp. 42, 122–126.
[47] Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

squeezed by those whose duty it is to protect the people. . . . These men—officers, soldiers, city notables, magistrates, and your (Emperor Philip's) subordinate agents . . . come to our village and take us away from our work and requisition our plough-oxen, exacting from us what is not due to them." [48] "The sharp antagonism between the peasants and the landowners of the cities may be found also in Egypt." [49] In later periods the peasants' oppression became so pitiless, and correspondingly, their hatred of the city became so hot, they were glad for any opportunity to destroy the cities and to kill and torture their inhabitants, as their worst enemy. This, according to such a competent historian as Rostovtzeff, was one of the most important factors in Roman decay.[50]

Similar was the relationship in European history from the beginning of urbanization of Europe and the appearance of cities. From the development of cities—the city-community, "worked solely for the profit of its members, without any regard for the rights of the neighboring and hostile communities. . . . It subjected the peasants of the surrounding district to itself, prevented a development of their commerce" and in hundreds of ways dominated, oppressed, and exploited them.[51]

With the development of the cities and growth of the non-agricultural classes, the land (its legal title but not possession) began to concentrate more and more into the hands of the non-agricultural classes,—governmental groups, the church, city landowners, and so on—who received a portion of the produce of the same rural class but who, as a rule, resided principally in the cities. The title to the land and its whole produce went more and more from the hands of the peasantry. The peasantry more and more were turned into serfdom, bondage, and half-free villeins and, in this way, directly and indirectly, were made a prey for the cities and non-agricultural classes. Besides, as K. Bücher says, "the wealth of the cities expropriated in all directions the possessions of the peasant and down to the present has continued to exploit him as a wretched metayer." [52] Hence, the "perpetual subjection of the peasants to the city groups and their sullen discontent" from time to time resulted in peasants' riots, revolts, and jaqueries against the cities and the dominant upper city classes,[53] including, of course, the big landowners.

We are often told that, with the growth of the cities in the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the cities were responsible for

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 426.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 447.
[50] See there pp. 237, 245, 253, 370, 443–447, 453, 628, 470 and *passim*.
[51] Boissonnade, P., *Life and Work in Mediæval Europe*, pp. 202 ff., N. Y., 1927.
[52] Bücher, K., *Industrial Evolution*, pp. 133–134.
[53] Boissonnade, P., *op. cit.*, pp. 101, 316–331.

liberation of the peasants from slavery, serfdom, and their unfree status. Perhaps in some ways it was so, but "the liberation" had other aspects, scarcely consistent with the word "liberation." During those centuries,

In all countries the peasant class happened to be dispossessed of its land; this is a trait common to all (European countries of that time). If further, we try to study the personal conditions (of the peasantry) in various countries, there appear some clearly cut differences. In Italy and in England, parallel with the liberation of the peasants from serfdom, they were more and more dispossessed of land (juridically) and formed the proletarian class; they were forced to cultivate the land of the *seigneurs* either as farmers or as laborers, living by the work of their hands. In the North-East of Germany, in Denmark, in Poland, and the Baltic provinces, the evolution was opposite: peasants who before were free in the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries were reduced to serfdom; they fell under the absolute domination of the proprietors who were to be considered but big entrepreneurs exploiting the gratuitous work of their subjects. The proprietors' estates were more and more aggrandized through the expropriation of peasants' land.[54]

(Land possession here is used to mean tillage rights without feudal dues other than taxes to the state. "Dispossessed peasants" generally returned all or part of their lands with certain feudal dues such as for marriage, succession, rent, church, wars, and other exigencies.) As these proprietors, in the majority, directly or indirectly, were urban groups and classes, and as both forms of change of peasant status in the centuries mentioned were rather negative for the peasants, one is confirmed again that during those centuries, the domination of the city over the peasantry, and the disfranchised position of the rural people remained. One is also cautioned in his enthusiasm for ascribing the liberation of the rural class to the cities and to view this liberation as a mere function of urbanization as do many enthusiasts. See about that in further chapters about political attitudes and democracy.

During the past two centuries, serfdom, slavery, and similar forms of unfree status of the peasants have been abolished. Nevertheless, the rights and privileges of the class studied scarcely any time have been equal really to that of the city people in general. Juridically and factually there always have existed a series of limitations and inequalities unfavorable to the rural agricultural class.[55] Up to the

[54] Loutchisky, J., *L'état des classes agricoles en France à la veille de la Révolution*, pp. 11–13. See also Sée, Henri, *La France économique et Social au XVIII siècle.*

[55] See the essentials of the situation during the Middle Ages up to the beginning of the nineteenth century in the quoted works of Sombart, Boissonnade, Vinogradoff, P., Sée, and numerous works indicated in these books.

"modern period," even juridically their political status was inferior to those of the city group.

b. The same may be said of the present in regard to the democratic countries, especially where farmer-peasants are declared juridically equal to other classes, and where they are praised, at least, in electoral speeches. Is the share of the political influence and power of the class studied factually proportionate to its share in the total population? Are the rights and interests of the rural class as well protected as those of city people?

An adequate answer to the question is exceedingly difficult, nevertheless, some significant data may be given. One of the criteria of political power and influence and political protection of the interests of any given social class is the number of the members of that given class represented in the political institutions. This criterion tells unmistakably that even now, when, as we shall see, *the political representation of the farmer-peasant class has been on the ascent, the class is represented in parliaments, congresses, and governments much below its proportion in the total occupational population or in the total population generally.* A few representative data show this clearly. In Soviet Russia, where the peasants compose from 83 to 89 per cent of the population (or occupational population), they compose only from 26.8 to 28 per cent of the representatives in All-Russian Congresses of Soviets, 25 per cent of the members of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union (the highest political authority juridically) and only 5.8 per cent of the personnel of other important political institutions.[56] Thus, the peasant class is represented more than three times less than it ought to be if the representation were to be proportionate to the proportion of the class in the total occupational, or even general, population. In France in 1906, the agricultural population composed about 42 per cent of the whole occupational population. In the years 1889 to 1892 the per cent was about 50. And yet, in the French Chamber of the Deputies (Parliament) in the fifth session of the legislature (1889–1892) out of 578 deputies only 10 or 1.8 per cent of all representatives were agriculturists according to their occupation. In the tenth legislature (1910–1914), out of 558 representatives only 32 or 5.7 per cent were agriculturists.[57] In the legislature elected in 1928, out of 611 deputies only 40 or 6.6 per

[56] *Ten Years of Soviet Power in Figures*, Central Statistical Board of U. S. S. R., pp. 7, 74, Moscow, 1927. Factually, the situation has been still worse: those who know the situation realize that during those years of Soviet Russia there has been no real election, and "peasants' representation" has been nothing but an appointment by the Communist party of some people who were once peasants but many years ago ceased to be peasants and became something else. But even as the figures given by the Government stand, they clearly show the situation discussed.

[57] Le Chartier, E., *La France et son Parlément*, p. 386; *Annuaire Statistique* (de la France), 1910, p. 11.

cent are agriculturists.[58] In England, in the Parliament at the end of the nineteenth century out of 551 members of the House of Commons only 50 were agriculturists. This per cent was somewhat below what the agricultural population was in the total occupational population of Great Britain at that time. Besides, these 50 agriculturists were not so much farmers as much various types of landowners, and gentry.[59] Similar has been the situation in the United States. In the Congress of 1919 there were only 18 representatives of agriculture while there should have been 165 representatives on the basis of proportionate representation.[60] In Poland the proportion of the agricultural class among the whole occupational population is probably about 80 per cent, while among the total number of the upper officials of the Republic (fonctionnaires supérieurs et employés) 120,705, there were in 1923 only 1,255 or about 1 per cent whose occupation before taking governmental position was agriculture.[61] In other countries the situation seems to be similar. We may admit that, in some degree, farmer-peasant interests may be represented by the deputies from other classes. Nevertheless, as a rule, such deputies scarcely would and could be devoted to farmer-peasant interests to such a degree, and would fight for them as well as farmer-peasant deputies. Otherwise we must admit that the farmer-peasant deputies can represent the interests of the nobility and the capitalists as well as the deputies from those classes. Such an admission is evidently wrong and by all means would be opposed by the nobility and capitalists had such a measure been offered for practical realization. In so far, the above data mean that the farmer-peasant class has been represented in the government, legislatures, and parliament far below its share in the total population. A similar conclusion seems to follow if we take the proportion of the number of all various agrarian, farmer, peasant, agricultural, and similar parties among the total number of the representatives of Congress, or Parliament, of the House of Commons, in brief the highest governing and representative bodies. Although an exact computation of the proportions is exceedingly difficult, some rough estimation is possible, at least, for some of the countries. The following data may give something in this respect.

[58] *Vozrojdenie*, May 1, 1928.
[59] Demolins, E., *Anglo-Saxon Superiority*, p. 206.
[60] See Barret, C. S., *The Mission, History and Times of the Farmers' Union*, pp. 45 ff.
[61] *Annuaire Statistique de la Rep. Polon.*, 1924, p. 199.

PROPORTIONS OF VARIOUS GOVERNING BODIES SHOWING ALLEGIANCE TO AGRARIAN PARTIES.[62]

Country	*Year*	*Number Members of the Farmer-Peasant Parties*	*Total Number of Representatives (Incomplete)*	*Per Cent of the Members of Agr. Parties in the Total Number*
Poland	1922	125 (Radical and Moderate Peasant Parties)	444	about 28
Serbia	1925	73 (Croatian and Serbian peasant parties)	310	" 23
Sweden	1925	17(Agrarian party)	150	" 10
Bulgaria	1923	39 (Agrarian party)	362	" 11
Czecho-Slovakia	1920	50 (Agrarian party)	282	" 20
Esthonia	1923	31 (Agrarian and polists)	88	" 35
Austria	1923	2 (Peasant's party)	165	" 2
Lithuania	1923	26 (Farmer and Peasant parties)	78	" 33
Norway	1925	22 (Agrarian)	150	" 15
Rumania	1922	50 (Agrarian and Peoples' party)	337	" 15
Latvia	1928 *	27 (Baltic, Latvian, Christian Peasant parties)	100	" 27
Switzerland	1922	34 (Agrarian)	198	" 17
Finland	1924	44 (Agrarian)	200	" 22
Germany	1928 *	26 (Christian National peasant party, German and Saxon Peasant parties, Land league	489	" 6

* Preliminary results.

These include only the countries in which special peasant parties exist and in which their rôle is especially influential. Besides, the years taken are those which were marked by a conspicuous rise of the farmer-peasant power, which led to the creation in many of those countries of governmental cabinets under the leadership of the farmer-peasant parties. The figures given are undoubtedly inaccurate in many respects, and therefore they may be taken only as very rough estimates of the situation. But, as such, they probably do not seriously disfigure the reality. Examining the column of per cents the members of these

[62] Table computed on the basis of the data of the *Statesman's Year Book*, (1926) and *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige*, 1926, p. 281; and some other sources, particularly *Krestianskaia Rossia*, Vols. I–XI; *Minneapolis Journal*, May 21, 1928.

parties are among the total number of the members of the legislative bodies, we see that the per cent remains far below the proportion of the agricultural class in the population of the countries given. As a rough index, the per cent is about 60 at least in all those countries. Meanwhile proportions of representatives showing agrarian allegiances are very far below this per cent. These data testify that the rural class is "under-represented" whatever may be the reasons for such a phenomenon. These figures are more significant than the previous data concerning former occupations of legislators. One may easily imagine a country in which professional lawyers formed the whole membership of the governing body. In such a case, the allegiance of the lawyer-representatives would indicate proportional representation rather than their previous occupation. So the above table is more conclusive proof of rural under-representation. Further, it has been shown that from the economic standpoint the class studied does not receive its share of the national income. Its income is lower on the average than that of the urban population. This shows again that, in so far as the amount of socio-political status is measured by units of income, the class studied is less privileged than the whole urban population. The cities take the lion's share. All of these do not necessarily represent conscious factors.

A similar conclusion is given by a confrontation of the military, and other duties, taxes, and levies imposed on the rural class with the amount of social service it receives. While in regard to taxes, duties, and obligations, the class is probably exempt less than any other, and must bear its full share, in regard to social services,—schools,[63] hospitals, churches, police, theaters, recreational facilities, sanitary and hygienic care, and so on,—it is served much less than the city population. In the cities are concentrated museums, universities, laboratories, national galleries, press, libraries, banks, the best brains, the best orators, thinkers, teachers, in brief, all the best flowers of culture. In the rural communities all this is lacking. Even elementary schools, or shops, or primitive hospitals, or other social service agencies are more rare, less numerous, and usually qualitatively the most elementary and primitive. What was said by the French Secretary of Agriculture, at the fifth congress of agriculturists in France, may be applied to the situation generally: "16,000 rural communities in France, do not have any mail office, and any mailman or rural delivery; 23,692 communities could not receive parcel-post delivery at the place. Meanwhile, every farmer must pay his share

[63] For instance, in Norway in 1921, the rural populations composed 70.5 per cent of the total population; the children of school age composed even higher than 70.5 per cent of the school age children of the whole country; meanwhile, of the total sum of expenses for the elementary schools, only 65 per cent went for rural schools while 35 per cent went for urban elementary schools. *Statistisk Arbok*, 1924, pp. 7, 206–207.

of taxes in full for the expenses of mail and transportation." Changing the statement, correspondingly one may say the same for the much poorer service the farmer-peasant class receives in regards to schools, medical institutions, churches, police, charities, and what not (see the actual figures in subsequent chapters). Undoubtedly this is due, to a very considerable extent, to the factors which depend very little upon human volitions and have very little in common with any intentional desires of the city to exploit the country. Granting this, nevertheless, the situation described remains. The following illustrations may serve to show this.

Farm property is primarily realty, as shown earlier in this book. Such real property cannot be hidden from the tax assessor nor from the tax collector. On the other hand, much of the city property is personal property. These, in the shape of bonds, stocks, bank notes, money at interest, jewels, and bullion may be, and are often, easily hidden from public taxation. In addition, the assessor generally knows the tax value of the farm real property because it is, in many respects, similar to the other plots of land and houses. A city hotel, to give an illustration in terms of real property, may be known to an assessor. Yet, he is incapable of judging its tax value or yield value because such depends to a considerable extent upon location, inner construction, management, and other factors not easily discernible even to practiced eyes. Such differences throw larger burdens of taxes upon farmers, relative to their abilities to pay.

Another illustration is in terms of the protective tariff, which has been the historic American method of subsidization of many urban industries. The net effect of a tariff upon imports, according to the theories of the economists, is to make the consumer pay more for the goods upon which the tariff is levied. Of course, there are exceptions to every rule and some tariffs which are for other than subsidization of certain favored industries. Farm products, especially in a country like the United States of America, are those exported, not imported. As a result, farm products, if a few minor and insignificant ones be excepted, are not subject to great benefits from tariff protection (this applies to exporting countries). Thus, we have an agricultural group, which buys much of its manufactured and urban products on protected markets and sells its own products upon world markets at unprotected prices. This, in essence, is the quarel with manufacturing groups of the American agrarian parties which are backing the much talked of McNary-Haugen or export bounty measures for farm crops. It must be indicated that tariffs are very complicated economic issues. Many economists have begun to doubt the extreme effect once attributed to tariffs. Nevertheless, the fact remains that if any benefits at

all are attained from the keeping or the raising of tariff bounties on imports, these have gone primarily to cities. To such extent, they are merely indications of the lower socio-political status of the rural groups.[64] Another series of facts which corroborates this theory is to be gained from studies of the incidence of poor relief in rural and urban districts and from studies of the distribution of physicians, lawyers, dentists, and men furnishing professional services, whether public or private, to the masses. Without giving the data, which are numerous, and are to be found in the references cited, we make the following statements. *The rural groups participate less in public services or advantages than the urban. The rural dwellers participate less and have fewer chances to secure the services of professional men, most of whom were educated and trained at public expense*, a part of which expense is born by farmers and peasants through the sources of taxation.[65] These and hundreds of similar facts make the proposition discussed rather certain. Since they are scattered throughout a wide territory and have much more difficulty in efficient organization; since they lack contact, and communication; since they do not possess much concentrated wealth, or the press, and other "powers"; the farmer-peasant class has not been able to compete with the city in protecting its political status. The city has been able to dominate over it, and to disfranchise it in several respects. Its relative remoteness from the seat of government also facilitates a negligence of its interests on the part of the government: the city masses are near the government which helps to make it sensitive to their interests; for this reason it is dangerous to tease them much. In regard to farmers and peasants such teasing is more safe: they are too far away and too slow to organize. Such is relatively true in the United States. It is more true in Europe and on other continents.

Compared with the separate urban classes, the socio-political status of the rural class is naturally nearer to the less privileged urban labor classes than to the privileged groups of nobility, aristocracy, wealthy, or professional classes. This is so clear that it does not require any corroboration.

[64] See Black, John D., "The McNary-Haugen Movement," *American Economic Review*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Sept. 1928, pp. 405–427.

[65] For the incidence of poor relief and state aid in rural and urban districts and among farmers and other social classes see especially *British Sessional Papers*, Vol. 19, 1924, pp. 7 ff.; *Parliamentary Papers* 121, 1923 and 172, 1922; *London Statistics*, Vol. 33, pp 131 and 139; *Census of England and Wales*, General Volumes for 1901, 1911, and 1921; Jones, R. C., *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 89, 1926, p. 694; *Denmark, Statistik Aarbog*, 1926, table 138; *Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics*, "Previous Occupations of the Retired with a Competency and Dependents upon Charity," *Bul. 25*, 1903, pp. 15–28. A most careful and valuable analysis of the participation of the rural classes in the services of the professional men, trained at public expense, in the United States, at least, is to be found in Fry, C. Luther, *American Villagers*, Institute for Social and Religious Research, Chapter VII and elsewhere.

Conclusion. This chapter shows that the farmer-peasant class is a *sui generis* class different from any other large class. It occupies a peculiar situation and may not be identified with any other class nor expected to be permanently and consistently cohesive with any one of them. This applies to the class of urban labor, capitalists, the professionals or what not. If, in one respect, the status of the rural class is similar to that of one of the other classes, in another respect it is dissimilar and antagonistic to that one class. Hence, we may expect, on the basis of this analysis of the social position of the farmer-peasants, only temporary unions with any one of these other classes when, according to the circumstances, their interests in one or two respects are similar. As soon as the interest is achieved or other issues become more important, their lines of policy may diverge and yesterday's partners may become to-day's enemies. History shows indeed that sometimes the rural class has joined with the upper or middle urban classes against the lower city classes; sometimes it has turned against the upper or middle classes and joined together with the labor class. Such "shifts" in allegiance have been common. They are comprehensible if we give consideration to the peculiar class position of the agriculturists as outlined above. The shifts themselves have not been so much an "adaptation" to one of the classes as a systematic attempt to carry out its own interests. Carrying out these interests has caused them to unite together with other classes whose movement happened to be in the same direction. As long as the interests were coinciding, such fusions lasted. Such has been the situation in the past; such it is also in the present.

A mere glance at the agrarian movement of to-day is sufficient for one to see this. Beginning with the platform and policies of the Agrarian International and ending with those of numerous farmer-peasant parties in various European countries (Czecho-Slovakia, Switzerland, Poland, Bulgaria, Jugo-Slavia, Rumania, Latvia, Esthonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, and other countries) we see quite distinctly that farmer-peasant organizations do not fuse together with those other parties and unions which fight for the interests of the urban labor classes or with those which represent the interests of the aristocracy, landlords, capitalists, and professional groups.[66] Farmer-peasant parties lead a policy of their own; and have ideologies of their own equally different from the political ideologies associated

[66] The best and the most authentic general source for a study of these parties, their history and policies, is *M. A. B. Bulletin de Bureau International Agraire*, published in Prague by the International Agrarian Bureau. In numerous copies of this Bulletin, (began in 1923) are given in various languages the papers written by the leaders of such parties in various countries, and carefully stated information concerning the plans, activities, and policies of the parties as well as of the International Agrarian Bureau itself.

with the proletarian class and from ideologies of the "bourgeoisie" or professional groups. The general name of the farmer-peasant political ideology is "Agrarianism." As such it is different from Socialism, Communism, Individualism, Liberalism, and Conservatism as the respective ideologies of the upper and lower urban classes. One of the leaders of the Internation Agrarian Movement, and at the same time of the powerful Agrarian Party in Czecho-Slovakia, Minister of Education, Dr. Milan Hodža, says that "Liberalism failed to serve as a basis for farmers, ideas and organizations. Socialism is equally unsatisfactory. The idea of collectivism failed also. All this is superseded by (the ideology of) Agricultural Democracy" as a new ideology of the Agrarian movement and agricultural classes.[67]

In ideologies as well as in policies, the farmer-peasant parties quite clearly show all the traits which characterize the status of this class among other classes and which have been analyzed above. In their activities of the past few years, these parties, carrying out their own policies, have sometimes joined together for special issues with the labor, sometimes with the capitalist parties and sometimes they have opposed all of the urban parties. In one of the subsequent chapters about the political attitudes of the class studied, we shall show this more consistently. For the present, it is sufficient to say that, on the basis of the above analysis, any hopes for long and harmonious "Farmer-Labor," "Farmer-Capitalists," "Farmer-Landlord" or "Farmer-Proletarian" parties and unions seem to appear merely utopian ideologies. Temporary fusions with any of these groups are possible to a certain point, but long-living unions "for life and death" will be possible only when the farmer-peasant class shall cease to be what it has been and is.

[67] See the address of Dr. Milan Hodža in the *Bulletin of the Czechoslovak Academy of Agriculture*, Vol. IV, p. 441, 1928; see also Sorokin, P., *Ideology of the Agrarian Movement*, in Russian, Bulgarian, Serbian; see the papers of Charles Mečir, General Secretary of the International Agrarian Bureau, in the *Bulletins of the Bureau*. These give the essentials of the Agrarian ideology.

PART II

BODILY AND VITAL TRAITS OF THE RURAL-URBAN POPULATIONS

CHAPTER IV

BODILY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS

Introductory Remarks. Thus far, we have defined sociology, rural sociology, the rural and urban worlds, and the social position of the farmer-peasant class. Further procedure in developing the features of rural sociology in a logical way, requires that we proceed logically through an analysis of other constant and significant sociological differences between rural and urban populations. We shall proceed from the tangible to the intangible, from bodily differences, on the one hand, to the most variable of psychic differences, on the other. This chapter deals with bodily differences.

Are there some bodily differences between populations of the city and of the country, taken as whole groups? If so, what are they? If so, to what are they due: to selection or environment or to both of these factors? Much has been written about the topic. And yet, the problem is still definitely unsettled.

Aside from many obstacles in the way of satisfactorily solving the questions, there is one circumstance which deserves special mention. It is the notable difference in understanding and defining city and country population in various statistical sources and numerous anthropometrical investigations. Indeed, in a series of studies, in which the criteria of the city is *the size of a community*, this size differs for different studies: in some of them the city is a community above 1,000 in population; in others, above 2,000, or 5,000, or 8,000, or 12,000, or 25,000, or 100,000. In another series of the studies, the criterion of the city is *density of the population.* In a third series, the criteria is administrative nomenclature; in a fourth, it is *occupation:* while the population engaged in agriculture is taken as the country population, that engaged in industry, trade, professions, and government is taken as the population of the city. These differences in the criteria of city and country results in differences of criteria of city and the country populations. This leads to the fact that, under the same name, city or country population, various investigators have studied practically heterogeneous social groups. For instance, a community of 1,000 population is "the city population" for one author, and a community of the same size is "the country" population for another author, who takes only communities above 5,000 as "the city." The same is true about other concepts of the city and the country

population. This fact alone does much to vitiate the results of the studies and calls forth discrepancies among the results obtained by various investigators. Such differences in understanding of the city and the country population have not been due to the fancy of the investigators, but to the fact that they have been forced, in each specific case, to use the criteria accepted by the statistical institutions of various countries. The factual material to be analyzed, has been collected only on the basis of such criteria. Many authors have understood this unsatisfactory character of the criteria of the city and the country used by many statistical institutions; nevertheless, they had to accept it, because, on the contrary, there would be no factual material for analysis and study.

The same dilemma faces us. Whether we like it or not, we must use the factual data as collected on the basis of various criteria of the city and the country in various countries and by various investigators. On the contrary, the factual material could not be used and we would either have to give up the study of the problem, or only to speculate about it. This latter is still worse than the shortcomings of the materials as discussed.

But when this shortcoming is realized, and the investigator is aware of it, it is possible to take a series of precautions which may eliminate considerable of the above defects in the data, and make them, to a considerable degree, suitable for the basis of study. The principal of these precautions are: first, to keep an account of the criteria of the city and the country population used in each given study; second, to deal principally with data based on an identical or homogeneous criteria of these populations; and third, to make cross-verifications of the results obtained on the basis of one kind of criteria with results obtained on the basis of a different kind, where each case represents logically and factually comparable and sound criteria. After these and similar precautions are taken, the above defect is diminished and the enormous amount of factual material collected in various countries may be used for study. A similar problem is to be faced in other investigations given in later chapters. Similar precautions are used in those cases.

According to the predominant nature of the factual data collected, we are forced to take as the criterion of the city and the country, *the size of a community*, on the one hand, and on the other, *the occupation*. The city population is that dwelling in communities above a certain size (indicated in each case): 1,000, 2,000, 5,000 or more. The country population is the population which dwells in the open country or in communities below the above sizes. On the other hand, many studies have been based on a division of the population engaged in agriculture (and partly in forestry, gardening, fishing, hunting) from

that engaged in industry, trade, commerce, government, and the professions. The first category of the population is styled the country, and the second, the city. We have seen that as a general rule, the enormously predominant part of the population engaged in the first group of occupations dwell in the open country or in small hamlets, villages, and communities, while the enormously predominant part of the population engaged in the second category of occupations dwell in communities of above 2,000 population. Therefore, in spite of some overlapping, the essential parts of the city and the country population coincides or is the same, on the basis of both criteria. For this reason, the results obtained from studies based on the size of community may be checked or tested by the results of studies based on the occupational criterion. The same applies also to the criterion of *the density of population.* We saw, as a general rule, the density of the population increases with the increase of the size of communities, on the one hand, and on the other with a transition from the areas of agriculture to the predominantly industrial, commercial, and administrative communities. For this reason, it is possible to make a mutual cross reference of the result obtained on the basis of the three above mentioned criteria of the city and the country population, and this may be utilized for testing the accuracy and reliability of the theories and conclusions. This practice is statistically valid. These preliminary remarks are sufficient to show the difficulties and the way of mitigation of the defects in the factual materials collected. Thus, we are attempting by a combination of statistical practices to study the city and the country as defined in Chapter II. Further, many additional remarks will substantiate these preliminary statements. Let us now turn to a survey of the data and theories regarding bodily differences between the city and the country population.

Stature of the Country and the City Populations. Are there some uniform differences in the stature of the population of the city and the country? May we say, with some authors, that on the average, the city population, taken as a whole group, is taller or shorter than the country population? If such a uniformity were found, would it be because of the results of selection or of environment, or of both factors? Let us turn to a brief survey of the principal studies. In regard to them, we must keep in mind that the comparison of the population of these two classes gives adequate results only when the samples taken are large in number, random in selection, and when the compared groups are identical at least in age, sex, and race. On the contrary, in view of the fact that stature depends greatly on race, sex, and age, not to mention other conditions, the results may be quite misleading. Many samples are far from being random. Recruit anthropometry deals with selected groups. The same may be

said of many measurements of school children. Add to this the differences in technique of measurement. All these make the results obtained somewhat uncertain and questionable.

In their ideal form these requirements are scarcely fulfilled by many studies. However, the great number of the individuals measured, the random sampling of many of these studies, and the comparisons of individuals of the same sex and age, make the results obtained not wholly useless. Besides, as yet, we do not have any other basis for our opinions. Therefore, whether we like it or not, the best we may do is to use these data. The relevant data exist in two principal forms: comparisons of the average stature of the city and the country population; and of the average stature of the people engaged in agriculture with the stature of other occupational groups. A score of studies indicate a city population taller than that of the country.[1] Without mentioning several other studies of the same character, let us now turn to other studies which found that the country population was taller than the city population.[2]

[1] Quetelet, A., "Sur la taille moyenne de l'homme dans les villes et dans les campagnes," *Annales d'hygiene publique*, Vol. 3, p. 24, 1830; Ammon, O., *Die natürliche Auslese beim Menschen*, Chap. IV; *Die anthropologische Untersuchungen der Wehrpflichtigen in Baden;* Röse, G., Beiträge zur Europäischen Rassenkunde," *Archiv für Rassen-und Gesellschafts-Biologie*, pp. 748-751, Vol. 2, 1905; Anoutchin, D. N., *O geographicheskom raspredelenii rosta moujskogo naselenia Rossii*, p. 165; Geissler, A., and Uhlitsch, R., "Die Grossenverhältnisse der Schulkinder," *Zeitschrift d. Königl. Sächs, statist. Bureau*, Vol. 34, p. 28, 1888; Pyle, W. H., and Collings, P. E., "The Mental and Physiol. Development of Rural School Children," *School and Society*, Vol. 8, p. 534, 1918; Zbinden, F., "Beiträge für Anthropologie der Schweiz," *Archiv für Anthropologie*, Vol. 10, p. 290, 1911; see the details in Porter, W. T., "The Growth of St. Louis Children," *American Journal of Physiology*, Vol. 52, p. 121, 1894; Holmes, B. A., "A Study of the Growth of Children," *N. Y. Med. Journal*, Vol. 60, p. 417, 1894; Schiötz, C., *Physical Development of Children and Young People during the Age from 7 to 20 Years;* Schieber, S. H., "Untersuchungen über den Mittleren Wuchs der Menschen in Ungarn," *Archiv für Anthropologie*, Vol. 13, p. 233, 1881; see *Annuaire Statistique des Pays-Bas*, p. 41, 1927; Villerme, L., "Memoire sur la taille de l'homme en France," *Annales d'hygiene publique*, Vol. 1, p. 354, 1829; Livi, R., *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. II, p. 52; *Anthropometria*, p. 117; Constantin, A., "Contribution à l'étude de correlations physiques et psycho-biologiques," *Anthropologie*, Vol. 29, 1918-19, p. 281; *Schweizerische Statistik*, Lief. 85, 1892, Table IX; Ripley, W. Z., *The Races of Europe*, p. 551; Pittard, E., et Kappeyne, J., "La taille humaine en Suisse," *Zeitschrift f. Schweizerische Statistik*, 1908, Band II, pp. 185, 189; Retzius, G., and Fürst, C., *Anthropologia Suecica*, pp. 41, 46, 50, 51; Popoff, Kiril G., "Résultat des mensurations anthropométriques des conscrits en Bulgarie," *Bulletin de l'Institut Intern. de Statistique*, Tome XXII, 2eme livraison, pp. 408-409.

[2] Davenport, Charles B., and Love, A. G., "Army Anthropology," *The Medical Department of the U. S. Army in the World War*, Vol. XV, Statistics, Part I, pp. 34 ff., 74-117; *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, War Dept., p. 391, Washington, 1920; Wissler, Clark, "Distribution of Stature in the U. S.," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 124 ff., 1924; Hrdlička, Aleš, *The Old American*, pp. 85 ff.; Galton, F., "On the Weight and Height of Boys aged 14 in Town and Country Schools," *Journal of R. Anthropological Institut*, Vol. 5, p. 174; Tuxford, A. W., and Glegg, A. R., "The Average Height and Weight of English School Children," *British Medical Journal*, 1911; Hill, A. B., *Internal Migration, Medical Research Council Special Report Series, No. 95*, p. 110; Paton, D. Noel, and Finlay, L., "Poverty, Nutrition and Growth, Studies of Child

These studies compare the stature of the *urban and the rural* population regardless of the occupational groups out of which each of these complex aggregates are composed. Meanwhile, we know that "the country" population, though predominantly agricultural, contains several groups engaged in other than agricultural occupations. The city population, in its very nature, represents "a hodge-podge" of the most different occupational groups, including even agriculture. In so far as we are interested not only in the "rural-urban" groups, but in the comparative bodily characteristics of the class of peasants, farmers, and persons engaged in agriculture, the above data must be tested by the studies of the stature of the occupational group of agriculturists. At present a few studies of this kind exist.[3] In Italy the peasants' stature was below that of almost all urban classes; in

Life in Cities and Rural Districts of Scotland," *Privy Council, Medical Research Council, Special Report Series, No. 101*, pp. 21 ff., 35 ff., 72–76; see the summary *ibid.*, pp. 72–76; Roberts, Ch., and Rawson, *Final Report of the Anthrop. Committee*, 1884; Beddoe, J., *On the Stature and Bulk of Man in the British Isles; Races of Britain;* Harrison, J. P., "The Influence of Town Life on Stature," *Report of British Anthropometric Association*, Vol. 53, p. 568, 1883; Schmidt, E., "Die Korpergrosse und das Gewicht der Schulkinder des Kreises Saalfield," *Archiv f. Anthropologie*, Vol. 21, p. 385, 1892; Peiper, E., "Korperliche Entwicklung der Schuljugend in Pommern," *Archiv f. Soziale Hygiene*, Vol. 7, p. 109, 1912; Levasseur, E., *La Population Française*, Vol. I, p. 383, 1889. On the other hand, according to data of Bertillon, the per cent of the low statures is a little higher, and that of tall statures a little lower among the peasant recruits compared with the averages for the whole Saxony. See Bertillon, J., "La Taille en France," *Revue Scientific*, p. 486, 1885; Brant, G., "Die Korpergrosse der Wehrpflichtigen," *Beiträge zur Anthropologie Elsas-Lothringens*, Heft 2, 1898, *Handbuch der Sozialen Hygiene*, Vol. V, pp. 206–209, 1927; Carlier, G., "Des rapports de la taille avec le bien-être," *Annales d'hygiene publique*, Vol. 27, p. 294, 1892; Dunant, P. L., *Taille moyenne des habitants de Genève;* Pittard, E., and Kappeyne, *op. cit.*, p. 189; Pagliani, L., *Sopra alcuni fattori dello sviluppo umano;* Oloriz, F., *La talla humana en España;* Ranke, J., "Sur Statistik und Physiologie der Korpergrosse der Bayerischen Militarpflichtigen," *Beiträge zur Anthopologie Bayerns*, Vol. 4, p. 1, 1881; see Korff-Petersen, A., "Die Wohnung," *Handbuch der Sozialen Hygiene*, Vol. V., pp. 206–209, 1927; Anoutchin, D., *op. cit.*, p. 165; *Annual Report of the Principal Medical Officers of Health of New South Wales for the years 1918–19;* Baldwin, B. T., "A Measuring Scale for Physical Growth and Physiological Age," *Fifteenth Yearbook of the Nat. Soc. for the Study of Educ.*, Bloomington, Ill., p. 15, 1916; *The Physical Growth of Children*, 1924, pp. 71, 191, *et passim;* Woodbury, R. M., "Heights and Weights of Children under Six Years of Age," *Publication No. 87 of Children's Bureau of the U. S. Department of Labor*, Washington, 1921; Porter, W. T., *op. cit.;* Holmes, B. A., *op. cit.;* Constantin, A., *op. cit.*, p. 281; quoted from the data given in *Journal of the Amer. Stat. Association*, Vol. 4; Descocudres, A., *Le Development de l'Enfant de deux à sept ans;* see *Bulletin de la Société d'Anthropologie*, Vol. XI, pp. 174–175; Retzius and Fürst, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–60; see in *Meddelelser om Danmarks Anthropologi* and *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. XX, pp. 542–548; Popoff, K., *op. cit.*, pp. 408–409.

[3] See the data about the upper and lower urban classes in Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility*, Chap. X: Livi, R., *Anthropometria*, p. 117, *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. II, pp. 49–59, Tables II and III, at the end of the book; Roberts, Charles, "On the Uses and Limits of Anthropometry," *Bulletin de l'Institut International de Statistique*, Vol. IV, pp. 15–16; Carlier, G., *op. cit.;* Erismann, F., *Untersuchungen über die Korperliche Entwicklung des Fabrikarbeiter in Zentral Russia;* Bertillon, J., "La Taille en France," *Revue Scientific*, p. 486, 1885; Bertillon, J., "Taille," *Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences médicales of Dechambre.*

England and France it was above that of all these classes, with the exception of the upper urban classes. In Russia and Saxony it also was above that of the majority of the urban occupational groups with the exception of the professionals, and commercial people, and masons. On the basis of all the existing data these conclusions follow.

Summary. 1. Contrary to the authors who have believed in the existence of an uniform difference between the stature of the urban and the rural population, in the form that the city population everywhere is, on the average, taller (or shorter) than the country population, such a uniformity does not exist. In some regions or countries the city population is taller on the average than the country population of the same age and sex; in some others, the situation is reversed; in others, there are no significant differences. The same is true in regard to the stature of the agricultural population compared with the majority of the city occupational groups.

2. While in countries like Great Britain, Australia, and the United States of America, the country population as a whole seems to be taller than the city population, in Italy, the situation is reversed. In other countries, like Germany, France, and Russia, the results of the studies are somewhat indefinite. The same is to be said of the stature of the agricultural class in these countries, compared with the average stature of the majority of the city occupational groups, with the exception of the nobility, professional, and well-to-do classes, whose stature, as a rule, is above the average stature of the city and the country laboring classes.[4]

3. If all the countries studied are taken together, the country population seems to compete quite successfully in stature with the city population because the number of studies in which it has been found taller, and the number of the individuals measured in such studies, are rather more numerous than the studies which found the opposite results.

4. If the classes of nobility, professional, wealthy, and the upper groups of the city population generally, whose stature is above the mass of the population, are excluded from the city population, and only the lower and partly the middle classes of the city are taken, then the differences in the stature of the city and the country population are rather definitely in favor of the country population. Some exceptions exist even under these conditions, but the general rule seems to be such as stated.

5. In regard to stature, the city population with its tall upper classes and its short poor—indoors and sedentary occupational groups—seems to be considerably more heterogeneous than the

[4] See the data in Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility*, Chap. X.

country population. With some exceptions mentioned further, the contrasts or variability in the stature of the city population seems to be much greater than in the country population. The findings of O. Ammon, A. Eichholz, Boas, Wissler, and many others corroborate this.[5] Such are principal conclusions which follow from the data given.

Interpretation. How shall we interpret these results? How may one explain that, in some cases, the city population is taller than the country population, while, in others, the country population is taller? Is there any general hypothesis which may account for this? In the literature of the various studies, several hypotheses, which try to give such an explanation, are to be found. They may be divided into two principal classes: *selectional and environmental hypotheses.*

Environmental hypotheses try to explain the differences through the different environmental conditions of the city and the country population. Among these conditions, an especially important rôle is ascribed to *food.* For instance, Ammon tries to account for the taller stature of the city recruits in Karlsruhe and Freiburg, compared with the country recruits, through the fact that the nutrition of the country recruits is less abundant, and, therefore, they grow slower than the city recruits. At the age of 20 to 22 they were less developed than the city dwellers. Hence, the difference in favor of the city recruits was due to food, according to Ammon's opinion. In a similar way, but more definitely, Erismann tried to explain the lower stature of the factory workers in Russia, and A. Niceforo the lower stature of the peasants of Southern Italy.[6] Even R. Livi explained the low stature of the Italian peasantry partly through their poor environmental conditions, particularly through insufficient food, not to mention other similar factors.[7] In a similar manner, Bertillon and a great many other investigators interpreted the differences in stature of various occupational groups. We shall not enter here into the details and varieties of this type of interpretation,

[5] Compare, Ripley, W. Z., *op. cit.*, pp. 552–555; Boas, F., "Notes on the Anthropologie of Sweden," *Amer. Journal of Phys. Anthropology,* Vol. I. p. 426, 1918; Ammon, O., *Die natürliche Auslese,* pp. 125 ff.; Wissler, C., *op. cit.*, pp. 132–133; Mackenzie, W. L., *The Health of the School Children,* p. 65; Retzuis, G., and Fürst, C., *op. cit.*, Table II, pp. 46–47. However, the indices of variability of stature in Sweden computed by F. Boas for each province, do not show greater variation for more industrial than the more agricultural provinces.

[6] Ammon, O., *Die natürliche Auslese,* Chap. IV. This explanation in favor of the city recruits does not hinder Ammon from recognizing that the principal factor of stature is race; but the environment may make the growth slower or faster and therefore can influence the stature of the individuals at the age of 20–22 when the growth is not yet finished; Erismann, F., *op. cit.;* Niceforo, A., *Richerche sui contadini,* pp. 31 ff., and *passim.*

[7] Livi, R., *Anthropometria,* p. 118; *Anthropometria militare,* Vol. 1, pp. 46 ff., *et passim.*

but shall sum up the hypothesis in its application to our topic by the following statement: for the cities in which the food and other conditions are more favorable than in the corresponding country, the stature of the population should be taller than in the country, and *vice versa*.

The selectional theories assume that the stature is determined by race. Correspondingly, the differences in stature of the city and the country population are due to the factor of selection. Where the city population is taller than the country population, it means that it is composed principally out of individuals of a taller race than the country population, and *vice versa*. Such is the essence of these theories. They must be divided further into two classes. Some of them claim that the attraction of the migrants to the cities is relevant to the stature; that, as a rule, the cities attract more of the taller than the shorter people (or *vice versa*). This means that such theories make the urbanization "selectional" in regards to stature. They ascribe to stature, as such, a rôle which is instrumental in the distribution of individuals between the city and the country, and which plays some part in determining the urban or the rural settlement of individuals. Other selectional theories do not ascribe such an instrumental rôle to the stature as such. But they claim, that whatever may be the factors which determine the racial composition of the population of a given city or country, the average stature of their populations is determined by the racial composition respectively. Where and when the city populations are composed out of predominantly tall races, they will be taller than the country population composed out of predominantly shorter races, and *vice versa*. In other words, these theories do not claim that the urbanization or the ruralization of persons is selective at the virtue of the stature of the individuals as such. The factors which determine the settling of an individual in the city or the country may be numerous and may have nothing in common with the stature as such, but whatever they are, the stature of the urban and the rural population is determined by the races of these populations. Among this branch of the selectional theories, a further detalization is to be mentioned. While it has been indicated by many authors, it was demonstrated conspicuously by R. Livi. Its essence consists in the statement that, since the racial origin is the principal factor, in the stature and since the city population is composed out of migrants from much more numerous, remote and racially heterogeneous places than the country population, it is natural to expect, first, that the stature of the city population is likely to show greater contrasts than that of the country population (greater variability); second, that uniform difference in the statures of the urban and the rural population could not

therefore be expected; and third, that in the city located in a place where the native population in the surrounding area is racially tall, the city population would be, on the average, shorter, if a part of it is composed not only out of the migrants from its surrounding tall population but out of migrants from other places, among which there usually are migrants from the places inhabited by populations of a short stature. The influx of such migrants into the city population would naturally lead to a lowering of the average stature of the city population. In such places we have to expect that the city population would be shorter in stature than the population of the country which surrounds it. Such is really the situation in many cases. If, on the contrary, the city is situated in an area whose population is predominantly short statured, then, for the same reason, the city population must be expected to be taller than the population of the surrounding country, because the population of the city would be composed, in this case, not only out of the short-statured migrants from the surrounding country, but out of migrants from remoter and different places where the population may be tall statured. An influx of such tall migrants to the city would raise the average of its stature, and make it higher than the averages for the statures of the population in its surrounding country. Such is this hypothesis. According to it, we may not expect uniformity in the comparative stature of the city and the country population. If one knew the stature of the population of the country which surrounds the city, and of migrants to the city from other places, he could predict whether the city population would be taller or shorter than the country population immediately surrounding.

Which of the above interpretations is to be recognized as accurate and complete? The answer is none, as far as each pretends to be exclusive. The insufficiency of the environmental theories is rather evident. At the present moment, we know that stature is determined primarily by race.[8] To exclude this factor is impossible. All the important differences in the stature of various groups of the population are unaccountable without this factor. For instance, the geographical distribution of stature of the recruits, or the population of Sweden (Retzius and Fürst), of Russia (Anoutchin), of Italy (R. Livi), of France (Brocà, Topinard), of America (Baxter, Gould, Love, Davenport), of England (Beddoe) and so on, are quite unaccountable through only environmental factors, without the factor of race. Therefore, deductively it is possible to claim that, without a consideration of race, the differences in stature of the country and the city

[8] Practically almost all serious studies in the field unanimously recognize this: Brocà, Topinard, Anoutchin, Livi, Gould, Baxter, Retzius and Fürst, K. Pearson, and others.

population are unaccountable. The environmental rôle consists primarily in hastening or retarding the processes of growth of young children,[9] and perhaps, although this is less certain, in very slight increases or decreases of the height of quite adult persons.[10] Only an exceedingly unfavorable environment, below the possibility of satisfaction of fundamental physiological needs, may influence the stature somewhat more.[11] That is all that the environment can do in this respect. This is insufficient to explain the differences found. Furthermore, practically almost all the environmental theorists have not taken pains to test their assumption by an inductive study of the factual differences in environment, and particularly in nutrition, of the country and the city population. Only, in very few cases, did authors, like Ammon, try to show that the nutrition of the country population around Freiburg and Karlsrhue was less abundant than that of the population of these cities. From this he concluded that the higher stature of the recruits of these cities (aged from 20 to 22 years) was due to this environmental factor. But the number of the cases of Ammon is very small and besides the statements about the food of his city and country recruits are very questionable. Therefore, even this case is far from convincing. With the exception of this, and one or two other studies, there has been no real attempt to show that the food of the city population, where it has been found taller or shorter, was correspondingly better or worse than that of the population of the country. Furthermore, several attempts to find such a correlation on a broad scale did not yield any results.[12] In

[9] The first part of the statement is practically certain, but the second part is to be tested still. See a good survey of the theories in the works of Anoutchin, Topinard, and others quoted. See Jackson, Clarence M., *The Effects of Inanition and Malnutrition upon Growth and Structure*, Part II, and *passim*, 1925.

[10] Recent studies in the field have shown that unless there is physiological starvation, the influence of environment becomes intangible even after 18 months of age. Correlation ratios of the height with nutrition, obtained by Medical Research Council, are as follows: for babies under 1 year of age, .4651; for those from 1 to 2 years, .2706; and for those from 2 to 3 years, .1870. For the older groups, it becomes quite insignificant. The authors conclude: "Whether environmental conditions are or are not responsible for the lag in growth below eighteen months in the slum child, it seems manifest that after that age the inherited growth impulse is sufficiently potent to carry it so completely on to the average size of its parents, that the influence of environment is not indicated on the curves of growth of the average of the whole number of children." Paton, D. Noel, and Finlay, L., *Poverty, Nutrition, and Growth*, pp. 61, 111. Pearson's coefficient of correlation between the stature of the parents and the children is .51. See also Davenport, Ch., "Inheritance of Stature," *Genetics*, Vol. 2, p. 313, 1917; E. Elderton's study in *Annals of Eugenics*, Vol. I.

[11] See the data of Ivanovsky, which show an appreciable decrease in stature of the population of Russia in the period of a terrible famine in 1922. Ivanovsky, A., "Physical Modification of the Population of Russia Under Famine," *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, No. 4, 1925.

[12] For instance, Anoutchin's, Retzius and Fürst's and other studies mentioned did not find any correlation between stature and food or the economic situation; Anoutchin, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–97; Retzius and Fürst, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

other cases, the nourishment of the city population has been found rather better than that of the country population, but the stature of the city population was lower than that of the country population. To this, it may be added, that in regard to adults aged 30 and above, whose growth is practically ended, the food and environmental factors exert insignificant, if any, influences. For these and many similar reasons, the environmental hypothesis is insufficient for the task discussed. It has some significance within the limits mentioned, and within them is to be considered, but no more.

As to the selectional theories, their fundamental claim that the stature is determined primarily by race or heredity is to be recognized. But may we recognize that the city-country selection *is selectional* in regard to stature? May we claim that those with higher statures gravitate to (or are selected) in a higher proportion by the city than the short statured? Or *vice versa?* Is stature a factor which tangibly determines the city or the country dwelling of individuals? Such hypotheses have been set forth, but even remotely satisfactory evidences in their favor have never been supplied. The data given above openly contradict it. They show a lack of uniformity in the differences between the stature of the city and the country population.[13]

Another proof in favor of the "stature-selectional" hypothesis has been seen in the fact that the country migrants to the city have a taller stature than those who stay "at home" in the corresponding country. For instance, Lapouge claims that migrants from country to country, from district to district, from the country to the city generally are taller than the non-migrants or stay-at-homes.[14] To corroborate this, he gives the results of the American anthropometrical studies by Gould and Baxter which, according to Lapouge, have shown that the average stature of the American Germans is taller than that of the Germans of Europe. He cites, further, that in the same measurements it was found that the average stature of the soldiers who enlisted in the army from states different from those of their birth, were found taller than the soldiers who enlisted from the states of their birth. H. Hart, on the basis of the data of Baxter, found a coefficient of correlation between the per cent of migrants (people born outside of state of residence) and per cent of soldiers 71 inches and taller in the Civil War Union Army of $+.631 \pm .084$.[15]

[13] By the way, there is also no valid reason for C. Wissler's theory of concentric diffusion of physical traits. His references to the distribution of these traits in European countries, along the lines of his theory, are contradicted conspicuously by the geographic distribution of stature, pigmentation, cephalic index, and so on, in practically all European countries. A slight acquaintance with the maps of distribution of physical traits in the best works of Europe show this beyond a doubt.

[14] Lapouge, *op. cit.*, pp. 366 *et seq.*

[15] Hart, H., "Selective Migration," etc., *U. of Iowa Studies*, Vol. I, No. 7, 1921, p. 51.

A similar opinion was expressed by Topinard. Some data of this kind have been offered also by a few other authors.[16] In regard to these contentions, we object, first, that granting the hypothesis of a greater stature of immigrants in comparison with the stay-at-homes is accurate, the data given do not concern the migrants from the country to the city. Neither Lapouge, nor Topinard, give anything factual in this field to corroborate their statements. It is a mere deduction from the supposed greater tallness of the immigrants to America from Europe applied to the migrants from the country to the city. But even the facts indicated by Lapouge, the facts which really were found by Gould and Baxter,[17] admit quite a different interpretation from Lapouge's. Gould interpreted them partly as a result of the better food and environment of the migrants to America in comparison with the stay-at-homes. Baxter set forth another which seems to be a more valid hypothesis. He says:

The suggestion has also been made that men who leave their native soil to seek fortune in other lands are corporeally superior specimens of their race; but it is yet to be shown that enterprise and ambition depend upon stature, and not on qualities of mind. After all, the true explanation of this curious fact (of a higher stature of the American immigrants compared with that of their native population and of a higher stature of the emigrants from the Eastern to the Western States in America, compared with the stature of the stay-at-homes in the Eastern States) is probably to be found in the *difference in age* of the men examined. The height of the soldiers in all European countries, excepting in Great Britain, is recorded at the period of their conscription, and this occurs from their eighteenth to their twentieth year.

Meanwhile the lowest average age of the American soldiers examined was 25.248 years, and the mean age, 27.319 years. As the stature continues to grow at least up to 25 years of age, "the comparisons have all the time been made of grown men, twenty-five years old and upward (in the United States) with lads of nineteen" (in Europe). The difference found was largely the result of this difference in age of the American and European population compared. The same is true of the difference in stature of the American Easterners in the East

[16] For instance, recently C. Murchison found that the inmates of the prison studied by him, who were born in states other than the prison state, were taller than the prisoners from the state of the prison studied. Murchison, Carl, *Criminal Intelligence*, 1926. Dr. Halfdan Bryn thinks too, that the higher stature of the Islander in Norway results because the migrants to the Island were selected tall persons. See his paper, "Die Menschenvarietäten Norwegens," *Anthropologischer Anzeiger*, Vol. 3, p. 173, 1926. But the migrants from the country to Oslo were found shorter than the stay-at-homes in a corresponding country district, *Anthropologischer Anzeiger*, Vol. IV, pp. 39–40, 1927.

[17] See Gould, B., *op. cit.*, pp. 126 ff.; Baxter, J. H., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 16 *et seq.*

and the West. When corrections are made for age, the difference disappears.[18]

This correction annuls the validity of the generalization of Lapouge and others. These indications are sufficient to conclude that, besides a lack of factual material which would show a stature-selective character for the city (or the country), we do not have, as yet, any valid reason to think that stature as such plays a uniform or highly instrumental rôle in the decision as to who will become migrants and who stay-at-homes. So much for this point.

We must recognize that whatever are the factors which determine the distribution of individuals between the city and the country, among those the rôle of stature, as such, is practically intangible. There are no valid reasons to claim that a mass of the migrants from the country to the city are migrants because they are tall while those who remain in the country do so because they are short, or *vice versa.* This means that, in regard to stature, the "unselective" branch of the selectional theory is much nearer the truth than the "selective." Indeed, at the present moment, we have a great deal of material which corroborates Livi's theory. In the first place, he has shown that in Italy the areas where the stature of the native population is relatively tall, the stature of the population of the cities situated amidst such areas is lower, while in the areas where the stature of the native population is relatively low, the stature of the population of the cities in those areas is higher than that of the surrounding country.[19] The same is true in regard to the stature of the peasants compared with that of the city population. The Italian peasantry is less mobile than the city population, and is racially short, especially in Southern Italy. Under such circumstances the population of the Italian cities is naturally taller because it is composed not only out of migrants from the short peasants, but also of migrants from remote places where the stature is racially taller. These tall migrants to the city tend to raise the urban average stature.

From the standpoint of the same hypothesis, it is comprehensible why, as a general rule, in Scotland and England, the stature of the city population is lower than that of the country population. The Scotch and English are racially tall. Since they have in their rural districts an incomparably less per cent of migrants from other countries, than in the cities, they have a very tall rural population. In the cities, side by side with the tall Scotch and English, they have

[18] Baxter, J. H., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 16–17. See there the data and details. For a valid criticism of Dr. Franz Boas' supposition of a taller stature of the children of the immigrants to America, see in Wissler, Clark, *The Relation of Nature to Man*, pp. 149 ff.; H. Hart's correlation coefficient does not take into consideration this difference in age of the soldiers of the Civil Army from the Eastern and Western States.

[19] See Livi, R., *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. 1, pp. 49 ff.

migrants and their offspring from other places, and countries, with a lower stature population. As a result, the city population, composed out of such a mixture, is naturally lower, on the average, than the rural population of Scotland and England. This explains, too, why in New South Wales and Australia, the rural population is taller than the city population. From the same standpoint, it is comprehensible that the populations of some cities in France, Germany, and Russia are taller, while in some other cities, are shorter, than the populations of their surrounding countries. The results depend upon the respective racial stature of the country populations, and on the statures of the migrants out of whom the city population is composed. Finally, the theory has been conspicuously corroborated by the recent measurements of the United States Army. We know that, all in all, the population of the rural and agricultural areas in the United States has been found taller than that of the urban and industrial areas. The explanation is as follows:

The great cities lie prevailingly in the lower part of the table (with lower statures), not because city life tends to stunt growth but because cities attract the short-statured people from Southeastern Europe, who remain in them instead of going upon the farms. On the other hand, the agricultural areas are occupied by persons of tall stature because the small races of the Southeastern Europe do not go to them in large numbers whereas Scandinavians and many Germans do.[20]

C. Wissler correlated the average stature of the soldiers of various areas of the United States with the per cent of short-statured Italians and tall Scandinavians within the population of these areas. The coefficient of correlation with the per cent of the Italians was −.72, and with that of the racially tall Scandinavians, +.46. In other words, the greater the per cent of the racially short Italians among the population of a given area of the United States, the lower is the average for the stature of the population.[21] The greater the per cent of the racially tall Scandinavians within the population of a given area, the higher is the average for the stature of its population. The same hypothesis reconciles well with the average stature of the population of various states and parts of the United States found in the last army measurement, as well as in the previous measurements published by Gould and Baxter.[22]

From the same standpoint, it is comprehensible why the average

[20] Davenport, Ch., and Love, A., *Army Anthropology*, quoted p. 105.

[21] Wissler, C., *op. cit.*, p. 136.

[22] See Baxter, J. H., *Statistics, Medical and Anthropological of the Provost-Marshal-General's Bureau*, Vol. I, pp. 16 ff., Washington, 1875; Gould, Benjamin A., *Investigations in the Military and Anthropological Statistics of American Soldiers*, Tables I, II, III, VII, IV, and *passim*.

stature of the soldiers from various states was different in the last measurement from that in the measurement of 1861–64. For instance in Illinois the average stature of the soldiers in 1861–64, was 67.97 inches, while in 1917–18, it was 67.40, a decrease of .57 inch. In Ohio, the decrease was .46 inch. It is due principally to an influx of the racially small immigrants from the southeastern Europe after 1870 to these areas. The immigration of the racially tall Scandinavians to Minnesota after 1865 is the cause of an increase in the average stature of its population by .41 inch from 1864 to 1917.[23] Furthermore, the Army Anthropology has corroborated the fact of a greater variability in stature of the city population compared with that of the rural population. The coefficient of stature variability of the urban population is 2.67, and of the rural population, 2.59.[24]

Finally, the hypothesis also satisfactorily explains the fact of greater variability in stature of the city population compared with the rural and even the exceptions from this rule. Since the population of the city is recruited from different and wide areas with the different—racially tall and short—populations, it naturally exhibits greater contrasts in stature than the racially more homogeneous populations of rural areas which, as we saw, have much more insignificant proportions of migrants from other places. This is the explanation of the rule discussed. If, however, we take a wide rural area which embraces the population of two different races, or in other words, if our rural area is such that it contains the population of two or more different races, then the stature of the population of such an area may be more variable than that of the cities in such an area. Hence, there are some exceptions to the rule discussed.

The above, as well as a series of other data, sufficiently corroborate the hypothesis discussed so as to make it reasonably certain. It does not explain all the facts but it explains the majority of the substantial facts. When the environmental factor (which, by no means, is excluded by the hypothesis, and which is certainly needed for the understanding of the series of differences in the stature of the upper and the lower classes, and of young persons, and several other differences) is added, the results given, in all substantial traits, by the above factual data become comprehensible.

Summary. 1. The average stature of the country population compared with that of the city population, is taller in many countries and areas, shorter, in several other countries and areas; and is similar in some other countries and areas. The same is true in regard to the

[23] See the details in Davenport, Charles, "The Mean Stature of American Males," *American Statistical Association*, Vol. 17, pp. 484–487, 1920–21. See also Hrdlička Aleš, *The Old Americans*, pp. 72 ff.

[24] Wissler, C., *op. cit.*, pp. 129–143.

average stature of the agricultural class compared with the average stature of the city population.

2. All in all, in the countries where the predominant native population is racially tall (England, United States of America, Australia, and some other countries), the rural population tends to be taller than the city population; in the areas and countries with a racially short native population (Italy) the opposite phenomena are predominant. In the countries where the native population is composed out of different races (for instance in Russia) there may be no uniformity and the picture is "checkered." In one area the city population may be taller and in another area shorter than the population of the surrounding country.

3. It is fallacious to claim that the country population is universally taller or shorter than the population of the respective cities. Such a uniformity does not exist.

4. If all the countries studied are taken together, the rural population, as a whole, in no way may be thought of as shorter than the urban population, taken as the whole.

5. With some exceptions the urban population is more variable in stature and shows greater contrasts than the country population.

6. The data do not permit the claim that the city population, as a rule, grows or matures faster (or slower) than the population of the surrounding country. The data show that in some areas the city, and in others the country, population matures faster.

7. The factors accounting for these results are partly environmental but principally selectional.

8. Environmental factors, especially food, facilitating retardation or quickening of growth, may explain, in some cases, some slight differences in stature of the young of the city and the country. But they cannot explain the fundamental differences and similarities in the field.

9. These fundamental uniformities or their lack are accounted for satisfactorily through the factor of the racial composition of the population of the country and the city in each given case, regardless of the factors which have determined this racial composition.

10. The above theory of Livi regarding city and country selection is the most valid generalization in the field. It explains the principal results of the studies.

11. Correspondingly, the hypothesis of the attraction by the cities of either tall or short persons, by virtue of their tallness or shortness, is unsupportable. As yet, we do not have any serious reason to think that the stature, as such, is an instrumental factor in determining the city or the country habitation of individuals. The "selective" branch of the selectional theory is to be rejected.

12. In a similar manner, there is no valid reason to claim, on the basis of the data concerning stature, that the city environment is everywhere more favorable (or more harmful) to growth and stature than the country environment. And *vice versa*. Such hypotheses are immature and fallacious, and contradicted by the data. Whatever results may be obtained through the study of urban and rural populations from other standpoints, the data concerning the stature of these classes of the population do not prove either that cities select the tall or facilitate better growth of stature, or select the short and stunted growth. The same is true in regard to rural selection and environment. The above data show no uniformity in this field.

Weight. The above investigations, plus some others, give results about the comparative weight of the city and the country population somewhat similar to that of stature. They are not entirely uniform. That is, in some cases the city population has a lower weight than the country population of the same sex, and age, and in some cases the situation is reversed. But there is a difference, however. It consists in that the studies in which the weight of the country population has been found greater than that of the city population, are incomparably more numerous than studies which have found opposite results. The studies mentioned of E. and F. A. Schmidt, Paton and Finlay, Galton, Tuxford and Glegg, Baldwin, Woodbury, Cailli,[25] Peiper, Asher, Kisskalt, Davenport and Love (*U. S. Army Anthropology* and *Defects found in Drafted Men*, pp. 151, 389), Medical Officers of Health of New South Wales, the Board of Education of England and Wales; [26] these and many others all have yielded a greater weight for the country population—the children, the adults, and recruits, than the weight of the city population (of the same age and sex). They also show a lower per cent of under-weight among the rural recruits than among the urban. In the United States this ratio is 31.3 per 1,000 urban, and 23.8 rural.[27] Even in Italy, where the stature of the country population or peasants is less, in comparison with the stature of other occupational groups, the comparative weight of the agricultural population was one of the highest—absolutely and relatively (in regard to stature). While the stature of the peasants was .4 cm. below the national average, the average weight of the peasants was .2 kg. above the average for the whole nation. Their relative weight, when the difference in stature is eliminated, or a unit of weight per unit of stature is taken, was .6

[25] Cailli, A., "Étude sur les variations de poids observées chez les enfants envoyés à la montagne," *Bulletin médical.*, Vol. 17, p. 849, 1903.

[26] See *Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education*, 1920, pp. 50–53 (Cmd. 1522).

[27] *Defects found in Drafted Men*, p. 389.

kg. above the national average.[28] Only a few studies, among them the study of Pyle and Collings already mentioned, have found the weight of the country population even slightly below the city population.

Thus, as far as these data show, we must recognize that, all in all, the country population, taken as a whole, tends to be somewhat heavier than the city population. However, there is no definite uniformity. This conclusion may appear in contradiction to the fact that stature and the weight are somewhat correlated. But we saw before that in many studies the country population has been found taller than the city population; therefore for these studies there is no contradiction between the rural advantage in height and weight. Even in regard to other studies, where, as in Livi's study, there was found a discrepancy between the stature and the weight (peasant recruits were below the national average in stature and above it in weight), such a discrepancy is not improbable. The studies show that the correlation between weight and stature is close during the earliest years of life of an individual. As we pass to older persons and adults, the correlation tends to decrease. Dr. B. T. Baldwin's study shows that the coefficients of the correlation between height and weight for the ages from 7 to 11 years is about .85 for boys and .58 for girls; for the ages from 16 to 17, they are .66 to .68 for boys and .48 for girls; and for the ages from 19 to 20 years they diminish to .35 and .28.[29] Dr. C. M. Jackson's study of Minnesota University Students yielded the correlation between weight and height of $.5 + .012$.[30] The studies of Newbold and Greenwood, Gripps, and Castle gave very similar correlations: from .5 to .58. For this reason it is not improbable that an adult group which is taller than the other group may be lighter in weight than the other group, especially when the difference in stature is slight.

Interpretation. A definite interpretation of the above distribution of weight between city and country population is scarcely possible as yet. So many causal factors are operating to bring it about, and they are so entangled with one another, that it is exceedingly difficult to measure with any degree of certainty the comparative rôle of each of these factors. Only in a tentative way, is it possible to set forth several principles.

First, the series of phenomena in this field may be accounted for

[28] Livi, R., *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. II, pp. 49–59, Tables II and III, at the end of the volume.

[29] Baldwin, B. T., *The Physical Growth of Children*, pp. 118, 129 *et seq.*; see also Baxter, J. H., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 56–59. Comparing the mean height with the mean weight of the groups in this study, we see they do not run parallel for the adult groups.

[30] Jackson, Clarence M., "The Physique of Male Students at the University of Minnesota," *The American Journal of Anatomy*, Vol. 40, p. 121, 1927.

through the racial composition of the population of a given city and country. The weight of various individuals and of whole racial groups, though to a less degree than for stature, nevertheless is considerably determined by the racial factor. For instance, the average weight of Italians, French-Canadians, Hebrews, or Japanese, is below that of Americans. If such a racial group composes a considerable per cent of the population of a given city or country community, the result is that the average weight of the community will be lowered. In fact, in the United States "the lowest average weights are found in those sections containing 10 per cent or more of *French-Canadians* and in the Eastern manufacturing group and commuter group." [31] The same may be said of the racially heavy populations, such as, for instance, the Negroes and the Germans in America, whose weight is highest.[32] The greater is its per cent in a given city or rural district, the higher will be the average weight of the population of the ctiy or of the rural district. This explains why the racial factor is not to be discounted in this field and must be taken into consideration. This is rather evident and has been mentioned to introduce the problem as to whether weight, as such, plays a part in the distribution of individuals between the country and the city or rural and urban districts.

May we say, for instance, that heavier people, by the virtue of their greater weight, predominantly gravitate to the country or *vice versa?* To answer the question, we must have facts which show, first, that great weight is an important feature for an adaptation to the city or the country; second, that the migrants from a rural district to the city are lighter (or heavier) than the remaining individuals; third, that the city population is uniformly lighter (or heavier) than the country population of the same age and race and sex. Only such data can justify the hypothesis. Do we have them? As far as known, data of the first and second types are lacking. No one has shown convincingly that a great (or small) weight is particularly profitable for city or country life. As to data of the third type, we see that there is no quite definite uniformity. All we have is that the rural population tends to be somewhat heavier than the city population. But even this is not quite certain. Granting, however, that such a tendency really exists, on account of the lack of corroborations of the first and the second types, we do not have any serious reasons to believe that it is a result of the selection of racially heavy people by the country, and of racially light-weighted people by the city. If such a belief is prevalent and accepted, it is a mere belief and nothing more. If, for instance, the Italian immigrants to America settle in a greater proportion in the city but not

[31] Davenport and Love, *op. cit.*, p. 134, Table 35. [32] *Ibid.*, pp. 36 ff., 117–136.

in the country, the reason for it is not seen in that they are lighter in weight but in some other, particularly economic, reasons. The relatively tall and short, heavy and light Italians settle equally predominantly in the urban and industrial areas. So do others, on the average, tall immigrants: English, Scotch, Irish.

The tendency of rural people to be slightly heavier is more satisfactorily explained through environmental conditions. It is reasonably certain that weight depends on environment much more than stature. For instance, the recent study of Paton and Finlay, which found a very low correlation between the stature and the nutrition of children aged from 2 to 3 years, yielded a much higher correlation between the weight and the nutrition of these children (.4616 for a constant height instead of .1870 for stature and nutrition).[33] Professor Koltzov's self-experiment shows, that within few days in the environment of the Russian Communist Che-ka, where he was imprisoned and was in danger of being executed, he lost, in spite of sufficient food, an enormous amount of weight. These are only a few illustrations of the well-established dependence of weight on the environment. This dependence is well known even to the ladies who wish to reduce or to gain in weight. Although we do not know exactly all the factors which facilitate and diminish weight, and although the hypothesis is to be tested further, in all appearance it is more consistent with the fact of greater weight of rural people in many cases, than the hypothesis of "selective selection" of rural and urban populations according to their weight.

Another fact to be noted is, that *the weight of the city population, as a rule, shows greater contrasts than the weight of the country population.* In other words, like the variability of stature, the city population is more variable in regard to weight than the country population. This points to the same fact of greater heterogeneity of the city population, which we shall see in regard to practically all physical and mental characteristics. An illustration of that may be taken from Livi's figures for the average weight of various city groups. The factual weight of the city groups fluctuates from +.5 and +.9 kg. above the national average (students and butchers) to —.8 kg. below the national average (masons).[34] We have shown that the contrasts in environment and in standards of living in the city, are greater than in the country. The contrast in stature, as we have seen, is greater too. Finally, the city dwellers are racially more heterogeneous, and composed from the offspring of more heterogeneous races than the country population. Therefore, all the factors which determine weight have a much wider range of variability

[33] Paton, N., and Finlay, L., *op. cit.*, p. 61.
[34] Livi, R., *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. II, p. 66.

within the city population than within the country population. Hence, a greater variability in the weight of the city population compared with that of the country population.

Summary. 1. There is no certain uniformity in the comparative weight of the city and the country population. In a great many cases, a greater or less average weight of the city population, in comparison with the country population, is due to the racial composition of the given urban and rural groups, whatever may be the causes of such a composition.

2. All in all, the weight of the country population, taken as a whole, seems to be somewhat above that of the city population. The rule, however, is not quite certain and has exceptions.

3. This difference is due probably to the difference in environmental conditions principally, and not to the selection of a racially heavier people by the country and a lighter by the city.

4. The weight of the city population has a greater variability or shows a greater contrast than the weight of the country population.

5. The causes of this are a greater range of contrasts in city environmental conditions, and a greater racial heterogeneity of its population, compared with the country population and environment.

Build. In the preceding section, weight was discussed from the absolute or factual point of view. From various standpoints, it is important to know the relation of weight and stature. Weight, considered in its relation to stature, may be styled build. The index of build is computed according to various formulæ. For instance, in the United States Army Measurements of 1917–18, the formula of build was $\frac{\text{Weight} \times 1000}{(\text{Stature})^{2}} = \text{Build}$. In other studies the formulæ are somewhat different. Whatever formula is used, what are the comparative indices of build of the country and the city population? That is the question discussed in this section. The principal existing data do not give quite uniform results. A part of this may be because they rarely make a clear-cut comparison of the city and the country population. The United States Army Measurements of 1917–18 show that the indices for the white population of the agricultural regions are, in some cases, higher and in others, lower than the indices for manufacturing and industrial regions. In general the city population in America has a slightly higher index of build.[35] Livi's data show that the peasant class has an index of weight, per unit of stature, far above the national index or that for all the city occupational groups, with

[35] Davenport, C., and Love, A., *Army Anthropology*, pp. 162 ff. Since the comparative stature of the rural population in America is taller, its comparative index of build naturally is lower than that of the city population. But as the weight of the rural population is somewhat higher, it is comprehensible why in some areas the index of build may equal or be even higher than that of the city population.

the exception of the drivers.[36] Since the comparative stature of the Italian peasants is short, while their factual weight is relatively high, such a result is natural and comprehensible. Though data concerning the comparative index of build are not very numerous, nevertheless, we may safely deduct, that in the countries where the comparative stature of the rural population is lower or equal to that of the urban population, and the weight of the rural is equal to or higher than that of the urban, the index of build of the rural population will be higher than that of the city population. In the countries where the stature of the rural population is taller, while the weight is equal to that of the city population, the urbanites' index of build will be higher. Finally, where the comparatively taller country population is also comparatively heavier, its comparative index of build may be equal, or lower, or higher than that of the urbanites; all depends on the comparative stature and weight differences of the city and the country populations.

Chest Circumference. The absolute and relative indices of chest circumference have some significance from the health standpoint. Omitting here the details concerning the methods of measurement of the chest circumference, and keeping in mind only that the measurement in each case is to be made uniformly in regard to the city and the country population (either at expiration or full inspiration), let us glance at the comparative results. In the U. S. Army, the national average circumference of the deflated chest (at expiration) was 33.22 inches; for the agricultural native-foreign white regions, 33.38; and for the eastern manufacturing regions, 33.20 inches. The maximum is given by the white population of the predominantly agricultural states.[37] Besides, deficient chest measurements were found slightly more common in the urban population. Thus the national average is slightly higher for the agricultural areas. However, there were some exceptions to the rule. For instance, the index for the native whites of the agricultural North and South was below the national index of the eastern manufacturing area (33.13 and 33.09 inches). The chest circumference of the peasant-recruits of Italy was the greatest among all the occupational groups studied, with the exception of the drivers (87.5 and 87.6 cm. respectively, with 87.1 cm. as the national average).[38] Similar results were found by Ammon. The rural recruits of the same age and stature as those

[36] Livi, R., *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. II, p. 66.

[37] Davenport and Love, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–162, 173; *Defects found in Drafted Men*, 351; according to computation of Clark Wissler, based on the same data, the chest circumference of the rural population is 34.0, and that of the urbanites, 33.16 inches. Wissler, C., *op. cit.*, pp. 129 *et seq.* By correlating the chest circumference with the density of the population, he finds the chest circumference decreases with an increase of density. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

[38] Livi, R., *Anthropometria*, pp. 137–140; *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. II, pp. 62–63.

of the urban recruits in Freiburg and some other German areas had a greater chest circumference at expiration and inspiration than the urban recruits.[39] The number of the cases of Ammon is, however, too small to be convincing. In England the investigation of the Board of Education (1920) yielded a greater vital capacity of the rural children compared with the urban.[40] Several measurements of the chest circumference of children in Germany (Peiper and others) have shown a greater chest circumference of the country children at the age of from 11 to 12 years, and slightly less at the age from 6 to 7 years.[41] Without adding a few other data which exist, we may conclude, first, that here again we do not find any definite uniformity; second, only in a tentative way is it possible to conclude that the rural population, as a whole, tends to have a slightly larger circumference of the chest than the urban population. This is consistent with a correlation of about .6 to .8 found between weight and chest circumference.[42] Since the rural population tends to be heavier, according to this correlation, it must have a somewhat larger chest circumference. The rule, however, has many exceptions.

A more certain conclusion, however, is that the *girth of the chest of the urban population is more variable than that of the rural population.* In the United States, the standard deviation from the mean chest of the population of the eastern manufacturing area was 2.08 inches, while that for the population of all the agricultural areas was 2.00 inches for the native white; 1.99 for the whites of the agricultural north; and 1.91 inches, for the whites of the agricultural south.[43] The deviation for the whole country was 2.01 inches. Livi's data show the same fact.[44] On account of the greater racial heterogeneity and greater contrasts in standards of living of the city population, this greater variability of chest circumference is rather natural and is to be expected, though some exceptions to the rule may be found.

Interpretation. The principal factors responsible for the urban-rural difference in chest circumference are: the racial composition of the populations and the environmental conditions of the city and the country. The average chest circumference of various racial stocks is not identical. For instance, the Finns and the Russians, have a relatively large average girth of chest while the Negroes or Italians have a small one. If for some reason, whatever it may be, the population of a given city has a higher per cent of the racial

[39] Ammon, O., *Die natürliche Auslese*, pp. 127 *et seq.*
[40] See quoted *Report of the Medical Officer*, 1920, pp. 51–53.
[41] Peiper, E., *Concordia*, 18 Jahrgang, No. 1, 1911.
[42] See Jackson, C., *op. cit.*, p. 104.
[43] Davenport and Love, *op. cit.*, pp. 150.
[44] Livi, R., *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. II, pp. 62–63.

stock with a larger chest circumference than the surrounding country, the result will be a higher index for the urban girth of chest in comparison with the rural. And *vice versa*. This can explain a series of differences between many city and country populations, in this respect.

The next problem is whether the size of the chest circumference, as such, is a basis for the selection of persons for city or for country habitation. In the above, we have admitted, tentatively, that, all in all, the rural population tends to be somewhat larger-chested than the urban. May such a tendency be accounted for through the hypothesis that the country attracts predominantly large-chested people while those with a small girth of chest more often gravitate to the city? In so far as known, no valid corroboration has been offered for such a hypothesis.[45] In view of the most different nature of urban occupations, it is hard to see why such a selection should take place. Finally, the very fact of the presence in the city population of the most contrasting chest circumferences, as shown by their greater variability compared with the rural population, speaks against the hypothesis. For these reasons, the hypothesis may be dismissed. The above tendency of the rural population to be somewhat larger-chested than the urban population, is more consistent with the hypothesis of environmental influences, particularly with the fresh air and outdoor work of the rural population. The air of the cities is more diluted and its population works principally indoors. Further, they furnish less exercise for the corresponding muscles and organs. This opinion is strongly reinforced by a series of data which show that, even within the city population, the occupational groups whose work goes on indoors, like barbers, tailors, even students and commercial people, have an average chest circumference lower than the occupations whose work is muscular and outdoor (masons, drivers, day-laborers).[46] For these reasons, in accordance with the opinions of practically almost all investigators of the problem, we must conclude that the discussed higher rural chest circumference, in so far as it really exists, is rather the result of environmental than selective differences between the city and the country population. As stressed above, the racial composition of the population is responsible for many contrasts in the city and the country population in this respect; but why a given city and rural district differ in racial composition, is to be looked for outside of the factor of selection on the basis of the chest circumference.

[45] Ammon has shown that the migrants from the country have a smaller girth of chest than the stay-at-homes of these countries. But the number of the cases is very small (less than one hundred); they show exceptions and he himself accounts for the difference through environmental conditions. Ammon, O., *Die natürliche Auslese*, pp. 127–136.

[46] Livi, R., *Anthropometria* p. 137.

Summary. 1. Although the data do not show any certain uniformity in the differences of the chest circumference of the groups studied, all in all, the rural population seems to be somewhat larger chested than the urban population.

2. The urban population has a greater variability in chest circumference than the rural.

3. For an explanation of the comparative results in chest circumference in each given case, it is necessary to take into consideration the racial composition of the given rural and urban population whatever may be the causes responsible for such racial compositions.

4. There is no valid reason to admit a selection of city and country population on the basis of the size of the chest circumference of the individuals.

5. The tendency of the rural population to be somewhat larger chested is probably due not to selection on the basis of the size of the chest circumference, but to a complex of the environmental conditions, beginning with fresh air and outdoor life.

6. The greater variability of the urban population, in this respect, is due to its greater racial heterogeneity and to the greater contrasts in urban environment compared with the rural.

Cephalic Index of the Urban and Rural Populations. Measurements by Ammon, Lapouge, Durand, and several other anthropometrists, led them to the formulation of the *Ammon-Lapouge Laws* which definitely state, first, that "the cephalic index of an urban population is lower than that of the country population around the city"; second, that, "in the regions where the brachycephalic type exists, it tends to concentrate in the country, while the dolichocephals tend more to the city"; third, that "the cephalic index of the emigrants from a given country to the city or to another country is generally lower than that of the stay-at-home people of this country," and finally, "that urban life tends to perform a selection in favor of the dolichocephals, and destroys or eliminates the most brachycephalic elements."[47]

The laws answer the problem clearly. The measurements made by these authors, a skilful presentation of the material found, and similar results by some other authors, led to the acceptance of the principal conclusion about the lower cephalic index of the urbanites and migrants, and about the selectional character of this difference, by a considerable number of investigators who rejected some other laws of Ammon-Lapouge.[48]

[47] Lapouge, G. Vacher de, *L'Aryen, son rôle social,* pp. 412 *et seq.; Les sélections sociales,* pp. 391 ff. Ammon O., *op. cit.,* pp. 72 ff. A lower cephalic index means greater long-headedness.

[48] Even such a careful author as W. Z. Ripley, after some limitations, accepts the principal conclusion of Ammon-Lapouge. "We are forced to the conclusion that there

Shall we recognize the above statements as accurate? The existing data scarcely permits such. They contradict so much, that several authors, among them K. Pearson, have made generalizations of an opposite character, that the urban people are predominantly brachycephalic.[49] In the first place, the number of cases by Ammon-Lapouge is very small. It usually is below even one hundred cases and does not go beyond a few hundred at the best. In the second place, even in these few cases, their own data show exceptions.[50] If there were no preconceptions by the authors, their own data would not have permitted anything except a very tentative hypothesis. In the third place, the existing data show, in fact, a very complex and indefinite picture. In some places and areas, the urban cephalic index is lower than that of the surrounding country. The places which showed greater urban long-headedness were: the districts and the cities of Rodez, Milhau, Espallion, Villefranche St.-Affrique (Durand de Gros); Manheim, Heidelberg, München (Ranke); Karlsruhe, Loerrach (Ammon); Lodève, Clermont, Marsillargues, Paris, Lyons, Strassburg, and few other cities of France (Lapouge, Collignon, M. Huck, E. Blind); Vienna (Weisbach); Madrid (Oloriz); Dresden, Coburg, Gotha, Nordhausen (Röse); and some other cities and their surrounding country districts.[51]

The places and results which prove the "laws," may be confronted successfully by no less numerous places and studies which show the opposite results or in which no difference was found. Such for instance are: the districts and cities of Montpellier, and Nîmes, in France; Malaga, Granada, and some other cities in Spain (Lapouge); Lublin, Russia (Olechnowicz); in England and Scotland generally the population of the cities was either more brachycephalic or about the same as the rural population (Beddoe, Parsons); in Italy 41 cities had average indices more dolichocephalic, and 28 more brachycephalic than the indices of the population of the corresponding districts (Livi); Malta and Gozo showed no difference (Buxton); Egypt has a rural population generally more dolichocephalic than in the cities (Craig); the same is true of the majority of the cases of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and of Belgium (Houzé); many cities of Nor-

is some mental characteristic of the *long-headed race* or types which makes them peculiarly prone to migrate from the country to the city; or else, a peculiar disinclination on the part of the broad-headed Alpine race to betake itself to the towns." These and subsequent commentaries of the author seem to contradict somewhat his statement that the "shape of the head seems to bear no direct relation to intelligence" or "civilization"; Ripley, W. Z., *The Races of Europe*, pp. 548 ff. and 40–44.

[49] See Pearson, K., *The Chances of Death*, Vol. I, pp. 290 ff.

[50] See for instance, Lapouge, *Les sélections sociales*, pp. 403 ff.

[51] See survey of the works and places in Ammon, O., *op. cit.*, Chap. II; Lapouge, *Les sélections sociales*, pp. 366–408; Ripley, W. Z., *op. cit.*, pp. 544 ff.; Röse, C., "Beiträge zur Europäischen Rassenkunde," *Archiv f. Rassen-und Gesellschafts-Biologie*, Vol. 2, pp. 348–351, 794–796.

way and Sweden (Retzius, Hultkranz, Lundborg, Linders, Bryn, Boas (for Stockholm)); and in samples taken in the United States (Ripley). The same is true for some ancient cities.[52]

Thus the factual situation is quite different from the picture drawn by the partisans of a greater urban dolichocephaly. The data show that there is no uniformity. And more than that: we are not sure at all that the number of cases in which the urban population is more dolichocephalic than the rural, is greater than the number of the cases of an opposite character. Taking into consideration the fact, that in the majority of the cases where the urban index has been found lower than the rural, the conclusion has been based on a very limited number of measurements, often far below even one hundred; and considering that the opposite cases of comparative rural-urban index have been based, as in the case of Italy, England, Sweden, Belgium, Egypt, on far more numerous measurements, sometimes amounting to tens and hundred of thousands, we are entitled to refute the alleged greater general dolichocephaly of the urbanites compared with the rural population.[53]

There are few direct data about the comparative variability of the cephalic index of the urban and the rural population; nevertheless, a few existing measurements, plus sound logic, make it possible to conclude that, in spite of exceptions and variations, probably it is greater within the urban than the adjoining rural population. Since the index depends primarily upon race; and since the city population

[52] See besides, the works of Lapouge, Ripley, Ammon, already quoted; Beddoe, John, "Sur l'histoire de l'indice céphalique," *L'Anthropologie*, Vol. 5, pp. 664–673; Craig, J. I., "Anthropometry of Modern Egyptians," *Biometrika*, Vol. VIII, pp. 66–78, 1911–12; Houzé, E., *Les indices céphaliques des Flamands* and *des Vallons*, Bruxelles, 1882; Lundborg, H., and Linders, F. J., "The Racial Characteristics of the Swedish Nation," *The Swedish State Institute for Race Biology*, Uppsala, 1926; Bryn, H., *Anthropologia Norwegica*, I, Oslo, 1925; Olechnowicz, W., see a summary of his findings in *L'Anthropologie*, Vol. 6, pp. 702–703, 1896; Parsons, F. G., "The Cephalic Index of the British Isles," *Man*, 1922, February, pp. 19–23; Livi, R., *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. I, Chap. V; Niceforo, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 39–41; Buxton, L. H. Dudley, "The Ethnology of Malta and Gozo," *Journal of Royal Anthrop. Institut*, Vol. 52, pp. 183–184, 1922; Bradbrooke, W., and Parsons, F. G., "The Anthropology of the Chiltern Hill," *Journal of the Royal Anthrop. Institut*, Vol. 52, pp. 113–126; Boas, F., *op. cit.*, p. 426; Pearson, K., *Chances of Death*, Vol. I, pp. 290 ff. Pearson claims that an urban population is, in general, more brachycephalic than the adjoining rural population. This claim can scarcely be accepted, either, as a general rule. Retzius and Fürst, *op. cit.*, Chap. IV, say extreme dolichocephalic as well as brachycephalic indices are both among industrial and urbanized as well as rural provinces. The same is true of average indices.

[53] At the present moment several other "laws" of Ammon-Lapouge are to be recognized fallacious, too. The claim that the upper classes are more dolichocephalic than the lower classes; that dolichocephaly is correlated with greater intelligence, energy, initiative, adventureness, than brachicephaly; these statements are unsupportable now. Correspondingly, the deduction that a greater dolichocephaly of the urbanites means their mental superiority over the rural population and all similar sweeping conclusions, crumble to pieces. See the criticisms, and the data in Sorokin's *Social Mobility*, Chap. X; Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. V.

is racially more heterogeneous and composed out of racially mixed offspring, the variation of the population of the cities where such a heterogeneity really takes place, must be greater in this respect than within the comparatively more homogeneous adjoining rural population. In fact, Lapouge found that, in the urban population studied, the index fluctuated from 72 to 91, while in the surrounding country population it fluctuated only from 75 to 91.[54] Similar are the results of Ammon's, K. Pearson's, and Ch. Myers' studies of the variation of the populations of Freiburg, Ancient Egypt, Modern Egypt, Germany, and France.[55] Without denying the possibility of exceptions from the rule as explained, due in some cases to a greater or equal racial homogeneity in the city population compared with that of the surrounding country,[56] we may assume, tentatively, that the variability of the cephalic index of the urban population is greater than that of the rural population. The proposition, however, is still to be tested.

Interpretation. We are reasonably certain that the cephalic index is determined, in the first place, by race. Correspondingly, the comparative urban and rural cephalic index in each given case would depend on the racial composition of the city and the country population, whatever may be the causes for racial distribution. Livi's hypothesis in this field remains as the most valid generalization. He states, properly, that the cities attract their migrants from places farther distant than the surrounding country; therefore, where the population surrounding a city is of the dolichocephalic type (as in Southern Italy, England, Sweden) the city population will be more brachicephalic because it will be composed not only out of the dolichocephalic migrants from the surrounding country but out of the migrants from other and more remote places with a more brachycephalic population. The infusion of such brachycephalic migrants into the city population raises its comparative cephalic index. Where the population of the country surrounding the city is predominantly brachycephalic, as is the case in many places of Germany, France, and Northern Italy, the comparative index is to be reversed for the same reasons: in such places the urban index would be more dolichocephalic than that of the surrounding country. His own analysis of the Italian population from this standpoint confirmed the rule. In 38 Italian provinces, where the average cephalic index of the population was above the average for the whole of Italy (in other words, where the

[54] Lapouge, *Les sélections*, p. 404.

[55] See the data and the curves in Ammon, *Die natürliche Auslese*, pp. 74–76. Myers, Charles S., "Note on Relative Variability," *Man*, pp. 24–26, 1906; Pearson, K., *The Chances of Death*, Vol. I, pp. 290–291.

[56] For instance, in Stockholm the coefficient of variation is rather low (+ 2.84). See Boas, F., *op. cit.*, p. 426; but Boas' hypothesis that this is due to the uniform influence of the city environment is contradicted by the data of other Swedish cities where the variability is relatively great.

population was conspicuously brachycephalic), 29 of the principal cities of the provinces had cephalic indices below and 9 above the rural index. In 31 other provinces, where the population is more dolichocephalic than the average for all Italy, 19 principal cities had cephalic indices above and 12 below the indices of the corresponding provinces.[57] In the predominantly brachycephalic provinces the peasants' index was higher (more brachycephalic), and in the predominantly dolichocephalic provinces it was lower than the index of the students who were the especially dolichocephalic part of the city population.[58]

This rule explains almost all the essential differences in the cephalic index of the urban and the rural population for the cases studied. It accounts why, in England, Scandinavia, and other predominantly dolichocephalic countries, the cities are rather more brachycephalic than the country, and why, in the areas with a predominantly brachycephalic population, the situation is rather reversed. In this way, and in view of the factual data, the myth of urban dolichocephaly is dissipated. This means also that the claims attributing long-headedness as a basis for the selection by the cities and the reverse by the rural districts, are annulled. The lack of uniformity in the data given, completely contradicts such a hypothesis of selection; Livi's theory makes it quite unnecessary.[59] This means that we do not have any valid reason to think that the cranial index as such is instrumental in determining man's city or country settlement. The more that the alleged correlation between the cephalic index and various psychical characteristics of the dolicho- and the brachycephals, is quite unsupportable at the present moment.[60] Livi's theory also shows the fallacy of other hypotheses set forth for the explanation of the comparative cephalic index of the rural and urban population, for instance, E. Pittard's theory, that the greater dolichocephaly of the city population is due to its greater stature.[61] Here everything is wrong; the suppositions of a greater dolichocephaly of the city population as

[57] See Livi, R., *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. I, pp. 86–91.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[59] It is curious to note that Lapouge himself explains several exceptions from his alleged law through a theory identical to Livi's hypothesis; but his preconceptions seem to have hindered him in understanding its general character. See Lapouge, *Les Sélections*, pp. 404–405.

[60] Besides Sorokin's *Social Mobility* and *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, see Hankins, Frank H., *The Racial Basis of Civilization, passim;* Pearson, K., "Relationship of Mind and Body," *Annals of Eugenics*, Vol. I, pp. 382–406; Musselman, J. R., "On the Correlation of Head Measurements and Mental Ability of Women," *Biometrika*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 195–206, 1926; Harmon, G. E., "On the Degree of Relationship between Head Measurements and Reactions Time to Sight and Sound," *ibid.*, pp. 207–220; in all these studies the correlation between various mental characteristics, beginning with intelligence, and the cephalic index was found nil: —.061 ± .021 (Pearson); .0161 ± .0165 (Musselman); —.0049 ± .00985 (Harmon). This is additional proof of the non-existence of the alleged correlation.

[61] Pittard, E., *Race and History*, p. 23, N. Y., 1925.

well as of its greater stature are quite fallacious; therefore, the whole theory is erroneous. Also unsupportable is the hypothesis of Dr. Röse, that the greater dolichocephaly of the urbanites and migrants is due to the greater intellectual work and "brain exercise" of the city population, compared with the rural population.[62] This, and similar theories which give an environmental explanation of the differences in the index are questionable. We do not know certainly whether environmental conditions can change the cephalic index of the masses. The attempts of Dr. Franz Boas and a few others to show that have failed and lose weight under the valid criticisms of specialists.[63] Besides, Röse's presumption that the urbanites are more dolichocephalic generally is wrong; therefore, the whole hypothesis is wrong, not to mention the fact that it is very questionable as to whether the bulk of the urban population think more or exercise their brains to a greater degree than the rural population.

It may be possible that the rural and urban environments in some way influence the shapes of the heads of their populations. But whether this is so or not, and if it so, the type and character of this influence, we do not know. For this reason, we cannot say anything certain about it and cannot explain the rural-urban distribution of the cephalic index through the direct influence of the environmental agencies.

Size of the Head and Cranial Capacity. As far as the existing data show, there seems to exist a slight but tangible correlation between intelligence and the size of head, or brain, or cranial capacity.[64] From this standpoint, it is of interest to know the comparative size of head, or weight of brain, or cranial capacity of the rural and the urban population. Unfortunately, the data existing are too scarce to entitle any certain conclusions. They do not show uniformity. Dr. J. Ranke's and A. Niceforo's studies showed a greater size of head of the urban recruits than the rural.[65] Dr. Röse's data concerning several thousands of the rural and the urban persons of Saxony show that the rural recruits and children have relatively greater average sizes of head (the length plus the breadth of head); next came the half-urban recruits and children, who were born in the city, but whose parents migrated from the country; and the 100 per cent urban recruits and children who themselves and both of whose parents were born and reared in the city, had the smallest average sizes of head.

[62] Röse, C., *op. cit.*, p. 750.

[63] See about that in Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, the chapters on the Anthropo-Racial and Geographical Schools. The literature and data are given there.

[64] See the data and literature in Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, Chap. X; Porteus, S. D., and Babcock, M. E., *Temperament and Race*, Part IV, Boston, 1926.

[65] Niceforo, A., *Ricerche sui contadini*, pp. 59 ff.

The data of the same author, concerning several thousands of the migrants and the stay-at-homes of the rural districts of Saxony, show that the migrants had a larger size of head than the non-migrants. From this the author concludes that the migrants from the country to the city are positively selected; but in spite of such a selection, since the relative size of head of the urban population is below that of the rural, this means that the city environment leads to a degeneration of its population. The longer it lives in such an environment, the more is this degradation.[66] The data of Ammon are rather opposite;[67] the data of A. Constantin, concerning a few hundreds of French soldiers in 1917–1918, show that, in some samples, the peasant soldiers had a greater, and in other samples, a lower cephalic circumference than the soldiers from the cities with 50,000 and more population.[68] These data do not permit any sweeping generalizations, either about a uniform difference between the rural-urban population in size of head or about a positive or negative selective character of the migration from the country to the city. Neither do they permit sweeping generalizations concerning the negative or positive influences of the city or the country environment.

It is probable that the variability of the urban population in this respect is greater than the rural population. The conclusion is warranted by the fact that among the urban population we find the largest heads or brain capacities (intellectuals, professionals, great men) and the lowest ones (unskilled labor).[69] While within the rural population such contrasts seem to be smaller.

Summary. 1. There is no uniformity in the comparative cephalic index of the urban and the rural population. The hypothesis of a general greater dolichocephaly of the urban population is untenable.

2. The same is to be said about the comparative brain capacity or size of the head or weight of the brain of the rural and the urban population.

3. The urban population seems to have a greater variability in the cephalic index and in the size of the head than the rural population.

4. The distribution of the cephalic index and size of the head among the city and the country population is primarily due to the racial composition of these populations. This racial composition is due to various and numerous causes.

5. There is no valid reason for thinking that the cephalic index (or the size of head) plays an instrumental rôle in the distribution

[66] Röse, C., *op. cit.*, pp. 748–753, 794–795.
[67] Ammon, O., *Die natürliche Auslese*, pp. 88–92.
[68] Constantin, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 280–287.
[69] See the data in Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, Chap. X.

of individuals between the city and the country. In other words, we cannot claim that the urban or the rural population is selected on this basis, and that the migration from the country to the city, and the reverse, is uniformly selective from this standpoint.

6. It is possible to admit that the city and the country environments exert some influence on the cephalic indices and the average sizes of the heads of their population; but the hypothesis has not been proved, as yet; and the character of this influence is unknown, as yet; at the best, if the hypothesis is not quite wrong, environmental influences are of secondary importance in this field. Race and migration satisfactorily explain almost all the substantial facts found.

Pigmentation. In connection with the Aryan theory, Lapouge and some others once thought and maintained that the city population, supposed to be predominantly Nordic (dolichocephalic), was blonder in color of eyes and hair, than the country population. A series of subsequent studies forced these authors to change their opinion, and to agree that the urban population has a tendency to be somewhat darker than the country population. This theory of a darker urban population seems to be predominant now and is supported by many measurements. In Germany, studies of 760,000 school children by G. von Mayr; of 6,758,827 school children by Rudolf Virchow; in the British Isles, the studies by F. Parsons and J. Beddoe; by J. H. Fleure and T. C. James; J. Craig; P. L. MacKinlay, J. F. Tocher; and in Italy, the studies of 256,166 recruits, by R. Livi; in Austria, by A. Schimmer; in the United States, by W. Z. Ripley; these and several other investigations seem to have shown that such a tendency really exists.[70] According to these results, all in all, in the cities the per cent of blonds is somewhat lower and the per cent of brunettes higher than in the country. However, even in these studies the exceptions are very numerous. Some other studies have shown city populations as either blonder or about the same as the country population. As a result, we are not quite certain that a greater brunetteness of the urban population is a general rule. To give an idea about the exceptions, it is sufficient to say that for 69

[70] See Virchow, R., "Gesammtbericht über die von deutschen anthropologischen Gesellschaft veranlassten Erhebungen über die Farbe der Haut, der Haare und der Augen der Schulkinder in Deutschland," *Archiv f. Anthropologie*, Vol. XVI, pp. 275–475; Livi, R., *Anthropometria militare*, Vol. I, Chap. IV; Graig, J., "Memoir on Pigmentation Survey of Scotland," *Journal of Anthrop. Institut*, Vol. 37, pp. 375–401, 1907; Parsons, F. G., "The Colour Index of the British Isles," *ibid.*, Vol. 50, pp. 159–182, 1920; Fleure, J. H., and James, T. C., "Geographical Distribution of Anthropological Types in Wales," *ibid.*, Vol. 46, pp. 151–152, 1916; Ripley, W. Z., *op. cit.*, pp. 555 ff.; MacKinlay, P. L., "Anthropological Studies of Glasgow School Children," *Journal of Hygiene*, Vol. 23, 1924; Tocher, J. F., "Pigmentation Survey of School Children in Scotland," *Biometrika*, Vol. 6, pp. 130–235, 1908–1909; Schimmer, A., "Erhebungen über die Farbe der Augen, der Haare und der Haut bei den Schukindern Osterreichs," *Mitteilunzen der Anthorp. Gesel. in Wien, Supplement, I*, 1884.

Italian provinces, in 26, the cities are blonder and in 40, darker; in 3 the results were the same.[71] In the British Isles, ten provinces have indices of nigrescence higher in the urban populations; three, lower; and three, about the same. "In the West country, where the nigrescence of the country folk is very high, the townspeople are fairer."[72] Also in Germany, according to Virchow's study, the exceptions are very numerous. One is almost tempted to doubt the very existence of the rule itself. In Austria, the situation is similar. Of 23 cities and their suburbs or surrounding country, 11 have higher proportions of blonds, and 12, lower than in the suburbs or the neighboring country; 19 cases have higher proportions of brunettes in the city, and 4 cases lower than in the suburbs or the surrounding country. Thus if in regard to the brunette type the cities are darker, in regard to the blond type they are identical with the country.[73] In Scotland a survey of 502,155 school children found the per cent of fair hair among the boys for the whole country as 24.95, and for the girls, 27.43. The largest five towns studied (Glasgow, Edinburgh, Leith, Dundee, and Aberdeen) in one showed the per cent of fair hair among the boys was above; in another, about the same; and in three others, below the national average. In regard to girls, the situation was similar. The per cent of red hair was practically the same as that of the whole country. The per cent of medium hair in three towns was above; in one, the same; and in one, below that of the whole country for boys. For girls it was slightly above in four towns and below in one. The per cent of dark and the black hair for the girls was above in three towns and below in two. For the boys, in four towns was below, and one above the national average for dark hair. If the per cent of the fair hair in three towns was below the average, the per cent of dark and black in towns was below the average for the country in three or four. This scarcely warrants a conclusion that there is a definite greater tendency for the cities to be darker in pigmentation, even in Scotland. In regard to eye color, the cities had a slightly greater per cent of the dark and medium, and slightly lower per cent of the pure blue and light eyes than the whole country. But here again, especially in the case of the boys, there are exceptions.[74] Taking into consideration, that the contrasts in pigmentation between various parts of rural Scotland are considerably greater,[75] the above slight differences between the city and the country in Scotland do not permit us to give them any important significance. In Switzerland, the situation is rather reversed; according to Chalumeau and Kollman, the cities there, on the aver-

[71] Livi, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 70–72.
[72] Parsons, F. G., *op. cit.*, pp. 179–180.
[73] Virchow, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 457–459.
[74] Craig, John, *op. cit.*, Tables I to VI.
[75] See about that in the quoted work of J. F. Tocher, *passim*, and pp. 227–228.

age, are blonder than the country.[76] In Malta and Gozo there is no difference between the city and the country pigmentation.[77] In Chiltern Hill, the eye color of the rural population is the same as that of the London working class; the hair color is rather darker; the same is true about Edinburgh and its surrounding country in Scotland.[78] The findings of Dr. Meisner in Schleswig-Holstein, are similar also: in regard to eye color, the city population is somewhat darker (per 100 blue eyes there are in all Schleswig-Holstein 33 brown eyes and in the cities of Bremen and Lübeck 47 and 54 brown eyes); in regard to hair color, Bremen is fairer, and Lübeck, darker, than the country.[79] Similar are the results of Olechnowicz's sample of the peasants and the city population.[80] Elissieff's sample from the Turkish population shows darker pigmentation of the rural population. In Belgium, the proportion of brunette type in Brussels is slightly lower than the average for the whole country.[81] In France and in Russia the situation is rather indefinite and unclear.

In the United States, the studies of Gould, or Baxter, or the recent anthropometrical measurement of the U. S. Army do not contain definite indications as to comparative urban-rural pigmentation. They do not permit any certain conclusions in this respect.[82] In Sweden, the most urbanized provinces do not show any definite tendency toward greater brunetteness in comparison with the least or less urbanized provinces. Extreme types of blond and dark pigmentation of the eyes and the hair are found among both types of provinces.[83] All this survey permits is the conclusion that there is no certain uniform difference between the city and the rural population in pigmentation. Only as a tentative hypothesis, is it possible to admit a slight tendency for the urbanites to be somewhat darker; but even this is not certain in view of the conflicting evidence. Further, not all studies give the proper consideration to age groups;[84] the comparisons often have been made not so much between the urban and the rural, as between the urban and the suburban population; and many countries have not been thoroughly studied, as yet;

[76] Ripley, *op. cit.*, p. 556; Virchow, *ibid.*, p. 460.
[77] Buxton, L. H. Dudley, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
[78] Bradbrooke, W., and Parsons, F. G., *op. cit.*, pp. 113–126; Tocher, J. F., *Pigmentation Survey* already quoted.
[79] Meisner, "Die Körpergrosse der Wehrpflichtigen im Gebiete der Unterelbe," *Archiv f. Anthropologie*, Vol. XVIII, p. 111, 1889.
[80] Olechnowicz, W., *op. cit.*, pp. 702–703.
[81] Virchow, R., *op. cit.*, p. 460.
[82] See Davenport and Love, *Army Anthropology*, pp. 43 ff.; 280 ff. Gould, B. A., *op. cit.*, Chap. VI.
[83] See Retzius, G., and Fürst, C., *op. cit.*, Chap. V, and Tables XXXIX, XLI, and diagrams between pp. 156–157.
[84] Identity of the age groups in comparison is important because the color of hair is changing with age.

the samples might not have been random; these and similar conditions make us less sure that the greater brunetteness of the city population is a universal and certain rule. As to the range of variability in pigmentation of the rural-urban populations, it is reasonable to expect a greater variability in the cities. A series of data seem to corroborate the expectation, to some extent. "There is usually an immense difference between the pigmentation (of the cities) and that of the surrounding country; in rural districts there are usually no abrupt changes . . . while they are common in the city." [85] However, there again are many exceptions.

Interpretation. The color index of the population of a given group depends primarily on its racial composition. For instance, the United States Army Anthropology has shown that among the Irish and the Scotch stocks, the per cent of blue eyes is about 73; among the Polish and English, 66; while among the Hebrews and Italians, 37 and 20 per cent correspondingly. For this reason, if the population of a group has a high per cent of Irish-Scotch stock, while another group is composed predominantly out of Hebrews and Italians, the eye-color index of the first would be much blonder than that of the second. The same, with corresponding modifications, may be said of any other groups compared. We saw that, in some cases, the city, in some, the country population, is blonder (or darker). Such a difference is due undoubtedly, in the first place, to the racial compositions of their populations.

Now take into consideration the fact mentioned that cities usually recruit their populations from areas much wider than their neighboring country. This leads to the result mentioned many times, that in the areas where the neighboring country population is predominantly blond, the urban population tends to be darker, and where the rural people are predominantly dark the city population tends to be blonder. The reason is the same as has been discussed above. This expectation is pretty well corroborated inductively. We saw that, in the West Country of England "where the nigrescence of the country folk is very high, the town people are fairer." While in other parts of the British Isles, where the country people are predominantly blond, the city people are darker.[86] Similar facts in general forms have been found in Scotland by J. F. Tocher and in Italy by Livi. In Scotland the correlation between the number of foreigners living in various country divisions and fair hair color is —.788, medium hair +.757; blue eyes —.688, medium and dark eyes, +.523 and +.514 respectively. Therefore, the above deviation

[85] Craig, J., *op. cit.*, p. 379; see there the data of divergence in color; see also the works of J. F. Tocher, P. L. MacKinley quoted.

[86] Parsons, F. G., *op. cit.*, p. 179.

of the pigmentation in Glasgow and partly in other cities and densely populated places of Scotland, is due to a high per cent of foreign immigrants in these places. They are, on the average, darker than the population of Scotland. Their influx to the cities and densely populated areas (the correlation between the foreigners and density in Scotland is +.9456) tend to increase the urban nigerscence.[87] In Italian provinces with proportions of blonds above the average per cent for all Italy, 21 city-country comparisons show city populations darker than the corresponding country, 1 shows them equal, and only 9 show them blonder. In 38 provinces with proportions of the dark above the national average, the city population were blonder in 17 cases (much higher proportions than in the blond provinces), equal in 2 cases, and darker in 19.[88] The same principle explains why in Elissieff's sample of the Turkish population, the cities were blonder; why in many cases in Germany, Austria, and France the cities are sometimes blonder and sometimes darker than their neighboring country. To be sure, there are some exceptions to the rule, because, in addition to the factor of recruiting the city population from areas wider than the neighboring country, there are many other factors whose total play sometimes masks the rôle of migration. Nevertheless, the expectation has been corroborated in so many cases, and its reason is so evident that Livi's principle may be taken as a rule. The above explains also, why the range of variability in pigmentation in the city is likely to be greater than in the country.

Now we need to explain the alleged greater darkness of the city population. Granting the tendency really exists, although in fact the very existence of it is doubtful, what are the factors responsible for it? The existing hypotheses are of two kinds: environmental and selectional. The most common variety of the selectional theory claims that either the cities attract more of the dark than the blond, and, in this way, produce greater darkness in their population; or that the dark and brunette people have a greater chance of survival in the city environment. Through this greater survival, they tend to replace more and more the blonds in the city, and in this way, we have the greater nigrescence of the urban population.[89] As to the first presumption, that the cities attract more of the dark than the blond, it is still in a stage of pure speculation because no great amount of evidence has been supplied which would show that the migrants from the country to the city are darker than the stay-at-homes.

[87] See Tocher, J. F., *op. cit.*, pp. 185–186, 229.

[88] Livi, R., *Anthrop. militare*, Vol. I, pp. 70–72.

[89] As examples of this kind of theories see the interpretations of W. Z. Ripley, F. G. Parsons, R. Livi, H. J. Fleure and T. C. James, J. Gray, in their works quoted. See also MacDonald, D., "Pigmentation of the Hair and Eyes of Children, etc.," *Biometrika*, Vol. 8, p. 13, 1911–1912.

Only such data upon being gathered in a considerable mass and showing a tangible uniformity, would be able to support the claim scientifically. Such data are absent. Besides, if such a "selection" had been really proceeding, the above fact of a great many cases in which the rural population was darker than the urban, could not have taken place. Finally, there must be shown some reason why cities select the dark. Earlier some students correlated pigmentation with a series of mental and psychical qualities. At the present moment, we do not have any reason to think that such a correlation really exists.[90] Therefore, the reasons for such a selective attraction of the brunettes by the cities become rather mysterious. For all these reasons the hypothesis is to be dismissed. As yet, we do not have any even remotely convincing evidence of a selection of brunettes by the cities.

Turn now to other variety of the selective theory. It claims that the brunettes either generally, or within the city environment, have a greater vitality than the blonds. The former either multiply in a greater degree, or die in a smaller proportion than the latter. If the premises are true such a "differential vitality" of the blonds and the brunettes within the city environment must naturally result into a brunette tendency of the city population. However, the evidences given in favor of such a hypothesis are far from being conclusive. They try to show that "pigmentation is an index of force," that "the dark-haired children are more tenacious of life," that "brunette soldiers in the U. S. Army in the Civil War were found showing a greater resistance to disease, than the fair-complexioned," that "the apparently greater pigmentation in woman is correlated with a greater resistance power in the matter of disease." [91] When one reads these and like arguments, he must wonder why the light-haired people exist up to this time. They should have been wiped out long ago as the less vital in the process of natural and social selection. And yet, they exist and, by this existence seem to disprove the theory. Further, as far as known, no one has successfully shown that there has existed either a differential birth- or death-rate between the brunettes

[90] See the data in Sorokin's *Social Mobility*, Chap. X, and *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. V; Pearson's coefficient of correlation between intelligence and color of eyes is .080 for boys and .058 for girls; between color of hair and intelligence, .09 that is, no correlation; Pearson, K., "Relationships of Mind and Body," *Annals of Eugenics*, Vol. I, p. 383, 1926; Lapouge and some others at the beginning expected that the city population was more blond than the country because they felt that initiative, enterprise, progressiveness, domination, and so on, were correlated with the blond Nordics. Later on, when it was found that the city population was rather darker, they illogically shifted the explanation, and tried to explain the thing through a greater survival of the dark compared with the blond in the city. Lapouge, *Les Sélections*, p. 400; *Race et Milieu Social*, pp. 205–206.

[91] See these and still less convincing arguments in Ripley, *op. cit.*, pp. 558 ff.; Parsons, Fleure, and James do not give practically any corroboration.

and the blonds. And the partisans of the theory have not given, as yet, any satisfactory data of this kind. Meanwhile if the theory were valid, such a phenomenon must necessarily have existed and probably would have been shown. Moreover, in some cases, for instance in Scotland, the medium and dark-pigmented people show a much higher death-rate than the fair-colored population. The coefficient of correlation between the death-rate and fair hair is —.806; medium hair +.567; blue eyes —.488; medium and dark eyes +.284 and +.410 respectively.[92] Furthermore, if the theory were true, there should have existed some difference in the duration of life of the blonds and the brunettes. Nobody has shown such. If pigmentation had been correlated with tenacity, vitality, and so on, the Negro would have been the most superior in these respects; the dark peoples of Europe would be more superior than the blond; the upper classes would be predominantly dark. And so on. Ascertained facts do not corroborate these expectations at all. They show that the *tenacious* classes which have greater longevity, in other words the aristocracy, are not darker than the common people with shorter duration of life.[93] Their death-rate is no higher but lower than that of the common people. The rôle of the fair-complexioned in the history of the world and Europe is well known to disprove the claim that they have been less tenacious or lacking in vitality than the dark-pigmented peoples.

Now if one turns to the results of the studies in this field, he does not find any uniformity even remotely similar to what, for instance, has been described by W. Z. Ripley and some other partisans of a correlation between vitality and pigmentation. J. Beddoe found out (on the basis of a limited number of studies) that dark-complexioned children probably show more tenacity of life than the fair, but he himself shows further that phthisis and cancer are more prevalent among dark-haired persons.[94] J. Tocher found that the death-rate in Scotland was higher among the dark than among the fair people. He found, too, that imbecility, blindness, and deafness were somewhat associated with blue eyes and with dark and jet black hair.[95] Darwin indicated several cases among the animals where the white pigs, chickens, dogs, cats, showed a less resistence to some diseases, but in regard to man, with an exception of the abnormal case of albino, he has not supplied anything but few cases where the dark

[92] Tocher, J. F., *op. cit.*, p. 188; this is brought out, not to show the greater vitality of the blonds, since such a premise is as wrong as the opposite, but simply to show the fallacy of the theory criticised. In this case, the greater death-rate of the dark-pigmented is due simply to "that a large proportion of them live under conditions which are productive of a higher mortality," *ibid.*, p. 230.

[93] See the data in Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, Chap. X.

[94] Beddoe, J., *Races of Britain*, p. 224.

[95] Tocher, J., *op. cit.*, p. 231.

pigmentation was associated with a greater resistance to some disease and less to some other ones.[96] F. C. Shrubsall found that tuberculosis, nervous, and malignant diseases were more frequent in dark types, while the blond traits were associated with rheumatism, heart-disease, tonsillitis, and osteo-arthritis.[97] K. Pearson's correlation between health and hair color is .19 and between health and eye color .07. Both are of a very low order and insignificant.[98] D. MacDonald found that, in regard to scarlet fever, diphtheria, measles, and whooping cough "the medium-haired child is more liable to become infected than the red-haired and, much more so, than the dark-haired and jet black-haired child. The fair-haired child occupies an intermediate position as regards infection. The medium-eyed child is more liable to become infected than the dark-eyed and, much more so, than the blue-eyed child. The light-eyed child occupies an intermediate position as regards infection." This is far from showing the superiority of the dark and the inferiority of the blond in regard to infection. In regard to recuperative power, the dark-complexioned children showed somewhat better results, but here the method and the data of the author are especially questionable.[99] In addition, the data of Baxter and Livi have yielded that the blond recruits and soldiers showed a somewhat less resistance to some diseases than the dark-complexioned.[100] A. M. Carr-Saunders, in a careful study, did not find any correlation between pigmentation and disease. An analysis of the data concerning 1,994 children in Birmingham "has shown that no obvious systematic connection can be discovered between any category of pigmentation and disease" and that "the results make it unlikely that pigmentation is a basis of selection." [101] Thus the findings are the most contradictory in the field discussed.

Finally, if the theory were accurate, the death-rate of the rural population, which according to the theory is blonder, has to be higher, and its health poorer, than that of the "more vital" and darker urban population. As a matter of fact, the situation has been rather reverse, as we shall see in the subsequent parts of this book. The theory also leads to an expectation that among the dark people, as especially

[96] Darwin, Charles, *Origin of Species*, p. 236; *Descent of Man*, p. 193; *Variation of Animals under Domestication*, Vol. II, pp. 328 ff.

[97] *Proc. Roy. Soc. Med.*, 1909, Vol. II; *St Bartholomew Hospital Reports*, Vol. XXXIX.

[98] *Biometrika*, p. 355, Vol. 8.

[99] MacDonald, D., "Pigmentation of the Hair and Eyes of Children, etc.," *Biometrika*, p. 38, Vol. 8, 1911-1912; see on p. 39 "Editorial Note" and on pp. 368–369 a criticism of the method and data.

[100] Livi, R., *Anthropometria*, pp. 156–157; Baxter, J. H., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 72 ff., Charts I to XXIII. Both authors, however, do not give any explanation of the finding.

[101] Carr-Saunders, A. M., "Pigmentation in Relation to Selection, etc.," *Biometrika*, Vol. 8, pp. 355–384.

predisposed to the urban environment, the cities are to be developed more than among the blond people. The expectation is scarcely corroborated by the facts of history or statistics. The reference to women's greater resistance to disease on account of their greater pigmentation is fallacious simply because the per cent of the blonds among them is rather higher than among men.[102]

The above discussion is sufficient for one to state the dark tendency of the city population is not firmly ascertained; that the selective rôle of pigmentation in the shifting of the rural migrants to the city is not proved; nor the greater vitality of the medium and dark-complexioned people compared with the fair. It is not possible to style the evidence in favor of such greater vitality of the dark "formidable" as was done by W. Z. Ripley. The criticised theory is but a reversed variety of the Nordic theory of the existence of a correlation between pigmentation, as such, and vital and mental qualities. The Nordic variety being questionable, its brunette replica is no less questionable also.

Thus, if the tendency exists, there remains, as more probable, an environmental explanation. That the color of hair and partly even the eyes is influenced by air, the sun, and other climatic environmental conditions, is rather certain. Therefore, in so far as such a tendency really exists, the explanation probably is in the environmental differences of the city and country. Besides air and other atmospheric and cosmical factors, purely social factors, beginning with the use of pomade, may be relatively influential.

Age of Pubescence and Maturation. O. Ammon and some others expressed the opinion that the city-environment facilitated a faster maturation of the human organism than the country environment. In their investigations, they have given some data to support the opinion. For instance, Ammon found that the hair of the mustache and the beard of the urban individuals developed one and a half years earlier than that of the rural recruits. The same is true in regard to pubescence hair. The maturation of the voice of the urban youth took place also earlier than that of the country youth. The migrants from the country to the city occupy, in all these respects, an intermediate position between the full urbanites and the country youth.[103] The difference is ascribed by Ammon to differences in the city and the country environment. The city facilitates a quicker development, which often leads to a premature growth and through that, at a later age, it hinders full development. The country environment does not force the development. As a result, the country youth at a later age, reach a full development of their bodies. A. Niceforo,

[102] See Livi, R., *Anthropometria*, p. 156; Tocher, J., *op. cit.*, 226.
[103] Ammon, O., *Die natürliche Auslese*, pp. 137–175.

Brière de Boismout, Raciborski, Leudet, and Meyer have expressed somewhat similar opinions though their findings have shown only that the age of the menstruation of the peasant girls comes somewhat later than the girls from the upper classes of the city. Comparisons with the girls of the urban labor classes have not shown any uniformity: in some cases the peasant girls, in some others the working girls were behind.[194]

Other investigations, however, have given the opposite results. For instance the studies mentioned of E. Peiper, and E. Schmidt, in Germany, B. T. Baldwin in America, and partly the studies of A. W. Tuxford and A. R. Glegg in England, have shown that the country youth matures somewhat earlier than the city youth. "For the pubescent stages, the country boys range from nine and one-half to fifteen and one-half, with the mode at 13.5 (years), and the city boys from 10 to 18, with the mode at 14. The country boys reach this period earlier than the city boys." "The girls from the country and from the smaller city (11,000 population) mature earlier than those from Chicago and New York, the median ages being respectively 13 years eight months, 13 years seven months, and 13 years nine months." [105]

This conflict of the evidence does not permit any generalization. As the factors of early or late maturation are not known yet exactly, it is probable that, in so far as it is conditioned by environmental agencies, in some cases these may be present in the city and in some others in the country. Besides, the maturation seems to depend on racial characteristics, also. At least, several studies have stumbled at such relationship concerning the age of menstruation.[106] For this reason, the above conflicting testimony may be due in part to the difference in the racial composition of the city and the country population studied. Whatever it is, we cannot make any generalization in this respect, either in the sense that the city population matures earlier, or in the opposite.

General Conclusions about Bodily Differences of the Urban and Rural Populations. The foregoing summarizes the essentials of the problem. Special summaries of the results have been given after each comparison of bodily traits. Therefore, there is no need to repeat them. The general conclusions which follow from the above analysis are as follows: first, although there are some differences in the bodily traits of the urban and the rural populations they are not

[104] Niceforo, A., *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[105] Baldwin, B. T., *The Physical Growth of Children*, pp. 189–191.

[106] See for instance Krieger, E., *Die Menstruation*, pp. 17 ff., 52 ff., Berlin, 1869; Kelly, H. A., *Medical Gynecology*, pp. 83 ff., London, 1912; Engelman, G. J., "First Age of Menstruation in the North American Continent," *Trans. Amer. Gyn. Soc.*, pp. 87 ff., 1901.

so conspicuous and uniform as may have been supposed; second, the totality of the data in no way shows a greater physical poverty of the rural population compared with the urban; third, the data presented do not warrant the claim that any of the bodily traits studied is, as such, instrumental in the rural or urban settlement of an individual; in other words, *we do not find any valid evidence that the cities attract particularly those who are tall, or heavy, or dark, or dolichocephalic, or with large size of heads and so on, or vice versa. We have seen that all varieties of this theory "selectional selection" by the cities are based on very fragile foundations and are contradicted by the facts.* The fact of recruiting of city populations from more remote and different places than the population of the country, and the interpretation by R. Livi, explain the differences found much more satisfactorily than the hypothesis of "selectional selection." This factor, when it is supplemented in several cases by various environmental considerations, makes the hypothesis of mysterious "selectional selection" unnecessary. Correspondingly, the hypothesis formulated by many, but especially well demonstrated by R. Livi, remains the most important generalization in this field.

CHAPTER V

COMPARATIVE HEALTH OF THE RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION

Introduction. Similar to the problem of the bodily differences between the groups studied, the problem of their comparative health meets important difficulties. The first difficulty is the very concept of health. The other difficulties consist in a series of conditions and circumstances involved in the methods of health measurement of the city and the country populations. Their nature will be seen from the subsequent discussion. Still greater are the difficulties involved in an interpretation of the results obtained. Nevertheless, in view of the enormous amount of material collected; and, at least in part, of its satisfactory character, the solution of the problem does not look hopeless, providing an investigator is free from bias and takes pains to examine carefully the important data existing. These may be divided into a few principal classes. The first class is composed out of the data of medical examinations of the health of children; the second class, consists of the results of medical investigations of recruits and various urban and rural groups; the third class consists of the data of the comparative health of various occupational groups; fourth, data concerning the comparative longevity and mortality in the city and the country, of the agricultural and non-agricultural population; and fifth, urban-rural distribution of specific diseases. When all these data, together with those of birth-rates and vital indices, are taken into consideration, one may arrive at a fairly accurate knowledge of the problem.

Physical Examinations of School Children. The first source for knowledge of the comparative health of the classes studied, is given by the data of physical examinations of school children. The data of this kind are possibly the most defective of any. Many of these examinations are quite superficial. Even those which seem to be more careful, very rarely give random samples; still more rarely do they standardize the groups compared according to their age, sex, and race, not to mention other important weaknesses. Again, the division of the children into rural and urban varies strikingly from study to study. Several studies, having found a prevalence of one kind of defect in a rural or urban group of a locality, extend the conclusion to all other defects and places, without any further study

whatsoever. Nevertheless, we cannot pass them by without a survey and analysis. In spite of these and many other shortcomings of the data, they have some, though very modest, value.

United States of America. In the first place, the results of compilation of data by T. D. Wood, are to be mentioned. These data are so startling and so sensational, that it is not to be wondered that after their publication, they have been quoted in all corresponding textbooks and accepted as decisive evidence of the superiority of the urban children over the rural in health. The results are as follows: [1]

PER CENT OF CHILDREN SHOWING DEFECTS

Type of Disease	*City*	*Rural*	*Type of Disease*	*City*	*Rural*
Heart disease	.40	.74	Breathing defects	2.1	4.2
Mental defects	.20	.8	Ear defects	1.28	4.78
Lung defects	.32	1.25	Enlarged glands	2.7	6.4
Anæmia	1.5	1.65	Malnutrition	7.65	16.6
Unclean	.17	1.7	Eye defects	13.43	21.
Skin disease	3.3	3.53	Adenoids	12.5	23.4
Curvature	.13	3.3	Tonsil defects	16.42	28.14
			Teeth defects	33.58	48.8

The table is so startling that one must scrutinize seriously the sources from which the data were compiled. In the quoted booklet by Dr. T. Wood, however, it is only referred to as "percentages from all available statistics" and "the table is based on the reports of over a half million children." At the end of the booklet, p. 23, there is a list of "references to health problems of rural schools." When one goes through these references, as has been carefully done by the writers, one does not find in them the sources for the above table. Therefore, in so far as this booklet is concerned, this table is rather dogmatic and is based on data of a somewhat mysterious character. We can but agree with Dr. Wood that "the statistics (of the sources of his table) lack uniformity; they contain, doubtless, many errors:" [2] To this we must add that even the computation from these sources is made in a way that is absolutely invalid. Dr. Wood tries to support the questionable validity of the table by further references of the following kind: "The claim that the health of the people in the country is not so good as the health of those living in the cities finds further proof by comparison of the death-rates of rural New York and of New York City." Further, he gives a table of the movement of the death-rate in New York City and in the state of New York without any standardization of the age composition of the groups

[1] Wood, T. D., *Health Essentials for Rural School Children*, prepared by Dr. Thomas D. Wood, p. 4.

[2] Wood, *ibid.*, p. 3.

compared.[3] This "proof" is such a crude error that one can but marvel why such an authority as Dr. Wood used it.[4] Later on, we shall see that when the comparison is made with a standardization of the sex and age compositions of New York City and the country population, the proof testifies definitely in favor of the country. So much about this sensational table and data. Let us pass now to a survey of the data existing in the field, among them those on which this table supposedly is based.

We collected data concerning 1,800,000 children and studied them carefully from two standpoints: first, what per cents of the urban and rural children are found defective generally; second, what are the defects predominating among the urban and rural children. (In view of the great length of the tables they are not given here but will be given in the *Source Book* mentioned.) [5]

These data of almost 1,800,000 children examined do not permit any definite conclusion either in favor of the city or the country. If Philadelphia children show a slight advantage, it is insignificant and might result because the data for Philadelphia concern 1922 while the data for the rural children concern 1914 (a period since which there has been a noticeable improvement in rural sanitation). The data for New York City testify partly in favor of the rural children, but in essentials the data for all city and rural school children of New York State are practically identical. Only villages show an advantage.

If from these data, we turn to numerous local studies, and to the kind and per cent of specific defects of urban and rural children, the conclusion is in no way unfavorable to the rural children. At the worst, they are to be recognized as healthy, at least, as the urban children.[6]

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 2–5.

[4] What is still more surprising is that many authors quote the same unstandardized "evidence" of rural and urban death-rates without any questioning. This is an example of how "scientific" opinions are created.

[5] See *On Medical Inspection of 469,000 School Children in Pennsylvania*, The State Department of Health, Harrisburg, 1915, pp. 3 ff.; *Report of the Commissioner of the Health, State of Pennsylvania*, 1915, pp. 283 ff; Wood, T. C., and Rowell, H. G., *Health Supervision*, pp. 260–261, Philadelphia, 1927; Howe, William A., "School Medical Inspection in N. Y. State," *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. XV, 305–309, 1925. *Public Health Reports*, Vol. 41, p. 2409, 1926; Gulick, L. H., and Ayres, L. P., *Medical Inspection of Schools*, p. 193.

[6] Wood, T. D., *op. cit.*, pp. 260–261; Gulick and Ayres, *op. cit.*, p. 195; Cubberley, E. P., *The Portland Survey*, p. 347, N. Y., 1916; Virginia Public Schools, *Educ. Commission and Virginia Survey Staff*, p. 366, 1919–1920; Moore, E., *Rural School Health Survey, Tuberculosis Assn.*, St. Louis, 1922, pp. 3–5; Diehl, H. S., "Rural and Urban Health," *Journal of Amer. Medic. Association*, Vol. 83, pp. 1117–1123, 1924; "Educational Survey of Elyria, Ohio," *Bureau of Educ. Bulletin*, 1918, No. 15; Beeson, M. F., "The Need of More Adequate Medic. Examination," *The Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. XXX, p. 396, 1923; quoted *Report of the Commissioner of Health*, p. 283; Nydegger, J. A., "Sanitary Survey of Schools in Bartholomew County, Indiana," *Public Health*

To these data, it is possible to add that E. Moore found generally that the country children in Missouri, were better than the city children in regard to teeth defects, and malnutrition, and not worse in other respects. T. Clark, G. L. Collins, and W. L. Tredway found that the rural children of Porter county, Indiana, were rather better than the city children of the county.[7] C. W. Leach and K. F. Maxey found that the typhoid fever morbidity in Alabama and other Southern States was incomparably lower in rural districts than in the cities.[8] In Virginia, rural school children gave a much lower per cent of gland defects (33.5 against 67.5 per cent), tonsils, adenoids, whooping cough (65 and 74 per cent), measles (48 and 74), chicken pox (36 and 58), mumps (37 and 71), (report quoted). In regard to goiter, trachoma, and orthopedic defects, in some cases the city, and in some others, the country children show superiority.

The above shows that the picture of comparative health of the rural and urban children is much more complex than usually considered. The great discrepancies in the data as well as in the norms for average per cent of defects given by various investigators (compare, for instance, Terman's and Wood's norms, which are very different), testify that all these data do not amount to much, and that the severity of the examination and judgments as to what is "defective" are highly subjective. Therefore, the data themselves cannot have any serious validity. The data do not permit a conclusion either in favor of the city or the country. They are very contradictory. This contradiction is only natural since the children examined are not standardized according to age and sex, since the examination itself is often superficial, and since the conditions vary strongly from city to city, and from one country district to the other. One thing is clear, however: the data do not permit the claim that the rural children are poorer in health than the urban. More than that. It is the unanimous opinion that the sanitary and other hygenic conditions of the country schools are much poorer than those of the city schools.[9] Also investigators are unanimous in their opinion that many of the above defects among the rural children are due to these poor sanitary and other conditions of the country schools, not to mention of the country homes. And a series of improvements

Reports, Vol. 29, pp. 352 ff., 1914; Roberts, L., "The Nutrition and Care of Children in Mountain County of Kentucky," *Children's Bureau*, No. 110, 1922, Wash.; quoted Ohio State Survey, p. 197.

[7] *Public Health Bulletin*, No. 77, June, 1916, p. 80.

[8] Leach, Ch. W., and Maxey, K. F., "The Relative Incidence of Typhoid Fever in Cities, Towns, and Country Districts of a Southern State," *Public Health Reports*, Vol. 41, p. 705, 1926.

[9] See for instance Dresslar, P. B., "The Hygiene of Rural Schools," *Nat. Ed. Assn. Proceedings*, 1912, p. 1103.

made during the last few years have already manifested themselves in a decrease of the defects among the rural children. This disparity of the sanitary conditions, coupled with almost equality in defects, testifies rather in favor of a better health for the rural children. Besides, the majority of these defects are somewhat superficial. They often disappear at more mature ages. As we shall see when more mature persons (recruits) are examined, the country recruits show better results. The same is pointed out by the mortality statistics. For these reasons, the above data do not testify in favor of the city children. This tentative conclusion is in harmony with the results of the recruit examinations and other data studied here, not to mention the data of comparative mortality.[10]

European Countries. With the exception of the children of the well-to-do classes from exclusively residential areas of England, all in all, the children from the rural areas of England and Wales, may not be recognized as worse than the children from London or industrial areas. This agrees with the data for the recruit examinations in Great Britain, given later.[11]

From other countries we have the following data. According to Dr. Blezinger's examination of 6,882 children of Cannstatt (Wurttemberg) in 1900–1903, the per cent of defective children was 8.6 among the rural children, and 12.2 among the urban.[12] According to H. Westergaard's investigation among the Danish children, there were 0.9 per cent speech defectives among the rural, and 0.74, among the urban children.[13] According to Kisskalt's measurement in East Prussia, the rural children excel the children of the city commonschools in the strength of the hand-grasp (dinamometer test).[14] Tschering found the per cent of children with myopia in rural schools much lower than in urban schools.[15] Other data of Germany, concerning the defects of school children, are fragmentary and somewhat contradictory. However, they do not entitle the claim of a superiority of the urban children in health. Neither do they give a certain basis for the claim of the opposite character.[16]

[10] Compare Lumsden, L. L., "The Physical Status of Farm Youth," *Rural America,* Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 10–11, 1927; Talafiero, Clark, "The Need and Opportunity for Physical Education in Rural Communities," *Amer. Phys. Education Review,* Vol. 24, No. 8, p. 81, 1919.

[11] See *Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education,* 1920, Cmd., 1522, London, 1921, pp. 46 ff.

[12] Blezinger, "Die vier ersten Jahre schulartzlicher Untersuchungen, etc.," *Zeitschrift f. Schulgesundheit,* Vol. XVII, p. 433; Prinzing, F., *op. cit.,* p. 95.

[13] Prinzing, *ibid.,* p. 99.

[14] Korff-Petersen, A., *op. cit.,* pp. 205 ff.

[15] Czellitzer, A., "Soziologie des Augenkronkheiten," *Handbuch d. Soz. Higgiene,* Vol. V, p. 663.

[16] Descourds, A., *Le Développement de l'enfant de deux à sept ans,* Paris, Delachaux and Nestle, 1922, p. 325, says rural children were superior to Paris children probably because of greater maternal care.

It is to be noted that the health of the city children compared with the rural shows the same greater variability which we have met before in other traits. Indeed, the children of the upper classes of the city population are rather better than the children of the country. But the children of the lower classes of the city are rather worse than the country children. The city has both extreme types and shows a greater contrast in this respect than the country. This conclusion is so well corroborated, that it is unnecessary to supply the data. In regard to weight, to stature, under- and over-nourishment, strength of grasp, as well as in regard to the most important defects and diseases of the children, the greater variability of the city population is practically ascertained—implicitly or explicitly—by almost all the studies made.

Conclusion. The above shows that the comparative health of the rural and urban children gives a very indefinite and contradictory picture. The totality of the data do not permit, with certainty, the claim of the general superiority of either class of the children. Therefore on the basis of these data only, we cannot state anything definite about the comparative health of the city-country population generally. For this purpose, we must pass to a study of the more mature urban-rural age groups. We have to follow, so to speak, the life-career of the children and to observe what is happening to them later on, at the periods of adolescence and maturity. As the majority of the diseases and defects of the children are not very serious, and are liable to be changed later on (to disappear or to increase); and as in the rather superficial physical examinations of children the diagnoses could not be very accurate; and as time and maturation only can show who among them is strong and weak; therefore, we must take more mature age groups of the city and the country and find out their comparative health.[17] Is the difference more uniform and conspicuous for older groups, and does it grow with a transition from the younger rural-urban groups to the older? If we find that the difference is growing and becoming more and clearer as we proceed to older rural-urban groups, this is a clear indication as to whether the country or the city population is healthier. The next group to be taken is at the age of 18 to 30 years. This group is especially well studied in the medical examinations of recruits and armies. Therefore let us turn to this material.

Medical Examinations of Recruits and Soldiers. The importance of these data need not to be discussed. The results of a medical examination of hundreds of thousands and millions of individuals, represent a real health-census of the population and its various groups.

[17] Later we give standardized death rates by age groups, which show, on the whole, that these children's defects are not serious.

However, the data have several defects which diminish their scientific value. First of all, the health requirements for military service are somewhat specific. Several defects like flat-feet, very important from the standpoint of fitness for military service, may not be so important from a non-military point of view, and *vice versa.* For this reason, the per cent of the recruits accepted and rejected from the rural and urban populations in the countries with obligatory military duty, may be taken as a criterion of comparative health only when the character of the requirements and defects found in the recruits of the both groups studied are known. Further, data of this kind often give a comparative index of the defects found only within the recruits accepted without any indication of the per cent of those who were rejected among all called to fulfillment of their military duty. It is evident that such data give information only about an already selected group. For this reason, they are considerably invalidated. Furthermore, we are not always certain that the standards of requirements in a medical examination of the recruits from the city and country are the same; since they are performed by thousands of various physicians, the standards may be different. Naturally this may vitiate the results. The next shortcoming is that in classification of the recruits into urban and rural, they take as the urban all who are found in the city. Meanwhile, we shall see that among the city dwellers there always is a very high per cent of persons born and reared in the country and residents of the city only for a few years. Counting these among the city recruits, the results are vitiated because they belong properly among the country recruits. The same is true of those born and reared in the city and later moving to the country. These are placed among the country recruits. The next shortcoming of the data is that comparisons of the recruits and soldiers within the same age-groups are not always made. Meanwhile, it is well known that health depends greatly on age. Furthermore, the very age of the recruits—from 18 to 22 years of age—is liable to lead to some errors: some of them whose development has been retarded, in subsequent years may improve their health, and those whose development has been premature may show defects later. These and similar shortcomings of the data explain why they must be taken cautiously. Nevertheless, the shortcomings must not be exaggerated. As we shall see, the medical examiners have understood them well and in many cases have taken necessary steps to eliminate such errors. As a result, we have, at the present moment, fairly satisfactory material to judge the comparative health of the rural and the urban, of the agricultural and the non-agricultural populations within several countries. On the basis of the same material, one cannot judge the comparative health of the population

of *various* countries. The requirements for military fitness for the city and the country population within a given country are the same, but they differ in various countries; and, for this reason, the results obtained on the basis of different standards in different countries cannot be used for an evaluation of the comparative health of their population. Turn now to the results.

Germany. As far as its recruit statistics show, the health of the recruits born, reared, and living in the country and engaged in agriculture is the best; the next best are the recruits born and reared in the country and dwelling in the city, or born in the city and dwelling in the country; the health of the recruits city born and reared and residing in the city and engaged in industry seems to be the worst. Finally, the recruits born in Berlin and engaged in industry are still worse. If before 1902 this might be questioned, since 1902, when the classification of the recruits according to these characteristics was introduced, the questioning seems to become impossible.[18] The following data show this.

PER CENT OF THE RECRUITS RECOGNIZED FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE (TAUGLICH) IN EACH OF THE SPECIFIED YEARS FROM EACH OF THE SPECIFIED CATEGORIES

Categories of the Recruits	*1902*	*1903*	*1904*	*1905*	*1906*	*1907*	*1910*	*1912*
I. *Born in the country:*								
a, engaged in agriculture	61.0	60.0	59.1	60.2	60.2	59.7	58.2	60.5
b, engaged in industry	60.2	59.2	58.2	58.5	58.3	57.5	55.1	57.8
II. *Born in the city:*								
a, engaged in agriculture	60.1	57.9	58.8	57.8	58.6	56.8	56.2	55.5
b, engaged in industry	54.7	53.0	52.6	51.3	50.5	49.9	47.9	50.8
c, born in Berlin and engaged in industry	—	—	—	34.2*	—	—	29.7†	30.8
Average for the whole German Empire	58.5	57.1	56.4	56.3	55.9	54.9	53.7	55.5
Difference between the categories of I a and II b	6.3	7.0	6.5	8.9	9.7	8.8	10.3	9.7

* Average for 1903–05. † Average for 1906–10.

The table is so clear and instructive that it makes unnecessary any long interpretation. The difference between the classes *I a* and *II*

[18] Claassen, W., "Die Abnehmende Kriegstüchtigkeit im Deutschen Reich in Stadt und Land," *Archiv. f. Rassen-und Gesellschafts-Biologie*, Vol. 6, pp. 73–77, 1909; Vol. 8, p. 786, 1911; Vol. 10, p. 584, 1913; see also Meisner, H., "Rekrutierungsstatistick," *ibid.*, Vol. 6, pp. 59–72; Claassen, W., "Die Einfluss von Fruchtbarkeit, Sterblickheit, etc.," *ibid.*, Vol. 8, pp. 483–492; see a criticism of Claassen's conclusions in Fischer, A., "Zur Beeintrachtigung der Kreigstüchtigkeit in Deutschland," *ibid.*, Vol. 7, pp. 174–179; this criticism, however, does not concern the difference found between the military fitness of the above categories; see the answer of Claassen, *ibid.*, Vol. 7, pp. 180–187; see other data *ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 618 ff., see Thurnwald, R., "Stadt und Land in Lebensprocess der Rasse," *ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 871–878; for the past, see E. Engel's data in the *Zeitschrift des Stat. Bureaus des K. Sachs; Ministeriums des Innern*, 1856, Nos. 4–7, pp. 61, 111, 112.

a, *b*, *c*, as well as between the classes I and II, is so conspicuous and consistent, that there is no room for doubt or divergency of opinion. We note only that the difference does not tend to decrease but shows rather an opposite tendency. A series of other data tend to show the same tendency. For instance, the areas of Germany in which agriculture is predominant over industry and commerce, yield the highest per cent of the fit recruits while as we pass to areas in which the industry and commerce prevail more and more over agriculture, the per cent tends to decrease.[19] Further, several authors, among them R. Kuczynski in his later works, have shown too, that the per cent of fit recruits (tauglich zum Dienst mit der Waffe) in the whole Empire, as well as in all its 22 military districts, with one exception, was higher among the country than among the city recruits.[20] Finally, the data concerning the occupation of the recruits, seems to point in the same direction, though not so clearly and not without exceptions. All in all, there seems to be a pretty valid basis for thinking that the data of recruit statistics in Germany show superior health of the rural and agricultural populations in comparison with the urban and non-agricultural occupational classes.

Great Britain. Until the World War of 1914, military service was not obligatory in England. Therefore the data of medical examinations of the recruits and soldiers in the British Army are not necessarily representative of the British rural or urban, agricultural or industrial populations. In 1917, however, when military service was made obligatory, 2,425,184 men of military age called to colors were examined by the National Service Medical Board. According to their health, all men were divided into four classes: I (the best), II, III, and IV (the worst). The material is a fair sample and representative for the whole country and the results "may legitimately be looked upon as a trustworthy criterion of the national health." [21]

[19] See Meisner, H., "Einfluss der sozialen Lage auf die Militärtauglichkeit," in *Krankheit und Soziale Lage*, by Mosse, M., and Tugendreich, G., pp. 363–365.

[20] *Ibid.*, Table IV, p. 396; see there other data and the literature, pp. 384–385; Kuczynski, R., *Heereserganzungsgeschäft* 1907 und 1908, *17 Jahrgang d. Stat. Jahrb. deutscher Städte;* see also Korff-Petersen, A., "Die Wohnung als Grundlage der Gesundheitsfürsorge," *Handbuch der Sozialen Hygiene und Gesundheitsfürsorge*, heransgegeben by A. Gottstein, A. Schlossmann, L. Teleky, Vol. V, p. 204, 1927; further, the volumes of this publication are quoted as "*Handbuch d. Soziale Hygiene.*"

[21] *Ministry of National Service, 1917–19*, Report, Vol. I, "Upon the Physical Examination of Men of Military Age by National Service Medical Boards from Nov. 1st, 1917–October 31st, 1918," London, 1920 (Cmd. 504), pp. 2–4.

The table shows the situation: [22]

PERCENTAGE OF EACH GRADE IN EACH OF THE SPECIFIED CLASSES OF THE POPULATION EXAMINED

Classes of the Population	*Grade I*	*Grade II*	*Grade III*	*Grade IV*
Total Group: 2,425,184 men	35.9	22.6	31.2	10.2
Agriculturalists	74.8	13.0	9.4	2.8
(various groups)	71.9	15.5	8.8	3.8
" "	62.0	23.0	11.6	3.4
Miners (various groups)	76.4	9.4	11.4	2.8
" "	68.9	15.1	10.5	5.5
Engineers	60.9	23.9	13.4	1.8
Iron and Steel Workers	60.2	25.6	11.2	3.0
Lace Workers	45.0	26.9	22.7	5.4
Woolen Trade	54.6	10.9	24.0	10.5
" "	37.5	31.7	27.0	3.8
Tailors	33.9	21.4	33.5	11.2

From the figures, it appears that the agricultural population is far above the national standard and practically is at the top of the list. "The miners and agriculturists head the poll and show the best grading results." The same conclusion is corroborated by a detailed study of various diseases and defects of the recruits of the agricultural and the non-agricultural occupations, and by the geographic distribution of the per cent of the recruits of each grade. The very good standing of the miners in some regions is due also to the fact that in such regions "the miners are usually the sons of farmers, who remain on the land and send their sons to the colliery. Therefore the type of man who becomes a miner (there) is good." In other places where the miners are recruited chiefly from "immigrants from the adjacent old industrial centers of England" they had a poor showing.[23]

These data are sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the agricultural class in England, which is predominantly a rural class, has shown a conspicuous superiority in health over the urban and industrial populations generally. Only a very few groups, like the miners, rival with the agriculturists. As we shall see, the results of other studies of the health and mortality and morbidity of the rural and urban population in England are in a complete agreement with the data of the army examination.

United States of America. Of several medical examinations of the recruits and army of the United States, two studies give considerable material for our purposes. One is that carried on under J. H. Baxter, which gives data about 910,652 soldiers and recruits of 1864–66; another, is that made in 1917–18 under the Surgeon-General M. W.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 12–19, 132.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 17 ff. *et passim.*

Ireland, A. G. Love, and Charles B. Davenport; it gives data based on the examination of about 2,753,922 men. Other examinations either concern only a relatively small number of men, or do not give anything definite as regards the comparative health of the city and the country, of the agricultural and the non-agricultural recruits and soldiers of the United States. For this reason, they may be omitted in our study. Baxter's investigation contains a series of valuable data concerning the comparative sickness of the recruits and soldiers according to their occupations. The data have several shortcomings. The principal of them are as follows: some occupational groups contain too few individuals to be quite representative for the corresponding occupation; further, the data are given without any discrimination of the comparative ages of the occupational groups, a defect which may considerably vitiate the results because health or sickness is depending greatly on the age-factor; and again, the whole group is already a selected body and besides some occupations, like professions or business, are represented by individuals selected rather negatively from professions and business, including many of those who may be styled as "failures." [24] These and similar defects considerably vitiate the data and make them questionable in regard to many occupational groups. In regard to farmers, the situation is better because this group contains a very large number of individuals, and may be compared more or less safely with the averages for the whole army at least, as well as some other large occupational classes. The principal results of the examination are as follows:

DISEASE IN ITS RELATION TO OCCUPATION: SHOWING THE NUMBER EXAMINED AND THE RATIO REJECTED PER 1,000 EXAMINED FROM EACH OCCUPATION. U. S. ARMY, CIVIL WAR RECRUITS

Classes of Occupation	*Number Examined*	*Number Rejected per 1,000 of each Occupation*
All occupations	334,321	366.7
Professions	7,576	520.0
Mercantile	18,818	479.5
Skilled	75,761	433.9
Farmers	137,425	349.8
Unskilled (including farmers)	232,166	347.9

More specifically, of 76 occupational groups studied, the ratio of rejected among farmers occupies the thirteenth place from the bottom; it is lower than that of 63 other occupational groups. Only blacksmiths, printers, ironworkers, boatmen, firemen, miners, sailors, and soldiers, show somewhat better results. But the majority of these occupations were more rural than urban groups (sailors, boat-

[24] See an indication of this in Baxter, J. H., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. LXXV, pp. 3, 7, 49, 72, 85 ff. *et passim.*

men, miners, blacksmiths). Besides, they are groups which are selected by the very nature of their occupations; at that time only strong persons could be blacksmiths, ironworkers, boatmen, or firemen. Finally, the size of these groups is very small to be quite representative. For all these reasons, the above leads to the conclusion that the farmer recruits were practically the best, with the exception of the few small-sized and positively selected, predominantly rural groups mentioned.[25] For nearly all particular diseases—syphilis, phthisis pulmonalis, disorders of the intellect, diseases of circulatory system, of the digestive system, and obesity—the farmers gave a ratio of the diseases below that for the whole army; only in paralysis and diseases of the nervous system did their ratio approach the national average closely and only in chronic rheumatism was it slightly higher. In some diseases, for instance in syphilis, the farmer ratio is the lowest among all 76 occupations studied.[26] Thus, the examination discussed showed that the health of the farmer-class was practically the best among all the large occupation classes in the United States.

As to the results of the recent medical examination of the United States Army for 1917–1918, there are also several serious shortcomings. Among them of especial importance are: a very inadequate basis for the division of the rural and urban classes (all communities below 25,000 are taken as "rural"), and the discordance of the data given in various reports of the examination.[27] But omitting these from the discussion, the results in essentials are as follows: According to the Second Report of the Provost Marshal General, the per cent of rejected men on account of their unfitness for military service, was *21.68 for all the urban recruits* and *16.89 for all the rural recruits.*[28] According to the statement of Surgeon-General M. W. Ireland, these per cents were 23 for the city and 20 for the country.[29] According to C. B. Davenport and A. G. Love, the per cent of the accepted recruits without defect was 61.74 for the urban, and 66.74 for the rural; the per cent of the accepted with defects was correspondingly 33.49 and 28.30; the per cent of rejected, correspondingly 4.77 and 4.96.[30] Notwithstanding the discrepancy, due partly to a different

[25] Baxter, *ibid.*, Vol. I, Chart XXXIV.

[26] *Ibid.*, Charts XXV to XXIII.

[27] See about that in Tucker, Rufus S., "Distribution of Men Physically Unfit for Military Service," *Journal of American Statistical Association*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 377–384, 1922.

[28] Second Report of the Provost Marshal General, p. 159, Washington, 1919.

[29] Ireland, M. W., "Physical Defects Discovered in Selective Draft Men During the World War," *Journal of American Medical Assn.*, Vol. 79, p. 1579, November 4, 1922.

[30] Davenport, Charles B., and Love, A. G., *Physical Examination of the First Million Draft Recruits: Methods and Results*, p. 121, Wash., 1919.

number of men examined and to differences in the methods of computation, all in all, the rural population gives a better showing in health than the urban.

This conclusion is in accordance with the ratio of physical defects found in the rural and urban recruits, as well as with the ratio of the defects of the predominantly agricultural and industrial regions of the United States.

For the whole United States there are found 557 defects per 1,000 men examined. For rural districts alone the rate is 528, and for urban districts (cities with 25,000 and more population) alone it is 609; that is, fewer defects were noted in registrants from rural than from urban districts. Part of this excess of defects in cities is probably due to the more critical examination by the physicians of cities.[31]

This result is corroborated by the geographical distribution of the ratio of defects among the predominantly agricultural and manufacturing sections of the country, "The agricultural groups thus show fewer defects than the manufacturing, commercial, and mining groups." [32]

On the basis of these data we can make but one conclusion, namely, the rural population was conspicuously better than the urban in 1864–1866; and the rural continues to be better still, though the contrast in 1917 was less conspicuous than in 1864–1866. At any rate, the data of the last examination do not give any basis for a claim that the urban population is superior in health for the United States, as some authors claim. Later on we shall introduce some other data which rather definitely support the above conclusions.

Holland. In Holland, according to the causes of unfitness, the recruits from the communities of 5,000 and less have throughout a lower per cent of defectives in comparison with the cities for all causes (anæmia, debility, hemorrhoids, lung and heart diseases, defects of the eye, the ear, mental diseases, scrofula, foot-defects, and so on) with the exception of hernia.[33]

Switzerland. Concerning other countries only fragmentary data are at our disposal. This is due partly to a lack of the data in the field discussed generally, and partly to the impossibility of securing the sources, where they exist. In Switzerland a corresponding study of the recruits according to their occupations, for the years 1885–1891, was made by Dr. O. Heers. The principal result is that, all in all, the military fitness and health of the agricultural recruits was about the average of that for the whole group studied. From the

[31] Davenport, C., and Love, A. G., *War Department. Defects Found in Drafted Men*, p. 348, Washington, 1920.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 280; see corresponding charts and tables in the book.

[33] *Annuaire Statistique de Pays-Bas*, p. 40, s'Gravenhage, 1927.

qualitative standpoint there was no conspicuous difference in the kind of defects between the recruits from predominantly agricultural and predominantly industrial areas.[34]

Conclusion. The totality of the data given seems to testify clearly that the health of the rural recruits as a rule is rather better than that of the urban recruits. This result is in an agreement with the results yielded by the above analysis of the bodily traits of the classes studied and it is not contradicted by the results given by the medical examinations of school children. As we shall see the conclusion is in harmony with the data supplied by other sources studied further. Thus far, the data given do not give any reason to think that rural health is worse than urban. The opposite conclusion seems to be nearer to the truth.

[34] See Heers, O., *Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Recrutierungsverhaltnisse der landwirtschaftlichen und industriellen Bevolkerung der Schweiz.* The study has many methodological defects.

CHAPTER VI

PREDOMINANT DISEASES OF THE CITY AND THE COUNTRY

The next source for an evaluation of the health of the city and the country population is given by the statistics of occurrence of various diseases within the rural and urban population of all ages and both sexes. Let us take the principal diseases and glance briefly at their "diffusion" within the classes studied. For the sake of brevity we shall give only some data in the text; other data will be given in the references; final conclusions in each disease will be based on a carefully weighted totality of the existing data.

Tuberculosis and Diseases of the Lungs. Tuberculosis constitutes about 7 to 11 per cent of deaths from all causes. This shows its importance. As is known, the ratio of pulmonary tuberculosis and tuberculosis of other organs is considerably different for the males and females and varies for different age groups. For specific young age groups it is sometimes lower in the city, especially for females. Nevertheless, all in all, one of the most prominent specialists in the field, says, "In all countries mortality from tuberculosis is greater in the cities than in the country. Exceptions to this rule exist only within some limited areas with specific conditions." [1] The data for tuberculosis morbidity and mortality seem to support the statement. Among the urban and rural recruits in America the respective ratios of tuberculosis was correspondingly 100 and 78.[2] Among the farmer-recruits in the army of 1864 the ratio also was lower than that for all occupations.[3] The per cent of deaths from tuberculosis of the lungs among all the occupations studied by Dublin was 20.5, and for farmers, 9.7; only miners had a lower per cent. All the other occupations were much higher.[4] Even the crude death-rate from tuberculosis of all forms (the crude rate gives an inadequate picture more favorable to the city than is the reality) still is higher in the cities of the United States than in the rural (below 10,000 population) districts.[5] A similar picture is given in Quebec

[1] Teleky, L., "Soziale Pathologie der Tuberculose," *Handbuch der Soziale Hygiene*, Vol. III, p. 122, Berlin, 1926.

[2] Davenport and Love, *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, p. 353.

[3] Baxter, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chart XXVII.

[4] Dublin, L. I., "Causes of Death by Occupation," *Bulletin of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 207*, March, 1917, pp. 8, 37.

[5] See *Mortality Statistics*, 1923, Washington, 1926, p. 37.

(Canada), Italy,[6] England and Wales [7] and in many other countries. Thus the farmers and agricultural laborers have the lowest ratio. In more detailed data of occupational groups, only the small group of clergymen gives a ratio lower than the agricultural laborers (the group of the clergymen, in a considerable extent, is a rural group, also). All the other groups give a ratio many times higher for tuberculosis. Similar are the ratios obtained by the previous British censuses.

For the females, the contrast is not so great. But again the ratio for all female age-groups taken, is higher for the urban than for the rural groups. When the migrants from the country of both sexes are eliminated from the city population, and only the city born are taken and compared with the country born and living, the city disadvantage becomes conspicuous throughout all the age groups.

The migration to towns of healthy young (men and) women and the departure from the cities of phthisics have favored the urban death-rate and the favorable rates at early ages in towns are really due to migration.[8]

If we take the comparative rates of the deaths from tuberculosis for the urban and the rural districts of England and Wales the rural rates have been far below the urban.[9] Similar is the situation in Austria,[10] Germany,[11] Bavaria,[12] Switzerland,[13] Holland,[14] and other countries.[15] When standardization of the population according to age and sex is made, and all the age-groups are taken, the country

[6] *Statistical Year Book of Quebec*, 1926, p. 88; *Annuario Statistico Italiano*, 1922–1925, Roma, 1926, pp. 47–49; Giusti, Ugo, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[7] See *Supplement to 75th Annual Report of the Registrar General of England and Wales*, Part IV, Stevenson, T. H. C., "The Social Distribution of Mortality," *Biometrika*, Vol. XV, pp. 383 ff., 1923; Newsholme, A., *Elements of Vital Statistics*, Chap. XXXVIII.

[8] Collis, E., and Greenwood, Major, *The Health of the Industrial Workers*, pp. 129–135; see there details; Hill, A. B., "Internal Migration and Its Effects upon Death-rate," *Privy Council Medical Research Council*, Special Report Series, No. 95, London, 1925, pp. 1–78.

[9] See *Eighty-Second Annual Report of the Reg. General*, 1919, p. XXVII, London, 1920.

[10] *Journal de Société Statistique de Paris*, 1926, p. 295.

[11] Teleky, L., *op. cit.*, p. 122; see there the data for other countries; Mosse, M., "Einfluss der sozialen Lage auf die Tuberkulose," in *Krankheit und Soziale Lage*, pp. 558 ff.

[12] Koelsch, F., "Einfluss von Arbeit und Beruf" in *Krankheit und Soziale Lage*, p. 179.

[13] Prinzing, F., *op. cit.*, pp. 481 ff.

[14] *Annuaire Stat. des Pays-Bas*, p. 40, 1927; Westergaard, H., *Die Lehre von der Mortalität und Morbidität*, pp. 530 ff., Jena, 1901; Levasseur, E., *La Population Française*, Vol. II, pp. 115, 118, Paris, 1891; Ballod, C., *Die mittlere Lebensdauer in Stadt und Land*, pp. 43 ff., Leipzig, 1899.

[15] See the data for other countries and many important details and analysis of the situation in quoted works of Teleky, Koelsch, Collis, Stevenson, Hill. See also Prinzing, F., *op. cit.*, pp. 454 ff.; Thurnwald, F., "Stadt u. Land, etc.," in *Archiv f. Rassen-Gesellschafts-Biologie*, Vol. I, pp. 719 ff.

population appears to be healthier in this respect than the city population.

There is no doubt that some cases of a few age-groups (usually the young) in the city show a ratio for tuberculosis somewhat lower than in the corresponding country age-groups. There is no doubt also, that the curves of tuberculosis rates vary considerably in various country-city comparisons. Nevertheless, the above general rule of a greater prevalence of tuberculosis in the city, and in large occupational classes of the city, remains.

Here again various strata of the city population give great contrasts. There are well-to-do classes and some occupations with a very low rate for tuberculosis. And there are the groups (poor classes and some occupational) with an exceedingly high rate for this disease. The contrast between them, as Dr. Teleky says rightly, is much more conspicuous than between the country and the city.[16] This means that in this respect the *city shows again a greater variability than the country.*

Now as to the factors of the prevalence of tuberculosis in the city, they probably are predominantly environmental. Poverty, diluted air, overcrowded rooms, insufficient nourishment, indoor work, and so on, all contribute greatly to this and all have been found to be correlated with tuberculosis.[17] This is corroborated, also, by a decrease of the ratio of tuberculosis with an improvement of the economic and sanitary conditions of cities. The factor of migration cannot be excluded, at least for an accounting of several particularities of the distribution of tuberculosis between the country and the city. Migration of the phthisics from the city to a country with an exceptionally favorable climate, may raise the rate for such a country area and lower the rate of the city. Migration from the country to the city of healthy youths or, on the contrary, persons predisposed to tuberculosis, may influence the respective rates for the country and the city. In fact, such phenomena are found. Therefore, in each given case, the factor of migration is to be considered as accounting for many peculiarities.

Venereal Diseases. Notwithstanding the differences in the accuracy of registration of venereal diseases, and especially syphilis, in the country and the city, it seems reasonable to think that syphilis, and other important forms of venereal diseases, are more common in the urban than in the rural population. The discrepancy between the ratio of syphilis in the city and the country population is

[16] Teleky, L., *op. cit.*; pp. 123 ff.; see there the ratio of tuberculosis according the income groups in Hamburg, Vienna, Paris, and other cities.

[17] See corresponding analysis in the works of Teleky, Prinzing, Koelsch, quoted; throughout all the volumes of the *Handbuch der Sozialen Hygiene*, quoted; and all the studies in the volume *Krankheit und Soziale Lage.*

so great, that it may scarcely be explained through mere differences in registration. Only a very few representative data are given here. Others may be found in the sources quoted.

The examination of the American drafted men of 1864 has shown that the ratio of syphilis among farmers is the lowest among all the 76 occupational groups studied.[18] The examination of the army of 1917–1918 has shown that the ratio of syphilis for the rural districts was 89, contrasted to the urban as 100. As to other venereal diseases, the ratio for chancroid was the same for the city and the country. Gonococcus infection was slightly higher in the rural districts (the ratios were 109 for the country and 100 for the city). This latter was due, primarily, to the spread of venereal diseases among the negro population.[19]

In England and Wales, the ratio of the deaths from venereal and urinary diseases in 1910–1912 for the agricultural laborers was the lowest among all the eight social classes studied, being 48; while for the upper and middle classes it was 103; for the second class, 104; for the skilled, 107; for the fourth class, 90; for the unskilled, 123; for the textile operatives, 199; and for the miners, 68.[20]

In the Netherlands in 1920, the per cent of still-births due to syphilis was 0.48 in communities with populations below 5,000; 0.90, for communities 5,000 to 20,000; 1.31 for those from 20,000 to 50,000; 2.32 for those from 50,000 to 100,000 and 4.11 for cities with populations over 100,000. In Switzerland, the ratio for the period from 1901 to 1920 was 1.56 for the canton populations, and 4.48 for the cities. In Denmark (1915–1920), the population of Copenhagen composed 21 per cent of the population of the country, but the per cent of syphilis occurrences in Copenhagen composed 67 per cent of all the cases of syphilis in Denmark; respectively the per cents of the population and syphilis cases were, for the provincial cities, 22 and 27; for the country 57 and 6. Such an enormous difference in Denmark is undoubtedly due, in a degree, to the fact that registration of syphilis is made according to the place of treatment. The country population go to city doctors for treatment; therefore many country cases are registered as city cases. And yet, this fact is insufficient to account for the whole difference even in Denmark. This is supported by the number of fresh infections with syphilis per 10,000. This number in 1920 was for Copenhagen 38, for provincial cities 14; and for the country 1.2. In Sweden, where the registration is made according to the place of infection, the occurrence of syphilis in Stock-

[18] Baxter, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chart XXVI.
[19] Davenport and Love, *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, p. 353.
[20] Stevenson, T. H. C., *op. cit.*, p. 387; quoted *Supplement to the 75th Annual Report of the Registrar General*, Part IV.

holm is forty times greater among males, and twenty times among females, than among the men and women of the rural districts. In the cities with populations of 50,000 and more, the occurrence, respectively, is twelve times greater for men and six times for women than in the country. In Germany (1919) in all age-groups the occurrence of syphilis in Berlin and the big cities was greater than in the country. Per 1,000 of the population of both sexes of all ages the ratio was 5.6, for Berlin, and 0.8; 1.5; 0.4 for various country areas.[21] Similar are the data supplied by other countries.

What has been said of syphilis may be said of chancroid, gonococcus infection, and the other important venereal diseases. Notwithstanding the above data for the American drafted men of 1917–1918, due probably to the qualification as rural of all communities with populations below 25,000, the totality of the data for various countries shows that these diseases are also more common in the city than in the country population.[22] If the data are taken only for the standardized age and sex groups of 15 to 50 years, the contrast between the city and the country increases still more.[23]

Thus the city population is to be recognized as less healthy in this respect than the country population. But again, in the city population the ratio of the venereally diseased fluctuates strongly from group to group, and from stratum to stratum. As a result, here again the contrasts in the ratio of the venereal diseases between various groups of the city populations sometimes is no less than between the city and the country population. Therefore, the variability of the urban population, in this respect, is probably greater than the country population.

The factors responsible for a greater spread of the diseases within the city population seems to be predominantly environmental. The city is the center of prostitution, and of a more intensive sexual life out of marriage. It contains a greater per cent of divorced persons who generally give a much higher per cent of the venereally diseased. All these factors facilitate such a spread. Besides, the city awakens sexual impulses somewhat earlier than the country and gives more opportunity for their satisfaction through prostitution; it attracts a crowd of persons from various parts who are venereally diseased; it keeps the army; through these and similar ways it greatly facilitates a spread of the diseases discussed.[24]

[21] Haustein, H., "Die Geschlechtskrankheiten einschlisslich der Prostitution," *Handbuch der Soziale Hygiene*, Vol. III, pp. 597–613; see there many other data and competent analysis; see also Prinzing, F., *op. cit.*, pp. 226 ff.; Blaschko, A., and Fischer, W., "Der Einfluss der Sozialen Lage auf die Geschlechtskrankheiten," in *Krankheit und Soziale Lage*, pp. 501–508. See there literature, analysis, and data.

[22] See Haustein, H., *op. cit.*, pp. 610–618; see there other detailed data; see also the works of Blaschko and Prinzing, quoted.

[23] Haustein, H., *ibid.*, p. 618.

[24] See an able analysis of the problem in the quoted works of Haustein and Blaschko.

Side by side with this the factor of migration and selection is to be mentioned, also. As mentioned before, the higher rate of the city is due, in a considerable degree, to the fact that many country individuals go to cities to treat their diseases. Further, many of such diseased go and remain in the city and increase its army of "venerics." On the other hand, a stream of such "venerics" incessantly flows from the cities to the country (soldiers, salesmen, officials, students, working people, etc.). Having been infected in the city, they go to the country and spread the diseases there, infect the rural population, and on the account of lack of medical treatment, are very often the agents responsible for the "wholesale" infection of given areas. This "venereal" exodus from the city to the country seems to have been incomparably greater than the influx of the country "venerics" to the city. At the best, a great many of these country "venerics" are the victims of the city migrants, by whom they have been infected; and, if finally, they flock to the city, the city is receiving its own victims. Through physical contact and, possibly, through heredity, the disease is transmitted to posterity. In this way the centers of venereal diseases grow.

Alcohol and Drug Addiction. Existing data seem to point out that these unhealthy habits are again more common within the urban than the country or the agricultural population. The examination of the U. S. Army has shown that the alcoholic ratio of rural to the urban is as 30 to 100. The corresponding ratio of drug addiction is as 25 to 100. Thus, in the words of the report, "alcoholism and drug addiction, are, above all, urban diseases." The mortality statistics, per 100,000 population of the United States, show a similar picture. Similar are the

Crude Death-Rates from Alcoholism for the Years

	1923	*1922*	*1920*	*1917*	*1914*	*1910*
In the cities of registration states	4.6	3.5	1.3	7.1	6.2	6.7
In the rural part of these states	2.0	1.8	0.7	3.5	3.7	4.1[25]

data given by the occupational Mortality of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company about the ratio of the deaths of farmers from alcoholism and cirrhosis of the liver (closely associated with alcoholism).[26] In Germany the situation is similar.[27] Similar also is the picture given by England and Wales.[28] The data of other countries are similar.

[25] *Mortality Statistics*, 1923, p. 54.

[26] Davenport and Love, *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, pp. 359–360; Doublin, L., *op. cit.*, pp. 38, 8.

[27] Dresel, E. G., "Der Alkohol und seine Bakämpfung," *Handbuch d. Sozialen Hygiene*, Vol. III, p. 471; see also Thurnwald, *op. cit.*, p. 725; see in these works the data and literature.

[28] Stevenson, *op. cit.*, *75th Annual Report of the Registrar General*, quoted, Part IV; Newsholme, A., *Elements of Vital Statistics*, pp. 321 ff., and Chap. XXVIII.

Tabes Dorsalis and General Paralysis of the Insane. Both of these diseases are in some relationship with syphilis. Since syphilis is more common in the urban population, it is to be expected that locomotor ataxia (tabes dorsalis) and general paralysis of the insane are to be higher in the city than in the country. The facts seem to sustain the expectation.

The examination of the U. S. Army has shown that the ratio of the rural recruits to the urban were, for tabes dorsalis, .59, and for the general paralysis of the insane, .67, to 1.0.[29] English mortality statistics give the ratio for the agricultural laborers as 33, the ratios for other classes being 117, 95, 92, 98, 146, 71, 69; they are much higher than for the agricultural class.[30] The data of several other countries seem to show a similar picture, at least in regard to progressive paralysis. For instance in Germany in 1889-1899 there were 1.3 paralytics in Innsbruck per 1,000 population, while in the surrounding country the ratio was only 0.4. In all Prussia (1898–1901) per 100 newcomers to insane asylums there were 16.2 men due to progressive paralysis, but in Berlin, the ratio was 18.8; the corresponding ratios for women were 7.5 and 13.8. Generally, in Germany, Austria, Russia, and several other countries, urban and industrial districts give a higher ratio for progressive paralysis than the rural districts; the more industrialized countries give a higher ratio than the less industrialized.[31] There are several exceptions, but they do not annul the rule.[32]

Disease of the Heart. The importance of this disease is seen from the fact that it constitutes about 14 per cent of the deaths from all causes. This disease seem to be more common for the city than the country population. Mortality statistics of the United States and the recruit statistics for 1864 and 1917–1918 show this.[33] The mortality statistics of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company give the mortality ratio from the organic disease of the heart for farmers at the age of 15 years and over as 16.5, while for all the occupational groups studied, the ratio was 12. The author, however, is right in saying that "inferences must not be drawn too hastily from the proportionate representation of organic heart diseases in various occupations, since they are rather unsatisfactory assignments of the cause of death obscuring, in many instances, more definite conditions which autopsies would determine." To this it is to be added, that since the farmers studied had a duration of life longer than any other occupational group, it is natural that they died from something and

[29] *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, pp. 352, 360.
[30] Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 387.
[31] Prinzing, *ibid.*, pp. 177–178.
[32] See *Krankheit und Soziale Lage*, pp. 403 ff.; see a later chapter on mental diseases.
[33] *Mortality Statistics*, 1923, p. 55; Baxter, *ibid.*, Vol. I, Chart XXXI; *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, p. 352.

this something was likely to be found in "heart disease." In other words, the high rate for the farmer is a result of "a transference" of the cause of deaths for this long living group from something else to heart diseases. This hypothesis is excellently corroborated by the ratios of deaths from this cause in various age-groups among the farmers and all other occupational groups. The figures show that up to the age-groups 45 years and over, the ratio for the farmer is somewhat lower than for all other occupations. Only after 45, an age which exceeds the average age at death for half of the occupational groups, does the ratio of heart disease among farmers become somewhat higher than those for other occupational groups.[34] For these reasons, the data do not contradict the above data from other sources. The same is to be said of Italy where the crude rate of death from heart diseases is slightly higher for agricultural males (11.6) than for the males of other occupational groups.[35] In England and Wales the ratios of mortality from valvular diseases of the heart for the agricultural class compared with those of other classes, for 1910–1912 (age-groups from 25 to 65) were: for the agricultural class, 63; for the upper and middle classes, 79; for the second class, 89; for the skilled, 95; for class IV, 95; for the unskilled, 149; for the textile employees, 101; for the miners, 98.[36] If we take the age-groups from 25 to 35; 35 to 45; 45 to 55; or 55 to 65, the results are similar: the agricultural class, in all these age-groups, has the lowest ratios of mortality among all social classes.

Existing data for other countries point out the same difference. For instance, in Vienna the mortality rate from this cause was higher for each of the age-groups than in Lower Austria without Vienna.[37] The data of Holland (for recruits) show an increase of the ratio of heart diseases with an increase of the size of community.[38] The data for some other countries and places seems to suggest a similar conclusion. Taking into consideration, that with the urbanization of a country, the rate of heart diseases is increasing; that alcoholism as a factor, is stronger in the city; that overeating, mental stress, anxiety, agitation, and strenuous psychical life favors an increase of the disease; that, on the other hand, very heavy physical work is likely to lead to similar results; the stated disadvantage of the city population, in this respect, is rather natural, in spite of much uncertainty as to the accuracy of the statistical data, especially as regards the country population.

[34] Dublin, L., *op. cit.*, pp. 8–9, 14, 37, 65.
[35] *Annuario Statistico Italiano*, 1922 1925, p. 49; Giusti, U., *op. cit.*, p. 22.
[36] Stevenson, T. H. C., *op. cit.*, pp. 385–387; see also the quoted *Supplement to the 75th Annual Report of the Registrar-General*, Part IV.
[37] Prinzing, F., *op. cit.*, p. 462.
[38] *Annuaire Statistique des Pays-Bas*, p. 40, 1927.

Further, it is to be noted that the city population shows in this respect greater contrasts. In the first place, the ratio of heart disease varies greatly with the rich and poor or the overfed and undernourished layers of the city population; it varies strongly also from one urban occupational group to another; the contrasts between them are rather greater than between the country and the city populations.[39] This means that the city population, even in this respect, represents a mixture of the very different elements, and is likely to be more variable than the country population.

As to the factors for the above difference, environment, heredity and migration seem to be responsible for the higher rate of the city population. The principal environmental factors have been enumerated. Inheritance of an organic disease of the heart seems to be probable. Therefore, defective persons are likely to leave a defective posterity, which more and more may accumulate in the city.

Arterio-Sclerosis and Related Diseases. Under this title is understood a series of rather numerous and ill-defined diseases, principally of the circulatory system, which are classified somewhat differently in different countries.

The examination of the U. S. Army in 1864 gave the rate for the diseases of the circulatory system generally for farmers as 28.678 per 1,000, while the rate for all other occupations was 34.607, or much hgiher.[40] The examination of the U. S. Army in 1917 [41] gave data in agreement with those of Baxter. The above data about the organic diseases of the heart also show that the farmer and the rural population are in a better condition than the urban. In Holland, rural recruits gave (in 1924) a lower per cent of the defectives in this respect than the recruits from the communities of 5,000 and above.[42] Mortality statistics for angina pectoris and arterio-sclerosis in England and Wales, 1910–1912, give, for the agricultural class, the ratio of 37, while the ratios for the other seven classes were: 161, 106, 98, 92, 99, 120, 75. Thus the difference there is still more conspicuous than in the United States of America and is again in favor of the agricultural class.[43] In Italy the ratios of deaths from "the diseases of the arteries" per 100,000 population was, in 1921–1923, 5.1 in the 18 big cities, and 3.0 in all Italy.[44]

As far as alcoholism, venereal diseases, forms of drug intoxication, and the use of tobacco are factors in these diseases, it is probable that the city population, which has greater rates for all these respects

[39] See about this in the above quoted works and references.
[40] Baxter, Vol. I, Chart XXXI.
[41] *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, pp. 351 ff.
[42] *Annuaire Statistique des Pays-Bas*, p. 40, 1927.
[43] Stevenson, *ibid.*, pp. 385 ff.; *75th Annual Report of the Registrar General*, Part IV.
[44] Giusti, U., *op. cit.*, p. 22.

than the country population, must be somewhat more liable to arterio-sclerosis and related diseases, than the country population.

Cancer and Malignant Tumors. The important and increasing danger of cancer is well known. Although the data are somewhat contradictory, nevertheless they do not permit us to conclude that the rural population is less healthy in this respect than the urban. The opposite tendency is more warranted by the data. The mortality statistics of the United States give the following crude death-rates from these diseases for the city and the country.

DEATH-RATE FROM CANCER AND OTHER MALIGNANT TUMORS PER 100,000 POPULATION

	1923	*1920*	*1918*
Cities in registration states	106.9	99.8	94.9
Rural part of registration states	73.5	68.0	67.1

A crude rate is, of course, misleading. But if we take the adjusted rate, or even the rate per specified age-groups, the results seem to be the same. The geographical distribution of the rates by states and areas, as well as the rates given for the cities, do not leave any doubt that it is more common in the highly urbanized areas (eastern manufacturing regions) and in the cities, than in the country.[45] This is, however, contradicted by the cancer death-rate for farmers in the data of the Metropolitan Insurance Company. According to these data, the cancer death-rate for all occupational groups studied was 4.9, but for farmers, 7.6. If we take the rates for specified age-groups, we see that, up to the age of 55 years, the difference in the rates for farmers and those in other occupations is very slight. The higher rate for cancer among the farm group is due principally to their high rate of deaths from cancer at the ages above 55, an age higher than the average duration of life in the majority of the other occupational groups. This, and the fact that the general death-rate of the farmers is low, and that their death-rate from other causes is lower than those within other occupational groups, explains that this high rate is the result of a mere statistical "transference," which, in itself, is misleading, as Dr. Dublin rightly mentions.[46] Besides, the number of the cases studied for farmers was only 295. It is too small to war-

[45] *Mortality Statistics*, 1923, pp. 41–50.

[46] This is supported also by the average age at death from cancer for farmers and other groups; the farmer average age at death from cancer is 62.5, and that for other groups is 57.8. The average age at death from all causes of all occupational groups is 47.9, and for the farmers, 58.5. Dublin, L., *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 65, 9. For proof that cancer is predominantly a disease of an advanced age, see Dublin, "The Chance of Death from Cancer," *Surgery, Gynecology and Obstetrics*, pp. 279–280, 1927; also Dublin, L. I., Kopf, E. W., and Lotka, A. J., "The Components of Death Curves," *American Journal of Hygiene*, Vol. VII, p. 303, 1927.

rant any conclusion. These reasons show that these data are not to be interpreted in favor of a higher mortality from cancer in the farmer group. A similar remark applies to the results of the examination of the U. S. Army for 1917–1918. In the whole army there were only 485 cases—a number too small to permit any conclusion. Besides, the recruits were in the ages too young to be significant for cancer mortality, because cancer is a disease typical of relatively advanced ages. Therefore, though the ratio of the rural (under 25,000 population) to urban cases was as 143 to 100, the authors are quite right in saying, that, in view of the above circumstances, "a discussion of the differences is hardly justified." [47]

The data of England and Wales (1910–1912) show that the agricultural class has the lowest rate of deaths from cancer. This rate was 68 and the rates of the other seven large classes were 99, 91, 101, 96, 131, 102, 78.[48] In another form, the rate for all occupational groups was 78, for agricultural laborers 54, and for farmers and graziers 58.[49] According to another computation, the farmer rate was 78 to 79 and the rates for the urban and industrial populations fluctuated from 224.9 to 95.6.[50]

The data for other countries, in an overwhelming way, tend to show a similar picture. For instance, in Vienna (1891–1898), per 100,000 of population, the number of deaths from cancer was, for the ages from 40 to 60 years, 26.7; for the same ages in Lower Austria, 19.2; for ages 60 years and over in Vienna, 82.9; and in Lower Austria, 60.2.[51] In Stuttgart (1892–1899), for the ages from 40 to 60, 31.5; for the ages 60 years and over 64.3; the corresponding rates for these age-groups in the province of Stuttgart were 17.3 and 39.3.[52] In Bavaria (1905–1911), with a standardization of the age-groups, per 1,000,000 of the occupationally engaged individuals at the age of 30 years and older, the cancer death-rates in agriculture were 2,428; in industry, 3,472; and in commerce and transportation, 3,585.[53] The data of Switzerland give similar results.[54] In Prussia (1895–1896),

[47] *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, p. 354.

[48] Stevenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 385 ff.

[49] Young, M., and Russel, W. T., "An Investigation into the Statistics of Cancer in Different Trades and Professions," *Medical Research Council*, Spec. Report Series, No. 99, London, 1926, p. 12.

[50] Collis, E., and Greenwood, Major, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

[51] Rosenfeld, S., "Die Krebsstatistik Österreichs," *Österr. San.-Wes.* 1902, No. 45; Prinzing, *op. cit.*, p. 467.

[52] Weinberg and Gastpar, "Die bosartigen Neubildungen in Stuttgart 1873 bis 1902," *Zeitschrift f. Krebsforschung*, 1904, Bd. II, p. 212.

[53] Kolb, K., "Der Einfluss der Berufes auf die Krebshaufigkeit," *Zeitschrift f. Krebsforschung*, Bd. 9, 1910; and *Zeitschrift f. Bayer. statist. Landesamts*, 1909, Heft I; 1914, Heft 3; Koelsch, F., "Neubildungen und Beruf," *Handbuch d. Soziale Hygiene*, Bd. II, p. 459.

[54] See Thurnwald, R., *op. cit.*, p. 720.

the mortality rates from cancer were more than twice higher in the cities than in the country for each specified age-group: 25–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–60, 60–70, 70–80 years and for each sex.[55] There are also other data for other areas which show a similar situation.[56] In Italy, for the period from 1912 to 1925, the city rates of mortality from malignant tumors (per 10,000 population) were higher than the rate for all Italy. In 1921–1923 the rate for the 18 largest cities was 10.1, and for Italy, 7.0.[57] In Austria, per 1,000 population, mortality from malignant tumors in Vienna in 1913 was lower than in Austria; in 1923 it was higher than in Lower Austria.[58]

Side by side with these studies there are, however, investigations which give results opposite to the above. For instance, Behla found that in Berlin, the agricultural occupation gives the highest death-rate from cancer of any other occupation.[59] However, Kolb seems to have indicated quite rightly that Behla's data were given without consideration for the age-composition of each group and that a high death-rate of the agricultural group of Behla was due to the fact that this group was older, cancer being a disease of old age. The long duration of life of the agricultural group naturally would give a high per cent of cancer mortality, if an investigator did not standardize the ages in his comparison. When this is made, the difference disappears in this case. Besides, Behla's data concern the urban but not the rural agricultural group. For these reasons, they lose their significance.

The above data, and those given in the works quoted, tend to show that, with some exceptions, statistics support the opinion about a higher rate for cancer among the city population compared with the country. This is in an agreement with the fact that, with an increase of urbanization, cancer increases also.[60] However, the conclusion can be but tentative. The statistical result may be due to a more careful registration of the cases of cancer in the cities than in the country: it may be due also to the possibility that country people often go to the city hospitals and die with cancer there. In this way, they increase the rate of the urban population. The increasing rate of cancer-mortality may be due to a mere transference to this cause of deaths previously registered under other names. These consid-

[55] Ballod, C., *op. cit.*, pp. 44–45.

[56] See the studies of R. Finkelnburg and R. Laspeyres in *Zentralblatt f. Allgem. Gesundheitspf.* Vols. XIII, p. 252; XX, p. 342.

[57] Giusti, U., *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[58] *Journal de Soc. Stat. de Paris*, p. 295, 1926.

[59] Behla, "Krebs in beruflicher Beziehung, etc.," *Medic. statist. Nachr.*, 1910, II; the quoted paper of Kolb; Teilhaber, A., "Der Einfluss of Soziale Lage, etc.," in *Krankheit und Soziale Lage*, p. 615.

[60] Dublin, L., "The Chance of Death from Cancer," *Surgery, Gynecology and Obstetrics*, pp. 279–280, 1927.

erations are tentative also; but they must be kept in mind, and they force us to accept the above conclusion as only very tentative. The cancer rates are different for the rich and the poor classes of the city and for various urban occupational groups. The differences in many cases is greater than those between the urban and the rural populations.[61] This means that the city population, in this respect, contains the most heterogeneous elements and is more variable than the country population.

Other Diseases and Conclusions. Though we have at our disposal the data of comparative diffusion of all other important diseases in the city and the country, the lack of space does not permit their presentation. Promising to give them in the mentioned three-volume publication, all that we can do here is to give the conclusions which sum up the situation depicted by the existing data.

Although each of the numerous series of data has its shortcomings, and each has only relative value, yet, in their totality, they permit certain general conclusions which may be approximately true. These conclusions are as follows:

1. In spite of some differences from country to country (for instance Italian peasants are at a greater disadvantage than English farmers in respective comparisons with the city populations of these countries) certain important diseases, part of which may have an influence on posterity, such as tuberculosis and diseases of the lungs, syphilis and important venereal diseases, alcoholism and drug addiction, tabes dorsalis and progressive paralysis, organic heart diseases, arterio-sclerosis, cancer, and several other malignant tumors, nephritis, and Bright's disease are more common within the urban populations. Further, teeth defects, obesity, underweight, errors of refraction, diseases of digestive organs, and diabetes mellitus are also more common within the city than the country populations. As the majority of these diseases compose practically the most important of the constitutional diseases, and are influential in regard to posterity; this mere fact is quite sufficient for the claim that the health of the rural population is no worse, and, more correctly, is somewhat better than that of the urban population.

2. Pellagra and a few other relatively unimportant and not widely spread diseases are more common within the rural population.

3. The majority of the infectious diseases, puerperal and other child-bearing diseases, hernia, and enlarged inguinal rings, defects of the eye, ear, trunk, upper and lower extremities, rheumatic diseases, tonsillitis, goiter, and so on, are distributed, on the whole, rather evenly between the classes studied.

[61] See the data in Prinzing, F., *op. cit.*, pp. 438–439, and in the above quoted works; in the works of Konrad Körösy and others given there.

4. The above generalizations and the data of "wholesale disability and sickness" make us think that, on the whole, the country population and the agricultural class is still healthier than the city population or the majority of the big occupational classes of the city.

5. As in all preceding items, the urban population, in its upper and lower classes, exhibits enormous contrasts which seem to be much greater than the contrasts within the rural population. "London shows greater extremes of excellence and superiority" but "the worst in London are lower than the worst elsewhere." [62] This may be said generally of city health compared with country health.

6. As these conclusions agree perfectly with the results of anthropometric measurements and the medical examinations of armies and recruits, and with other fundamental sources for study of the comparative health of the rural-urban populations, they add still more to the validity of the conclusions from these other studies Their validity, in turn, adds to the results given by this other source.

[62] Mackenzie, W. L., *The Health of the School Children*, p. 65.

CHAPTER VII

RURAL–URBAN SUICIDES

Rural-Urban Rates for Suicide. Suicide, in the sense of volitional putting an end to one's own life, because the life is a burden and death is better, is important to us from three standpoints. First, it is one of the *symptoms of vitality:* volitional ending one's own life (in difference from altruistic sacrifices) means a weakening or a dying out of the very roots of vitality. Second, it is one of the *symptoms of happiness:* one who prefers death to life is evidently very unhappy; otherwise, he would not give up his own life.[1] Third, the analysis of its causes discloses a great deal in the field of social relations of various societies with different rates of suicide. For these reasons, suicide-phenomena deserve to be mentioned in any analytical or comparative study of any one social group.

In view of the relative uniformity of the comparative rural-urban suicide rates it is unnecessary to quote the data extensively or to give many tables. It is sufficient to formulate certain propositions which are reasonably valid, to give one or two typical tables for each proposition, to indicate sources where the reader can find the necessary corroborations, and finally, to pass to an interpretation of the results.

The first fundamental fact revealed by the data is that, making all the necessary allowances or corrections for the differences in the sex and age compositions of the city and the country populations, as a rule, *in all the countries for which the data exist, the city has given and still gives a somewhat higher rate for suicide than the population of the rural parts.* In few, if any, cases are the urban rates lower. From an occupational standpoint, with a very few exceptions, *the agricultural population gives one of the very lowest rates for suicide.* It has a rate, as a rule, much below those of the industrial and commercial occupational classes or any big urban occupational group. The fact that the comparative rates for suicide of the city and the country are almost everywhere consistent with those of the agricultural and the non-agricultural populations, reinforces the validity of the conclusions. Finally, the ascertained fact that the rates for suicide in the predominantly agricultural countries are lower than those in

[1] See about that in Durkheim, E., *De la division du travail sociale;* Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 467 ff.

the highly urbanized and industrialized nations,[2] and the fact that in almost all western countries, for the last hundred years, the rates for suicide have been growing parallel with the progress of rapid industrialization and urbanization of the countries, make the validity of the above uniformities reasonably certain. For the past, practically almost all studies verify the above conclusion.[3] For recent years, the situation is not so clear and the city-country rates do not differ so conspicuously. Nevertheless, the above statements hold true. This present situation is shown by the following few data:

Country	*Date*	*Suicide Rates per 100,000 Inhabitants*		
Belgium[4]	1924	*Cities of*		
		25,000 or more		20.53
		5,000 to 25,000		10.91
		2,000 to 5,000		10.74
		2,000 and less		11.54
		Belgium		13.64
Sweden[5]		*Cities*		*Rural Parts*
	1821–30	15.39		4.91
	1901–10	24.04		12.45
	1911–15	24.32		14.39
	1916–20	14.91		11.30
	1923	16.27		13.28
Germany[6]		*Berlin*	*Cities 15,000 and more*	*Germany*
	1902	—	26.2	21.4
	1908	—	26.7	21.9
	1918	39.0	—	15.7
	1919	47.2	—	18.4
	1920	75.1	—	21.7
Netherlands[7]	1921–25	Whole country		6.2
		Amsterdam		6.7
		Rotterdam		7.1
		Utrecht		4.7
Scotland[8]	1919	Large burghs		4
		Small burghs		4
		County districts		4

[2] See substantiation and corroboration of these propositions in the following works: Durkheim, E., *Le suicide;* Wagner, A., *Die Gesetzmässigkeit in den scheinbar willkürlichen Handlungen*, pp. 142 ff., 176 ff.; Jacquart, C., *Le suicide;* Morselli, H., *Der Selbstmord;* Mayr, G. von, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 258–404; Frenay, A. D., *The Suicide Problem in the United States.*

[3] See the indicated studies. A good summary is given in Mayr's work, quoted.

[4] *Annuaire de la Belgique*, p. XLIII, 1927.

[5] *Statistisk Arsbok*, p. 77, 1927.

[6] Mayr, III, p. 274; *Jahrbuch d. D. Reiche*, pp. 48–49, 1921–1922.

[7] *Annuaire des Pays-Bas*, pp. 35, 25, 1927.

[8] *Sixty-fifth Report of Reg.-Gen. for Scotland*, Table 36.

Country	*Date*	*Suicide Rates per 100,000 Inhabitants*	
England and Wales [9] (standardized)	1911–14	London	10.1
		County boroughs	9.6
		Other urban districts	9.2
		Rural districts	8.8
Bavaria	1901–05	Cities	21.0
		Country	11.9
United States of America [10]		*Cities in registration states*	*Rural part in registration states*
	1914	19.5	12.8
	1920	12.0	8.5
	1923	14.2	9.3
Italy [11]		*Cities 100,000 and more*	*Italy*
	1912–14	22	9
	1916–18	16	7
	1921–23	18	8
France		*Cities*	*Country*
	1896–1910	27.0	18.0
Finland [12]	1911–20	16.3	8.0
	1925	25.8	13.0

Such are the rates for urban and rural suicide, at their face value. Correction made for differences in age and sex composition of the city and rural population is not likely to change the above rural and urban rates because the females, who have from three to four times a lower rate for suicide than males, are represented more in the urban than in the rural population.[13] As to age, the greatest rates of suicide are given by the groups 40 years and above, that is by the ages whose proportions are rather equal or greater within the rural than the urban populations.[14] This, together with prevalence of the females in the cities, counterbalances somewhat the greater proportion of children, who also have low rates for suicide, and are predominant within the rural population.[15] For these reasons, it seems to be reasonable to think that the urban population is more "suicidal" than the rural, as is shown by the crude suicide rates.

[9] *81st Annual Report of the Registrar-General*, 1918, p. XCVIII, London, 1920.

[10] *Mortality Statistics*, 1923, p. 68. With registration cities in non-registration states the difference is still greater.

[11] Giusti, Ugo, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[12] Zahn, F., "Selbstmord Statistik," in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, Vol. 7, p. 440, Jena, 1926; *Finland, Statistika Centralbyran*, Vol. 25, p. 69.

[13] See about the sex and age distribution of suicide in the works quoted.

[14] See Mayr, G., *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 80 ff.

[15] The data of Denmark and Sweden, which give the rates separately by sex and age-groups entirely warrant this. See Mayr, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 317.

Although, in some countries,[16] for the last few decades or years, there appears some tendency for the rates to approach each other, nevertheless, the difference still exists. We even do not know whether this tendency for the rates to approach each other is common to all or to many countries. In so far as the isolation of the city and the country tends to disappear more and more through industrial changes and increased communication, and rural conditions begin to approach the urban in many respects, such an approach of suicide rates appears natural and comprehensible.

Let us turn now to the comparative rates of the agricultural and other occupational groups. The existing data show that, in almost all countries, the rate for suicide in the agricultural class formerly was one of the lowest. It was below the average for all occupations and for the big urban occupational classes (industry and commerce). In Italy, the rate of the agricultural class (1897–1906) was 80 per 1,000,000, while the rates of other occupations were from 100 to 470; only the rate for the clergy (60) was below that of the agricultural class. In Switzerland, the rate of those engaged in agriculture and the milk industry (480), is also below the average of all occupations (590). Similar are the data for Denmark, Prussia, Bavaria, Belgium, and Sweden.[17] In England and Wales (1910–1912) the comparative rates of suicide (for male standard population at the ages from 25 to 65) are: for agricultural workers 66, for miners, 61, for all other classes (unskilled, skilled, textile workers, middle, and upper classes) far above these rates (from 88 to 127).[18] In short, for all countries, the suicide rates of the agricultural class, compared with those of other occupations, are quite consistent with the above rates for the city and the country populations. Both categories of the data show the greater anti-suicidal vitality of the rural and agricultural population compared with the urban and industrial.

In the United States, the picture is somewhat different, though not inconsistent with the above data and conclusions. The principal exception is that the suicide rates of the agricultural and the important urban occupations do not seem to show such great differences as in other countries. The rates in the American sources are computed not for a definite number (*i. e.*, 1,000,000) of the given occupational populations, but in the form of the per cent of deaths by suicide among all causes of death as 100 per cent in a given occupation. Also the data for the whole United States registration area do not exist after

[16] In Sweden, France, England, partly the United States of America. See the above figures for Sweden; for France see Icohok, G., "Peut-on parler en France d'une épidémie de suicides," *Journal de Soc. Stat. de Paris*, pp. 278–291, 1926; for England, the *Report of Reg. General*, p. XCVIII, already quoted.

[17] See details in Mayr, *op. cit.*, pp. 329 ff.

[18] Stevenson, T., *op. cit.*, pp. 385 ff.

1909; and other existing data concern either only one state or a small selected group of the policyholders of Life Insurance Companies (Metropolitan and Prudential). These conditions may be partly responsible for the lower difference in urban-rural rates for suicide in the United States of America. But the data as they are show that the rate of the agricultural group in the United States is still somewhat lower than the majority of the urban occupational groups.[19] The data show that the whole group "agricultural pursuits" has a rate below the average for all occupations, and practically below any other important occupational division. The rate for farmers and planters is particularly low. Thus these data for the whole United States registration area are in complete accordance with the data of other countries. They agree also with the "urban" and "rural" rates of suicide given above for the United States. The following data verify these results. The per cent of deaths by suicide among all (100 per cent) causes of death for the policyholders at the age 15 years and over of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was, for all occupations 2.3 per cent, and for farmers and farm laborers, 2.1.[20] An investigation by the Department of Health of the State of New Jersey (1919 to 1923) [21] yielded results somewhat contradictory to all the above results. Taking into consideration, however, that the number of cases studied was small; and that the figures (like all other occupation suicide data for the United States) give only the per cent of deaths due to suicide among other causes of deaths and not a rate of suicide per a definite number of individuals in a given occupation; and, finally, that there are many reasons to believe that the farm and rural class of New Jersey is far from being representative for other states and the country as a whole, we cannot consider these results other than exceptional and not generally valid.

Thus the above survey of the data on the rural-urban and the occupational rates for suicide, on the whole, seems to entitle the conclusion that the rural and agricultural population is less subject to suicides than the urban and industrial population. As has been indicated above, a standardization of the data according to the sex and age composition of the population would not greatly modify the results. Thus, in so far as a lower suicidal rate means a higher vitality and less dissatisfaction with life, we must conclude that the rural population shows, in this respect, greater forcefulness, vitality, and love for, or satisfaction with, life. The conclusion about vitality is

[19] See *U. S. Mortality Statistics*, 1909, pp. 388 ff., 410 ff.; after 1909 suicide statistics according to occupation were discontinued.

[20] Dublin, L., *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 37. Somewhat similar results were obtained by Dr. Hoffman for the Prudential Insurance Company.

[21] See Frenay, A. D., *op. cit.*, pp. 88 ff.

in accordance with the results already obtained from the study of the comparative health of the rural people. The conclusion in regard to their less dissatisfaction with life, as we shall see, is consistent with other comparative results and analyses.

Interpretation. Now how may we explain the difference? Does general sociology have some theories about the factors in suicide which furnish a satisfactory explanation of the above results? The answer is yes! Sociology has such theories, and they explain the results found above. On the other hand, these results support and lend color to the theories. Durkheim, in his classical study of suicide, has shown that the main factors of suicide, in the given meaning, are either an increase of psycho-social isolation (do not mix psycho-social with physical or spatial isolation) or a decrease of the intensity of the social cohesion of a group. The phenomenon of a sudden shattering of the social equilibrium and moral constitution of a society is similar to this second factor. For these reasons, the single and divorced give higher proportions of suicides than the married, because family bonds make the isolation or lonesomeness of the married less intensive. Roman Catholics, whose religion is more dogmatic and integrates members more strongly, show a smaller percentage of suicides than Protestants or freethinkers, who are removed from such ties. For the same reasons, the periods of social movement or war, when individuals go out of their "individual shells," decreasing their isolation and increasing their social cohesion, are marked by a sudden decrease of suicide: while the ends of such movements, when the individuals again confine themselves within their "shells," are marked by a sudden increase in suicides. Suicides after economic crises and bankruptcies are the result of the shattering of the equilibrium and moral constitution of a society. An increase of suicides after such "social earthquakes" is not due to an increase of poverty, because suicides increase also when such crises lead to an increase of prosperity and because poor people, as a rule, do not give higher rates of suicide, but it is due to a disruption of the social ties of the individuals. This disruption is caused by such a shattering of the social and moral equilibrium of society. In other words the increased suicides are due to the same increase of psycho-social isolation and loneliness.[22]

In the light of this theory, it is easy to understand why the rural population is less "suicidal" than the urban. In many textbooks a popular topic for discussion is "the great isolation of rural people." In the sense of a great number of physical contacts with others than the family or neighbors, it is true that rural people, especially on large open farms, have a less number of contacts than the urban.

[22] See Durkheim, E., *Le suicide, passim;* Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 471–474; Sorokin, *Social Mobility,* pp. 522–524; Cavan, R. S., *Suicide.*

(See above, Chapter II.) But this physical isolation is something quite different from what we style as psycho-social isolation or loneliness or a low intensity of social bonds. Man may be amidst a crowd of thousands of people and yet he often feels quite isolated, a stranger to all other men, lonesome and untied. And *vice versa*, man may be alone or amidst only his family or a few friends, and yet, he may not feel any loneliness or psycho-social isolation if he is bound to them by intimate friendship, devotion, love, duty, attachment, or if he "co-feels," "co-thinks," and "co-lives" together with such friends or members of his family. Exactly in this sense, the psycho-social isolation of the rural population has been much less than that of the urban population. Indeed, take, in the first place, the stability or integration of rural and urban family. In other paragraphs of this work it is shown that the rural family is much more stable; averages a greater number of children, and a lower per cent of childless couples; has a less rate for divorce; and is bound together by social bonds, incessant co-operation, community of feeling, beliefs, traditions, interests, purposes, and homogeneity much more strongly than the urban family. This means that, amidst such a family, the rural population is protected from psycho-social isolation incomparably better than the urban. The rural districts contain fewer single persons and divorced and childless couples, as indicated above. As Durkheim has shown, these types are more successful candidates for suicide than the population in normal family units. Such is first evidence of the greater social cohesion or the lower psycho-social isolation of rural people compared with the urban.

Consider further the *rural and urban neighborhood in which the individual resides.* Community of tradition, feeling, belief, interest, and intimacy in the relationships are much greater in the rural than in the urban. In the first place, the population of a rural neighborhood community is much more homogeneous than that of the urban neighborhood. In Chapter II we have shown that, within the rural community, a much greater proportion of the people live and die at the place of their birth, than in the urban community. Such neighboring individuals are "partners" for life: they are reared and brought up along the same general standards: they know one another intimately; they are like-minded, or homogeneous; therefore they understand one another much better than the heterogeneous urban strangers, occasional "bed-fellows," brought together from quite different places with varying habits and psychology. For these reasons, a man born and reared in a rural environment is bound to his neighbors by thousands of social ties much stronger than the city man with his occasional bed-fellows. This means again that the character of the neighborhood community in the country is

much more stable relatively and gives less chances for psycho-social "atomization" or isolation or lonesomeness of the individual.[23]

Add to this the *more mobile or shifting character of the city population.* Its greater mobility is a factor in the increase of psycho-social isolation. Great shifting of the urban population, composed out of heterogeneous strangers, gives little chance for one to be on an intimate level with the multitude of people with whom one meets and is in contact. Meanwhile, only when one is in such an intimate relationship with another; or only when he really has a community of feeling, understanding, and believing, is he really bound closely to others. Only such types of relationships break loneliness or isolation. A great deal of homogeneity or like-mindedness and a considerable length of time are necessary in order to establish such intimate relationships with others. On the contrary, there can be but mere imitations of intimacy with the "hellos" and "how do you dos" which really help little; or purely exterior, half-mechanical contacts which are no insurance against isolation. Since the people of the city are more heterogeneous and are strangers; and since, due to their great shifting, there are fewer chances or little time for establishing intimacy (before it is reached, either one or the other shifts), and real community of feeling or strong social bonds of religion, friendship, tradition, and duties, it is comprehensible that the psycho-social isolation of the city population is greater than that in the country. A great number of lads and girls, who have just left their families and come to the city, are lonely, and hence suffer severely because they are strangers to all. A great many other people are in the same situation. This is sufficient to understand why, contrary to the number of physical contacts, the psycho-social isolation is greater in the city. Many people have experienced this in their personal life-careers.[24]

The greater mobility of the city population leads to the same increase of suicide in many other ways. Through it, the social and moral equilibrium of the city psychical atmosphere is disturbed more often and more strongly. The greater dynamics of social life in the city makes its whole "moral and social equilibrium" unstable; shatters this equilibrium (through crises on the exchange, markets, and in political life) more often and more strongly; and in this way leads to what Durkheim has styled *anomie sociale.* This upsets the equilibrium and increases the suicidal tendency.

In addition, the *city mind is more sophisticated, less dogmatic, more sceptical, and more "free" from traditions, dogmas, and "superstitions."* Man is less bound by these and similar ties and therefore is

[23] See Le Play, F., *Œuvres Complétes,* Vols. I, II, VI, *passim.* See also Wiese, L. von, *Das Dorf als Soziales Gebilde,* Chap. IV, Die Nachbarschaft.

[24] See Sorokin, *Social Mobility,* pp. 519 ff.

more "free" and "isolated" than in the rural community. Since, "free-thinkers" and "open-minded anti-traditionalists" give higher rates for suicide than the traditionalists and dogmatic followers of dogmatic sects and religions, it is comprehensible that city people supply a greater quota of suicide than country people. It is the price which "free urbanites" pay for their liberation from traditions, and other social bonds which they style as "prejudices" and "superstitions"; with these ties broken, the individual is left to his own "reason." He is in a very unsafe position, and the ground under his feet is less stable. He is crushed as soon as some slight ill-wind blows. To whom or to what may he go for consolation in such a misfortune? He does not as often believe in God, or when he believes it is less dogmatically and in a less proportion. He has lost his traditions. Therefore they cannot furnish mental support to him. His sophistication and scepticism have made him relatively free from any "duty" or "obligation" and have stripped these from their "sacredness" to his eyes. His fellows are "strangers"; and, at the best, they would only say a few words of sympathy to him, which, as he knows, are mere politeness and do not enter into his heart. He either does not have children or a wife, or a community of co-living with these or similar persons. Suffering, he does not see any reason to continue the struggle and, as a result, he takes his life either quietly or with curses at the injustices of the world.[25]

These factors, not to mention many others, are sufficient to show that the above data on the distribution of suicides reflect the reality accurately, and are entirely in accord with what is to be expected from our knowledge of the factors of suicide and the specific characteristics of the city and the country communities.

All this is supported also by the fact that an increase of suicides in the majority of the countries has been associated with increased urbanization. Per 10,000 population during the last sixty or seventy years, the rate increased in Italy from 2.8 to 8.3; in France from 7.1 to 23; in England, from 7.3 to 11; in Prussia from 10.6 to 20.5; in Belgium from 6.3 to 14.2; in Ireland from 1.3 to 3.5; in Spain from 3.6 to 6.1; in the United States from 3.18 in 1860 to 11.9 in 1922; in Sweden from 8.1 to 12.4; in Japan from 11 to 20.1; in Rumania from 0.6 to 4.0; in Serbia from 3.8 to 5.1; and in Finland from 2.9 to 5.5. Only in Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Germany did an increase either not take place or move erratically.[26] However it may

[25] We are, of course, magnifying the situation somewhat here as the reader will observe. But this elaboration is the essence of the "typological" method of analysis. In its essence it is scientifically justifiable.

[26] See Mayr, *op. cit.*, p. 279; Frenay, A., *op. cit.*, Chap. II; Ferri, E., "A Century of Homicides and Suicides in Europe," *Bulletin de l'Institut Intern. de Statistique*, Tome XXII, 3eme Livraison, pp. 438 ff.

be, one thing seems certain, that, all in all, the cities have been more "suicidal" than the country and such a situation is rather to be expected.

A progress of urbanization and means of communication, as we know, tends to obliterate many differences between the city and the country and brings the rural population more and more under the influence of the city. Since this is so, shall we wonder that the rural and urban rates for suicide in several countries tend to become more and more similar. Although the similarity is not achieved, as yet, in almost all countries, nevertheless such a trend is to be expected. Unfortunately, however, it does not tend to equalize the rates through lowering the urban rate to the level of the rural rate but through increasing the latter to the level of the city rate. Thus in this, as in several other traits, the city in spreading its influence and benefits, at the same time, spreads its mental, moral, and physical poisons. Urban medical services, hygiene, and the like, travel the same road to the hinterland, and at the same time, as its psycho-social isolation and its other factors in suicide. The final results of the process, whether having reached a point of saturation in suicides the increase would stop, or whether human beings will elaborate an anti-poisonous immunity and adapt themselves to the city environment, or whether the trend will continue indefinitely, no one can predict with certainty. For the present, however, the above factual situation and the continuation of the trend in the near future, seem to be reasonably certain. Thus the data of suicide are in an agreement with the data given by other sources of rural-urban vitality.

CHAPTER VIII

COMPARATIVE LONGEVITY AND MORTALITY OF THE RURAL AND URBAN POPULATIONS

Introductory Remarks. The next basis for judgment of the comparative health of the classes studied, is given by the data of their comparative longevity and mortality. It is quite evident that, providing the comparison is made with proper standardization of the age and sex groups in both classes, longer duration of life or lower mortality testify in favor of better health, regardless as to whether it is due to heredity or environment or to both factors.

In a number of recent works, the statement has been made that, at the present moment, the health of the city population is relatively better because its death-rate is already lower than that of the country population. Such authors quote the crude death-rates of the city and the country without standardization for age and sex differences. There is no need to say that such comparisons are entirely misleading in view of the different age and sex compositions of the city and country. The proportions of the young and the aged, which give the highest death-rates,[1] are greater among the rural population than in the city (see chapters about Migration). Thus, the crude rates overestimate the actual death-rates of the rural when compared with the city population. In order to make comparisons accurate, we must take the death-rates or the rates of survivorship within the same age and sex groups in the city and the country; or, what is still better, the standardized death-rates according to any of the principal methods of standardization used in connection with the construction of Mortality or Life Tables.[2] Only in the case of such

[1] The following figures give an idea of the greater mortality of the young and old age-groups, whose proportions among all age-groups are greater in the rural population. In 1906–1915 in the United States of America out of 1,000 males at the age under 1 year 165.3 died; out of 1,000 at the ages 1–4 years, 14.6; out of 1,000 at the ages from 65 to 74, 66.0; from 75 to 84, 131.1; at the ages from 85 and more, 243.2; while out of each 1,000 at the ages 15 to 24 only 3 died; from 25 to 34, only 4.4; and from 35 to 44 only 9.6. As the crude death-rate is computed per 1,000 of the population of all ages, without their discrimination, and as the city population among all its age-groups has a notably lower proportion of the young and the old than the rural population, it is comprehensible why the crude death-rate is fictitiously favorable to the city and fictitiously unfavorable to the country; and why the crude death-rate of the city is often lower than that of the country when in fact the death-rate of each age-group in the country is lower than that of each corresponding age-group in the city.

[2] See about this in Newsholme, A., *Elements of Vital Statistics*, Chaps. XIX–XXI; Ballod, C., *op. cit.*, pp. 8–34; *Grundriss der Statistik*, pp. 47 ff.; Mayr, G. von., *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 245 ff.; *Supplement to the Seventy-Fifth Annual Report of the Registrar-General*, Part II, Abridged Life Tables.

standardizations are comparisons approximately valid. Having noticed this *elementary* condition of comparison, let us turn to the data. They represent three principal types: first, the data of average age at death for the agricultural and non-agricultural populations; second, the rates of the number of survivors at given ages among the rural and urban populations; and third, the rates of comparative mortality for the same age and sex. These give a sufficient basis for conclusions regarding the comparative longevity and mortality of the groups compared.

With a reasonable degree of certainty, it is possible to state for the past that the duration of life in cities was lower and the mortality rates higher than in the country. All the existing evidence shows this. There is hardly any competent investigator who would question it. For instance, according to John Graunt, in the seventeenth century, 1 in 32 died in London each year compared with 1 in 50 in the country; according to William Petty, the relationship of births to deaths was 5 to 8 in London and 5 to 4 in the country; and according to Gregory King there died annually in London, 1 in 14.1, in the cities and market towns 1 in 30.4, and in the villages and hamlets 1 in 34.4. From Varro and Cato up to modern competent writers—all state that the mortality in the past was much higher in the cities than in the country.

The situation has become more complex since approximately the middle of the nineteenth century. A series of factors, beginning with the enormous hygienic and sanitary improvements in the cities and ending with the general spread of hygienic knowledge and improvement of the standard of living of the population, has caused the death-rate generally, and particularly in the cities, to decrease. As a result, in many cities, at the present moment, the crude death-rate is lower than in the country. This has led many an author to believe that the urban death-rate is now lower than the rural, that the longevity of the city population is greater than that of the country, and that, in accordance, the health of the city population, as shown by the data of mortality and longevity, is now better than that of the country. Some of these authors, as R. Kuczynski, tried to show this by using different methods of computation of the comparative death-rate other than the crude mortality rates.[3] However, his method, as Dr. C. Ballod has shown, is fallacious.[4] It is unnecessary to repeat that the method of crude death-rates is absolutely misleading and therefore cannot have any scientific value for our purposes. Turn now to the results obtained with more sound methods.

[3] See Kuczynski, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 190 ff. The same is to be said of Weber, A., *The Growth of the Cities*, where he follows Kuczynski.

[4] See Ballod, C., *Die Mittlere Lebensdauer*, pp. 14–23.

Average Age at Death of the Farmer and Other Occupational Groups. Dublin's investigation of 94,269 policyholders of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has shown that the average age at death of the farmers and farm laborers was the highest (58.5 years) of any other occupational group studied. It is more than ten years greater than the average age at death for all the occupations studied (47.9 years).[5] The results, of course, do not show the comparative longevity of the uninsured adults, and the groups of younger ages which are also not insured. Some questions may be raised as to what extent the sample is random and representative. The writers believe that, in view of the large number of cases, and the careful investigation of the material, the results are to be taken as significant. The more so that they agree with results obtained by other methods, as well as the studies in Italy.

In Italy per 100 deaths at the age of 25 and above, the proportion of those who died at the age of 65 and over was, for all occupations, 54 in 1905, and 57 in 1913, while these proportions for the agricultural occupations were, respectively, 58 and 63, that is, conspicuously higher. In other words, the longevity of the agricultural group was tangibly above that of the average for all occupations.[6] In Russia the average duration of life of the peasants has also been greater than that of the majority of urban occupational classes.[7]

Comparative Standardized Death-Rates of the Rural-Urban Populations. Omitting from here a discussion of the various methods of standization of death-rates, of construction of life-tables, or of computation of the average duration or expectation of life generally, and for the rural and urban populations particularly, let us study the results obtained by various authors by somewhat different but, all in all, sound methods.

United States of America. Even the crude death-rate of the cities of the registration area, although it shows an approach to that of the rural parts, still remains slightly higher than the crude death-rate of the country (communities under 10,000 and open country).[8] Further, the crude death-rates by states are lower for the white males in the cities than in the rural parts in 6 out of 38 states, and higher in 32 states; for the white females they are lower in the cities in 13 states and higher in 25 states. For the colored males, the death-rates of the cities are lower in 10 out of 38 states, and higher in 28. For colored females the death-rates of the cities are lower in 19 states, and higher in 19.[9]

[5] Dublin, L., *op. cit.*, p. 65.
[6] Coletti, Francesco, *La populazione rurale in Italia*, p. 67.
[7] See Novoselski, S., *Mortality and Duration of Life of the Population in Russia* (in Russian).
[8] *Mortality Statistics*, 1924, p. 12.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 86–89.

If such are the results of the crude death-rates, it is to be expected that the standardized death-rates, measured by the number of survivors at higher ages out of 1,000 born, would show a lower death-rate or a greater longevity of the rural population more conspicuously when compared with the urban groups of the same sex and age. The following table shows that:

UNITED STATES LIFE-TABLES, 1909–1911, FOR MALES

Number of Survivors at Higher Ages out of 1,000 Born

	White Males, Rural Parts	*White Males in Cities*
No. at birth	1,000	1,000
No. at age		
25	806	751
30	785	728
35	763	698
40	738	662
45	710	619
50	677	569
55	637	510
60	581	435
65	506	347
70	409	253
75	294	162

Similar results in favor of the rural parts are given if we take 1,000 males in the city and in the country at the ages 25 or 40 and compute the number of survivors in the country and the city out of each of these 1,000 at later age periods. In each of these computations, we have the number of survivors among the country population greater than among the city population.[10] Besides, if similar computations are made for the predominantly urban and industrial states, like New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and for the less urbanized states we would obtain similar results in favor of the less industrialized states.

For the rural parts of the American population, the expectation of life and the number of survivors to age 75 are much higher than in the entire registration area, while in cities and in the three states (N. Y., N. J., Mass.) having a preponderant city population, life is considerably curtailed.[11]

An approximate computation by W. S. Thompson for 1920 and by P. K. Whelpton for 1920–1924, give similar results.[12]

[10] Newsholme, A., *op. cit.*, p. 255; see there many interesting details.

[11] Newsholme, A., "National Change in Health and Longevity," *American Statistical Association*, Vol. XVII, p. 703, 1920–1921.

[12] Thompson, W. S., "Rural Demography," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XIX, p. 154, 1925. See a similar computation with similar results

The female death-rate in the cities is more favorable relatively than that of the males. But, on the whole, their standardized death-rates are also higher in the cities than in the country, in spite of the fact that a few age-groups of the females give in some countries, lower death-rates in the city.

Thus when standardization is made, the result is that the death-rates of the country, especially for the males, in almost all age-groups is lower than in the city. R. M. Woodbury states, however, that since 1921 the infant mortality (age-group from 0 to 1 year) in the cities has appeared a little lower than in the country.[13]

According to his data the death-rate of the infants is very slightly lower in the city only from the ages from 0 to 6 months. Beginning with the age at six months and above, it is still lower in the country. At the best this only means that, thanks to better medical service in the city, many weak babies, who die in the country within the first few weeks, survive in the city for a period up to six months; but after this period the weaklings begin to die in greater proportions than the country infants and children.

It is possible to take these data, and without any further consultation of the census, to start the myth that infant mortality is now lower in the city than in the country. In view of this, it is advisable to give first, the census rates for the last several years for the "Original Birth Registration Area"; second, to give the data for the registration states. These data are as follows for the "original" area.

Death of Infants Under 1 Year of Age Per 1,000 Live Births[14]

	1924	*1923*	*1922*	*1921*	*1920*	*1919*	*1915*
Rural parts	70	82	76	79	85	87	94
Cities	72	78	81	78	92	90	103

These figures show that 1921 was not a turning point in the movement of infant mortality; that the next year gave a rural rate considerably lower than the city rate; and that 1923 was more favorable to the city while 1924 was again favorable to the country. If now

for the years 1920–1924 and for the future in Whelpton, P. K., "Population of the United States, 1925 to 1975," *Amer. Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIV, p. 259, 1928. That a proper standardization in age composition of rural population would very significantly lower rural crude death-rate is shown also by a series of special studies. For instance, Dr. Dwight Sanderson found the crude death-rate for farm population of Cortland County, N. Y. (1911–1920), 15 per 1,000, while the standardized rate for the same population is only 10.7. Sanderson, D., *A Survey of Sickness in Rural Areas in Cortland County*, Cornell University Agric. Exper. Station, March, 1928, p. 13.

[13] See Woodbury, R. M., *Infant Mortality and Its Causes*, p. 19, Baltimore, 1926.

[14] *Births, Stillbirths, and Infant Mortality Statistics*, 1924, p. 31; Dr. Woodbury, in his careful investigation, took only the data for 1915 and 1921.

we take the whole area of the present registration states (1920) the results would appear as follows: [15]

INFANT MORTALITY RATES FOR ALL REGISTRATION STATES AND CITIES OF 25,000 INHABITANTS OR MORE IN 1920: 1919–1924. DEATH OF INFANTS UNDER 1 YEAR OF AGE PER 1,000 BIRTHS

	1924	*1923*	*1922*	*1921*	*1920*	*1919*
White: cities in registration area	69	75	77	75	87	86
rural parts	65	72	69	70	76	80
Colored: cities	127	138	127	128	158	148
rural parts	105	106	102	100	118	123
Cities; total	72	78	80	78	91	89
Rural parts; total	69	76	72	74	81	84

The data show that infant mortality in the United States is still higher in the city than in the country, in spite of the fact that the method of computation, through the ratio of deaths to 1,000 live births, is likely to give results which fictitiously improve the situation of the city and unduly aggravate the situation of the rural parts.[16] In spite of this, the data show in favor of the rural districts.

This conclusion is reinforced also by the ratios of still-births in the city and the country. Still-births are one of the important symptoms of the vitality of the parents as well as their progeny. Statistics show definitely that the rates of still-births are higher in the city in practically all countries than in the rural areas. Per 100 live births in the U. S. registration states the per cent of still-births was 3.9 in 1924 for the whites in the cities and 3.2 in the rural parts; 8.8 for

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 31. The original area includes those states with compulsory registration before 1915. The whole area includes the newer states in addition.

[16] Dr. C. Ballod has shown that a considerable number—from 2 to 14 per cent—of illigitimate children whose mortality is especially high used to be "smuggled," after their birth, from the city to the country. Their births are put to the city and their deaths to the country, which artificially raises the infant mortality rates of the rural and lowers those of the urban parts. See Ballod, C., *Die mittlere Lebensdauer*, pp. 16 ff. Dr. Woodbury himself has shown that the infant mortality rate is positively correlated with the order of birth or the number of children born in a family. The comparative rates of infant mortality are for the first child 104.6; for the second, 95.7; for the third, 104.6; for the fourth, 108.8; for the fifth, 118.8; for the sixth, 122.7; for the seventh, 136.8; for the tenth and later, 181.5. Woodbury, R., *op. cit.*, p. 45; see also the Newsholme, *op. cit.*, p. 345. The city family is of a less size than the rural family and the city families with four and more children born are less numerous than the country families. The alleged favorable trend in the city infant mortality may be due also to this fact and to the fact that, especially for the last two decades, the birth-rate of the cities has been decreasing and the size of the urban families has been shrinking rapidly. Granting that Dr. Woodbury's correlation is valid (though there are some data and studies which question it very seriously) this would only mean that the alleged favorable trend of infant mortality in the city is bought at the price of a lowering of the city birth-rate. Such a "price" itself, when it goes too far, is nothing as we shall see, but one of the symptoms of a falling vitality of the city population. When there would be no births there would be no infant mortality. But this would mean an extinction of the human race,

the colored in the cities and 7.0 in the country.[17] Similar have been the relationships for the preceding years in this as well as in other countries. It is also valid in most countries at the present time.[18] For the above reasons one may seriously doubt that the real infant mortality rates in the cities of the United States are already lower than in the rural parts. For all other groups the death-rate of the rural males is much below those of the city males while the death-rate of the females, as is shown even by the crude death-rate, is still higher in the cities of the United States than in the country.[19] Are the corresponding rates of the city and country really approaching one another? We shall discuss this later on.

These conclusions are applicable to other countries even in a greater proportion. A few representative standardized data show this. In England and Wales the infant mortality rate for the urban districts continues to be higher than for rural districts.[20]

As we pass from "under 4 weeks" to "9–12 months" the rates for the cities grow; this suggests that many weaklings in the city, thanks to excellent medical and other care, do not die at once; but they are dying more and more as time goes on.

The comparative mortality of the older age-groups is also higher in the cities. With the exception of the age-groups from 20 to 25 years for males and from 15 to 25 for females, all other age-groups give a considerably higher death-rate for the cities than for the

[17] See *Births, Stillbirths and Infant Mortality Statistics*, 1924, p. 25.

[18] See the data for the past in Levasseur, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 53; Mayr, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 108; for the present see, for Germany *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1926, pp. 25, 29; for Bavaria, *Statist. Jahrbuch für den Freistaat Bayern*, 1919, p. 55; for Bulgaria, *Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria*, 1926, p. 77; for Italy, Giusti, Ugo, *Le grande città Italiane*, p. 16, Firenze, 1925; for Belgium, *Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique*, p. XXXIV, 1927; for Poland, *Annuaire statistique Repub. Polonaise*, p. 95, 1927; for Switzerland, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, pp. 59, 92; for France, *Annuaire statistique* (of France), 1910, pp. 23–24; for Sweden, *Statistisk Arsbok*, 1927, p. 46; for Holland, *Jaarclijfers voor Nederland*, 1925–1926, p. 19; for Denmark, *Statistisk Aarbok*, 1926, pp. 22–23. For the sake of brevity the actual figures are not given here, but, in the sources indicated, they may be found. They show, without any exception, that in all these countries the per cent of still-births computed per 100 live births is higher in the cities than in the rural parts. Only in Holland and Denmark is the difference insignificant; in all other countries it is consistent and quite tangible.

[19] Later on we shall see that this relatively lower death-rate of the females than males in the city is probably due to a considerable extent to the migration of the country females to the city. It does not necessarily mean selection of a more fit biological group from the rural females but may mean an infusion of healthy rural females into the female population of the city and less harmfulness of urban conditions to females than males.

[20] *Eighty-second Annual Report of the Registrar-General*, 1919, pp. XLIV–XLV, London, 1920. In Scotland and Ireland the rates of infant mortality, per 100,000 population in 1918 and 1919 were conspicuously lower in "county districts" compared with "larger burghs" and "smaller burghs" or urban districts. See *Sixty-fifth Annual Report of the Registrar-General for Scotland*, Table 36, Edinb., 1920; *Fifty-sixth Annual Report of the Registrar-General for Ireland*, 1919, p. XXXI, Dublin, 1920. Newsholme, A., *op. cit.*, p. 343.

country. The slightly lower death-rate for the above age-groups from 15 to 25 years "might be due to a migration of the healthier and more ambitious lads and girls from the country to better paid work in towns—in other words, to the weaker elements being left behind," [21] or to a less harmfulness of the urban conditions for the females of these ages. Later on we shall see to what extent this hypothesis is probable. For the present we see that the urban mortality rate is conspicuously higher than the rural in the country studied. More than that, comparing the urban mortality ratios for the years 1891–1900, 1901–1910, and 1914, we see that there is no clearly expressed tendency towards a decrease of the discrepancy between the rural and urban death-rates in the course of these twenty-four years. If the difference decreased for some age-groups, for others it increased. This is particularly true for the rates of 1914. Only the difference for the ages from 0 to 5 years show a decrease. This is comprehensible probably as a result of the improvement in child welfare service. Other ages do not show any uniform tendency of this type. Thus these figures do not warrant the opinion of a lower death-rate in the cities compared with that of the country at present. Neither do they permit the certain claim that the difference between the urban and rural rates tends to disappear.

If now we take the mortality rates of the eight large social classes of the English population and compare these with that of the English agricultural class, we shall see that the mortality rates of the farmer-class for all the age-groups from 25 to 65, is the lowest of all social classes. In an abbreviated form the table is as follows: [22]

COMPARATIVE STANDARDIZED MORTALITY RATES FOR THE SPECIFIED SOCIAL CLASSES AT EACH SPECIFIED AGE FROM ALL CAUSES. ENGLAND AND WALES

Age	*I* Class	*II* Class	*III* Class	*IV* Class	*V* Class	*VI* Class	*VII* Class	*VIII* Agr. Class
25–35	88	98	89	96 (109) *	146 (131) *	90	94	*68*
35–45	85	97	92	93 (107) *	151 (136) *	86	88	*62*
45–55	87	94	97	92 (106) *	144 (130) *	100	88	*56*
55–65	90	91	100	93 (106) *	133 (120) *	116	101	*58*
25–65	88	94	96	93 (107) *	142 (128) *	101	94	*59*

* Corrected by T. H. C. Stevenson.

The agricultural class is number VIII in this table. Class I is the upper and middle classes; class II is intermediate between I and III; class III includes artisans and skilled labor; class IV is intermediate be-

[21] Hill, A. B., *Internal Migration and Its Effects upon the Death Rate*, London, 1925, p. 13.

[22] Stevenson, T. H. C., *op. cit.*, pp. 385 ff.

tween III and V; class V is unskilled labor; classes VI and VII are, correspondingly, textile operatives and miners. The table shows so conspicuously the exceedingly low death-rate of the agricultural class in England and Wales that any commentary is useless.

The above data are sufficient to show that in such a highly industrialized country as England and Wales, and in spite of a relatively very high standard of living of the population of the cities, especially before the World War, the mortality rates and general health of the rural population are remarkably better than those of the urban population. We have seen that this has been shown by all the above data concerning recruits, distribution of various diseases, and so on, in that country. The superior health of the agricultural population of England is incomparably more marked perhaps than in any other country. In view of the great amount of urbanization and industrialization in England, this is very symptomatic. Let us remember this; its significance shall be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Summary of the Comparative Mortality of the Urban and the Rural Populations in Other Countries. Although we have at our disposal a vast army of data concerning many countries mentioned further, nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, these data will not be given here. Instead, a general summary of the situation as it exists at the present moment will be given. The details and peculiarities of secondary importance for each country will be omitted; but the detailed list of references, and the most important data will be given in the *Source Book*, mentioned. The conclusions are based on the latest data available. For the great majority of the countries this includes the years 1925–1927.

1. *Infant Mortality.* The infant mortality rate has been and is lower in the rural compared with the urban parts of the following countries: England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland; the United States of America; Denmark; Belgium; Sweden; British India; Poland; Union of South Africa (Europeans); the majority of the provinces of the Commonwealth of Australia; possibly New Zealand; in a minority of the provinces of Canada; and in France (comparison of the rate of Paris with that of 77 provinces). It is now higher or the same in the rural compared with the urban parts of the following countries: the Netherlands; Germany; majority of the provinces of Canada; Switzerland; and possibly in Italy and Soviet Russia. The above permits the claim that, *on the whole, rural infant mortality is by no means higher than the urban.* When necessary corrections in the rates are made for still-births, the smuggling of illegitimates from the city to the country, for the size of family and so on, it is probable that several of the countries of the second group (with a higher

rural rate of infant mortality) would show results less favorable to the cities.

2. *As to the comparative mortality of the rural and urban populations of all ages and both sexes, in spite of many local variations, it is certainly higher in the cities on the whole than in the country.* This shows in the crude rates for the United States of America, England and Wales, Scotland, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, British India, Rumania, Spain, the Commonwealth of Australia, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, and possibly France. In other countries, namely in Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Bulgaria, and Switzerland, the crude death-rate at the present moment is higher in the country than in the city. When, however, the standardization of the rates according to age and sex is made; or when the standardized death-rate of the agricultural population is compared with that of other large occupational classes; or when the standardized expectations of life in the city and the country are taken; then the situation changes. Several studies concerning Germany, the Netherlands, France, and some other countries do not leave any doubt that the standardized death-rate of the agricultural occupation almost in all age-groups is lower than among the large urban occupational classes and that the standardized rural death-rates for the majority of the age-groups is lower than the urban rates. The expectation of life in the country is still higher than in the city. Thus, when the necessary corrections are made, *the real mortality of the city is to be recognized as greater than that of the country.*

3. A difference in the urban-rural mortality of the sexes is to be noted. As a rule the male urban death-rate compared with the rural shows greater difference (in favor of the country) than the comparative rates for females. *The urban conditions seem to be less harmful for women than for men.* In several countries at some of the ages, females give a lower or similar death-rate in the city than in the rural parts. Whatever may be the causes of this difference, it is to be noted. Thus there is no valid reason to claim that the death-rate of the country population is higher now than that of the city population. The opposite is nearer to the truth.

4. A tendency for the urban and rural death-rates to approach each other in recent times is true in regard to infant mortality. It seems to be true also in regard to the adult groups in several countries as far as the crude death-rates are concerned. In other countries, such a tendency has not been shown clearly at least.[23] The existence of such a tendency expressed in the crude death-rate does not signify that urban health and the longevity of the adult population improves more rapidly than the health and longevity of the rural population.

[23] These conclusions are based on standard references for each country.

Such an approach of the urban-rural crude death-rates may be, and in fact is, due mainly to a more rapidly falling birth-rate in the cities and correspondingly to a more rapid decrease of the proportion of infants and younger aged within the total city population. At the beginning of this chapter, figures were given to show that the mortality rate of children from 0 to 5 years of age, is many times higher than the mortality rates of adults. Therefore, if in the cities the birth-rate has been decreasing more rapidly than in the country (see the next chapter); and if the proportion of the children among all age-groups of the total city population has been diminishing more rapidly than in the country; this gives, in the statistical computation of the death-rate, a more rapid decrease of the crude death-rate of the whole city population compared with that of the country population, and a statistical increase of the average expectation of life of the population, amidst which such a falling birth-rate and diminution of the proportion of the infants and younger aged in the total population, takes place. This is the real and main cause of the approaching of the urban and rural death-rates and of the much talked about (but quite wrongly interpreted by popular writers) so-called "recent prolongation of life" or an increase of the expectation of life by 15 or 20 years. These popular and sensational writers have interpreted this increase of the recent life expectation in the sense that those who (25 years ago) died at the average age of 45 years, now die at the average age of 60 years; those who died at the age of 75 now die at the age of 90. After the above, it is unnecessary to explain that such an interpretation of either the recent falling crude death-rate or the recent prolongation of life expectation is quite wrong. As a matter of fact, those who (25 years ago) died at the average ages of 45 or 75 years, at the present moment, really die at about the same age and in some countries even earlier.

The following figures show, first, the decrease of the younger aged in the total population of some western countries for the last twenty years; and second, the actual death-rate of various age-groups, especially of the older aged for the last three decades.

PROPORTION PER 10,000 POPULATION (OF ALL AGES) OF THE CHILDREN OF BOTH SEXES AT THE AGES FROM 0 TO 5 YEARS IN THE SPECIFIED COUNTRIES IN 1900 AND 1920 [24]

Country	*1900*	*1920*
Belgium	1,170	693
Germany	1,308	634
Great Britain	1,149	887
Netherlands	1,299	1,132
Sweden	1,147	956
Switzerland	1,140	847

[24] Jastrzebski, S. de, "Changes in Sex and Age Constitutions of Some Representative European Populations," *Journal R. Stat. Society*, Vol. XCI, p. 240, 1928.

The same is true of practically all European-industrialized countries and the United States of America. This enormous decrease of the younger aged, who generally have an exceedingly high mortality compared with the adult groups, results, in the statistical construction of the life expectation tables or in the computation of the crude death-rates, in a fictitious increase of the life expectation or in a decrease of the crude death-rates, when compared historically. The greater the decrease of the birth-rate or of the proportion of the younger aged within the total population (of all ages), the greater is this statistical decrease of the crude death-rate or the increase of the average expectation of life. Thus, the recent much talked of "prolongation of life" has been due mainly to this statistical performance, wrongly interpreted by popular writers. In a less degree it has been due to a real decrease of child mortality or to a real prolongation of life of the younger aged, due to the progress in medical and other sciences and the improvement of the conditions of living. Infants who died before at the age of one year, now live a few months or years more. Persons who died before at the age of 20 years now die a little later. But the more aged is the group taken, the less is the real prolongation; and after the age of 45 years, there is practically no prolongation of life. For instance, in Massachusetts in 1876–1885 out of 1,000 male infants at the age from 0 to 1 year, on the average 202.4 died; in 1906–1915 only 165.3; out of 1,000 of the male children at the ages from 1 to 4 years in 1876–1885, 32.8 died; in 1906–1915 only 14.6. The figures show a real decrease of the death-rate of these younger aged. Similar has been the situation in European countries. If, however, we take the corresponding death-rates for the more aged, say from 45 years and above, the situation changes. It is shown by the following figures for Massachusetts. Per 1,000 male persons at the age of 45 to 54 in 1876–1885 there were 14.9 deaths; in 1906–1915, 15.9; the corresponding figures for 1,000 males at the ages from 55 to 64 were: 25.8 and 32.8; at the ages from 65 to 74, 54.9 and 66.0; at the ages from 75 to 84: 123 and 131.1. Instead of a decrease of the death-rate within this period, we have an increase for these age-groups; instead of a prolongation of life, we have a shortening for these ages.

Similar has been the situation for Scotland, France, Sweden, and practically all western countries. In some of them the death-rate of the ages of 45 and above did not decrease, and in some it increased. All in all, there has been no noticeable gain in the real prolongation of life for these age-groups.[25] This shows that the real character of the

[25] See other data in Baker, G. W., "The Trend of Adult Mortality," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 852–865. See also Prinzing, F., "Kulturelle Entwicklung und Absterbeordnung," *Archiv für Rassen-und Gesellschafts Biologie*, pp. 549–605, 1910.

so-called recent extension of life-span is very different from its interpretation by popular writers. In its essentials it means a mere statistical result of a falling birth-rate, plus, to a less degree a real decrease in the death-rate of the younger aged. It does not even mean that the span of life of infants increased by 15 or 20 or even 10 years; it does not mean that the death-rate of the more aged groups, especially at the age of 45 and above, decreased; it does not mean also that the average span of life of these aged groups tangibly increased. Vulgarly speaking, it means mainly a mere "statistical trick," plus some decrease in the death-rate of the younger aged.

The above explains more clearly why a more rapid decrease of the crude death-rate in the cities is due principally to a more rapid decrease of the birth-rate in the cities and, in this sense, represents mainly a "statistical trick." It has very little, if anything, in common with a more rapid real improvement of the health of the city population compared with that of the country population. Only in so far as the mortality of the urban younger aged has been decreasing in some cases more rapidly than those of the country (due to a better child welfare service in the cities) may we talk of a real approach of the urban and rural death-rates for the infants and young children. For the majority of the older age-groups a more rapid falling of the urban crude death-rates compared with the rural, means principally a mere statistical result of the more rapid decreasing of the urban birth-rate and of the proportion of the younger aged within its population. Being such, it does not warrant the claim of a more rapid improvement of the vitality of the urban population compared with the rural.

5. Finally, *mortality rates of the urban various classes, the rich and the poor, the professionals and the unskilled and the semi-skilled, the upper and the lower social classes show enormous contrasts.* The difference between the death-rates of these classes is likely to be greater than those between the death-rates of the city and the country, on the whole.[26] The statement of Dr. Woodbury that "a study of mortality in different cities indicated wide variations in rates, while in rural areas variations were much less marked" stresses the same fact.[27] This shows again that the city population, in this respect, is more variable than the country population.

6. The conclusions reached about urban-rural mortality and duration of life are in agreement with the results given by the data of medical examinations of recruits; partly by the studies of school children; the comparative morbidity; and suicides. All these data,

[26] See the data and the literature in Sorokin's *Social Mobility*, Chap. XI; *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 349 ff.

[27] Woodbury, R., *op. cit.*, p. 26.

together with the data of comparative longevity and mortality, uniformly show, that, all in all, the health and the vitality of the rural classes by no means is worse and is somewhat better than that of the urban population.

Interpretation. The problem to be discussed now is what factors are responsible for the above rather lower mortality of the rural population compared with the urban. In the literature on this subject we have numerous and various theories concerning the factors of mortality. One group stresses innate factors in the form of an *inherited good or poor health;* another particularly stresses various *environmental conditions* as being responsible for high or low mortality. In spite of the extremists in both groups there is no valid reason to exclude the significance of either of these two factors, although up to this time we do not know their relative importance exactly.

1. *Innate Factors.* We know, as shown by a series of the most careful studies of the past, as well as of the present, that the inherited health of various individuals is not the same: some inherit a basis for a relatively good, and others for a relatively poor health and vitality. Correspondingly *in the same environment* the chances for death of these persons are different: persons with a better inherited basis of health generally give a lower death-rate than persons with poor innate vitality. Numerous studies of K. Pearson and his school of researchers have shown that the coefficient of correlation between heredity and health is about .52.[28] A series of studies, among them the recent and particularly careful studies of E. Elderton, A. B. Hill, N. Paton and L. Finlay, R. Woodbury and many others, have shown that, for instance in infant mortality, the factor of the mother's health is one of the most important. Dr. Elderton's careful study led to the conclusion that "an important factor in determining infant mortality is the health of the mother" and that mortality "depends very largely on the health of the baby at birth." [29] On the other hand such an "environmentalist" as Dr. A. Newsholme says: "It can be agreed that the infants of weakly parents are severely handicapped" and that "infants born prematurely from any cause, or whose mother has died in confinement, or who are twins, are likely to have their chances of survival much reduced." [30] Furthermore, Dr. Woodbury, in spite of the elimination of type of feeding, economic earnings of the father, and other environmental conditions,

[28] See Pearson, K., *The Scope and Importance to the State of the Science of National Eugenics*, pp. 27 ff.; *The Chances of Death* and other works of the Pearson School. See Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 256 ff.

[29] Elderton, E., "On the Relative Value of the Factors which Influence Infant Welfare," *Annals of Eugenics*, Vol. I, p. 379.

[30] Newsholme, A., *op. cit.*, p. 365.

could not eliminate marked differences in infant mortality rates of various nationalities in the United States. He had to conclude that "nationality must still be regarded as an important factor in infant mortality, although the exact nature of its influence cannot be stated." [31] If this is so, then from the fact that the health of the rural classes does not appear poorer than that of the urban classes, we may conclude tentatively that there are no reasons to admit that the innate health of these rural people is poorer than the urban. On the contrary, as we shall see, the lower or even the equal mortality of the rural classes cannot be explained entirely in terms of the environmental factors in the city and in the country. If we do not have quite convincing evidence that the innate health of the rural population is better than that of the urban, we do not have evidence to claim that it is poorer than that of the city population. This is mentioned here in order to show the fallacy of the theory which claims that the people who migrate from the country to the city are positively selected and represent the innately more healthy persons than those who stay in the country. If such a hypothesis were true; and if the innate factor of inheritance of health is really important as is recognized by the partisans of this theory of positive selection by cities, then we should have found that the health of the city population is better and its mortality rates are lower than those in the country. The above facts do not warrant such an expectation at all; this is especially true in regard to such highly industrialized countries as England. Cities have existed there for a relatively long time; an enormous part of the country population migrated to the cities during the past one hundred years; the cities should have drained off almost all the innate health of the country and should, at the present moment, have shown an incomparably better health than the country population. This should have happened if the hypothesis of positive selection of the migrants to the cities were true. The facts entirely contradict such an expectation. For this reason, as far as health and mortality depend considerably on the inherited constitution (a premise which may hardly be denied and which is recognized by the partisans of the selective theory discussed), the hypothesis of the positive selection of the migrants by the cities is to be dismissed as entirely in contradiction to the facts. To repeat: if the totality of the data presented in this section of the book do not entitle us to claim that the *innate* health of the rural population is better than that of the urban population, they certainly do not warrant the contrary claim. This hypothesis is in a more complete agreement with the facts than the theory of positive selection

[31] Woodbury, R., *op. cit.*, p. 122, see the whole of Chap. VI. See also the studies of Hill, Paton and Finlay, quoted.

by the cities and its premise of the better innate health of the city population.

As has been mentioned, we do not know exactly how great is the rôle of innate factors in the lower mortality of the rural population. Whether or not it is to be explained through this factor only, there is no conclusive evidence. If the supposition of better innate health among the urban population is sharply contradicted by the facts, there are no conclusive proofs that the innate health of the rural population is better than the innate health of the urban population. This would lead us to an admission that the city selection of the migrants is negative, that those who migrate to the city are innately poorer in health in comparison with those who stay in the country. Such an hypothesis is again sharply contradicted by the facts (see the chapter about Migration). For this reason it is unacceptable also. Therefore, recognizing the rôle of the innate factors in health and mortality, and accepting the most probable hypothesis that the innate health of the rural population is about the same as the innate health of the urban population, let us turn to the environmental factors in order to see if they can explain the differences found in the mortality of the urban and rural populations. We shall begin with the factors which, in our opinion, cannot explain the situation found.

2. *Environmental Factors.* One of the environmental factors which used to be given great importance as a cause of mortality is the *economic factor.* Numerous studies have shown that the mortality rates of the rich are lower than those of the poor; that in periods of social impoverishment of a country the mortality rate goes up, while in periods of a prosperity it declines; that the mortality rates of poor countries is higher than those of more prosperous countries, and so on.[32] There is no doubt that when poverty is so great that the most elementary physiological necessities cannot be satisfied (for instance the food is below the physiological level, there is a lack of elementary shelter, necessary clothing, etc.) it leads to a great increase of mortality. However, when the difference or fluctuation in economic conditions is such that most of the people remain above this "physiological poverty" the relative rôle of the economic factors in mortality becomes somewhat unclear and not exactly known. For instance, Dr. Yule found that since 1850 (in England and Wales) "there is no evidence that the death-rate has tended to rise in times of depression. For a very striking instance of this we have only to turn to the records of the past few years; 1921, 1922, and 1923 have

[32] See the literature and the data in Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 549 ff.; Collins, S. D., "Economic Status and Health," *Public Health Bulletin*, No. 165, Washington, 1927.

been years of record low death-rates, in spite of the greatest and most widespread depression of industry to which we have ever been subject." [33] For several states of the United States, in the period from 1870 to 1920, W. Ogburn and D. Thomas found the correlation a pretty high one: +.57; and with cycles from nine-year moving averages, +.63; but, contrary to expectation, the correlation happened to be positive. Instead of a decrease, the death-rate in the period of prosperity increased, and *vice versa.* Dr. Thomas' study of the data for England and Wales in 1854 to 1913 yielded a correlation which, with the death-rate lagging a year behind the business cycles, was positive also: +.30. For the sub-period from 1854 to 1874, the coefficient was +.24; for the period 1875–1894, +.32; [34] for the period 1895–1913, +.35.[35] M. B. Hexter's results are considerably different. The correlation between the death-rate and wholesale prices obtained by him was +.613 (deaths lead by 27 months); that between the death-rate and unemployment was −.361 (deaths lead by 10 months).[36] These data are nearer to the usual expectation, and to the results of the earlier investigators.

Similar to many previous investigators, Dr. Woodbury and S. Collins, in their works quoted, found a negative correlation between infant (and adult) mortality and economic conditions (in the form of the amount of income and so on). But other, and no less careful, studies have found practically no, or quite an insignificant, correlation. The study by E. Elderton already mentioned yielded only .03, as a coefficient of correlation between the totality of the environmental conditions, particularly wages, and infant mortality; the study of Paton and Finlay (quoted) gave similar results; very insignificant also was the correlation found in the study of M. Greenwood and J. Brown.[37] In view of these contradictory evidences about the influence of economic conditions when the subjects are above physiological poverty, it is hard to say to what extent they are responsible factors in mortality. Add to this the fact that, as we saw in Chapter III, the economic conditions and the standard of living of the farmer-peasant class are by no means better than those of the bulk of the city population. Even granting that the economic conditions (above physiological poverty level) are influential factors in mortality, we cannot explain through this factor

[33] Yule, G. U., "The Growth of Population and the Factors Which Control It," *Journal of Royal Statistical Society,* 1925, p. 30; also his quoted paper: *On the Changes in the Marriage,* etc., *passim.*

[34] Thomas D., *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle,* p. 69, London, 1925.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 109.

[36] Hexter, *Social Consequences of Business Cycles,* p. 144, 1925.

[37] See E. Elderton's study quoted, in *Annals of Eugenics,* Vol. I, Paton and Finlay, *op. cit.,* pp. 127 ff.; Greenwood, M., and Brown, J., "An Examination of Some Factors Influencing the Rate of Infant Mortality," *Journal of Hygiene,* Vol. XII, No. 1, 1912.

the lower mortality of the rural population because its economic conditions and standard of living, all in all, are poorer than those of the city upper and middle classes and no better than those of the bulk of the labor classes in the city. For this reason its mortality should be greater compared with the mortality of the city. But in fact it is not higher and is rather lower. Therefore, economic factors as discussed do not help explain our problem and should be dismissed.

The next important factor in mortality is the *amount of medical service and sanitary and hygienic precautions* taken by a group or an individual. While we do not deny the importance of this factor, at the same time, we must contend that it is unable to explain the lower or equal rate of country mortality compared with the city. Indeed, it is certain that, in these respects, quantitatively and qualitatively the rural population is served much more poorly than the cities. As a rule, rural people know less of the A B C's of hygiene; and medical service is obtained with greater difficulty and is of much worse quality than that of the city people. The number of hospitals, sanatoriums, and similar institutions and the number of doctors, and other similar agencies are less numerous in the rural parts than in the cities. The same is true of various child welfare institutions and agencies. For these reasons, in so far as medical service and hygiene are influential in regard to mortality, the city population should have a lower mortality than the country population. The facts are somewhat opposite to this expectation. Therefore, this factor cannot account for the difference. It seems, that in rural conditions there are some other factors which overcome the negative effects of poorer medical service. This is sufficient to show why the factor discussed cannot help in an explanation of the comparative rural-urban rates of mortality as shown by the above data.

In a similar way, *the geographic factors* do not explain the differences in mortality rates because the city and the country populations are not situated in uniformly different climatic and other geographical conditions. No one has proved that the geographical conditions of the country have been better than those of the city.

The same is to be said in regard to the factor of the *order of birth* or, what is near to it, *the size of the family*, to which several investigators have given considerable importance in infant, and partly, in adult, mortality. According to the results obtained by one group of researchers, such as L. March, G. Tugendreich, A. Hamilton, and R. Woodbury, the fourth and subsequent children born in a family give a higher rate of mortality than the earlier children in order of birth (first, second, and partly the third); or the mortality of children of large sized-families is generally higher than that of children

of small-sized families.[38] This hypothesis, however, does not help in understanding the comparative mortality of infants and adults in the city and the country. Granting that the theory is valid, on its basis we should expect a higher infant and adult mortality in the rural parts because rural families are larger than the urban families (see further) and the number of the children of later orders of birth is greater proportionately in the rural than in the urban population. As a matter of fact, neither the adult, nor the infant mortality in the rural population is higher than in the city population. Therefore either the hypothesis is wrong [39] or, if it is valid, the influence of this factor seems to be overcome by some other factor operating within the rural population. This other factor annuls the influence of the alleged higher mortality of the children of the large-sized families or of those later in the order of birth.

The next factor which shows a high correlation with mortality rates is the *birth-rate*. A series of studies has found that high birth-rates are positively correlated with the high death-rates and *vice versa*. For instance, G. U. Yule found that the coefficients of correlation between birth- and death-rates, were .81, .70, .75. M. Greenwood and J. Brown found a relationship of .776.[40] Several other authors have found similar results. Granting that the hypothesis is valid, nevertheless it does not help in this problem. As the birth-rate in the rural population is higher than that of the urban population (see next chapter), we should expect, according to the hypothesis, a higher mortality rate in the country compared with the city. It is not higher; consequently, either the hypothesis is wrong or the influence of the factor of a high birth-rate on mortality is overcome by some other factor operating within the rural population.

Without mentioning other environmental factors which, like the above, do not help to explain the results of the comparative rural-urban mortality, let us turn to the factors which may explain, to

[38] See the data in March, L., "Some Researches Concerning the Factors of Mortality," *Journal of the Royal Statist. Society*, Vol. 75, pp. 514–520; Tugendreich, G., *op. cit.*, pp. 301 ff.; Newsholme, A., *Vital Statistics*, pp. 345–346; Woodbury, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 67, 68.

[39] This hypothesis in both its variations cannot be regarded as definitely proved. A series of other, and no less competent investigators have obtained quite opposite results, or found no correlation between infant mortality and the order of birth or the size of family. See Pearson, K., *Handicapping of the First Born;* Weinberg, W., "Über die Frage der Minderwertigkeit der Erstgeborenen," *Archiv für Rassen-und Gesellschafts Biologie*, Vol. XII, 1917; "Methoden und Technik der Statistik," in the *Handbuch der Sozialen Hygiene*, Vol. I, pp. 96 ff.; Elderton, E. M., *op. cit.*, *Annals of Eugenics*, pp. 379–381; Paton, N., and Finlay, L., *op. cit.*, pp. 248–249.

[40] See Yule, G. U., "The Growth of Population," *Journal of R. Stat. Society*, pp. 31–33, 1925; Greenwood and Brown, study quoted; March, L., *op. cit.*, p. 520. A criticism of this theory is given in Hill, A. B., "A Note on the Correlation Between Birth- and Death-Rates," *Annals of Eugenics*, Vol. I, pp. 224–256, 1925.

some extent, the results given by the data. Among those factors we shall take, in the first place, *the density of the population.*

This environmental factor has been stressed very much. Many statisticians in the past (W. Farr, H. Westergaard, P. E. Verhulst, and others) and R. Pearl, T. H. Stevenson, G. U. Yule, A. Bowley, and others in the present have shown that *with an increase of the density of the population the death-rate tends to increase.*[41] Without further analysis as to whether increasing density itself or some other factors which are correlated with density are responsible for the increase of mortality with an increase of the density, we must admit that, within some limits, the correlation seems to exist. Increasing density of the population is followed, within some limits, by an increasing mortality. We saw that one of the most important differences between the rural and the urban worlds is a greater density of the population in the cities. In so far, it is probable that *whatever may be the real factors correlated with density, a higher mortality of the city population is due, to some extent, to the higher density of its population compared with the population of the rural parts.* Admitting this, at the same time, it is scarcely possible to explain the whole difference through this factor of density alone. First of all, the positive correlation between density and mortality is by no means universal, or high or even relatively constant.[42] In the second place, the studies of Elderton, Paton and Finlay and some others already mentioned have not found any tangible correlation between the factor of density (measured in various ways) and infant mortality. In the third place, many studies have indicated several other factors of mortality whose operation is to be considered in the problem discussed. Let us glance briefly at them.

A series of recent studies of infant mortality and the health of children have especially *stressed a notable correlation between infant mortality, health, and the maternal* (and, in a less degree, paternal) *health and care of the children. The better is the health of the mother at the moment of the childbirth, and the better is the maternal care of the children, the lower is the infant mortality and the better is the health of the children.* Of all the environmental factors, the health of the mother appeared to be the most important, according to the study of E. Elderton, quoted. In a similar way, N. Paton and L. Finlay found that "the efficiency of the mother (her care for the children) is the factor . . . most definitely related to the growth, weight, height, and nutrition of the child." (Coefficients of correlation between these variables are from .3 to .6, higher than between any

[41] See the data and literature and criticism in Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 370 ff.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 373 ff.

environmental condition studied and the health of the children.)[43] Several other studies give similar conclusions. The hypothesis is somewhat related with the breast feeding of children because better care of the children means also breast feeding of the child by the mother, instead of artificial feeding. Several studies have shown that breast feeding tends to give a lower mortality than artificial feeding of the child. The theory, in its substantial form, appears valid. Thus it accounts, to some extent, for a lower or equal mortality of rural infants and the adults compared with urban infants and the adults. As we shall see in the chapter about the Rural-Urban Family, the *family institution is much stronger and much better integrated in the country than in the city. This also means that the mother's care of the child in the country is greater than in the city.* The mother in the country is practically the only feeder, nurse, and educator for the child. Artificial feeding, hiring some other woman to feed the child, hiring a nurse to look after it, or leaving it with someone else, all these are much less developed in the rural family than in the urban. In the rural family the child is incessantly under the eyes of the mother while in the city, especially among many employed mothers, every day, for hours, the child is separated from the mother. She works in an office, or a factory or a shop or is busy with "social engagements." These and other similar circumstances suggest that the maternal care of the child in the rural family is more intensive. For this reason, according to the above hypothesis, this works to reduce infant mortality in the country to a greater degree than in the city. As such, it is consistent with the comparative rates of mortality found and makes them, at least partly, comprehensible.

Of other factors which seem to help lower the mortality of the rural population, the following may be mentioned. *A lower per cent of the single and divorced, and a higher per cent of the married in the country than in the city.* (See chapter about Marriage-Rates.) It is known that the married give a lower death-rate than the single or the divorced.[44] For this reason the greater prevalence of the married in the country leads, to some extent, to a lowering of the death-rate of the country population.

Outdoor work of the agriculturists and the less diluted air of the country compared with the city. There is hardly any doubt that outdoor work is generally more healthy than indoor work in the city shops and factories, and that the pure country air is a positive factor in health, compared with the diluted air of the city. The na-

[43] Paton and Finlay, *op. cit.*, pp. 233 ff.

[44] See the data in Groves, E., and Ogburn, W., *American Marriage*, pp. 141 ff.; works of G. von Mayr, Levasseur, quoted.

ture of agricultural work, its variety and character, give, on the whole, excellent physical exercise to all parts of the body and, in this sense, is much more healthful than a great many occupational operations of the city population, beginning with the monotonous work of a factory hand and ending with the many "jobs" of the clerical, professional, and commercial groups in the city. These "jobs" either do not give any exercise to the body, or are often dangerous, poisonous, and unhealthful, or, being quite sedentary, undermine the health in the course of time.

Side by side with these physical conditions of the environment of the rural and urban population, other—more subtle and less tangible, nevertheless scarcely less important—*psycho-social conditions* deserve mentioning.

In the subsequent parts of the book it will be shown that the *farmer-peasant attitudes and psychology are marked by greater stability, simplicity, idealism, religiosity, dogmatism, and generally by what may be styled as "a greater peace of mind."* These characteristics are due to differences in the city and the country environmental conditions: such as a lower mobility of the rural class; its less intensive and less complex interaction; its greater psycho-social homogeneity; a less degree of social contrasts in the country; and the nature of the agricultural occupation where man deals more with nature and less with the emotions and frictions of men. (See the further chapters about the psychology and cultural traits of the country.) In this sense, these psycho-social characteristics of the farmer-peasant class are acquired or environmental. These characteristics, which we style under the term "greater peace of mind," appear to be significant factors in health and mortality. From our common experience we know that "a lack of peace of mind," or "worries," "hesitations," "incessant uncertainty," and the various "inner conflicts" of a person undermine his health and directly or indirectly facilitate an increase of mortality. This common observation has been corroborated by various scientific studies.

In so far as the rural environment compared with the urban is more conducive to this "peace of mind" and in so far as the farmer-peasant psychology really exhibits it in a greater degree than the bulk of the urban population (see further), this factor is to be recognized as significant in the low rural mortality. Although under the name of "peace of mind" we cover a very complex union of the numerous psycho-social conditions, nevertheless, for our purposes such a unification is sufficient. Due to the peculiarities of the rural environment, this "peace of mind" exists and operates and, in spite of its intangible character, represents if not the most, then, at least, one of the most important factors in rural health and vitality. It

is a factor which accounts for a great deal of the relatively low mortality of the rural classes.

This leads us to a still more general factor in the problem discussed. From biology we know that life is an incessant adaptation of an organism to its environment. It continues as long as the equilibrium between the organism and the environment remains. Any great and sudden change in the environment tends to upset the equilibrium and to endanger the vitality of the living body. From this standpoint the totality of the urban conditions represent a great change compared with the rural world. An enormous majority of human beings for thousands of years have lived in, and adapted themselves to, the rural world. Their reactions and responses have been elaborated to fit the rural, but not the urban, conditions. Cities appeared at a relatively later period, and only a relatively insignificant part of mankind has lived in the past amidst such an urban environment. When the human beings, equipped with reactions adapted to the rural environment, were suddenly transplanted into the urban world they were placed in a world to which they were poorly fitted. The equilibrium between their organism and the new environment was upset. Hence—the enormous increase of mortality in the cities of the past. The same, in a somewhat less degree, appears probable at the present. Although the city world itself has been reconstructed recently in the way of improvement; and although a considerable proportion of the city dwellers are urbanites for two, three, and sometimes for four generations; nevertheless another (and a greater) part of the city population is urban in only one generation of migrants born and reared in the rural world. The transplantation from the country to the city for this part is a sharp shock which tends to upset their vital equilibrium and in hundreds of ways to undermine the vitality. Thus, *this poor adaptation to the relatively new and different city world appears as a general factor in a lower urban vitality and its relatively high mortality.* (See the chapter about Political Attitudes where this is elaborated.)

Finally, one special remark about *the urban prevalence of still-births.* Among its factors, the most important seems to be *a low birth-rate.* An excellent study of A. A. Tschuproff has shown that the movement of still-births is negatively correlated with the curve of the birth-rate. *A decrease of the birth-rate is followed by an increase of still-births, and vice versa.* As the city birth-rate is lower than the country birth-rate (see next chapter) it is comprehensible why the urban rates for still-births are higher than the rural rates.

Summary of the Interpretation. Without going further in our analysis of the factors in rural-urban mortality, we may sum up the above in the form of the following statements:

1. A general supposition for an understanding of why rural mor-

tality on the whole is somewhat lower than the urban is an admission that, on the whole, the innate health and vitality of the rural population is no poorer than the innate health and vitality of the urban population. The data do not contradict the proposition. They sharply contradict the hypothesis of a better innate health of the migrants to the cities in comparison with those who stay in the country. For this reason this hypothesis as well as the hypothesis of a poorer innate health of the rural populations are invalid.

2. In so far as we do not have conclusive evidence that the *innate* health of the rural population is better, the above supposition of, at least, equally good health among rural people compared with urban, does not explain why the mortality of rural people is somewhat lower than urban mortality. In order to understand this we have turned to an analysis of the environmental factors of the urban and the rural populations.

3. Of the environmental factors in mortality neither the economic factors, not the factor of medical care and hygienic precautions, nor geographic factors as such, nor the order of birth and the size of the family, nor the size of the birth-rate can account for the lower or even equal mortality rate of the rural population compared with the urban. All these factors, as they exist in the city and the country, should make the rural rate higher than the city rate. The facts contradict this expectation and force us to conclude that either the hypotheses concerning the influence of these factors are inadequate or their effects are overcome by the interference of other factors whose operations smash the effects of these above-mentioned factors.

4. Of these other factors which seem to be responsible for the relatively low rural mortality rate and whose influence seems to be sufficient to counterbalance the effects of the above environmental factors, which work in favor of lower urban death-rates, the most important are: lower density of the population in the country; greater integrity of the rural family and greater maternal care of the child in the rural family; the outdoor character of agricultural work; better country air; more healthful nature of agricultural work; "the greater peace of mind" of the rural people due to the peculiarities of the rural environment; and finally, a generally poorer adaptation of human beings to the urban environment which is relatively new and different from the rural environment in which an enormous majority of mankind lived for thousands of years and to which—but not to the urban environment—the reactions of this majority have been adapted. These factors are probably the most important among those which are responsible for the relatively low rural mortality.

Now turn to the birth-rate as the last fundamental basis of the comparative health and vitality of the rural-urban population.

CHAPTER IX

RURAL–URBAN BIRTH-RATES AND VITALITY

Introductory Remarks. This chapter summarizes the relative behavior of the two groups as measured by the crude and standardized birth-rates and crude indices of vitality. A crude birth-rate is the number of births for a given time per a certain number of the total population. It is generally given as the number of births per 1,000 of the population for a period of a year. For instance, the crude birth-rate in the cities of America for 1925 was 21.9 per 1,000. However, for comparative purposes the crude birth-rate is very inadequate. The reasons are as follows:

1. *Births Are Affected by the Age Distribution of the Population.* That is, groups which have the largest proportions around the productive ages of life (15–45 years) may appear to have higher birth-rates than others merely on account of the fact that a greater proportion of the population are at the ages in which they produce children. This is an important factor, because city populations are grouped around these productive ages of life (see the chapter about Migration) and for that reason alone should show much higher birth-rates, even without having any more children born to the individual families.

2. *Births Are Affected by the Sex Composition of the Population.* Crude birth-rates make no allowances for differences in the distribution of the sexes. Urban societies which have greater proportions of the female sex on the average (see the chapter about Migration), should give higher crude birth-rates, even with smaller families, because of the greater excess of women of the child-bearing ages. Comparisons of societies by the crude rates, when the sex distributions of the populations vary, lead to erroneous conclusions.

Not mentioning other reasons for the complete inadequacy of the crude birth-rate, we may conclude that *the crude brith-rate is entirely inadequate as an index for comparison of the births of rural and urban populations, or the births of the total populations in a given society with historical trends in urbanization or ruralization, due to variations in sex proportions and age distributions*, not to mention other factors. The real birth-rate may be given only when the rural-urban populations compared are standardized, at least, in their age and sex compositions, that is, when in both groups the birth-rates are computed for the same age and sex groups. On the whole, on account of differ-

ences in age distribution and sex proportions, we should expect higher crude birth-rates in the cities because the proportion of the productive age-groups (15–45 years) is higher in the cities and the proportion of women of the productive age, all in all, is also higher in the urban population. Therefore, if the crude birth-rate of the cities is lower or equal to that of the rural parts, this certainly means that the real birth-rate of the cities is below that of the country. When the urban crude birth-rate is somewhat higher than the rural crude birth-rate, the real urban birth-rate may also be lower than the rural birth-rate, if the differences in the age and sex composition of the urban and rural populations are considerable.

Rural-Urban Crude Birth Rates. Since the crude birth-rates are an inadequate and unsatisfactory measure of the fertility of a given population, we will only give a short summary of the situation as it exists, and then turn to the standardized rates. The following conclusions are suggested by the data:

1. Highly industrialized countries, such as England, United States of America (especially the eastern states), and partly, France, show the same or higher crude birth-rates in the urban districts compared with the rural. These are due, as will be shown later, to age and sex differences which magnify the urban rates.

2. Rural countries, which include most of the others, show much higher crude birth-rates in the rural districts, in spite of age and sex distributions more favorable to the cities.

3. Urbanization is associated with a rapid decline in the crude birth-rates, and the total births both in city and the country. The crude birth-rate is somewhat inadequate as a means for analyzing these historical trends on account of changes in the ages and sex proportions of a population.

4. Any further analysis must be made on the basis of standardized rates, for the reasons suggested above.

Statistical Proof. The crude birth-rate for America, based upon the so-called original or early registration area consisting of about 32 millions of the population located in New England, New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Minnesota, for the years between 1915 and 1924, were higher *each year in the urban districts.*[1] However, there appears to have been more of a decline in the urban rate than in the rural. The same comparison for the total registration area of the United States which comprises about 85 millions of the population and includes most of the sections of the United States for 1920 through 1925, shows that for three years out of six the total rate for the rural is higher than the urban. Two years out of six the white

[1] See *Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics*, U. S. Department of Commerce, 1924, for 1925, Vol. I.

rate is greater in the rural districts. Four years out of six the colored rate is greater in the rural districts. What is the meaning of these differences between the old registration area and the new? The old area is primarily all an industrial area. Since these birth statistics are based on the classification of all under 10,000 as rural, this does not give a clear rural-urban distribution for the industrial section of the east. Consequently, the addition of the other portions of the United States, included in the new area, means adding much more of the purely rural territory. Since these relatively pure rural communities have higher crude birth-rates, even at times higher than cities, the addition of these new territories makes the rural rates higher. The negro crude rates are low in urban areas because they have just recently been migrating rapidly to the cities. Extreme age and sex differences, rural and urban, are a factor. The crude birth-rates for England and Wales for 1912 and 1919 were also lower in the rural areas compared with the urban.[2] In France [3] the crude rate for all France was below that for Paris before 1900 and above it since. A declining birth-rate is typical of both populations but has gone on at a faster rate in the city of Paris. Other data for France point to the conclusion that the crude birth-rate, which was formerly generally higher in the urban districts, is falling until first the large cities and Paris fell behind the rural and later the smaller cities. Other countries, namely: Sweden, Bulgaria, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Canada, New South Wales, Italy, Norway, Union of South Africa, *showed higher crude birth-rates in the country and rural districts.* All the countries have showed a rapid decline in the crude birth-rates during this period of the last 50 years. Further, *the data show a rapid decline in the birth-rate with the increase of urbanization, and that this decline is more rapid, on the whole, in the highly industrialized countries, as contrasted with the more ruralized.* This conclusion is entirely corroborated by the fact that, for the last few decades in many countries, if not in all, the crude birth-rate of the cities has been decreasing faster than that of the rural parts. The above data for the United States, England, and France show this. In Italy between 1872 and 1924 the crude birth-rate in the 18 cities with 100,000 and more population fell 36 per cent and in the whole of Italy only 24 per cent. Similar has been the situation in the Union of South Africa, New South Wales, and many other countries. Taking into consideration that for the last few decades the productive age-groups in the cities have been growing at the cost of the unproductive (children), this fall in the birth-rate of the cities has been in reality much greater than is shown by the above crude rates.

[2] See *Registrar General of England and Wales*, Report for 1912 and 1920.

[3] See Paris, *Annuaire Statistique*, 1920, pp. 18–19 and Vol. 30, *Annuaire Statistique de la France*, 1910. *Annuaire General*, 1927, p. 601.

Standardized Rural-Urban Birth-Rates and Occupational Fertility.[4] The existing standardized data suggest the following conclusions:

1. Countries in which the urban crude birth-rates are higher than the rural have urban standardized birth-rates lower than the rural. Illustrations are England and the United States of America. This proves that apparent greater urban fertility, as registered in crude birth-rates, is fictitious. The crude rates give unreliable results because of differences in the age and sex distributions, already mentioned.

2. Countries which have higher crude birth-rates in the rural districts, give standardized birth-rates relatively higher yet, in comparison with cities. In other words, standardization of birth-rates increases the relative size of the rural and decreases the relative size of the urban birth-rates. The results are enumerated in the above two propositions.

3. The agricultural occupation, with the exception of a very few small occupational groups, gives the highest fertility rates of any of the major occupations. No matter what method of standardization is used, the agriculturists have the greatest fertility.

4. For the last few decades the fertility of the urban population, as measured by the standardized birth-rates, has been declining much faster than that of the rural population.

In the United States standardized birth-rates are given in the 1925 volume of birth statistics. They are based upon the age of the mother and the occupation of the father. The table on page 209 presents a few of the chief results:

These data show that the agriculturists, as a class, are next to the miners in having the highest rates of fertility in America. No further explanation is needed. In Great Britain [5] data for the year 1912 show that higher crude birth-rates in cities do not mean either a greater fertility or a greater net fertility for children reaching five years of age. In other words, the higher proportion of urban marriageable persons leads to more children, but the net result is less per 10,000 women of child-bearing age. The agricultural occupations in 1921 had a ratio

[4] A standard or standardized birth-rate attempts to eliminate differences in these rates due to changes in the age distribution or sex composition of the population. Sometimes it tries to remove the differences due to the variations in proportions married. This is achieved by various methods. One is to give the number of births relative to each 1,000 females, ages 15–45. Another type gives the number of children per 1,000 married persons. Still others use: 1,000 married women; 1,000 married women in certain age-groups such as 15–45; per 1,000 marriages of a given duration, etc. They are all attempts to measure variations in birth-rates when the effects of age, sex, and sometimes marital status are, eliminated. The tables are omitted from here but will be given in the more full three volume source book.

[5] *75th Annual Report of the Registrar-General for England and Wales*, 1912, pp. XLI

BIRTHS ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION OF THE FATHER AND AGE OF THE MOTHER FOR THE U. S. REGISTRATION AREA [6]

Occupation of Father	*Births According to Age of Mother*		
	All Ages	*Less than Twenty*	*40–44 years*
All occupations	3.3	1.3	7.4
Agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry	3.9	1.3	8.1
Extraction of minerals	4.1	1.4	8.9
Manufacturing and mechanical	3.2	1.3	7.4
Transportation	2.9	1.3	6.8
Trade	2.6	1.2	6.1
Public service	2.9	1.2	4.9
Professional service	2.3	1.2	4.9
Domestic and personal service	2.9	1.2	6.5
Clerical occupations	2.1	1.1	5.2

of 114 compared with a general expectancy of 100 based on all married men of England of the same ages. Only five minor classes out of 32 had higher ratios.[7]

The chief groups competing in fertility with the agriculturists are miners and city laboring classes. In a similar way, the 1911 census of Scotland shows that the fertility of the agricultural class, together with miners, crofters, and fishermen, is the highest compared with all other 60 occupational groups.[8] As early as 1860, Block presented data for France, which showed a higher fertility of the rural France compared with the urban France.[9] Further data for France [10] were computed for 1906 which was the time that the crude rates for the large cities were about equal to those of the rural districts and those in small cities were lower. The data show that the real fertility of the agricultural classes was higher, whether measured by births or survivals.

In Switzerland [11] the standardized rates per 1,000 women of marriageable age (15–49) for the past 50 years show a high positive correlation for all groups of years between ruralization and the standardized birth-rate. Besides it shows that the urban standardized fertility has been falling much faster in the urban than the rural, so that the difference in rural-urban fertility now is much greater than it was in 1871–1890. In 1920 the Norwegian government made a study of the fertility of its various classes and groups.

[6] *Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics*, 1925, U. S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.

[7] *General Report*, 1921, p. 183.

[8] See Dunlop, James C., "The Fertility of Marriage in Scotland," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXVII, pp. 259–288, 1913–1914.

[9] Block, M., *Statistique de la France*, Vol. I, pp. 61 ff., 1860.

[10] France, *Annuaire Statistique*, Vol. 30, 1910, p. 19.

[11] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1926. Still-births are included before 1901.

The results are based on the number of married women and arranged according to the number of years they had been married. It was found that the number of infants was less in cities for all lengths of marriage. Three infants, on the average, appeared among rural families married 9 years; but the urban did not reach 3 until 13 years of married life had been passed. By the time 13 years of married life had been passed the rural families had 4 children; but the urban families did not reach an average of 4 children until after 19 years. By professions, fishermen had the largest families (7.06 for marriages which had lasted 18 years), agriculture was next, and the higher functionaries and liberal professions least (4.24). Each city had fewer children per family than the surrounding territory. Rural and urban differences in fertility before 1890 were minor, but the city rate has declined most rapidly since. Thus, the country birth-rate had declined 14.1 per cent between 1900 and 1920; whereas the city rate declined 27.9 per cent. These historical considerations were based upon a standardized rate back to 1865; no data were presented for earlier periods. Previous to 1880 less than 20 per cent of the population lived in cities.[12]

Similar data are given by Belgium, Germany, Australia, and other countries.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that even the *crude birth-rates of the predominantly agricultural countries have been higher than those of the predominantly urbanized and industrialized countries.* All the more industrialized countries are far below the more agricultural countries. If, instead of the crude birth-rate, the standardized rates were taken, the differences would be still greater. Add to this the enormous decline in the birth-rate in the past societies, as ancient Rome and Greece, when their urbanization became great.

The preceding figures are sufficient to justify the claim that we have proved the four hypotheses set forth at the beginning of the discussion of the standardized birth-rates. These above lead to a few other conclusions which will be presented before we proceed to the presentation of data concerning the vital index.

1. The nature of social organization in rural-urban countries is such that the greatest increase of human population comes into the rural districts. These push out, like water seeking its level, into the urban districts. This applies between countries as well as between rural and urban areas in the same country.

2. The result of this type of increase of population, is that the urban population is being replaced continually by the rural. In other

[12] These data are taken primarily from a summary in the *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris*, by Jean Bourdon. The series runs from November, 1925, to January, 1926. Some of the data are presented on page 19, *Statistisk Arbok Norge*, 1925.

words, the rural population of to-day is the urban of to-morrow. This process is not mutual and retroactive. (See Chap. II for the discussion of rural societies as "caste" or "closed-door" societies.)

3. As a result of this replacement, the biological and environmental patterns of rural life are, eventually, one of the strongest determining factors in the nature of the "great society," and of the civilization of the time. That is, one of the most important and determining factors in a society are the persons, who are born in rural homes, of farmer-peasant parents, and reared in rural environments. With the farmer-peasant biological background, and characters moulded in farmer-peasant cultural patterns, they go to the cities and enter urban life and, for good or bad, are its strongest determining human factor. As a stream of water into a pond which has only a few "springs" and no other replacements (only outlets), these rural youths go to the cities, and little by little, replace the contemporary urban populations. Coming to the city they are influenced by it, but, in turn, they exert an enormous influence on the city stock and culture.

4. The constant and permanent phenomenon, at least in any rural-urban society or civilization, is the dilution and replacement of the urban population by the rural within countries; of the non-agricultural population by the agricultural; and of the populations of the urban countries by those of the rural countries and areas. So much for these points here. Later on we shall discuss them more fully. Meanwhile, let us conclude this section of the study by giving the vital indices of rural-urban populations.

The Crude Rural-Urban Vital Indices. We have examined all the fundamental sources which serve as the thermometer of the comparative health and vitality of the rural-urban populations. Some of these sources, like the medical examinations of the school children and recruits, and morbidity statistics, depict the qualitative side of the problem. Some others, particularly the statistics of suicide, mortality, longevity, and births give quantitative and "wholesale" knowledge of the problem. We have seen, that on the whole the *testimony of all these sources is in mutual agreement and point at a greater vitality and a better health of the rural population compared with the urban.*

Now to conclude this part let us give comparative rural-urban vital indices which, in spite of their inadequacy, at least roughly and in a concise form give approximate quantitative measures of the comparative vitality of the classes studied. These indices measure the vitality through the relationship of fertility to mortality. It is evident that for the vitality of any group both phenomena—fertility and mortality—are important. A group may have a very low mor-

tality, but if its fertility is still lower, in the course of time it will die out and disappear. If the group's fertility is very high, but its mortality is still higher, it is doomed to disappear also. Therefore, for any vital index, both processes are important and are usually included.

Many different types of indices of vitality are used by various students, depending *largely* upon their *tastes and points of view.* For the purposes of this analysis, we are using the formula $\frac{100\ births}{deaths}$ as an index of vitality. This formula merely tells the relative contributions of the group to the constitution of the future population of the state or of the nation. It increases if factors within the population enable this group to survive with a low rate of deaths per year. It also increases if the population has a high birth-rate. An index of vitality of 100 means that the number of births for that group for that year is just equal to the number of deaths within the same group. This signifies that the size of the group in the course of time remains stationary. The index is less than 100 if the deaths are greater than the number of births; in that case it means that the population tends to disappear because its natural production is less than its consumption of human material. If it is more than 100 it means the opposite—the population is increasing. (No allowance is made for migrations here.)[13] But when we start to apply the formula for the vital index to urban and rural populations, we are faced with an insurmountable difficulty. The only comparable birth- and death-rates are the crude rates. While we possess standardized birth- and death-rates for a large number of countries, yet, the method of standardization for the birth-rates is such that they are not available for use in the equation. As a result the only recourse is to use the crude birth- and death-rates. But at the same time we must recognize clearly that: First, the crude birth-rate underestimates the fertility of rural classes, and *vice versa;* second, the crude death-rate overestimates the mortality of the rural population, and *vice versa;* third, immigration to the cities from the rural parts and from foreign countries fictitiously raises the urban vital index; and fourth, this triple bias works steadily in favor of a bias for the urban districts, so that in every case the crude vital indices give a fictitiously favorable index for the urban districts and the industrial classes, and a fictitiously unfavorable index for the rural and agricultural classes. Nevertheless, if we give these crude indices, the reason is that even as such,

[13] See Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 140–141 for a discussion of indices of vitality. The one used here is approximately as valid as the best, it is simple and easy to compute and to understand. It possesses all the advantages and disadvantages of the ordinary arithmetic average—as a matter of fact it is a great deal similar to such an average.

with all their inadequacy, they show something instructive. With these weaknesses in mind, we shall proceed to give the comparative vital indices,[14] and indicate once more that the relative position of the urban classes in relation to the rural is always overestimated and exaggerated by these indices and the more the more recent years they concern.

The United States of America. For the original registration area in the United States, the following crude vital indices, rural and urban, express the situation since 1915:

Year	*City (More Than 10,000)*	*Rural (Less Than 10,000)*
1915	178.6	177.6
1918	175.7	169.6
1924	185.8	184.0

For the total registration area for 1924 the following crude ratios are found:

Class of Population 1924	*City (More Than 10,000)*	*Rural (Less Than 10,000)*
White population	188.4	206.5
Colored population	123.9	174.5
All population	182.3	202.4

These two registration areas give just opposite results. In the original area this computation gives the city population a higher index two years out of three, whereas in the total area of 85,000,000 people the rural exceeds the urban by a wide margin. Which is more valid? It appears that for the reasons indicated above, the whole area is more representative. Further, the original area, as already pointed out, includes primarily the manufacturing east, except Michigan and Minnesota; rural-urban differences there begin with smaller units than 10,000 population on account of the great amount of industrialization in the east. If the states comprising the original area are compiled separately for 1924, the results show that the states in which urban-rural differences actually exist so that 10,000 or above and below separates them, the rural crude rate is higher. These states are *Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Maine.* The others are primarily industrial states.[15] In England and Wales in 1912 the rural districts were slightly below the average for all England and Wales. In 1917 the crude rate was slightly higher for rural districts but in 1919 conditions were again as in 1912. In Sweden the period from 1821 to 1926, enables us to get an historical perspective of behavior of vital

[14] These vital indices are computed from the same sources as the death- and birth-rates previously cited. We have not repeated the references in most cases.

[15] These data are compiled from *Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics*, 1924.

indices in this field. Before the industrial revolution, death-rates were extremely high in cities, and as a result they had a negative index even with crude rates. The only time the city index of vitality was greater than the rural index was from 1901–1910, which was after considerable improvements in public health and before the spread of birth control. The same type of urban vital movement has occurred in Switzerland as indicated by the trend of this series of rates which begin with 1891.

Rural and Urban Crude Vital Indices for Switzerland Since 1891 *

Year	*City*	*Rural*
1891	141.4	135.7
1896	170.3	154.9
1901	176.5	157.6
1906	163.2	160.9
1911	153.6	153.0
1916	125.8	151.4
1921	138.8	171.1
1926	118.5	168.0

* The city rate is based upon 15 principal cities before 1910 and 18 since that time.

The figures show that the crude vital index for city populations was slightly better than the rural at that time. This difference increased up to 1901, and since that time disappeared and, at the present, the rural is far ahead. In France, before 1860, the rural districts apparently had higher crude vitality than the urban if we may judge from Paris compared with all France using only crude rates. The time between 1860 and 1900 were years of fluctuations, but on the whole the rural districts kept their ascendancy. Since that time they seem to be gaining on the urban districts, although the last war and the post-war influx of the foreign-born into France were disturbing factors. For the year 1926, the following data depict the situation in German Republic.

Berlin	*Cities of 100,000 or More*	*50 to 100 Thousand*	*30 to 50 Thousand*	*15 to 30 Thousand*	*Under 15 Thousand*	*Kingdom*
98.5	137.7	168.8	169.8	175.9	185.0	166.8

The high crude index of vitality is to be found in communities under 15,000; there is a progressive decline with increases in size; Berlin shows a negative rate. In other countries, namely in Bulgaria, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Rumania, Canada, New South Wales, Uruguay, Italy, Union of South Africa, the rural crude vital indices are much higher than the urban.

Summary of Rural-Urban Vitality. Data studied here cover about 20 countries and are representative of 5 continents. In addition some of the countries give data for all of the 19th as well as the 20th century. What are the most general conclusions? Rural people have greater vital indices than urban people. This appears in spite of the consistent over-estimation of urban vitality in the crude rates. This is true generally. In some countries cities have greater crude vitality index than rural parts but this is due to the use of crude rates. Corrected, the vital indices would show even for these cities a lower vitality than for the rural parts. The relative vitality of rural peoples is higher in purely rural countries than in countries more fully urbanized. Contrast the more purely rural countries of eastern Europe with England or the western portions of the United States of America with the east. In many countries, rural districts showed less difference in their favor during the period 1890 to 1910 than before or after. This was noted for France, Sweden, and Switzerland. It may be attributed to the period when public health measures had developed in cities and before the spread of birth control. It may be due also to the wave of migration to the cities before and during this period.

In addition to the above, we feel justified in the following assertions. First, we have shown the validity of the four hypotheses stated at the beginning of the consideration of vital indices, namely: the increase of population comes primarily in the rural districts; urban population is primarily being replaced by the rural (see the chapter on Migration); urban biological stock is continually being replaced or diluted by the rural; and, as a result, the rural biological stock of to-day tends to form the basis for the urban biological stock of to-morrow. Second, the claims of many writers at the end of the last century, that cities were on a trend toward furnishing their own populations by natural increase rather than by migration appears unfounded.[16] There was a period from 1875 to 1910 (varying for countries with different amounts of urbanization and with different cultures) in which crude vital indices in cities gained upon, and sometimes surpassed, rural crude vital indices. But that was a mere cyclical trend due to the development of medicine and hygiene in cities and the wave of migration to the cities. It was followed by another period in which city families developed more extensive use of birth control and contraceptives, and the medical and hygienic culture of the cities spread to the rural districts. What may happen

[16] This does not mean that cities have not gained in that they now, as a rule, replace deaths by native births in a greater proportion. It means that relative to city increases, rural migration is as important as before. See the chapter on Migration for the elaboration of this.

in the future, concerning the spread of birth control to rural districts, cannot be foretold because of the rigid selectivity of rural districts upon many phases of urban culture. But the results were, as shown by the figures given here, that vital rural and urban indices separated again, and are now considerably more in favor of the rural. If it were possible to give, not the crude, but the standardized vital indices, the incomparably more favorable situation of the rural parts now, and an increase of the discrepancy between the vital indices compared recently would have appeared quite general and much greater.

Third, we need only indicate that birth-rates and vital indices are similar to other rural-urban phenomena, in that the variations, from city to city, and from one class within the city to another, are greater than the variations within rural districts, and from the lower rural classes to the other. In other words, *urban districts show greater variations in these phenomena than rural districts and the agricultural classes.)*

Interpretation. A number of reasons might be suggested for the rural and urban differences in birth-rates. Considering the birth-rate separately, it is evident that there are a number of primary and secondary causes for the fact that it is higher in rural districts. We will try to enumerate a few of these causes although we will not always be able to tell which are primary and which are of lesser significance.

One of the important factors is *religion and traditional morals.* As will be shown in the chapter about Rural-Urban Religion, the religious and the moral attitudes of the rural population lag in comparison with the urban attitudes and contain much more from the previous or the traditional forms than the attitudes of the city people. The traditional attitude of the Christian religion in regard to the family has been expressed in the Biblical "multiply and replenish the world." Correspondingly, birth control and other means of limitation of the posterity, as well as the sexual life outside of the legitimate marriage, have been strongly condemned by the church. The cities have been "freeing" themselves from this attitude much earlier than the country. While the attitudes of a considerable part of the city population, in this respect, at the present moment are rather opposite, the above traditional attitude of the Christian religion is still much more alive and followed within the country population. Furthermore, in many agricultural countries, like China or India, and partly the Balkan countries and Russia, the *cult of the ancestors and the family* composes a vital part of the religion of the agricultural populations. This cult requires, as the primary duty of every man, a posterity in a legal family; the more numerous is this posterity the better. Such

beliefs and attitudes stimulate by all means "the replenishment of the world" and the high birth-rate of the rural people and countries. In a milder form the cult of the family is still more alive in the country than in the city. In so far, the religious and moral factors are one of the forces responsible for the higher birth-rate of the rural population.

Closely connected with this factor is *the factor of the family.* Since the development of the agricultural society, the family has been the principal form of social organization of the peasants. In the Middle Ages, a family, not an individual, was the social unit among the peasants. "This family solidarity persisted in peasant societies when it died out in towns and in industrialized countries. In 1664, in certain villages of the Limousin 'families of more than one hundred persons were living in common, as in a college.'" "Right down to the Revolution the population of French villages was computed not by individuals, but by 'hearts.' In Denmark in the middle of the last century from four to six related families could be found living together."[17] In many agricultural countries, like Russia, the Balkan countries, China, and India, such families have been existing up to the present time. This means that the family institution has been something much more important for the peasant class than for the other classes of society. This means also that within the class studied, not the interests of an individual, but those of the family has dominated. Such a situation remains to some degree up to the present time. While in the city the individual and his interests are considered first, within the rural population the family and its interests are still something to which and for which the interests of its individual member should be and are sacrificed. While in the city the monogamic family is already considerably disorganized, in the country it is still much more alive, and stable, and integrated. (See the chapter about the family.) Shall we wonder that the duty of prolonging family history by having a large posterity has been and is much stronger in the country than in the city. Add to this the above cult of the family; that of the ancestors; the feeling of sinfulness and harmfulness in the limitation of posterity; and the greater difficulty for sex satisfaction outside of the family in the country than in the city. These and similar conditions explain why the rural family has been one of the factors of the higher birth-rate of the rural populations compared with that of the city population.

The next factor *is economic.* In numerous studies it has been found that the birth-rate tends to increase in the periods of prosperity and

[17] Irvine, Helen D., *The Making of Rural Europe,* pp. 33 ff. See the whole Chap. III where this idea of an extraordinary importance and vitality of the family among the peasants is well stressed. See also *Wiese, L. von, Das Dorf als soziales Gebilde,* pp. 21 ff.

decrease in the periods of depression. The coefficients of correlation between the birth-rate and the business cycle run in various studies from .15 to .64. Although the rule shows many exceptions and the correlation in no way may be regarded as universal, or constant, or high,[18] nevertheless some connection between the birth-rate and economic conditions seems to be probable. The peculiar economic conditions of the agricultural class seem to be responsible, to some extent, for the higher rural birth-rate.

There are few women's employment agencies in the rural districts. Children are not expensive in the country. Farmer-peasants spend relatively less for medical services for bringing the children into the world. Once they are here, they are soon old enough to add services and income to the family by aiding in the agricultural work. Child labor laws do not affect them, and are not generally needed, because the children work at home with the parents. It costs very little to raise these children on the farm because, up to the time that a child is capable of helping about the farm and becomes self-supporting, his primary needs are for food, shelter, and rough clothing. With the large houses peculiar to many agricultural countries—in comparison with the housing room in cities of the same countries and the same times—the shelter is no more expensive with four or five children instead of two or three. Food, which is primarily a matter of consumption of home production, does not expand in cost as rapidly as the number of children. To give an illustration for an American farm family, let us consider the case of a farmer who has five children. The fifth cost, let us say, $25 [19] for medical attention at birth. Neighbors came in and "helped out" so that there was no nursing charge. The mother had splendid physical vitality, and was soon about her work. The other children took care of the young one; he did not add much to the duties of the mother—at least not so much as one in the cities. Clothing cost little because he was furnished from the "hand-me-downs" of the other children. There was no extra rent to pay on account of the child. If more quarter was needed, the father and his neighbors put up an additional "L" to the house, with little expense other than for raw lumber. The extra meat, potatoes, dairy products, and other basic articles in the diet did not cost very much because they were primarily articles of home production and their appropriation did not reduce the total money income of the family. In other words, *these had little economic cost of production.* Thus we see that this additional child was not as expensive as an additional one in a

[18] See the data, the literature, and criticism in Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 554 ff.

[19] This is the modal cost of "deliveries" in Minnesota farm communities, 1926–1927. Zimmerman, *Minn. Exp. Sta. Bulletins 234 and 246*.

city family, whether of the upper or lower classes. Furthermore the child in the rural family early begins to "pay for himself" by aiding in the agricultural work and, through his services, increasing the family income. In countries where the peasant community landownership exists, an additional child means an additional lot of land in the periodical redistributions.

Coupled with this greater economy of rearing children and their early "income-increasing" activity in rural districts is the matter of *expansion of wants and needs in cities.* If city families were to attempt to rear their children as simply as those in the country, more could be raised in the cities. But the factors which go to make city life (heterogeneity, mobility, contact, isolation among strangers, etc.) seem to affect the demands of city populations, especially the upper classes, so that they refuse to have many children and to raise them on the simple scale as in the country. Some of these facts are inseparable from the city environment but others are new systems of ideas which become inculcated into the parents themselves. One type of these attitudes of city parents is the feeling that children will hinder them in their attempts to climb the social ladder in cities. As the greater vertical mobility of the city population promises more chances for social climbing, many urban climbers limit the number of children they have; in many cases they have none, and in others they do not marry. We may speak of it as *an economic individualism.* It results in more of the energy and economic ability of parents being spent on self-promotion than on a multiplication of the children and prolongation of the family history.

Further, the factor of the *density of the population* is also to be mentioned. A series of the recent studies has tried to show that the birth-rate tends to decrease with an increase of the density of the population. Though the contention is by no means proved and is contradicted by many opposite facts,[20] nevertheless there may be an element of truth in it. In so far, in view of the greater density of the city population, this factor may be, to some extent, responsible for a lower birth-rate of the cities compared with the country.

Another factor which is of some significance in the problem is the *age of the marriage of the country and the city population.* Numerous studies have shown that the fertility of the marriages between relatively young parties, say from 18 to 20 years old, has been greater than the fertility of the marriages between older parties. In the next chapter it will be shown that on the whole the rural population (especially the females) tends to marry at ages somewhat earlier than the urban population. This suggests that this factor of marriages in

[20] See the theories, the data, and criticism in Sorokin's *Contemp. Sociol. Theories,* pp. 374 ff.

the country at relatively earlier ages may also be responsible for the higher birth-rate of the country population.

Finally, whatever may be its causes, the mere fact that the practice of birth control and artificial limitation of posterity appeared and spread in the cities earlier, and has been more accessible in the comfortable forms, such as the use of contraceptives, in no less degree is responsible for the lower birth-rate in the cities. The totality of the above-mentioned factors explains why birth control and desire for limitation of posterity has had more success in the city population; the greater practice of birth control itself in the city explains its lower birth-rate and the downward movement of the birth-rate during the last few decades in all urbanized and industrialized countries.

Without lengthening this discussion, we may summarize it by saying that religion, family life, economic causes, less expansion of wants due to a simpler environment, and lower mobility, lower density of the population, marriages at an earlier age, and the less use of birth control are the primary factors holding the birth-rate relatively higher in the rural districts compared with the urban. But each of these major causes may in turn be reinterpreted into the other "causes" or rural-urban differences stressed in this book. This has already been done in other chapters.

General Conclusions Concerning Rural-Urban Health and Vitality. Hesiod, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Virgil, Varro, Cato, Columella, Pliny, Tacitus, Ibn-Khaldun, and practically all the great thinkers of ancient Greece, Rome, and the Arabian and European Medieval period stated that the health and vitality of the rural and agricultural classes was much better than that of the urban population. The preceding chapters and the data given in them lead us to a similar conclusion. All in all, even at the present moment, this opinion of these great thinkers of the past holds: the rural population is still superior in these respects than the bulk of the urban population.

CHAPTER X

RURAL-URBAN MARRIAGE

Introductory Remarks. In this chapter we limit ourselves to an analysis of those phases of marriage which are allied most closely to the vital processes—marriage-rates, civil status, and age of marriage in the rural-urban populations. It serves at the same time as a preliminary analysis for the Family Organization, which is discussed in a later chapter.

Marriage-rates, in their crudest form, give the number of marriages per 1,000 of the total population per year without regard to age, sex, remarriages, or proportions already married in that population. It is evident that populations grouped closely about the productive ages (15–45) as are the city populations, other things being equal, will give higher crude marriage-rates solely on account of this single statistical factor. Second, those with greater proportions of unmarried (the city populations) have more chances for marriage than others where most of the available persons are married. Third, those with the highest divorce-rates may show higher marriage-rates on account of the inclusion of second and later marriages among the total. This also tends to give the city populations higher crude marriage-rates. The influence of sex distributions is somewhat more involved, as later analysis will show. Attempts to standardize the marriage-rates consist of various measures to eliminate differences due to age, sex, proportions already married, and remarriages. The most common standardization merely takes the proportions of the populations of marriageable ages and gives their civil status—proportions single, married, widowed, and divorced. With these preliminary considerations in mind, let us turn to an analysis of marriage-rates and civil status. In view of the above inadequacy of the crude marriage-rates it is unnecessary to give them. We can pass directly to the data which, at least, to some extent, are standardized and for this reason give a more accurate picture of the situation in the urban and rural groups.

Civil Status of the Rural-Urban Populations. The following table presents data as to the relative proportions of the population of the United States over 15 years of age which had attained a certain civil status by 1920.[1]

[1] From the *14th Census of the United States*, Vol. 2, p. 574.

PROPORTIONS OF THE POPULATION IN 1920 WHO HAD BEEN MARRIED, WIDOWED, OR DIVORCED

Based on Population 15 Years of Age or Over	*Males*		*Females*	
	Rural	*Urban*	*Rural*	*Urban*
All	65.0	64.2	74.3	66.2
Native white native parentage	64.9	63.0	74.3	65.0
Foreign or mixed parentage	57.1	53.5	60.8	49.3
Foreign-born	66.3	73.3	87.3	81.2
Negro	67.6	66.3	70.0	72.9

From this table it is possible to say that the rural population had attained or passed through the marital status to a greater degree by 1920 than the urban. *The difference was much greater for rural females than for rural males.* This was true for all classes of the population except the negro females. These negro females classed as urban were or had been married to a greater extent than those in rural districts. But this is largely due to a difference in age composition of the negro female population in the city and in the country. If the age composition were the same, the difference would be in favor of the country. With the age distribution in 1920 the same in both urban and rural districts, there would have been 57.0 per cent married in the city and 63.5 per cent married in the rural districts. Thus, according to the somewhat different computation of W. F. Ogburn, there are 11.5 per cent more married in the country than in the city.[2]

From the above and other data the following conclusions are suggested. An increase of urbanism is associated with an increase in the proportion of single persons, a decrease in the proportion of married persons, an increase in the widowed females and a decrease in the widowed males.

The United States Census for 1910 and 1890 gives the same conclusions.[3] Are these statements generally true?

The data for England and Wales suggest [4] that single females increase with urbanization. On the other hand, the rural districts have a higher proportion of single males than London or any of the urban groups given above.[5] The proportion of married females decreases with urbanization, but that of married males increases. Similar to the United States, the relationships for the widowed are opposite, males decreasing with urbanization and females increasing.

[2] See Groves, E., and Ogburn, W. F., *American Marriage and Family Relationships*, p. 301, 1928. See other details there in Chapters XI, XII, XIX.

[3] *The 14th Census, op. cit.*, p. 754; Weber, *Growth of Cities*, p. 323.

[4] General Report, p. 83, *Census of England and Wales*, 1921.

[5] The difference was not so great for males as females in the United States of America.

The differences between the behavior in England and the U. S. A. are that English rural districts have a much higher proportion of single males and a less proportion of married males. This contemporary situation in England has appeared during the 20th century.[6] It was noticed as early as 1912 and attributed to a lack of cottage accommodations in rural districts. However, there may be underlying and deeper causes.[7] Concerning the proportions of persons of marriageable age married in France, recent data are not available. For 1906, the data concerning all occupied males 20 years of age or over in agriculture, forestry, and fishing show 22.7 per cent single compared with 26.5 per cent for all France. The rural married were 69.4 compared with 67.1; and the widowed and divorced were 7.9 compared with 6.4 for the entire country.[8] Thus France shows also that the marriageability is higher in rural than in urban districts.

Denmark gives the civil status of the population for 1921. An analysis of the data shows [9] that the rural districts had a greater proportion of married women and much less single women. On the other hand, the males are relatively less married in the rural districts than in the provincial cities and more so than in the capital. In *Norway* [10] in 1920 the rural districts had a greater proportion of married males at the age of 20 years and over and females at the age of 15 years and over. Single persons of both sexes predominate in towns. The widows are to be found more in towns and the widowers in the country.

The data for *Sweden* [11] suggest that the *proportion of single persons is higher in cities in every age-group for all who were born out of the commune. Urban males born in the communes more often have married* (whether divorced or widowed) *until the age-groups past 40 are reached.* The females are married less in every age-group in the urban districts whether they were born in the commune or not. The inclusion of the divorced lowers their civil status more yet.

Data given for *Switzerland* shows that practically every census year since 1860 the population of the largest four cities has had a higher proportion of married and a smaller proportion of single per-

[6] Weber reached the opposite conclusion at the end of the 19th century, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

[7] See *Registrar General's Report, op. cit.*, p. XXXVI, 1912. A. W. Ashby, one of the leading agricultural economists of England, suggested in a personal talk with the authors, that this was due to the great demands for serving girls by the English suburban families.

[8] See France, *Annuaire statistique*, 1910, p. 24, and in Résumé rétrospective, p. 14; Levasseur, E., *La Population Française*, Vol. 2, p. 72, compared with 305; Block, Maurice, *Statistique de la France*, Vol. 1, Paris, 1860, pp. 61 ff.; Weber, A. F., *loc cit.*

[9] See *Denmark Statistisk Aarbog*, 1927.

[10] See a table on page 10, *Statistisk Aarbok, Norge*, 1925.

[11] *Sweden Statistisk Aarsbok*, 1927, p. 21.

sons. However, these data are not standardized for marriageable ages, religion, or nationality, and no conclusions may be drawn from them. If the data for 1920 be standardized by sex and marriageable ages (15 or above) the results seem to be an exception to all the general conclusions which have appeared before, except that urban females are single more often than rural females. However, this is to be explained by the cross-combinations of religion and nationality which complicate the rural-urban correlations. The following is an illustration. For each 10,000 men 18 years of age or over and marriageable (single, widowed, or divorced) 1911 through 1920 there were the most marriages in the urban districts (industrial), next in the mixed industrial and agricultural and least in the agricultural. This appears to be an exception to all the general rural and urban correlations with the standardized marriage-rate. If we consider the German Protestants separately we find the industrial districts have a rate of 142 marriages per 10,000 men 18 years of age or over and single, widowed, or divorced, the mixed 188 and the agricultural 222. The same correlation appears of the German Catholics, the French Protestants, the French Catholics, and the Italian Protestants and Catholics separately. Thus the apparent discrepancies in Switzerland arise because the religions and nationalities which marry most are to be found more in the cities.[12]

In *Bulgaria* per 1,000 of men actually engaged in an occupation at the age of 15 years and over in 1919–1922 on the average there were 47.7 marriages in agriculture and 45.5 marriages in all other occupations.[13] These data are sufficient to show that the rural districts have a less proportion of persons of marriageable age unmarried than they have of the total population of the country and that the marriage-rates in the agricultural occupation are higher than in the totality of the other occupations.

The material from the *Australian* census of 1911 shows [14] that the males in the six cities have married to a greater extent in all age-groups than the males in the rest of the country. The reverse appears for the females. The reader must remember that the extrametropolitan areas include the mining, grazing, and other than purely agricultural areas of this commonwealth.

Conclusions Concerning Civil Status. We may now return to the original statement or hypothesis based on the data for the United States of America. This is, that an increase of urbanism is associated

[12] See *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1926.

[13] These data are computed from pages A117 and A38 of *Annuaire Statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie*, 1923–1924; *same*, 1926, p. 45.

[14] See Vol. I, *Census of the Commonwealth of Australia*, 1911, pp. 258 ff. By "metropolitan areas" is meant the six capital cities. All the remainder of the Commonwealth is included under the other caption.

with an increase in the proportion of single persons, a decrease in the proportion of married persons, an increase in the widowed females, and a decrease in the widowed males. Our study has shown us that urbanism is nearly always associated with a decrease in the proportion of married females, but not always with a decrease in the proportion of married males. England, Sweden (to the age-groups of 40–44) and Australia prove the contrary. Switzerland is an explainable exception. As far as can be told, widowed males decrease with urbanization and widowed females increase. The divorced are to be found more in cities. On the whole, however, marriage increases as a form of social organization in rural districts, and its ties are held to be more binding. The differences between the marriages of rural males and rural females may be explained by a number of reasons. In England it has been attributed to a lack of cottages and need for servants in towns which make it impossible for the rural males to marry in many cases. In Australia and probably in some parts of Sweden the nature of the rural occupations such as grazing, sheep farming, mining, or timbering often make it undesirable or impossible for the men to marry. Another factor which is to be found in all countries is the relative proportions of females in the rural districts. In many cases, there are few if any available females in the rural districts. Northern Minnesota, for instance, has a dearth of females in the farming sections and many bachelor farmers. Farm communities nearly always have relatively fewer females per 100 males than urban districts.

Ogburn has shown for the United States that an increase in the ratio of males to females up to 115 to 100 is associated with an increase in the proportions married. After that there is somewhat of a decrease. While we are not sure that this relationship is causal, yet it may be a partial explanation why rural males are less married in some of the districts enumerated here than urban males. But he has also further shown that an increase in the proportion of men to women is associated with a decrease in the proportions of men married, although this decrease is less rapid than the increase in women married. His regression equations are as follows:

$$X_1 \text{ equals } 67.55 - 0.08X_3$$

where X_1 is the percentage of the males over 15 married and X_3 is the sex ratio.

$$X_2 \text{ equals } 19.58 \text{ plus } 0.38X_3$$

in which case the X_2 is the percentage of females over 15 married. This simply shows that the disproportion of the sexes in favor of more men must inevitably keep men from marrying unless a system of polyandry is developed.[15] An increase in the proportion of men

[15] See Ogburn, W. F., *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XVIII, p. 50.

to women keeps men from marrying but leads to very rapid increases in the proportion of women marrying, and *vice versa*. A decline in the proportion of men (cities) leads to a slow decline in the proportions of men married and a rapid decline in the proportions of females married. The changeable and important element, from the standpoint of family and children, is the proportion of marriageable women married. As we have shown, this is greater in the rural districts.

Age at Marriage. Before giving any final interpretation, let us attempt to find if there is any correlation between the ruralization or urbanization of a community and the age of marriage. According to Thompson,[16] the data for New York State seem to show that the rural population marries on the average at an earlier age, if we may judge from these data concerning brides only. W. F. Ogburn's computation for the United States gives the following results:[17]

Age-Groups	*Percentage Married*	
	Urban	*Rural*
Males 15–19 years	1.7	2.4
Females 15–19 years	10.4	14.5
Males 20–24 years	25.8	31.1
Females 20–24 years	47.6	58.4

Data for *Sweden* verify the conclusion that rural females marry at earlier ages than the urban. This is true also for the rural females born in rural districts compared with rural females who migrated from the commune of birth to cities before marrying; for rural females who migrate to urban districts compared with native-born urban females; and for rural females born in one commune and migrating to another in comparison with rural females marrying in the community of birth. But the native-born urban males marry somewhat earlier than the native-born rural males; the rural migrants to cities marry earlier and more frequently than the native-born urban males; the migrants to cities marry earlier and more frequently than the native-born rural males; and the migrants from one community to another in rural districts marry earlier than the native-born rural males. We cannot explain these variations with the limited data at hand. But we may point out that the native-born males in urban districts as well as the migrants to urban districts marry earlier than the rural males native-born to their communities. This is an exception to the

[16] Thompson, Warren S., *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 19, p. 152. Urban communities are certain cities specified in the Report (of New York State); and rural communities are all others; the dividing line is about 10,000 population.

[17] See Groves and Ogburn, *op. cit.*, p. 230. See there other details.

earlier marriage in rural communities; however, it does not affect the birth-rates because the age of marriage of the woman is the important factor as far as age of marriage affects birth-rates generally. As we have already shown the responsive factor in marriage is the female; she is also the important factor because of the relation to the child. Since females marry earlier in rural districts, the birth factors have greater chances.

The data for *Bavaria* show a tendency for the ages of marriage of both sexes to be approximately the same in rural and urban districts. Levasseur gives some data for *France* which show earlier marriages in the country. They are given for first marriages as well as others. These data show a slight tendency for males and females to marry earlier in the country. The chief difference was between Paris and the rural districts. There was some tendency for the average age of marriage to decrease with progress of time in urbanization but that was due to the increasing proportions of divorces and their more earlier remarriages than formerly.

Weber presents data for *Austria* for the latter years of the 19th century which show that later marriage of both sexes is correlated with size of the community. He quoted Rauchberg's conclusion for Austria as "of wide application":

The marriage-rate, the age at marriage, the preponderance of unmarried among the migrants, and the direction of migration (toward the cities) work together to raise the participation in marriage life, especially in the younger years, to a higher level in the villages and country places than in the middle-sized and large cities.

Further data by Weber indicate that the migration to cities only delays the marriage a few years, and that by 30 years of age and past the migrants have married as often as the native-born urbanites. Further, they stay married to a greater extent, thus carrying with them some of the moral traditions of the open-countryside. In *Australia* we find that the rural males marry later and the females marry earlier. In *Scotland* both males and females marry earlier in the rural districts, but the difference was much greater for the females than the males. The difference between the average age of bridegrooms and brides in 1917 in the larger burgs was 2.98 years and in the remainder of Scotland was 3.26 years. In *England*, certain industrial counties show greater proportions of under-age marriages than the rural counties, but these are attributed to local conditions and customs. As a rule the rural districts, compared with the urban, including London, give slightly higher rates of the married and lower rates of the single for the ages from 15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 34; that is for the younger ages. In *Russia* and *Bulgaria* both males and

females in rural districts marry at considerably earlier ages than in urban districts.

Finally if we confront the predominantly agricultural countries with the predominantly urbanized countries we can see that the first group of the countries, all in all, give higher rates of marriages at the early ages than the second.

Conclusions Concerning Ages at Marriage. It is apparent that females nearly always marry at earlier ages in rural districts. Males fluctuate from country to country, in some marrying earlier in urban districts, in others rural districts and in others at about the same age in each. But since the important factor in age of marriage is that of the female, we may conclude for all important purposes that age of marriage is earlier in rural districts.

Interpretation. Real marriages, as judged from the proportions of the marriageables married, are greater, relatively, in the country. This correlation is generally true of females. In a few cases there are exceptions in the case of males. These exceptions are probably due to the factors which affect the sex-proportions. Nevertheless, when we consider the really important factors in marriage, the rural districts have the following characteristics:

a. Rural populations are more likely to marry.
b. Rural populations marry at earlier ages (especially the women).
c. Rural populations exist in family organizations to a much greater extent (standardized for age groups). That is, rural communities have smaller proportions of single, widowed, or divorced persons in their populations, as a rule.
d. Rural populations stay married longer and more frequently. (They marry earlier and have less divorce. Further, their longevity is greater.)

The main causes of these rural-urban differences may be listed as family, religion, mores, economic reasons, geographic isolation, less mobility, and more homogeneity. The rural people marry at earlier ages because they are expected to have families; it is considered as a religious duty; the mores are more strong against sex life outside of marriage especially for women, so that the opportunity for sex satisfaction is limited; an unmarried female finds her situation in the country more difficult than in the city;[18] a young man can start a farm for himself and climb the agricultural ladder more rapidly with a family than without (the opposite is often true in cities); the demands for a fine display of wealth at marriage are less strong in the country;

[18] Ogburn's study has shown that a relatively greater employment of women is followed by a smaller percentage of women married. In the cities the chances for women's employment are greater than in the rural parts. See Groves and Ogburn, *op. cit.*, Chap. XVII.

geographic isolation of the young persons calls for compensating psycho-social ties (marriage) at an earlier age; the population is less mobile (this enables acquaintanceship of those intimate types which more often fruit in marriage); there are no new environments for the individual to become adjusted to in the economic side relative to city environments and the new environments of migrants; and, last, the great homogeneity enables the rural youth to meet women with the same types of training, outlook, and ideals as his own at an earlier age.

Once the individual is married, it becomes his religious and social duty to stay married and have a family. As will be shown, the religious organization of country life is more about the family than in the cities. These children, in turn, make the marriage more stable by binding it together with more numerous ties, adding to its productive capacity as an economic unit, and benefiting all concerned.

Numerous studies show that *there exists a tangible correlation between economic factors and the marriage-rate.* The coefficients of correlation between business cycles and marriage-rate obtained by numerous authors (Hooker, Yule, March, Ogburn, D. Thomas, and Hexter) fluctuate between .46 and .87. All these are significant.[19] For this reason it is natural to expect that these factors are responsible, to some extent, for a higher marriage-rate in the rural parts of many countries.

The family as an economic unit or the marriage status is better fitted to agriculture than to urban life. There are few opportunities for women's work outside of the home. There are few boarding houses or hotels for unmarried men. When this unmarried man does find a suitable place for staying, it is generally in another farm home where the marriage pattern is before him. The family as a unit can produce better in agriculture. Marriage there is not an economic burden, as it is often in the city, but is a positive economic asset for both parties. The groom's family gets, in his bride, a useful worker; the bride gets a husband and family, without whom her independent existence in the country would be highly difficult from the economic standpoint. About every farm there are tasks peculiarly fitted to a man and to a woman. There are always young animals and poultry needing care. Women often do these things more capably than men. On the other hand there are certain other duties, requiring greater manual strength, which, on the whole, are more capably done by men. Every farm requires a certain amount of supervision at all times, especially that great majority of farms with some livestock and poultry and diversified agriculture. A family unit handles this economic function best. In other words, the peculiar economic and social productive functions of agriculture are adapted to family life and the married status more

[19] See the data in Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociol. Theories*, pp. 552–555.

than many city occupations. Further, climbing the economic ladder in agriculture may be achieved more easily in family units than otherwise. In cities, this often leads to delayed marriages, failure to marry, and disrupted marriages.

The geographic isolation of country life requires, and to some extent demands, compensating forms of social organization to offset the possible psycho-social isolation which might result from the geographic isolation. How well the family offsets this geographic isolation and gives the farmer-peasant a greater amount of socialization, has already been shown in the chaper on Suicides.

The less mobility of country life makes the farmer-peasant more amenable to the mores and religious beliefs of the community concerning the necessity for the sanctity of marriage. Further, it keeps him from challenging contacts and beliefs which lead to sex life outside of the family, failure to marry, and from the forces leading to divorce and family disruption.

Numerous studies about the choice in marriage show that generally in marriage "like tends to beget like." *The parties which are more homogeneous (in race, age, nationality, religion, social, occupational, economic, and other states) are attracted to enter the marriage bond more than the parties which are heterogeneous.*[20] This assortative mating may also play some part in the differences discussed. The rural people are more homogeneous. According to this theory, for this reason of homogeneity, they find suitable mates easier than in the heterogeneous urban population. The homogeneity of country life places the farmer-peasant in contact with a number of women of the same ideas, tastes, training, and ideals. As a result he has less trouble finding a suitable life-mate and a less number of challenging factors which might prevent him from marrying and joining the family unit, than the urbanites.

Further, the *differences in the mores with respect to sexual freedom among women are such as to affect this difference in marriage, especially the prevalence of single females in the cities.* And last, all the factors which lead to *the greater concentration of women, relative to men, in cities* (see the further chapter on Migration) affect the marriage-rates of the city females, as shown by the study of Ogburn already quoted. The increase in the sex proportions (women relative to men) is associated with a rapid decline in the females married. Somehow, the factors in mating reflect themselves quickly and sensibly in the proportions of females married. What these are, we are not sure. But we do know that they are associated with sex proportions within the population.

[20] See about that in Savorgnan, F., *La scelta matrimoniale;* Harris, J. A., "Assortative Mating in Men," *Scientific Monthly,* April, 1912. See other literature in Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* p. 716.

PART III

RURAL–URBAN INTELLIGENCE, EXPERIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES

CHAPTER XI

RURAL-URBAN INTELLIGENCE

Popular Theories Concerning Rural-Urban Intelligence. After a study of rural-urban vitality and the principal correlations in this field, it is logical to pass to a similar study of rural-urban intelligence and psychology. This section is devoted to this problem. In it we shall study the most important mental traits, such as intelligence, mental diseases, character of perception, representations, associations, reproductive imagination, emotionality, and experience or knowledge in their formal aspects. The psycho-social differences between rural-urban populations, according to the "content" of these differences—moral, religious, æsthetic, family, etc.—are the components of rural-urban culture, and as such, are examined in the subsequent parts of the book devoted to a cross-section of the rural-urban cultures, attitudes, and ideologies. Such a subdivision is logical and technically convenient.

So much for this point. Let us turn now to a study of the comparative rural-urban intelligence. Since populations first became conscious of urban-rural distinctions, or the separation of the agricultural and the non-agricultural, there has been some discussion, and opinion regarding the relative intelligence of the two groups. This discussion has been very present the last few decades, due to the development of various so-called measures of intelligence. *The general belief has been that the brighter have migrated to the cities.* Various authors have attempted to prove this on several grounds. They have maintained: that most of the men of genius and leaders were born in cities; that bright persons born in the country migrate to the cities where greater opportunities and appreciation awaits them so that their children are born in cities; that the statistics of feeble-minded show that the duller are congregating in the country; that studies of school achievement show that the bright pupils are in cities; and finally, that psychological tests and school achievement show that the urbanites have higher intelligence, on the average, than the country people or ruralites. Such are the principal lines of proof generally given for this argument. The purpose of the subsequent paragraphs is to find out to what extent these arguments are valid.

Results of the Blanket Rural-Urban Psychological Tests. We shall begin with the problems of rural-urban intelligence tests and

school achievement. For purposes of analysis these psychological tests may be divided into two main classes: those which separate communities by size and compare the rural with the urban; and those which divide the groups according to the occupation of the parent. Let us take up those which divide communities by size and compare the intelligence test results. For purposes of discussion, we shall hereafter refer to these as "blanket" comparisons, rural and urban, because they do not differentiate the occupational groups, nor the different types of rural and urban peoples living within the same community.

We will not attempt to give any complicated definition of intelligence. As generally understood, *intelligence is that combination of mental factors which the individual is supposed to use in achieving some aim or goal in life or the ability to adjust itself adequately to a new situation.*[1] Students disagree as to the exact proportions of innate and environmental factors in intelligence; in all probability it is a composition of the two—certain innate abilities polished by the environments both natural and social.[2] Not giving here the actual data supplied by more than thirty of the best studies in the field,[3] let us sum-

[1] See Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility*, pp. 280 ff.

[2] *Ibid*, Chapter XIII.

[3] Pressey, S. L., and Thomas, J. B., "A Study of Country Children in a Good and a Poor Farming District, by Means of a Group Scale of Intelligence," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1919, Vol. 3, pp. 283–286; Pressey, L. W., "The Influence of Inadequate Teaching and Poor Environment upon Results with Tests in Intelligence," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1920, Vol. 4, pp. 91–104; Engelhart, Fred, "Survey Report of Lake Crystal Schools," *Bulletin of the Minnesota College of Education*, 1926, Monograph 10; Pyle, William H., "The Nature and Development of the Learning Capacity," *Educational Psychology Monographs*, No. 25; also "A Manual for the Mental and Physical Examination of School Children," (rev.), *University of Missouri Bulletin*, 1920, Vol. 21, No. 12; Hinds, James H., "A Comparison of the Brightness of Country and City High School Children," *Journal of Educational Research*, 1922, Vol. 5, pp. 120–124; Coxe, Warren W., "School Variation in General Intelligence," *Journal of Educational Research*, 1924, Vol. 4, pp. 187–199; Chase, H. W., and Carpenter, C. C., "Response of a Composite Group to the Stanford Revision of the Binet-Simon Tests," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, Vol. 10, pp. 179–188; Dashwell, F. J., and Glenn, W. D., "A Reëxamination of a Socially Composite Group with Binet and Performance Tests," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1925, Vol. 16, pp. 335–340; Adams, F. J., *An Intelligence Survey of a Rural School System*, an unpublished Master's Thesis, University of California, May, 1922; Pintner, Rudolf, "A Mental Survey of the School Population of a Village," *School and Society*, Vol. 5, pp. 597–600; Book, W. F., "Variations of Mental Ability and its Distribution among the School Population of an Indiana County," *Bulletin of the Extension Division*, Indiana University, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 100–131; Koch, H. L., and Simmons, Rietta, "A Study of the Test Performance of American, Mexican, and Negro Children," *Psychological Monographs*, Vol. 35, Whole Number 166; Goddard, H. H., "Two Thousand Normal Children Measured by the Binet Measuring Scale of Intelligence," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1911, Vol. 18, pp. 232 259; Duff, James, and Thompson, Godfrey, "The Social and Geographical Distribution of Intelligence in Northumberland," *British Journal of Psychology*, 1923–1924, Vol. 14, pp. 192–198; Bickersmith, M. E., "Application of Mental Tests to Children of Various Ages," *British Journal of Psychology*, Dec., 1917, Vol. 9, pp. 23–73; Gordon, George B. *A Study of the Intelligence Differences of Rural and City*

marize the conclusions which follow from these studies. These studies include several hundred thousand children from all portions of the United States and England. The populations included in the study represent all ages and grades of school children and all types of farming and city populations. Many different types of tests were used. Some measure pure nerve and muscle coördination; others chiefly pure "book intelligence" or the results of indirect experience. *The greater proportion of the tests place the rural children below the urban.* The only exceptions are as follows; Engelhart found the non-resident (farm) high school pupils predominating not only in the lowest groups but in the next to the highest group; Pyle found country children in certain age-groups excelled in substitution and concrete rote memory; the data of Coxe show that the agricultural schools were not materially behind the average except for the schools attended by the business and the professional classes; Duff, Thompson, and Bickersmith found the districts far removed from the cities with average I. Q.'s much higher than those nearer the cities; Bickersmith's data also show country children excel in rote memory; Gray and Marsden found country children superior to those from the poorer parts of town and not very much inferior to those from the better portions of the towns; Windes found only a small difference in favor of non-farm children in his Connecticut high school study and that difference was mostly among the boys, and in his Madison study farm girls actually excelled the average of the non-farm girls; McCracken found city children lower than rural children in the elementary schools but higher in the upper grades and attributed the difference to a comparison of a "good farming district" with an industrialized population. With these minor exceptions, all these studies agree that the intelligence of farmer-peasants and their children is lower than the urban average. *The greater proportion of the investigators seem convinced that the difference in results is due to difference in native ability of the two populations.* Most of them

High School Children on the Basis of the Army Alpha Tests, Master's Thesis (unpublished), Ohio State University, 1924; Burt, Cyril, *Mental and Scholastic Tests;* Nelson, C. A., and Windes, E. E., *U. S. Bureau of Education*, 1924 Bul. No. 4, pp. 11–12; *New York Rural School Survey*, Vol. 6; *Educational Achievement*, pp. 220–222; Gray, P. L., and Marsden, R. E., "Intelligence Tests in Rural Schools," *Journal of Experimental Pedagogy*, 1922, Vol. 6, pp. 224–233; *Oklahoma Report of a Survey of Public Education*, 1922, Dept. of Interior, U. S. Bureau of Education, Washington, Dec. 11, 1922, section of Educational Tests and Measurements; McCracken, C. C., *Logan County and Bellefontaine, Ohio, School Survey;* Lufkin, H. M., "Report on the Use of the Army Alpha Test in Rural Schools," *School and Society*, Vol. 13, No. 314, pp. 27–30; Madsen, I. N., "Some Results from a Testing Program in Idaho," *School and Society*, Vol. 13, No. 337, pp. 668–671; Darsie, Marvin L., "The Mental Capacity of American Born Japanese," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1925–1926, Vol. 3, pp. 56 ff.; Wahlquist, J. T., *Elementary School Journal*, Vol. 27, pp. 682–684, May, 1927. See also the elaborate discussion in *Survey of Education in Utah*, U. S. Bureau of Education Bulletin, No. 18, 1926.

think this difference in native ability is due to the migration of the brighter to the cities. Are these points proved by these data? Let us see.

The first criticism that must be made is that the classing of the schools as rural and urban is not a clear demarcation. It varies from test to test. The real point in issue is the intelligence of agriculturists as a class in comparison with the various city groups such as laborers, artisans, clericals, professionals, and business men. The primary migration of population is from occupation to occupation and only from country to city in so far as the various occupations are segregated in country and city districts. This classification of rural and urban does not make this comparison clear. Take Gordon's study as an example.[4] He selected 53 Minnesota schools in communities with populations ranging from 90 to 800. With these he compared the schools in Alexandria, East Grand Forks, Lake City, Eveleth, Staples, Melrose, Tracy, Luverne, and Sleepy Eye, Minnesota. None of these latter towns has a population above 3,400. The comparison was based on grades 7–12. Many farm children were included in the so-called urban schools, and many non-farming children in the rural schools. All of these towns called urban are merely agricultural villages. While it is true that some of them have a few industries such as railroad round-houses, sugar-beet factories, and iron mines, it is also true that the majority of them depend entirely upon agriculture; all except one or two depend more upon the business from agriculture than from any other source. The majority of these towns have more farm children in high school than any other occupation. This is really a comparison of the smaller rural community with the larger. This same criticism applies to practically all the other studies included in the table.

The second criticism is that of logical fallacy. The size of the school and the constituency of the population are both varying at the same time. Yet the authors attribute the variations in the independent variable (I. Q.) to variations in rural-urban population alone. Mathematically stated it is as follows. Let x and y, independent variables, and z, dependent variable, vary together. Are variations in z due to x or y? Or either? The case is not proved. If these tests are biased by the indirect or "book experience" of the pupils; and if rural-urban populations as well as size and efficiency of the schools vary at the same time; then we are not sure that the differences in the I. Q.'s are due to changes from rural to urban and *vice versa;* or to changes in the size and efficiency of the schools. This same criticism applies to most of the above studies, an illustration of which is given in the table on the following page.

[4] Gordon, George B., *Unpublished Master's Thesis*, 1924, Ohio State University.

AN EXAMPLE OF THE COMPARISONS OF RURAL AND URBAN INTELLIGENCE IN WHICH TYPE OF SCHOOL, CONSTITUENCY OF THE POPULATION, AND THE MEDIAN SCORE TESTS VARY AT THE SAME TIME [5]

Type of School	*Average Mental Index*	*Per Cent Very Bright*	*Per Cent Bright*	*Per Cent Average*	*Per Cent Backward*	*Per Cent Dull*
Good section of city	58.5	12.6	17.2	53.7	10.6	5.9
Mixed city population (some poor)	47.0	9.2	14.0	51.7	17.6	17.5
Good city working class district	44.5	6.0	14.0	53.9	16.0	10.1
Fair section of city	58.0	13.3	17.4	46.0	12.4	10.9
Low class village	30.0	0.7	5.9	50.6	16.4	26.3
Poor farming section	17.0	0.0	2.4	31.4	26.5	39.8

The third criticism is of bias in the tests. These tests were made by men with urban backgrounds, working in urban institutions, and are carried on with urban tools (concepts, writing paper, pencils, etc.). There are two or three possible sources of bias. First, *they often measure direct experience which is more within the field of urban behavior* such as, for instance, the results of baseball games or participation in such, or the use of umbrellas during periods of rain, than the direct experience which is more within the conceptual spheres of the rural worlds such as, for instance, which side of a cow is the milking-side, etc. To give a concrete illustration, we should expect fewer rural children to understand the combination of umbrellas and rain; and we should expect fewer urban children to understand which side of a cow is the milking-side. The first type of situation, umbrellas and rain, is met more often in many of these tests than the latter, cows and milking-sides. *The second type of bias is that the tests are based more upon indirect experience (reading, school training, and second-hand experience) than the direct experience.* Since, as is shown in Chapter XIII, the indirect experience of the farmer-peasant group is much more limited than the indirect experience of the urban groups, this in itself is bias in favor of the urban. Nearly all of these tests show a high correlation between schooling and type and efficiency of schools. This will be shown when we take up school achievement later on.[6] It is

[5] Pinter, Rudolf, *The Mental Survey*, pp. 41 ff.

[6] For a concrete illustration, see *Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences*, Washington, Government Printing Office, Vol. 15, chapter on Education (Army Tests).

generally argued that such correlations exist because there is a correlation between native intelligence and school achievement, etc. But this is an interpretation of a correlation, which indicates the bias of the interpreter toward the belief that the intelligence rating variable is the independent and causal variable; and that school achievement is the dependent or resulting variable. One might reverse the situation and argue the opposite with no other data at hand. All that really exists is the correlation, and mathematical coefficients of correlation *do not interpret themselves.* However, we are not going to completely reverse the situation and argue the opposite; but at the same time *there are some grounds for belief that both variables (school achievement and intelligence quotients) are at times independent and causal and at others dependent and resulting.* This means that school achievement increases the amount of indirect experience; and this increased amount of indirect experience adds some to the ability to compete successfully on the intelligence tests, as far as they are biased toward the results of orientation into certain types of indirect experience. *The third type of bias which might exist is that the tests are made, as a rule, by certain types of activity (writing, reading, card games, etc.) which are more within the specialties of the urbanites than the ruralites.* We show in other chapters that the ruralite is more diversified; that the urbanite is more specialized; and that the urban world is made up to a greater extent of this artificial man-made environment of paper, pencils, writing, printing, and ink. In so far as these habits bias the tests, the tests show a bias toward the urban.

Concrete proof of the validity of some of these criticisms is given by the results of the testers themselves. L. W. Pressey returned to one of the schools in which he made a first test and repeated it with children of a much younger age. He found the difference was reduced two points out of 10 or 20 per cent.[7] Gray and Marsden found that the rural children showed greater differences in the factors which the schools influence most, such as vocabularies.[8] Darsie also found that the schools affected the results of his studies and tests.[9] Gordon tried to measure this, but found no results, and reached opposite conclusions from the above three concerning the effect of schooling.[10] Colvin studied some urban children using the Otis group scales.[11] Considerably more than half of them fell into the superior classes, although the schools appeared not markedly superior to the rank and file. He concluded, "The Otis scales are primarily literary tests; they are based on a knowledge of words and skill in the use of words. On

[7] See *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1920, Vol. 4, pp. 91–104.
[8] See *Journal of Exp. Pedagogy*, Vol. 6, pp. 2–24.
[9] See *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1925–1926, Vol. 3.
[10] See his *Thesis, op. cit.*
[11] See *Journal of Educational Research*, Jan., 1921, Vol. 3, pp. 1–12.

the other hand they are quite misleading as measures of absolute intelligence." The same criticism undoubtedly applies in part to other tests, although Pyle and some of the others have eliminated this in part by the use of more primitive tests. Later analysis in this chapter also furnishes some evidence as to the effects of these three biases. *The conclusion is that all these three types of possible biases tend to reduce the rural and increase the urban intelligence ratings on these tests, without regard to differences in native intelligence.*

The fourth criticism is that the comparison is a meaningless one. An unselected group is compared with a mixture of several groups; some of which are undoubtedly selected. If we allow the rural group to represent all farmers (which they are not) then the comparison is with a hodge-podge of unskilled and skilled laborers, business, clerical, and professional peoples. The upper parts of these city groups are unquestionably the élite in the social order. The social climbing is from the farms and the lower ranks in the cities into the upper groups in the cities. The blanket rural-urban comparison is a comparison of one unselected group (farmers) with another unselected group (lower classes in cities) combined with the selected leaders of both groups (upper classes in cities). This is an obvious error and makes the comparison and the results meaningless. This is eliminated, as shall be shown later, by dividing the rural and urban groups into their constituent occupations.

The fifth criticism is that many of these studies are analyses of organic "wholes" of society into non-competitive groups. As Galpin has shown in his studies of the rural community, the agricultural village is an organic whole with its surrounding community.[12] To the extent that such a social organism exists, the comparison of farmers and villagers is like that of father and child. The country people are compared with their natural leaders, who are, in most cases, the children of country people and the fathers of future country people.

The sixth criticism is that these blanket comparisons do not take into consideration the enormous differences in educational and cultural opportunities of the farmer-peasant class and the city people, especially the city upper classes. In order that any comparative I. Q.'s may be significant they must concern social groups whose educational and cultural conditions are, at least, somewhat similar. Meanwhile it is evident that these conditions for the city middle and upper classes and farmers are strikingly different. For this reason the comparisons are meaningless.

We must finally conclude that unless these major criticisms invalidate the data and the conclusions that are drawn from the studies in Table I, then a firm foundation has been laid for the theory of a

[12] See Galpin, C. J., *Rural Social Problems,* Chapters 5 and 15.

"country bled-white by the migration of the brighter to the cities." The authors believe these six criticisms so invalidate the data that the point is not proved as yet.

Results of Occupational Comparisons of Farmers and Other Groups Based Upon the Psychological Tests. Many studies give the data from the tests so as to show the occupation of their male parent.[13] This classification meets some of the objections to the blanket test just discussed so we will analyze the results of another group of such studies including measurements of more than 150,000 persons, both children and adults, and covering large samples in the United States, England, and the Isle of Wight. Let us analyze them for common results.

1. Farmers or their children ranked between skilled and semi-skilled labor in 11 out of the 14 studies. (That of Haggerty and Nash is counted as two separate studies because both grade and high school results were given separately and with different conclusions.)

2. The three studies in which farmers ranked lower than the group of common labor are all based on high-school students. (The studies of Book, Colvin and Haggerty and Nash.)

3. Farmers may be divided into two main groups, the entrepreneurial or managerial class and the laborer or employee class. In England and the Isle of Wight this division is clearly marked.[14] The entrepreneurial class averages considerably higher in test scores than the labor class. For that reason, the army tests were claimed to underrate considerably the relative ability of the farm class.[15]

4. The farm labor class themselves are by no means as low in test score rank as the lowest common labor groups in the cities.

5. Studies of high-school groups and especially of high-school

[13] Book, William F., *Intelligence of High School Seniors;* Duff, James F., and Thompson, Godfrey, "The Social and Geographical Distribution of Intelligence in Northumberland," *British Journal of Psychology*, 1923-1924, Vol. 14, pp. 192-198; Dexter, Emily Smith, "The Relation between the Occupation of the Parent and the Intelligence of the Children," *School and Society*, June, 1923, Vol. 17, No. 440, pp. 192-198; Colvin, S. S., and MacPhail, Andrew H., "Intelligence of Seniors in the High Schools of Massachusetts," *U. S. Bureau of Education*, 1924, Bull. No. 9; Fryer, Douglas, "Occupational Intelligence Standards," *School and Society*, 1922, Vol. 16, pp. 273-277; MacDonald, Hector, "The Social Distribution of Intelligence in the Isle of Wight," *British Journal of Psychology*, 1925-1926, Vol. 16, pp. 123-129; Hinds, J. H., "Does Mentality Influence the Choice of High School Subjects," *Vocational Education Magazine*, Nov., 1923, Vol. 2, pp. 178-183; Haggerty, M. E., and Nash, Harry R., "Mental Capacity of Children and Paternal Occupation," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1924, Vol 15, pp. 559-572; *Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 15, Washington, Government Printing Office, chapter on Occupational Ratings (Army Tests); Bear, Robert M., "Factors in the Achievement of College Freshmen," *School and Society*, 1926, Vol. 24, pp. 802 ff.

[14] See Ashby, A. W., and Jones, J. Morgan, "The Social Origin of Farmers in Wales," *English Sociological Review*, 1924. Only 11 per cent of the rent paying or operating farmers were sons of farm laborers, whereas 75 per cent were sons of "capital farmers."

[15] See *Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, op. cit.*, p. 830.

seniors (or educational institutions above the grades) underrate the average ability of farmers because of differences in social selection of higher education upon farm children and certain other groups. Book's study in Indiana showed that while farmers composed only 33 per cent of the population of the state, their children composed 37 per cent of the high-school seniors, whereas laborers, who composed 24 per cent of the population of the state furnished only 9 per cent of the seniors. The study by Haggerty and Nash in New York found that farm children were 46 per cent in the grades and 34 per cent of the high-school group or a decline of 25 per cent, whereas laborers dropped from 11 to less than 4 per cent, or a decline of about 66 per cent in proportion. These and other studies have established the principle that comparisons of occupations on the basis of analyses of school children more advanced than the common school is inadequate because of differences in social selection.[16] This principle invalidates many of the occupational comparisons made in this and in many other fields.

The following tables give the details from the important studies by Haggerty and Nash and Hector MacDonald. By study of these tables one may see for himself that the previous five conclusions as to the results of the occupational tests are fully justified. It is apparent that such studies as these satisfy the criticism we made of the blanket rural-urban comparisons of intelligence in that they give the occupation of the parent or of the person tested.

INTELLIGENCE OF CHILDREN AND OCCUPATION OF MALE PARENT

(Data from the Study by Haggerty and Nash in New York State)

COMPARISON IN GRADES III–VIII

Occupational Class	*No. of Cases*	*Per Cent of Group*	*Median Score*	*Range*
1. Professional	349	5.07	116	70–177
2. Business and Clerical	944	14.11	107	54–169
3. Skilled Laborers	1028	15.38	98	54–177
4. Semi-Skilled Laborers	524	7.84	95	53–152
5. Farmers	3098	46.33	91	50–161
6. Unskilled Laborers	745	11.14	89	51–146

[16] For further data on this conclusion, see Pyle, W. H., *op. cit.*, p. 15; Ayres, L. P., in the educational section of the *Springfield Survey*, p. 46; Counts, G. S., *The Selective Influence of American Secondary Education*, pp. 48 ff., 78 ff.; Brinkley, S. G., "Selection in Secondary Education in America and in China," *Peabody Journal of Education*, 1925–1926, Vol. 3, pp. 214–222; and Thorndike, E. L., "Changes in the Quality of Pupils Entering High School," *School Review*, May, 1922, Vol. 30, No. 5.

INTELLIGENCE OF CHILDREN AND OCCUPATION OF MALE PARENT—*Continued*

(Data from the Study by Haggerty and Nash in New York State)

COMPARISON IN HIGH SCHOOLS

Occupational Class	*No. of Cases*	*Per Cent of Group*	*Median Score*	*Range*
1. Professional	201	14.02	121	80–167
2. Business and Clerical	374	26.10	112	60–168
3. Unskilled Laborers	54	3.77	111	69–139
4. Skilled Laborers	267	18.63	108	78–149
5. Semi-Skilled Laborers	48	3.50	108	90–159
6. Farmers	489	34.12	106	72–155

INTELLIGENCE OF 11–13 YEAR OLD CHILDREN AND THE OCCUPATION OF MALE PARENT

(Data from the Study of Hector MacDonald on the Isle of Wight)

Occupational Class	*No. of Cases*	*Average Intelligence Quotient*
Managers	21	108.7
Professional	8	106.6
Higher Commercial	83	103.3
Foremen	17	103.1
Engineers	111	100.8
Shopkeepers	224	100.7
Army, Navy, Police and Postmen	141	99.9
Metal Workers (incl. Ship-builders)	123	99.3
Building Trades	207	99.1
Miscellaneous Industries	201	99.1
Miners and Quarrymen	6	97.9
Seamen and Boatmen	60	97.4
Agriculture (all classes)	277	96.7
Laborers and Low Grade	328	96.0

INTELLIGENCE OF 11–13 YEAR OLD CHILDREN OF AGRICULTURISTS BY TYPE OF OCCUPATION OF PARENT

(Data from the Study of Hector MacDonald on the Isle of Wight)

Occupational Class	*No. of Cases*	*Average Intelligence Quotient*
1. Farm Foremen and Bailiffs	4	108.8
2. Dairy Farmers	27	101.3
3. Gardeners	90	99.3
4. Groundmen	9	98.3
5. Farmers (general)	41	98.2
6. Shepherds	10	95.5
7. Coachmen and Grooms	8	93.8
8. Farm Laborers and Carters	83	93.8
9. Cowmen	16	92.8
10. Estate Workers	7	89.6
11. Estate Workers (unemployed)	15	88.8

However, they do not answer the criticism that the size and efficiency of the schools vary as well as the constituency of the population. Neither do they answer the objection that differences in the bias of the tests, the use of work symbols and general differences in cultural behavior are a limiting factor in ability to answer the tests, as these tests are always made by urban people. But the criticisms that comparisons of all urban and all rural people are meaningless and that the organic whole of society is cut into non-competitive and hence non-comparable groups, are satisfied. The final conclusion is that if these tests measure native ability, instead of school environment and differences in cultural behavior and common word symbols, we have a real measure of the relative intelligence of farmers—about that of the upper groups of semi-skilled labor. If this fact were settled we could of course state that net migrants from agriculture who rise above semi-skilled laborers are destructive to the native ability of the farm class, and those who end up in common labor are improving it. Migrants of the ability of the semi-skilled laborers would have no effect of a qualitative nature. But the probable truth of the matter is that the tests do measure some differences in school environment and in the use of word symbols, in which cases the net result is that they lower the real rating of farmers. This, of course, lowers the chance of harmful migrations to cities.

In addition to the occupational tests already discussed, there is another group which represents the results of tests given to college students preparing for the different occupations. *The only common characteristic in the results of these studies is that colleges of agriculture have ratings below the medians for the universities at large.* Even if we grant that these data are valid and that these are real native differences, they do not prove anything concerning the native ability of farmers as a class, because many of the students in other schools are sons of farmers, some of those in the colleges of agriculture are sons of other occupations and many in the colleges of agriculture never return to the farm, either as bona fide farmers or as agricultural leaders. Further, we know nothing of relative types of selectivity of colleges upon the different groups. The same criticisms of cultural differences and bias of tests also apply to these studies. While this is not conclusive data, it is submitted as a part of that large body of material which is often cited as proof that the brighter farm children have or are migrating from the farm.[17]

[17] Noble, Ellis L., and Arp, George F., "University Students' Intellectual Ratings According to the Army Alpha Tests," *School and Society*, Feb., 1920, Vol. 11, pp. 233–237; Hill, D. S., "Results of Intelligence Tests at the University of Illinois," *School and Society*, Vol. 9, pp. 542–545; Roberts, George L., and Brandenburg, G. C., "The Army Intelligence Tests at Purdue University," *School and Society*, Vol. 10, pp. 776–779; Kuenzie, Myra A., and Toops, H. A., "The Relative Stability of Intellectual Levels in Colleges," *School and Society*, Vol. 22, pp. 176–184.

Retardation and Acceleration in Schools. Another rural and urban comparison often made, and used as data for comparative intelligence, is the amount of retardation and acceleration in rural, village and city schools. Here, another group of studies may be analyzed in the same way as previous ones.[18] All these studies agree that the rate of retardation is higher for the rural schools and the rate of acceleration is higher for the urban. The same relationships are to be noticed in these studies as in the other comparisons; the village schools have a better record than the open-country schools and cities and towns exceed the villages. The only exception is to be found in the data presented by G. W. Gayler for Illinois, which finds actual retardation higher in the graded schools, but excessive retardation higher in the ungraded "rural" schools.

Do these studies prove anything concerning comparative intelligence? It is doubtful. All the criticisms that have been leveled against the other comparisons of intelligence apply with even greater force to these. In addition, we have these further criticisms of this type of comparison. Country children are kept from school more than urban due to weather, need for help at home during the busy seasons, and other reasons. Country schools have shorter terms. Rural teaching equipment and teaching methods are poorer. The better teachers, as a rule, are to be found in town. Country people are often less interested in book learning, especially if it does not have an extremely practical appeal. As a result of these factors, we may conclude that *these data may only be accepted as highly questionable proof as to differences in native ability of rural and urban people.*

Data as to Persistence in School and Mobility up the Educational Ladder. Still another summary presents data from studies

[18] U. S. Bureau of Education, *The Educational System of South Dakota*, Bul. 1918, No. 31, pp. 46, 163; Odell, C. W., *Elementary School Journal*, 1923, Vol. 24, pp. 755–765; Oklahoma Education Survey Commission, *Report of a Study of Education in Oklahoma*, 1922, pp. 213 ff.; Goddard, H. H., "Two Thousand Normal Children Measured by the Binet Measuring Scale of Intelligence," *Pedogogical Seminary*, 1911, Vol. 18, pp. 253–259; Gayler, G. W., "Retardation and Elimination in Graded and Rural Schools," *Psychological Clinic*, 1910–1911, Vol. 4, pp. 40–45; Kelly, F. J., and Loomis, A. K., "Retardation in One Room Rural Schools in Kansas," *Journal of Educational Research*, 1920, Vol. 1, pp. 271–284; Gordon, George B., *A Study of Intelligence Differences of Rural and City High School Children on the Basis of the Army Alpha Tests*, master's thesis (unpublished), Ohio State University, 1924; Koch, Helen L., and Simmons, Rietta, "A Study of the Test Performance of American, Mexican, and Negro Children," *Psychological Monographs*, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, Whole No. 166; Burdge, Howard G., *Our Boys*, A study of 245,000 16–18 year old employed boys of the state of New York, New York military training commission, Bureau of Vocational Training, 1921; Adams, Frederick Joseph, *An Intelligence Survey of a Rural School System*, master's thesis (unpublished), University of California, 1922; Madsen, I. N., *School and Society*, Vol. 13, pp. 668–671; Wahlquist, J.T., *Elementary School Journal*, 1926–1927, Vol. 27, pp. 682, ff-i, and *Survey of Education in Utah*, U. S. Bureau of Education, Bulletin, No. 18, 1926.

of the comparative persistence in school and mobility up the educational ladder of rural and urban children.[19] What do these data show? They show first of all that *farm children progress less rapidly through the elementary schools than non-farming children.* The rural children take a longer time to go through a less number of grades than the urban children.

The study by H. G. Burdge shows that it took New York farm boys until the average age of 15.8 to complete 7.7 years of school whereas New York City boys finished 8.3 years by the average age of 15.5. Furthermore, the average per cent of one grade completed each year was less for farm boys.

These data show that farm boys persist more in school than urban boys. Further, the Utah study shows that, relative to I. Q.'s they make more progress than urban children. A less per cent leave illegally. A larger per cent leave at the legal age. A larger per cent remain one or two years and a less per cent remain three years past legal age. With minor variations these general conclusions hold.

A smaller per cent of farm boys actually dislike school than urban boys. They give as reasons for leaving "wish to work," "financial necessity" or such items as "sickness in the family" more often than urban boys.

Farmers in the United States furnish a greater proportion of high school students than they comprise of the total population. This same conclusion applies to high school seniors. In this respect farmers are to be classified with the upper rather than the lower groups in society. The following conclusion seems evident. Laborers (skilled and unskilled) contribute a less percentage of high school students and seniors than they comprise of the total of the population, whereas, all other groups including farmers contribute a greater per cent.

[19] Windes, E. E., *High School Education of the Farm Population of the United States,* U. S. Bureau of Education, Bulletin 1925, No. 6; Ramsey, E. E., in Indiana University Extension Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 10, Sept., 1914—*Proceedings of a Conference on Educational Measurements;* Counts, G. S., *Selective Character of American Secondary Education,* Sup. Ed. Monograph, No. 19, University of Chicago Press, 1922; Sears, J. B., Proctor, Wm., and Williams, J. H., *Boise School Survey* (further reference lost); Burdge, H. G., *Our Boys,* New York Military Training Commission, Bureau of Vocational Training, 1921; Sorokin, P. A., and Zimmerman, C. C., et al., "Farmer Leaders of the United States of America," *Social Forces,* 1928; Book, William F., *Intelligence of High School Seniors;* Colvin, Stephen S., and Macphail, Andrew H., *Intelligence of Seniors in the High Schools of Massachusetts,* U. S. Bureau of Education, 1924, Bulletin No. 9; Smith, H. L., *A Survey of a Public School System,* Columbia University contributions to education, No. 82, 1917, T. C. Series. Summarizes data for Clifford Woody, pp. 214–215; Oklahoma Educational Survey Commission, *Public Education in Oklahoma,* Washington, 1922; Murphy, C. R., *School Board Journal,* Feb., 1916. Quoted from U. S. Bureau of Education, Bul. 1925, No. 6, p. 17; Garnett, W. E., *Virginia Agr. Exp. Sta., Bul. No. 256,* 1926, pp. 45 ff.; Bear, Robert M., "Factors in Achievement of College Freshmen," *School and Society,* Vol. 24, 1926, pp. 802 ff.; Wahlquist, John T., *Elementary School Journal,* 1926-1927, Vol. 27, pp. 682–684; see also U. S. Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 18, 1926, *op. cit.*

In other countries, however, this situation seems to be different. For instance, in Soviet Russia, at the present moment, the proportion of the peasants in elementary, as well as in high schools and colleges especially, is many times lower than that of the city classes.

Farm children move through high school and college, at least more rapidly than the laboring population. In spite of early handicaps and a presumed lack of ability, they seem to achieve this barrier more frequently and more rapidly. We do not know whether this is by harder work or by more rapid development with an improved environment (which is equal to that of the urban populations).

Besides the above American data, the data of Soviet Russia are particularly important in this respect. It is well known that the Soviet government by all means facilitates the school education of the city laboring class at the cost of other classes, including peasantry. This facilitation goes so far that juridically all the vacancies in High Schools and Universities are reserved for the students of the urban labor class; only in cases where all the places in the schools are not filled by the students from the labor class are the students from the peasant and other social classes permitted to enter High Schools and Universities. In spite of such protection of the labor class of the cities the factual situation for the last three years has been such that an enormous per cent of the vacancies could not be filled by labor class students; that an enormous per cent of the aspirants from this class failed at the entrance examination; that in Moscow and Petrograd their per cent has declined from year to year in the schools, in spite of the governmental protection; and finally, that as we pass from the first grades of the schools to the higher grades their per cent systematically declines because "they quit the schools before graduation and, in enormous proportions owing to failure, remain in the same grades for two and three years." The following figures published by *Pravda*, official organ of the Communist Party, give some idea of that. In Kostromia in six colleges in 1927 the students from the urban labor class composed 18.7 and from the peasant class 3.6 per cent of all students. Among the graduating seniors of two of these colleges in 1928 only 7 and 12 per cent were from the labor and 32 and 15 per cent from the peasant class; that is, as we pass from the freshmen to the seniors, a greater and greater part of the labor class students are eliminated mostly by failure while the proportion of the peasant students increases. In the Petrograd schools, in 1927, the labor class pupils composed 50 per cent of all pupils in the first grade, 47 in the second, 44 in the third, 41 in the fourth, 36 in the fifth, 32 in the sixth, 27 in the seventh, 24 in the eighth, and 22 in the ninth. These and some similar data are in complete agreement with the above

American data and still more conspicuously stress that, in spite of obstacles put by the Soviet government, the peasant students move quicker and more successfully through High Schools and Colleges in Russia than the students from the labor class. Perhaps it is due to a more severe selection of these peasant students, but even granting this, the point claimed is in agreement with the data and interpretation. As we shall see further, the conclusion is also supported by the data of the proportion of the prominent men in Russia from the peasant and urban labor class. This conclusion makes the case still stronger *that intelligence tests underrate the average ability of the farm population in comparison with the urban classes.*

Several studies of the intelligence of whites and negroes have shown us that at the early years negro children make progress as rapidly, or even more so, than the whites; but after some time, while their progress stops, the whites continue to progress. We have a slow mental advance of the whites at an early age, and quicker and greater later. Similar results are obtained in the study of the children of lower and higher castes in India.[20] There may be a somewhat similar phenomenon in the school progress of farm children: at early ages (elementary schools) they are slow, but later on (in high schools), they move quicker, in spite of a less rigid selection of the farm boys. This is more so as the number of talented men also is greater from the farms than from the city laboring classes. (See later analysis.)

Rural-Urban Specific Types of Intelligence, Based upon Achievement in Various School Subjects. A number of theories exist concerning the mental types selected by urbanization. Not all of these theories are backed by data; those which consist of mere statements without verification may be neglected as purely speculative.[21] But there are others based upon some concrete facts. The first of these we will mention are those of Ellsworth Huntington, R. H. Holmes, and F. Giese.[22] Their conclusions are based upon an analysis of the types of leaders found in rural districts and the types of leaders (as listed in *Who's Who in America* and in *Wer ist's* in Germany) born in rural or urban districts. In essential respects the data follows on page 248:

[20] See Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 300 ff., for data and references.

[21] See Groves, Ernest, "Psychic Causes of Rural Migration," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1915–1916, Vol. 21, pp. 623–627, for one of these theories.

[22] Given in *Scribner's Magazine*, LXXX, September, 1926, pp. 316–324. See also the same material in *The Pulse of Progress*, Chapter 4; Giese, F., *Die öffentliche Persönlichkeit*, Beiheft 44 zur *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, 1928, p. 72; Holmes, R. H., "A Study of the Origins of Distinguished Living Americans," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 670–686.

Types of Leaders Listed In Who's Who	*Per Cents Living in the Rural Population*	*Per Cents Born In—*			
		Rural Districts		*Large Cities*	
		America	*Germany*	*America*	*Germany* *
Agriculture	20	74	75.	0	6.2
Education	11	66	68.2	13	5.5
Religion	8	62	72.6	16	5.3
Science	6	59½	35.1–45.7	22	9.9–14.3
Philanthropy	9	59	—	18	—
Government	15	56	48.4	24	6.9
Medicine	3	48	45.1	33	14.3
Journalism	6	47½	41.2	32	16.3
Law	3	46½	44.7	30	9.9
Literature	9	44	35.5	36	22.1
Music	5	41	35.5	39	35.5–22.1
Engineering	4	40	30–42.1	36½	18–10
Business	5	36	34.7–69.2	40	2.9–6.9
Art	8	31	34.2	53	14.5–25.3

* Cities of 100,000 and more.

On the basis of these data, Huntington [23] reaches the following conclusions. "The most obvious fact is that the rural districts produce people who achieve eminence in one set of occupations and the large cities in quite another, while the intermediate places produce a well-balanced set of men who enter all sorts of occupations. This suggests that the sifting power of large cities is bad for rural districts and large cities, but good for the small cities" (p. 322). Later he raises the question as to whether these differences in types of leaders (compare the upper and lower groups in the previous table) produced by rural and urban districts are due to environmental determination or to the selection and inheritance of specific abilities by members of the urban populations. He reaches the conclusion that environment and heredity are both factors which must be considered. The

[23] More complete data of R. H. Holmes about the leaders of *Who's Who* give the following results (*op. cit.*, p. 683):

Occupation	*Per Cent of Urban Born*
Art	59
Business	46
Journalism	44
Engineering	43
Law	42
Medicine	41
Science	32
Army and Navy	30
Church	27
Politics	25
Education	24
Agriculture	9

cities attract men with special talents in music, engineering, business and art. Their children inherit the abilities of their fathers to a greater extent than any other special abilities. As a result, ruralization and urbanization are selective of specific mental types as well as of greater proportions of those with exceptional ability (attracted by the cities).

The next study dealing with the selection of specific mental types by migration is that of Hornell Hart.[24] His first conclusion was that migration, especially among pioneer stock in the settlement of America, produced an unusually large number of lawyers and journalists (2½ times as frequent) (p. 57). "In the case of the migration to the city, therefore, it seems clear that a selection parallel to that operating on the pioneer is in force" (p. 80). "Attractive selection lures the adventurous, action-loving, energetic, potentially, distinguished youth with promises of ardent life, fame and fortune" (p. 80). Proofs of this are from historical statements, opinions of psychologists and some data from *Who's Who.*

Numerous studies have been made of the achievements of rural and urban children upon various school subjects such as reading, writing, arithmetic, etc. It is possible to believe, that if urbanization had been carrying people with special kinds of talents from the rural to the urban districts, these results ought to be registered in the achievements in the different types of school subjects. In this kind of a study, the fact of lower rural ratings on all school subjects will not interfere with the analysis, because if urbanization has been draining off persons with special talents, the results, if they are registered in achievement in various school subjects, will vary according to the special talents migrating to the cities and the others staying on or returning to the farm communities.

The following analysis presents a number of such studies. The results of 11 original studies are given, 4 of which cover the school systems of entire states, Virginia, New York, Oklahoma, and Kentucky. In addition, the conclusions from a study by Norman Frost are presented. The data of Frost cover 28 studies of a similar nature but not reported otherwise here. Altogether, there are 39 original studies, covering more than a hundred thousand school children. What do these tell us concerning comparative and specific phases of rural-urban intelligence?

Summary and Analysis. Frost presents the following conclusions after summarizing 28 studies: [25]

[24] University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare, *Selective Migration*, Vol. i, No. 7, pp. 56 ff.

[25] *A Comparative Study of Achievement in Town-Country Schools*, Ph. D. thesis, Columbia University, 1921, pp. 14 ff.

"The studies reported include two studies of composition work; both of these favor the urban school. There are 6 studies of handwriting reported, and of these 3 favor the urban school, 2 show negligible differences, and 1 favors the rural school. Nine studies of arithmetic were reported, and 8 of these favor the urban school while 1 favors the rural school. Four studies of reading are reported, and all of them favor the urban school. Seven studies of spelling are reported, 3 of which favor the urban school and four of which find negligible differences. In all, 28 studies are reported, of which 20 find the results better in urban schools, 6 find negligible differences, and 2 find results superior in the rural schools."

From the complete study [26] of all the researches we may draw the following conclusions. All studies give unanimous results which show the rural are behind the urban in all subjects other than arithmetic, handwriting, and spelling, German, physical geography, and physics (one only).

The majority of the studies show the rural are behind the urban for these above exceptions especially in arithmetic, handwriting, and spelling. Undoubtedly these exceptions are individual variations due to better standardization of teaching methods for these subjects; we may conclude that, as far as *these data* go, no evidence is presented concerning differences in mental make-up of rural and urban people.

The fact that arithmetic, writing, and spelling are the most thoroughly standardized of subjects taught in elementary schools, and that, in a few schools, rural children surpass the urban in these subjects, is evidence which leads us to doubt if these differences in school achievement are valid indices of differences of native ability between rural and urban children. The problem of multiple causation

[26] Wood, Ernest R., "Tests of Efficiency in Arithmetic: A Comparison of the Results Obtained in the Rural Schools of Santa Clara County, California, and Results Obtained in a County in Southeastern Ohio," *Elementary School Journal*, Feb., 1917, Vol. XVII, pp. 446–453; Heckert, W. J., "The Cleveland Survey Tests in Arithmetic in the Miami Valley," *Elementary School Journal*, Feb., 1918, Vol. XVIII, 447–457; Chapman, J. Crosby, and Eby, H. L., "A Comparative Study by Educational Measurements of One Room Rural School Children and City School Children," *Journal of Educational Research*, 1920, Vol. 2, pp. 636–646; Frost, Norman N., *A Comparative Study of Achievement in Town and Country Schools*, 1921, Ph. D. thesis, Columbia University; Brandenburg, G. C., "The Quality of Freshmen Composition," *School and Society*, Vol. XIV, No. 364, Dec. 17, 1921, pp. 579–584; *Virginia Public School Survey*, Part I, Chapter VI, "Results of Instruction Measured"; Haggerty, M. E., in *Rural School Survey of New York State*, Vol. 6, Educational Achievement; General Education Board, *Public Education in Kentucky;* Iowa Bureau of Educational Research, Private Report furnished by H. A. Greene, Director; Woody, Clifford, in "A Survey of a Public School System," *Teachers College Contributions to Education*, No. 82, by Smith, H. S., 1917, pp. 208 ff.; Darsie, Marvin L., "The Mental Capacity of American Born Japanese Children," *Psychological Monographs*, 1925, 26, Vol. 3, pp. 68 ff.; Madsen, I. N., "Some Results from a Testing Program in Idaho," *School and Society*, Vol. XIII, No. 337, pp. 668–671,

presents itself again. Are differences in school achievement between rural and urban children due to differences in the social composition of the population or to differences in the efficiency of the schools? [27]

The differences may also be due partly to the fact that these subjects, especially physical geography and physics, are objects more of direct experience than many other school subjects. The relatively greater orientation of farmers into direct experience, compared with their amount of indirect experience (see Chapter XIII), may affect their ratings on these subjects.

These data conflict with the previous conclusions of both Huntington and Hart. According to Huntington, the engineering and business types are relatively more prevalent in the cities. Yet, the few exceptions to the standard rural-urban differential in school subjects, show greater achievement by the rural districts in mathematics, physical geography, and physics, which certainly ought to be easy for the "engineering" and "business" types. Neither does this bear out Hart's theory that the action-loving and energetic have gone to the cities. This practical, action-loving man ought to be as well equipped in arithmetic as in many of the other school subjects. Let us note also that the data for Germany, based on a study of 10,034 notables of German *Who's Who* do not agree with the data and the contentions of Huntington and Hart. Even the data of Holmes are considerably different from those of Huntington.

All these considerations bring us to one or the other of two conclusions. Either achievement in various school subjects do not register the specific mental abilities of the two populations; or there has been no differential selection of one special mental type of ability to the exclusion of all others by either cities or rural districts. This does not prove that cities have or have not selected those with greater proportions of general ability than those remaining on the farms; it means that we have no evidence of the selection of specific mental types.

Comparisons of Rural-Urban Intelligence Based upon Data as to the Origin of Distinguished Persons. This type of comparison has been especially popular during the 20th century. In the following the results of a number of such studies are catalogued and compared. These studies include most of the intelligentzia of England, France, Germany, and America since the year 1000 A. D. In addition, there are some data for other European countries, including Russia and Italy, as well as a study of all the distinguished women of history.

[27] Taylor, E. H., found that changes in the teaching methods eliminated some of the differences between urban and rural schools. See *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1914, Vol. 5, pp. 461–466. The Iowa study found that consolidated schools often exceeded the urban.

Surely this vast array of data[28] should be conclusive as to the comparative intelligence of farmers and other groups and as to changes taking place due to selection.

Summary and Analysis. The data may be divided into two classes, blanket rural-urban comparisons and those differentiating the social classes such as farmers, laborers, artisans, and upper classes. Summarizing the blanket comparisons first, we make the following conclusions:

a. The urban populations appear to produce eminent men to a greater extent than rural populations. However, this result is received without standardization of the age-groups of the rural and urban populations. Since the rural population has a higher per cent of the younger persons, this artificially lowers its rate of great men produced. If such a standardization by age is made or the quota is

[28] See studies based upon origins of distinguished persons: Sorokin, P. A., and Zimmerman, C., with Adams, I. G., Behrens, W. O., Duncan, O. D., Dvorocek, Dan., Fred C. Frey, and Lott, E. H., "Farmer Leaders in the United States of America," *Social Forces*, Sept., 1928. See Lott, E. H., unpublished master's thesis, Minnesota, 1929, *Some Aspects of Rural-Urban Migration in Montana;* Odin, Alfred, *Genese des Grands Hommes gens de Lettres Français Moderne;* Ward, Lester F., *Applied Sociology*, pp. 135–233; Yoder, A. H., "The Study of the Boyhood of Great Men," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1894, Vol. III, pp. 134–156; Davies, George R., "A Statistical Study of the Influence of Environment," *The Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota*, 1913–1914, Vol. IV, pp. 212–236; Nearing, Scott, "The Geographical Distribution of Genius," *Popular Science Monthly*, 1914, Vol. 85, pp. 189–199; Lombroso, *Cesare, the Man of Genius*, Chap. V of Part II; Jacoby, Paul, *Études sur la Selection Chez l'homme*, Second Edition, pp. 542 ff.; Huntington, Ellsworth, "The Sifting Power of Cities," *Scribner's Magazine*, September, 1926, Vol. LXXX, pp. 516–524; *The Pulse of Progress*, Chapters 1–5; White, R. Clyde, "The Cityward Drift of Population in Relation to Social Efficiency," *Journal of Social Forces*, November, 1923, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 17–23; Spillman, W. J., *Science N. S.* Vol. XXX, pp. 405–407; Woods, F. A., "Birthplaces of Leading Americans and the Question of Heredity," *Science N. S.*, Vol. 30, pp. 17–21; Giese, F., *op. cit.*, pp. 72–78; Holmes, R. H., *op. cit.;* Sorokin, P. A., with Hanna, Guy, and Israel, Celia, McKibben, L. L., Parten, Mildred, Rotnem, M. B., Tanquist, Mamie, and Eddy, E. N., "Leaders of Labor and Radical Movements in the United States and Foreign Countries," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1927, pp. 382 ff.; Cattell, J. McKeen and Brimball, Dean R., *American Men of Science*, third edition, 1921; second edition, 1920; Sorokin, P., "American Millionaires and Multi-Millionaires," *Journal of Social Forces*, May, 1925, Vol. III, No. 4, pp. 627–640; Visher, Stephen S., "A Study of the Place of Birth and of the Occupation of Fathers of Subjects of Sketches of 'Who's Who in America,'" *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1925, Vol. XXX, No. 5, pp. 551 ff.; Cooley, Chas. H., "Genius, Fame and the Comparison of Races," *Annals of the American Academy*, May, 1897, Vol. IX, pp. 15 ff.; Candolle, Alphonse de, *Historie des Sciences et des Savants Depuis deux Siecles*, second edition; Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, Chapter XII; Fritz, Maas, "Ueber die Herkunftsbedingungen der Geistigen fuhrer," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozial politik*, Sept., 1915, Vol. 41, pp. 141–186; Clarke, E. L., *American Men of Letters*, Columbia University Studies, 1916, Vol. LXXII, pp. 74–76; Castle, Cora S., *A Statistical Study of Eminent Women*, Columbia University contributions to philosophy, and psychology, August, 1913, Vol. XXII, No. 1; Galton, Francis, *Englishmen of Science*, Popular Science Library; Ellis, Havelock, *A Study of British Genius;* Woods, F. A., "The Conification of Social Groups," *Eugenics, Genetics, and the Family*, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 312–328; Maclean, *British Men of Ability of the 19th Century*, quoted from Ellis, Havelock, *A Study of British Genius.* Original not located.

computed per 1,000 occupational population, the quota of the city would decrease and the country would increase. Giese's computation shows that in such a case the quota of the large cities may be below that of the country.

b. Rural populations furnish farm leaders to a greater extent than urban populations.

c. There is no absolute correlation between urbanization and the eminence of the population. Small towns often exceed large cities, especially if the small towns are located near the large cities. This trend was noted before the development of the present residential suburbs whose residents commute to the larger cities.

From the comparisons based upon the occupation of the parent, the following conclusions may be drawn:

d. Farmers do not produce as many of the eminent persons relatively as do the upper classes (nobility, big business, and professional groups). On the other hand, farmers have shown a greater productivity than common and semi-skilled laborers in every case and rank below artisans in only a few countries where the so-called landed gentry, or upper class farmers, have been included with the upper classes and not with the peasants or farmers.

e. Judged by their productivity of great men, farmers rank considerably higher than on the occupational and psychological tests.

f. These studies are all based upon one generation. To that extent they are unfair to rural people and to farmers because they compare social climbing of farmers with city classes without any allowance for the handicap which farmers must undergo in making the transition from rural to urban as well as the vertical transition. In order to rise vertically, a farm child must change horizontally as well.

g. These studies considerably discredit the results of the psychological tests of rural and urban peoples because they give a great deal more evidence that these tests underrate the actual ability of the rural people. If these studies of origin of eminent persons are also unfair to farmers on account of being based only on one generation, as has been indicated above, then the results of the psychological tests are more fully discredited.

h. Historically speaking, the proportion contributed by farmers is maintaining itself or even increasing while those from laborers and the cities generally appears to be decreasing. This would appear to indicate that, if these studies are representative, social selection is draining the ranks of laborers more than those of farmers. In other words, farmers have been able to reproduce and maintain their native ability to a greater extent than most of the other manual laboring classes.

i. Farmers' sons appear to rise to eminence through channels that are relatively different from those of other social groups. That is, it is easier for farmers' sons to rise in some channels than in others. Some of these are, Labor and radical leaders; Political leaders in democracies; Scientific and intellectual leaders. Some of the channels through which it is hard for farmers to climb are business; military; and state and political channels in monarchies. Data as to artistic and theological channels conflict.

Rural-Urban Intelligence Based upon the Origin of Less Distinguished Persons. We have already noted some differences in the social origins of greater leaders compared with smaller leaders. Spillman found 88 per cent of governors, presidents, and cabinet officers in the United States were rural born, whereas 77 per cent of the members of the United States Senate, 64 per cent of Congressmen, and 55 per cent of Railway Presidents were of such origin. Sorokin, in his study of labor leaders, found that farmers furnished 20.9 per cent of the highest class but only 9.4 per cent of all leaders. Sorokin found also that of 120 members of the Cabinets of the United States Government since the beginning of the nineteenth century, 13 were farmers' sons, while only one came from an urban labor family (weaver). The rest were from the urban upper and middle classes. Of 161 most prominent men of medicine in America, 41 were farmers' sons and the rest came from the professions. Philiptschenko's data conflict. Farmers furnished 7.9 per cent of the present Russian scientists, 9.6 per cent of the present literati, 6 per cent of the greatest contemporary scientists, and 14.1 per cent of the greatest scientists for the previous 80 years. Cattel's data show that rural districts furnished a larger per cent of the American scientists of low distinction than those of high distinction. These studies about balance each other in that they conflict.

Several studies have been made of a still lower class of leaders. L. D. Coffman made a random sample of 4,500 school teachers in the secondary schools of the United States in 1910.[29] He found that farm children furnished 69.7 per cent of the male teachers and 44.8 per cent of the females. Agriculture furnished twice as many male teachers and two and a half times as many female teachers as it did to the gainfully employed for the appropriate occupational census. In 1917, Coffman repeated his study, at which time he secured data as to the origin of 4,395 secondary school teachers in Illinois.[30] In this study he found that 30.5 per cent were children of farmers, 20.5 of artisans, 17.4 of business men, and 3.4 of unskilled laborers. The parents of 30.6 per cent resided in the country, 18.1 per cent in towns,

[29] Coffman, L. D., *The Social Composition of the Teaching Population.*
[30] Coffman, L. D., *The Illinois School Survey*, pp. 28 ff.

and 44.5 per cent in cities. Since 55.3 per cent of the population of the state resided in the open country, or villages less than 2,500, at the time of the 1890 census, it appears that this second study conflicts with the results of the first. In the Oklahoma school survey a similar study was made. This included the occupational groups of origin of 4,754 teachers in towns of 200 or more of that state. The results showed that 1,682 or 35 per cent were from farm homes. In 1920 50.2 per cent of the population were on farms and in 1900, 92.6 per cent of the population were classed as rural. These results agree with those from Illinois.[31] Kelly made a study of the origin of theological students in America and claimed that the farms furnished a larger percentage than they did of the total population. This information would seem to show that farmers' sons rose more readily in the ministry. This result is in partial agreement with the study of Maas, which shows that farmers rise more readily as theologians than many other classes in society although the proletariat rose still more readily through this channel.[32]

Although, theoretically, it is possible to believe that farmers would rise slowly to any social position, on account of the joint horizontal and vertical transition they must make in rising, these data do not appear to substantiate such a theory. If it were so, a comparison of the origin of less distinguished leaders based on the occupation or geographic location of their fathers would always show that the lower groups had more farm children than the upper groups. However, these data are so conflicting, that this one point will have to remain unsettled as yet.

Rural-Urban Intelligence Based upon Data as to the Origin of Children of Exceptional Ability. Four studies of exceptionally bright children give data as to the rural-urban origin of the children. The Almacks took the brightest children in the six grades of the schools of the city of Eugene, Oregon, in 1920. Of the 50 gifted children found, farmers furnished 13, common labor 1, skilled trades 22, merchants 7 and professions 8. Since no data are given as to the relative percentages of these classes in the schools, or in the city and surrounding country trade area, we cannot evaluate these figures. However, it is apparent that farmers did considerably better than common and skilled labor considering the fact that it was a town study.[33] L. M. Terman found the birthplaces of the parents and grandparents of the

[31] See *Public Education in Oklahoma*, quoted.

[32] See Kelly, *Theological Education in America*. See also Maas, Fritz, *Über die Herkunftsbedingungen, op. cit.* Of the whole group of leaders, 11.4 per cent were theologians. Of the leaders furnished by the lower middle class, 11.9 per cent were theologians; by the skilled trades, 12.7; by the Bauern, 20.4 per cent; and by the proletariat, 25 per cent.

[33] See John C. and James Almack, "Gifted Pupils in the High School," *School and Society*, 1914, Vol. 14, No. 352, pp. 227–228.

California children of genius included in his studies. The grandparents were rural born in 28.8 per cent of the cases and the parents in 26.6 per cent. The skilled labor group, including farmers, furnished 11.8 per cent, the semi-skilled 6.6 per cent, and common labor 0.13 per cent. This group of superior children were found mainly in the high schools of the cities of California.[34] E. E. Jones made a study of the 116 most distinguished high-school pupils in Illinois in 1916–1917. One was taken from each high school. It was found that 94 lived in town and only 23 in the country. Farm children furnished 31 (20 girls and 11 boys). Day laborers only furnished 2 and skilled labor 9. Since 46 per cent of the population was in villages less than 2,500 or the open country in 1900, it is apparent that the country was behind. However, the comparison with the wage earners in towns (Illinois is an industrial state) shows that this difference is not because of the wage earners, whose quota is much poorer than that of the farmers, but rather of the upper classes. Deich and Jones made a second study of similar nature for Iowa distinguished high-school seniors in about 1921. Of the 316 children, 172 or more than 54 per cent were of farmers. Those living in the country were 217 and in town 95. Day laborers only furnished 10. In 1900, 74.4 per cent of the population of Iowa was rural, but we have no means of separating the villages from the open country. About 70 per cent of the children were born in the open country, so the showing of the rural people was better in Iowa than in Illinois. Here again the laborers in towns made a poor showing.[35]

A summary of these studies adds strength to the conclusions drawn in the section devoted to the rural or urban origin of distinguished men. Further weight is added to the conclusion that *the wage earning classes in towns seem to be drained considerably drier of leadership than the farmer-peasant class.*

Comparisons of the Variability of Rural and Urban Intelligence. Thus far we have approached comparisons of intelligence entirely from the positions of the means or averages. There are other measures of intelligence which are of great importance—measures of variability or the closeness of the distributions about the means for the various rural and urban groups. We have already shown the greater varability of urban populations in previous sections of this work. If we consider rural populations as one occupational group with one mode and urban populations as a number of such groups with many modes, it is readily apparent that the urban are more variable. This is evidence for the theory that the extremes are found in the

[34] See Terman, L. M., *Genetic Studies of Genius*, Vol. 1.

[35] See Jones, E. E., *The Illinois School Survey, op. cit.*, pp. 238–276, and Deich, Chas., and Jones, E. E., "A Study of Distinguished High School Pupils in Iowa," *U. S. Bureau of Education, Bulletin 1923*, No. 46.

cities and the mean or average types are in the country. Some of the studies of intelligence already reported give data as to variability. What do these show?

Haggerty and Nash give the semi-interquartile range [36] for the various groups included in their New York study. A summary is presented in the following table:

COMPARISONS OF THE VARIABILITY OF URBAN AND RURAL INTELLIGENCE BASED ON THE DATA OF HAGGERTY AND NASH IN NEW YORK

Occupational Group	*Common School*		*High School*	
	Median	*Semi-Interquartile Range*	*Median*	*Semi-Interquartile Range*
Professional	116	12.6	121	9.2
Business and Clerical	107	13.5	112	12.2
Skilled Labor	98	11.8	108	13.8
Semi-Skilled Labor	95	11.7	108	9.5
Farmers	91	10.5	106	11.0
Unskilled Labor	89	12.5	111	9.5

The results are that in the common school groups, which are most representative, farmers are less variable than any of the social groups found in urban life. A composite measure of variability for the whole urban group would of course exaggerate this rural-urban difference in variability. In the high-school groups the classes of unskilled and skilled laborers and the professionals are less variable than farmers. The variability of the farm children who attend high school appears larger than the average of the common school children whose fathers are farmers. This study covered an area settled by a comparatively homogenous rural group whereas the cities are fairly representative of the heterogeneous industrial east. It suggests the theory, already stated, that high school and educational *selectivity among all urban groups is more "selective" and stringent than among farmers.* The semi-interquartile ranges for all urban groups decline in passing from common to high schools, whereas that for farmers increases. Are these results borne out by other studies?

Dashwell and Glenn found in North Carolina that the average deviation of the country children was 4.5, the village children 5.0, and the University faculty children was 6.5. Koch and Simmons found in Texas that the rural whites showed a larger sigma in every grade than did the city whites. The same was true for the rural

[36] The semi-interquartile range is $\left(\frac{Q1-Q3}{2}\right)$. It is the average distance from the median to the range lines on each side which include the middle 50 per cent of the distribution.

Mexican group in comparison with the city Mexican group.[37] McCracken found in Ohio that the children in Bellefontaine had a more uniform distribution than the rural children. However, his analysis of variation is not quite clear and he uses the range as a measure. The range is only a rough measure at the most. Nelson and Windes found in their study of high-school pupils in the state of Washington that the pupils from the town of about 4,000 had slightly less variation than the farm pupils.[38] Duff and Thompson give data as to the number of pupils in groups based on a scale formed from the distribution of the whole group. An attempt to analyze this data and use as the index of variation the percentages for the occupational groups that have I. Q.'s between 90 and 109 merely tells us that the lower classes are skewed on one side of the general mean and the upper classes on the other. The same may be said for MacDonald's study on the Isle of Wight and for the Surgeon General's study of drafted soldiers during the war. However, one of the studies made by the psychological examining corps during the war gives data for the positions of the quartiles so that an index of variation may be computed.[39] From this list of occupations farmers had a semi-interquartile range of 21.6. Then 23 city occupations were chosen by taking all four of the lower groups listed—laborers, general miners, teamsters, and barbers. For the rest of the occupations every other one was taken. These give a fair sample for comparison. The following were secured. Nine of the occupations had less variation than farmers and these were located mainly in the lower city groups. Barbers were the only one of the four lowest groups that varied more than farmers and the difference was only as 21.6 to 22.2. The upper groups which varied less than farmers were plumbers 21.5, gunsmiths 18.5, and accountants 19.0. As a whole cities varied more than farmers but specific groups in cities varied less. Darsie's study of American-born Japanese children found that large cities had a Q of 10.9, all urban had 8.4, and rural children 7.9.

The final conclusions from these inadequate data are only tentative. It appears that local homogeneous rural communites have indices of variation lower than the corresponding city groups for all major occupations. Large rural areas which include different nationality and environmental types have indices of variation larger

[37] This sigma is standard terminology for the standard deviation. The results may be biased in Texas by the great range of territory covered.

[38] This is from the semi-interquartile range. They give the original data and the Q was computed from their tables. The comparisons were as 18 to 17.5 for town pupils. However, the New York study shows that the farm high-school pupils are liable to vary more and the town less than the common school pupils, who are more representative of the general population. Their data were so grouped that this comparison is only a rough one and may easily vary one point.

[39] *Op. cit.*, p. 824.

than the lowest city groups and smaller than the upper city groups on the average. On the whole, the city groups exceed the rural in these variations also if cities be approached as units without regard to occupation. The conclusion is corroborated entirely by an enormous difference in the quota of the great men furnished by the upper and the lower classes. All in all, this variation in psychological tests, and in intelligence, shows greater variation in cities than in rural districts. The urban districts have the least capable proletariat and the most capable genius.

Summary and Interpretation. This chapter has been limited to an analysis of the works of the psychologists, educationalists, and students of eminent people or leaders to see if their findings tell anything concerning the relative intelligence of country people in comparison with city people and the contrary. It was shown at first that most of these students had definite ideas concerning the effect of urbanization upon increase of intelligence in cities. The procedure has been to go from comparative studies of intelligence that are most unreal to those that approach closer to reality and finally conclude with the results of studies that summarize the real achievement of rural and urban peoples. This analysis will not be complete, however, without a consideration of the next chapter on mental disease. As a summary to the results of the present chapter, we suggest the following:

1. Blanket comparisons of rural and urban children are the furthest from reality in that they include only a rough measure of intelligence and attempt to correlate it with a very rough measure of urbanization. No attempt is made to remove extraneous variables such as the size and constituency of the schools, educational, "conceptual," and cultural differences in rural and urban life. All these studies place the average of rural people far below the urban. These results have already been criticized thoroughly.

2. Occupational comparisons of rural and urban intelligence eliminate some of the roughness and unreality from the previous blanket studies and place farm people in a slightly different light. The most careful studies have found farmers or their children to be considerably above unskilled labor in average intelligence and many of them find farmers among the ranks of skilled labor. In other words, farmers assume the category of an unselected group from which two types of people may be selected—those rising in the social scale to the upper groups of urban and national life and those finding the rôle of a wage earner easier than the entrepreneurship of the individual farm. Some exception must be made to this latter statement for civilizations in which farmers are divided sharply into the two classes, the rural wage earner and the proprietor or renter. In places such as this—the rural south in the United States and some European and

Asiatic countries—the social processes are much more complex and, as yet, relatively less unravelled. Some minor criticisms are made in various sections such as the unreliability of comparisons based on the achievement of high-school pupils and above, where the agencies of social selection bias the sample.

3. Studies of acceleration and retardation in schools give the same relative results as the blanket rural and urban comparisons of intelligence quotients except that it appears that farmers are more "persistent" in school than urban children. These results further question the validity of results achieved by the blanket and other comparisons based on intelligence tests.

4. Studies of persistence in school and mobility up the educational ladder also show that farm children are more persistent in schooling than the average of the city population. Further, farmers come in a category which is to be entirely unexpected from their results on the comparative intelligence quotient tests. In America they fall with the upper urban groups in that they furnish a larger proportion of the students in high schools and colleges and other institutions of higher learning than they compose of the entire population. In this respect they are different from the laboring populations, whether skilled or unskilled. One exception to this study was found—Virginia, where, as before indicated, a rural laboring population exists (the croppers) who make the rural-urban processes much more complex. In addition, further doubt as to the validity of the blanket comparative I. Q. tests is given in the findings that farm children make unusual progress through institutions of higher learning. This latter is not entirely proved in comparison with all strata of population but it seems relatively true for the laboring population. Further investigation should be made.

5. Studies of achievement of farmers and rural children in definite school subjects furnishes no further data for the hypothesis that definite psychological types are migrating to the cities. While there are some evidences that rural children are not as far behind urban in some school subjects like mathematics, etc., these differences appear to be due to relatively more efficient teaching methods in the standardized subjects and to the nearness of some of the subjects to direct experience. They conflict also with the previous conclusions of other authors who have suggested the city selection of definite psychological types.

6. The summary of the contributions farmers and peasants have made to the élite or prominent persons approaches much closer to the realities of intelligence than any of the studies discussed before. This summary as presented here brings out three points. Blanket rural and urban comparisons of these types obscure the relative contributions

of farmers because about four-fifths of any one class of intelligentzia nearly always are the children of previous classes of intelligentzia and upper urban classes. This natural leadership, which is the result of previous generations of social selection, is able to carry the laboring classes on its shoulders, figuratively speaking, and to give city people, as a whole, a high place in the productivity of genius. When these kinds of comparisons are omitted and the masses of the people, whether in town or country, are compared, farmers achieve, on the whole, a much higher rank in "intelligence" than they do from the intelligence tests. According to this type of comparison farmer-peasants rank higher than the urban unskilled and semi-skilled classes and about the same as the skilled class of the cities. Further, the little data at hand do not show that the relative intelligence of farm children is declining but increasing. This relative increase may be due to the strong social selection which operates among the lower classes in cities and rapidly lifts a greater proportion of their talented children into the upper classes. And, finally, farmer-peasant children appear to rise in channels relatively different from the average to positions of leadership. Many of these correlations have been discussed at various times such as that farmer-peasant children rise as preachers, or educators more often than in other fields. The data summarized here show they rise as labor leaders more often than laborer's children. Many of these correlations are merely tentative and should be studied further.

7. No important conclusions were reached from a study of farm or rural contributions to small leaders or to persons of less distinction.

8. A study of rural and urban contributions to children of genius (children who are outstanding in high schools or who have I. Q.'s above 140) bears out previous conclusions reached from a study of men of genius. They give further proof of the theory that urban laborers are sapped of their ability to a greater extent than farmers.

9. A study of indices of variation in intelligence in rural and urban communities, finds, on the whole, greater variation in cities.

This study will have achieved its purpose if it has shown the doubt and unreliability which exist concerning the methods, the tools, and the results of most of these studies of comparative rural and urban intelligence. We are not yet ready to reach sure and definite conclusions.

Last, but not least, whatever may be the types of urban selection upon the native intelligence of rural people, or the farmer-peasant class, the rural groups are holding and maintaining their intelligence with much greater persistence than the lower urban classes. If there is any validity to the theories that the declines of civilizations are functionally connected with the process of draining and exploitation

of the intelligence of the masses by the upper urban groups, the farmer-peasant class responds much slower to this process, is more persistent in keeping its leaders, and hence, operates to slow-down this process and to maintain the stability and position of a society for a much longer period. Here, as in many other social phenomena, the position of the farmer-peasant class is considerably better than it is credited in popular and pseudo-scientific beliefs.

CHAPTER XII

RURAL-URBAN MENTAL DISEASE

Mental Disease as a Measure of Intelligence. The data on the distribution and incidence of mental disease in rural and urban districts, especially feeble-mindedness, have been used as a popular argument that the intelligence of rural people is declining or is, at least, in a bad shape relative to that of the urban populations. In this chapter we are going to attempt to find the relative amounts of mental disease in rural and urban districts, and see what they tell concerning relative urban-rural intelligence or the types of population selected by urbanization. At the beginning we may indicate two or three basic propositions which may have some value in the interpretation of the results. First, an increase of mental disease, if the causal factors are environmental, indicates a poorer adaptation of the organism to the environment. This may be either because the environment has become more complex and the organism has not yet learned to accommodate to it, or cannot accommodate to it as well; or because the organism has lost its ability to accommodate, through deterioration or selection of a new or less capable type. Second, an increase of mental disease indicates, if the causal factors are innate, that the population which shows the increase is selected from a less capable element. Now let us see what happens to mental disease rates under the influence of urbanization.

Mental disease statistics have been compiled for some years by the various governmental organizations because persons subject to such diseases, as a rule, either become the objects of public support, or if self-supporting, they are usually incarcerated in governmental or public hospitals and become a matter of public record. These data ought to tell something about the rural-urban incidence of mental disease, providing rural dwellers use the hospitals, when afflicted with mental disease, to the same relative amount as the urban; or the differences are so small that the error does not destroy the validity of the facts for the real correlation.

The three main classes into which mental diseases are given are insanity, feeble-mindedness, and epilepsies. Each of these three classes may be subdivided into many others, according to the nature of the symptoms and the causes or the seriousness of the disease. Let us proceed first of all to study the United States of America according to admissions to the hospitals for insanity.

Insanity in the United States of America. For 1910 and 1922, rates for first admissions to mental hospitals, public and private, for the United States[1] were respectively, in 1910, 86 per 100,000 population for the city and 41.4 for rural, in 1922, 78.8 and 41.4. These figures show a strong correlation between urbanization and total insanity. The 1910 Census of Mental Diseased breaks up the population into various types of groups and gives the following data:

First Admissions to Mental Hospitals per 100,000 of the Population by Foreign and Native Born and by Color and Urbanization [2]

Population Groups	*Crude Rate of First Admissions per 100,000*	
	Urban	*Rural*
All of population	86.0	41.4
All white	86.5	44.0
Native born	73.7	40.0
Foreign born	122.2	78.4
Negro	78.0	26.9
Indian	58.7	16.2
Colored	109.6	42.4

Furthermore, the 1910 census breaks up the urban classification as follows and gives these results.

First Admissions to Mental Hospitals per 100,000 of the Population by Foreign and Native Born and by Size of Community [3]

Size of Community	*All per 100,000*	*Native White per 100,000*	*Foreign Born White per 100,000*
Cities of 500,000 plus	102.8	81.0	132.8
100,000 to 500,000	89.9		
50,000 to 100,000	77.2	68.0	103.8
25,000 to 50,000	86.5	72.6	110.6
10,000 to 25,000	75.6		
2,500 to 10,000	70.2	64.6	100.7
Rural	41.4	40.0	78.4

This last table shows that if the population is broken up into its constituent elements the correlation between urbanization and the crude rates of admissions to mental hospitals for the insane appears general and permanent for the period and country under discussion.

Standardized Rates. Both of these census volumes give data as to the comparative incidence of insanity (admissions to mental hospitals)

[1] *Patients in Hospitals for Mental Disease*, 1923, Washington, G. P. O., p. 14. The lower urban rates for 1922, in comparison with the trend of increasing urbanization, are largely due to the post-war decline in admissions and to the restriction of immigration. During the war there was a rapid increase in first admissions which was followed by a downward fluctuation after the war.

[2] *U. S. Census of Mental Diseased*, 1910, Tables 50–57.

[3] *U. S. Census*, 1910, Tables 50 and 56. Similar data for 1922 without reference to country of birth or color are given on page 39 of the *Census of 1923*.

for the sexes, urban and rural. Furthermore, the 1923 census gives data for age-groups and for the sexes. Since there is substantial agreement between the results of 1910 and 1923, only the latter data will be presented here. The following table is for 1922. It standardizes the rates by age and sex.

NUMBER OF FIRST ADMISSIONS TO MENTAL HOSPITALS FOR 1922 CLASSIFIED BY URBAN AND RURAL ENVIRONMENTS, AND BY AGE AND SEX [4]

Age-Groups	*Rates per 100,000 of the Population*					
	Both Sexes		*Males*		*Females*	
	Urban	*Rural*	*Urban*	*Rural*	*Urban*	*Rural*
All ages	78.8	41.1	89.6	46.4	67.8	35.5
Under 15 yrs.	1.7	.9	1.8	.9	1.7	0.8
15 to 19 yrs.	40.0	19.6	46.0	20.9	34.5	18.3
20 to 24 yrs.	72.2	45.4	93.2	56.1	53.2	34.6
25 to 29 yrs.	96.8	60.7	116.8	71.8	77.1	49.4
30 to 34 yrs.	109.7	71.8	125.6	76.5	92.9	67.0
35 to 39 yrs.	114.8	71.4	127.3	76.0	101.1	66.4
40 to 44 yrs.	125.5	74.0	140.8	76.7	109.5	70.9
45 to 49 yrs.	121.9	69.1	123.8	71.3	119.8	66.3
50 to 54 yrs.	122.6	76.5	127.5	75.5	117.3	77.7
55 to 59 yrs.	127.7	71.8	146.5	81.8	108.4	59.4
60 to 64 yrs.	139.8	82.3	156.5	93.0	123.1	68.5
65 to 69 yrs.	170.4	87.5	198.9	104.8	143.6	65.7
70 and over	246.0	137.5	282.0	161.4	217.0	110.9

This table and its accompanying chart make the correlation between urbanization and admissions to mental hospitals still further more general by finding it true for the separate sex and age-groups. According to the census itself we are able to agree that "these rates clearly show the fallacy of the oft-quoted legend that a high rate of insanity is found among women in the rural districts."

Types of Insanity. The 1922 census gives complete data for types of disease according to sex and environment. Twenty-five different types of psychoses are given in this volume. If a comparison be made between both sexes, urban and rural, the following appears true. All types of mental psychoses are more prevalent in urban districts except Huntington's chorea and psychoses with pellagra. The rate for Huntington's chorea is the same in rural and urban districts. This is an unimportant disease because it caused insanity in only one out of a million of the population for that year. Pellagra accounted for 0.2 per hundred thousand in urban districts and 0.5 per hundred thousand in rural districts.[5] *From the tables it appears that the two outstanding types of insanity which increase in urban districts are general paralysis and alcoholism.* General paralysis is nearly

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

[5] *Ibid.*, 1923, pp. 42, 49.

always the result of syphilis. Outside of these two major types of insanity, all types increase about the same with urbanization except those associated with epilepsy and with mental deficiency. These conclusions are borne by the other recent studies.[6] A comparison of urban with rural males and females for 1922 brings out the following characteristics. General paralysis increases most rapidly among the urban males. Epilepsy is the same for the males in both groups (1.9), but lower in the rural districts for females (1.3 to 1.1). Mental deficiency is higher for the rural males but lower for the rural females. These differences are so minor, however, except for general paralysis, that no definite conclusions may be drawn from them.

Feeble-Mindedness in the United States. Data concerning the two other general types of mental ailments, feeble-mindedness and epilepsy, are given in a separate report for the year 1922.[7] The data for feeble-minded in institutions show urban with 8.5 per 100,000 and rural with 4.4. It appears that there is some correlation between urbanization and the proportion of the population classed as "feeble-minded in institutions." Concerning this, the census says, "These rates, while constituting a true comparison of first admissions to institutions for feeble-minded, cannot be taken as indicating the relative prevalence of feeble-mindedness in urban and rural districts. Social adjustment in cities is much more difficult than in rural districts. It is probable, therefore, that, of the total feeble-minded in the community, the proportion sent to institutions is larger in cities than in rural districts" p. 56). "If a careful examination be made of the table in the reference it may be seen that the rates from rural districts are higher in New England (10.8 to 7.2). This is due to the much higher rates of females from rural districts (15.6 to 6.5). Further, the rate for females is higher for rural districts in the Middle Atlantic division and the rate for males is higher in the West South Central. If an examination be made of the individual states, then it will be seen that the correlation between urbanization and feeble-minded in institutions is by no means general.[8] Nine of the states

[6] See Pollock, H. M., and Furbush, E. M., "Mental Diseases in 12 States, 1919," *Journal of Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 5, pp. 353 ff., 1921; Furbush, E. M., "Social Facts Relative to Patients with Mental Diseases," *Journal of Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 6, 1921, pp. 587 ff.; Pollock, H. M., and Nolan, W. J., "Mental Diseases in Cities, Villages, and Rural Districts of New York State, 1915, 1920," *State Hospital Quarterly*, Vol. 7, pp. 38–65, 1921; Pollock, H. M., "Alcoholic Psychoses Before and After Prohibition," *Journal of Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 6, 1922, pp. 815–825; Pollock and Furbush, "Prohibition and Alcoholic Mental Diseases," *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 8, 1924, pp. 548 ff.; and Pollock, "Frequency of Dementia Præcox in Relation to Sex, Age, Environment, Nativity and Race," *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 10, 1926, pp. 596 ff.

[7] *Feeble-Minded and Epileptics in Institutions*, 1923, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1926.

[8] See *U. S. Census*, 1923, p. 57.

have greater total rates for first admissions from rural districts, four have rates for one or the other of the sexes greater for the rural districts, and one has an equal total rate for the entire state. Eleven show a higher rural rate for males and eight for females. In one other state the urban and rural rates for females equal each other. However, the reader is to be cautioned that this total table of these "exceptional" states is based on only 7,009 cases so that the rates for separate states may fluctuate considerably.

On the basis of further data given in the census,[9] and making all the necessary allowances, we come to the following additional conclusions: First, the urban districts contribute more than their share of idiots. About the same proportion of imbeciles (62.4) come from urban districts as from rural. However, more than 73 per cent of the morons come from urban districts. This may be due to the fact that the rural districts keep the morons within the community in a greater proportion and send them to the institutions in a less degree than the cities. The morons are able to exist in the country, and even to be of some use to the families on account of the relatively simpler life of the rural communities, while the idiots are of no more value as farm hands than for any other purposes. Therefore they are probably sent to the institutions with the same intensity as the urban idiots. Thus, as far as the properly weighted census data show, idiots are more prevalent in urban districts. Imbeciles are about the same in the city and in the country. As to the morons we must discriminate their urban-rural shares (a) in institutions, (b) out of institutions, and (c) the total—the institutional and the non-institutional morons. The urban share of the institutional morons is much higher; but, on account of a more intensive commitment of their morons to the institutions, the urban population may have either an equal or even a lower proportion of the non-institutional morons than the country population. When both groups—the institutional and the non-institutional morons—are taken, their total proportions remain unknown; it may be about the same in the urban and rural populations. Such are the conclusions which appear to us the most probable on the basis of the census and other relevant studies. These studies are somewhat fragmentary and do not give quite uniform results, but many of them found a somewhat higher proportion of the morons in the rural parts, which supports our hypothesis of a less intensive sending of the rural morons to the institutions. For this reason, such a finding does not warrant the conclusion that the total—the institutional and the non-institutional—proportion of the morons is higher in the rural than in the urban districts. It also does not warrant the opposite conclusion. These data, plus the results given in other

[9] See *U. S. Census*, 1922, p. 56.

studies,[10] lead us to the following conclusions. In regard to the incidence of feeble-mindedness in the non-institutional population, there is some evidence to believe that it is more prevalent among the rural than the urban population in the United States. However, the importance of feeble-mindedness in the whole category of disease may have been over-estimated somewhat and the situation may not be as bad as is pictured. Further, the town-country differences in this respect are not as great as often pictured. We must set the greater incidence in the rural non-institutional population against the greater incidence in the urban institutional population.

Epilepsies in the United States. The census of feeble-minded for 1922 gives a separate analysis of epileptics. Based upon first admissions (1,372 cases) the rural rate for 1922 was 0.9 compared with the urban rate of 1.7 per 100,000. This rural-urban difference was true for both sexes and for all states except four, Illinois, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Ohio. The census itself questions the validity of this rural-urban comparison by the following statement:

> The difference in these rates does not necessarily imply that epilepsy is more prevalent in urban than in rural districts, as it is likely that a larger proportion of epileptics in urban districts reach institutions (p. 80).

The important conclusion that may be drawn at this point is that epilepsies, whether greater in urban and rural districts, are minor types of mental disease.

Recruit Statistics on Mental Disease. Before summarizing these data on the rural and urban incidence of mental disease for the United

[10] Terman, Dickson, and Ward, *Backward and Feeble-Minded Children in the Public Schools of X County, Calif.*, State Board of Corrections and Charities, 1918; Treadway and Lundberg, *Mental Defect in a Rural County*, Pub. No. 40, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Children's Bureau, Washington, Gov't Printing Office, 1921; Clark, "Mental Examination of School Children," *Public Health Reports*, Vol. 31, part 3, 1916, pp. 2265–2271; see Pintner, R., and Paterson, D. G., "A Psychological Basis for the Diagnosis of the Feeble-Minded," *Journal of the American Inst. of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 1916, Vol. 7, pp. 32–55. See the well-known studies of the Jukes, Kallikaks, and other outstanding degenerate families. Needless to say there are also some similar degenerate families in urban communities. Their mobility is so high and their chances for hiding so great that they have not been mapped or written about as often. One family has been on the Minneapolis family welfare list for 25 years or more. Campbell, C. Macfie, "A City School District and Its Subnormal Children," *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 1, pp. 95–117, 1917, and Vol. 2, pp. 232–244, 1918; Sandy, A. C., "Mental Deficiency in N. Y. State," *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 4, 1920, pp. 380–392; Bailey, Pearce, and Haber, Roy, "Mental Deficiency," *Mental Hygiene*, Vol. 4, 1920, pp. 564–596; *Annual Report of the U. S. Public Health Service*, 1916, p. 61; *Annual Report of the U. S. Public Health Service*, 1916, p. 62; see Indiana Extension Division, *Bulletin No. 1*, Vol. 5, 1919, pp. 56–59. Regarding this quarrel as to the definition of feeble-mindedness, see the original works of Binet and Simon, the study by Pintner and Paterson, *op. cit.*; Kuhlman, F., *Outline of Mental Deficiency;* and the works of Edgar A. Doll and others; Book, W. F., "Variations in Mental Ability and its Distribution, etc.," *Bul. of the Extension Division, Indiana University*, Vol. 4, No. 4, Dec., 1918, pp. 100–132.

States, let us consider the incidence of various types of these diseases as found in the examination of recruits for the World War and the Civil War.

Omitting the results of Coolidge's [11] study, as based on a small number of cases and obviously inadequate, the results of a more comprehensive data of J. H. Baxter [12] based on 334,321 soldiers of the Civil War may be summarized as follows: (1) For the age-groups they represent, farmers suffered from total nervous and mental disabilities about the same as the average of the country. Professionals and common labor had higher rates and mercantile and skilled labor lower rates. (2) Farmers had a lower rate than any other represented here for diseases of the brain and its membranes. (3) Farmers had more paralysis than laborers and carpenters and less than mechanics, clerks, merchants, teachers, and physicians. (4) Functional diseases of the nervous system were more prevalent among farmers than any of the other social groups. (5) Diseases of the intellect were less prevalent among farmers than among common laborers and more prevalent than among any of the other occupations given here. If a further analysis be made by disease, the following is suggested. Chorea was more prevalent among farmers than among any of the others except clerks. Epilepsy was more prevalent among farmers than the other groups, except teachers. However, the differences were small. Neuralgia was less prevalent among laborers and carpenters than farmers and more prevalent among the upper urban groups. Stammering was less prevalent among laborers and carpenters than farmers and more prevalent among the upper urban groups. Alcoholism was less prevalent among farmers than any of the others. Imbecility was more prevalent among common laborers and less prevalent among the other groups. Insanity and solitary vice were more prevalent among farmers. These data must be interpreted in the light of the fact that they represent non-exempted men; no allowances have been made for mental diseased in hospitals and institutions; and they represent drafted men for 1863 and 1864, after the war had gone on two years by volunteer enlistments. Any conclusions must be drawn cautiously because we do not know the total effect of these unknowns.

The next important source for the problem discussed is given by the results of the medical examination of the recruits of the United States in the last World War.[13] Omitting many details, let us indicate

[11] Coolidge, Richard H., "Medical Statistics of the U. S. Army, 1839–1855," *U. S. Senate Executive Document*, No. 96, 34th Congress, 1st session, pp. 628–631.

[12] See Baxter, J. H., *Medical Statistics of the War of the Rebellion, 1875*, Vol. I, Chart 28; Vol. II, Table 20.

[13] See *Physical Examination of the First Million Draft Recruits*, War Department, Office of the Surgeon-General, Bul. No. 11, March, 1919, pp. 121–138 and 344; and Love, Albert G., and Davenport, Charles B., *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, War Department, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1920.

at once that these results are greatly vitiated by a series of circumstances. First, the rural and urban division is extremely arbitrary (45,000 in one, and 25,000 in another study were taken as the boundary line of the city and the rural parts), which led to the inclusion of very large numbers of the industrial populations among the rural. Second, one analysis was based only on those who reached camps and does not account for those 30 per cent rejected by local boards. The local boards were considerably less strict in rural districts than in urban. Third, no allowance is made for the fact that a larger part of those suffering from nervous diseases are already in institutions among urban groups. With this warning the actual data of the examinations are represented in the following table:

MENTAL AND NERVOUS DEFECTS FOUND IN DRAFTED MEN DURING THE WORLD WAR[14]

(Comparison of rural and urban areas) (Rates per 1,000 men called)

Defect	*Agric. 1*	*Agric. 2*	*Agric. 3*	*Agric. 4*	*Manufacturing*	*Commuter*
Total mental disorders	21.80	20.14	21.74	23.20	15.98	13.26
Total functional nervous disease	10.64	8.94	9.38	8.69	8.15	8.16
Total of both	32.44	29.08	31.12	31.89	24.13	21.42

This table seems to show that the total of mental disorders and the total of functional nervous disorders as well as the combined totals are more prevalent in each of the agricultural areas than in either the manufacturing or the commuting area. If we make a careful analysis of the table in the reference (detailed data by disease are omitted here), however, some interesting conditions must be made to this conclusion. In the mental disorders this conclusion of greater rural mental disease is due to the inclusion of mental deficiency, because the grand totals for the other mental disorders give an opposite result when compared with the manufacturing district, and an opposite result in three out of the four agricultural communities when compared with the commuter district. The totals for mental disorders other than mental deficiency for the various areas are as follows: Agr. 1, 3.32; Agr. 2, 4.08; Agr. 3, 2.83; Agr. 4, 2.13; Manufacturing, 4.28; and Commuter, 3.55. In the functional nervous diseases, neurosis, hysteria, and neurasthenia were lower in all the agricultural groups than in the manufacturing groups. If we eliminate the epilepsies and the mental deficiencies from this table, because these cases are incarcerated in institutions in urban districts more often than in rural districts, the conclusion drawn would be that all diseases of a mental or nervous nature were found more prevalent

[14] For a discussion of these areas see pages 207 ff. of the report.

in urban districts except paralysis and apoplexy, chorea, and constitutional psychopathic states. These conclusions themselves must be thought of in the light of the findings of mental diseased in institutions, rural and urban. The further criticism to be made of conclusions drawn from this table is that we have no measure of the types already selected from the different areas by previous enlistments. Further, the rural and urban classification involves in some cases a change of many other variables because it is based on regions. But these figures must be given serious consideration, because they appear to show some opposite correlation between urbanization and mental disease compared with the census of inmates in mental hospitals and institutions.

In addition to this attempt to compare urban and rural peoples, another is presented in the same volume. In this case the criterion of urban includes all cities above 25,000 in population. For ten selected mental diseases the data are not only given for the selected urban and rural (all others) but also for four of the largest cities in the United States. These are as follows:

Ratio for Selected Mental Diseases in Rural Districts, Urban Districts, and for Four Large Cities[15]

Type of Disease	*Rural*	*Urban*	*Boston*	*Philadelphia*	*Chicago*	*New York*
Mental deficiency	17.59	8.77	8.76	8.24	8.05	8.34
Epilepsy	5.36	4.79	6.13	5.52	4.53	5.62
All paralysis	3.14	3.27	3.09	2.97	3.05	3.27
Drug addiction	.26	1.04	.86	1.07	.24	2.15
Neurasthenia, neurosis, and hysteria	.87	.94	1.52	.94	1.19	1.11
Dementia præcox	.69	.91	3.60	1.07	1.31	1.19
Psychasthenia and psychoneurosis	.60	.71	.86	.73	1.06	.89
Constitutional psychopathic states	.51	.63	.51	.55	.38	1.18
Alcoholism	.17	.56	1.57	.46	1.36	.44
Psychosis, maniac depressive	.21	.21	.15	.31	.20	.38

This table possesses, in important respects, the same general characteristics as the preceding table in that mental deficiency is the most important disease or defect. Further, mental deficiency is more prevalent among the rural recruits. Epilepsy, next in importance, is slightly higher in the rural districts than in the urban. All the other diseases were more prevalent or at least as prevalent among the urban as the rural. This suggests strongly that the prevalence of mental deficiency and epilepsy among the rural recruits is considerably biased by the fact that a smaller proportion of them are in

[15] *Defects Found in Drafted Men*, p. 394 (per 1,000 men examined).

the institutions in the rural districts. An adequate interpretation as to the incidence of these diseases in rural or urban peoples must be made from a joint consideration of both sources.

Summary for the United States of America. Thus far in this discussion of the correlation between urbanization and mental disease, the main purpose has been to give the most important data from all sources, only suggesting at various times the most obvious conclusions or criticisms of the various studies. The summary of specific results is as follows. There appears to be a permanent and high correlation in the United States between urbanization and the total of diseases known as insanity, in so far as patients in mental hospitals are representative of the various groups. This correlation appears valid for all ages, for all sexes, it increases with size of community and with the increase of urbanization. Further, the correlation is positive for foreign-born and native-born and for Indians and Negroes.

If this correlation be tested for various types of insanity, those cases correlated with alcoholism and syphilis have the most rapid increase with urbanism. Insanity associated with epilepsy and mental deficiency show the slowest rate of increase with urbanism. As a matter of fact, the correlation is negative in regard to insanity connected with mental deficiency. Separation of the sexes by types of insanity finds these rural-urban correlations by types of disease still valid. The data concerning feeble-minded in institutions show, at first sight, a correlation with urbanization. But a closer examination finds this is not general and is even reversed in states with the best administrative systems. Further, the two sexes often give opposite results in the same state. The census officials themselves state that a greater proportion of the feeble-minded from urban districts are in institutions. The census data give some evidence that morons in rural districts are more liable to be kept out of institutions. A rural and urban comparison based on idiots and imbeciles in institutions still shows greater incidence in urban districts without even standardizing the results for the higher proportions of children in rural districts. An analysis of the most important studies of feeble-mindedness in the non-institutional population gives some evidence to prove that the non-institutional morons are more prevalent in rural districts. However, in view of the fact that students of this disease are at variance as to what constitutes feeble-mindedness; and in view of the fact that cities are sending their morons more intensively to the institutions, which naturally decreases their proportion in the non-institutional urban population, we do not know exactly whether the total—institutional and non-institutional—feeble-mindedness prevails in cities or in the country, or if the shares are the same in both groups. Epilepsy exists more in cities if the

institutional population is a fair index. But the census officials doubt if they are representative. Most other types of mental disease showed a positive correlation with urbanization.

Mental Diseases in England. The British Census gives data concerning the former occupations of those located in mental hospitals or lunatic asylums. The data for the three census reports of 1921, 1911, and 1901 are as follows:

OCCUPATIONS FOR THE 1901, 1911, AND 1921 CENSUSES OF ENGLAND AND WALES ARRANGED IN ORDER ACCORDING TO THE PROPORTIONS PER 1,000 OF MALES SO OCCUPIED FOUND IN LUNATIC HOMES [16]

1921		*1911*		*1901*	
Occupation	*Proportion per 1,000*	*Occupation*	*Proportion per 1,000*	*Occupation*	*Proportion per 1,000*
Laborers	9.1	Laborers	26.4	Laborers	14.3
Defense	15.1	Defense	5.8	Defense	5.3
Skins, leather	5.6	Dress	5.4	Dress	4.8
Dress	4.7	Skins, leather	4.9	Painters, decorators	3.9
Watches	3.9	Painters, decorators	4.9	Wood, furniture	3.9
Fishing [17]	3.4	Wood, furniture	4.5	Skins, leather	3.6
Painters, decorators	3.2	Watches	4.3	Sport	3.6
Wood, furniture	2.9	Paper, print	3.9	Fishing	3.4
Sport	2.8	Professional	3.8	Paper, print	3.2
Personal service	2.8	Sport	3.7	Agriculture	3.0
Paper, print	2.8	Fishing	3.7	Watches	2.8
Bricks, pottery, glass	2.7	Agriculture	3.2	Textiles	2.8
Food, drink, tobacco	2.6	Building	3.2	Professional	2.6
Professional	2.6	Food, drink, tobacco	3.1	Food, drink, tobacco	2.6
Com. and clerical	2.6	Transport	2.8	Com. and clerical	2.5
Agriculture	2.4	Com. and Clerical	2.7	Transport	2.4
Transport	2.3	Bricks, pottery, glass	2.6	Building	2.3
Building	2.0	Textiles	2.5	Metals	2.2
Textiles	2.0	Metals	2.4	Stationary-engine drivers	2.2
Metals	1.8	Personal service	2.4	Bricks, pottery, glass	1.9
Stationary-engine drivers	1.6	Stationary-engine drivers	2.2	Personal service	1.8
Mines	1.5	Public, administration	2.0	Public adm.	1.8
Gas, water, electricity	1.4	Mines	1.9	Mines	1.7
Chemicals	1.2	Gas, water, electricity	1.4	Chemicals	1.4
Electrical	1.0	Chemicals	1.2	Gas, water, electricity	1.4
Public administration	1.0	Electrical	1.1		

[16] This table is from Jones, R. Caradog, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Volume 89, 1926, p. 694. Similar conclusions may be reached from the copy of the Special Report of the Lunacy Commission on "Alleged Increase of Insanity," London, H. M. S. O., 1897, *British Sessional Papers*, Vols. 38–43, pp. 98 ff.

[17] In every case two rates were given for fishermen, one based on census figures and the other on a computation which allowed for those at sea. In this table only those based on census figures are given. The other rates for fishermen were either .2 or .3 lower in each case.

This table is based entirely on males and the proportions per 1,000 occupied for each census are arranged in order. In all cases, agriculturists have fallen near the middle of the list. Their rate has never been higher than 3.2 per 1,000 of the occupied males. Note also that, as we pass from 1901 to 1921, agriculturists tend to show less insane and to occupy a relatively lower place in the table. Of the 25 classes of occupations in 1901, agriculture was 10th from the top. There were 26 classes in 1911 and 1921 and agriculture occupied the 12th and 16th places respectively. In every case agricultural and professional are within the same group. In 1921 all occupations gave a ratio of 3.36 per 1,000 whereas agriculture furnished only 2.4. Similar data by Greenwood, Thompson, and Woods, in which the asylum population of England for 1908–1912 are compared with the distribution of occupations for 1901, show that agriculture furnished 88.3 out of every thousand 10 years of age or over and employed and only 75.1 out of every thousand in the asylums.[18]

These data over a period of 30 years for the entire country of England and Wales would seem to establish a similar positive correlation between urbanization and mental disease in hospitals, asylums, and institutions. They are borne out by the rates for poor law relief which segregate the mentally infirm from the others in receipt of relief. On January 1, 1924, 54 persons out of 10,000 in London were in receipt of public relief on account of mental infirmity and insanity. At the same date, the rate for the other urban unions of England and Wales was 30, and for the rural areas, 29. The rate for the whole country was 32.[19] This same study also shows one other fact of interest here. The proportion of persons mentally ill and in receipt of poor law relief domiciled in institutions was greater for urban districts than for rural. That is, in London, none of the mentally incapables received extra institutional relief, but in the rural districts 6 per cent were not in institutions. This points out a fact, well recognized for feeble-minded and epileptics, that many rural residents afflicted with insanity are not in institutions. However, this tendency probably does not change the correlations established because insanity is of such serious nature that not a great portion are out of institutions.

[18] The data for the three census studies are taken from Jones, R. Caradog, "Some Statistics Concerning Occupational Invalidity—Economic, Mental, and Moral," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 89, 1926, p. 694. The study of asylum populations for 1908–1912 is from Greenwood, R., Thompson, C. M., and Woods, Hilda M., "Heights and Weights of Patients in Mental Hospitals," *Biometrika*, Vol. 17, Parts I and II, June, 1925, pp. 142 ff.

[19] See *British Sessional Papers*, Vol. 19, 1924, Table 4, p. 7 in section devoted to persons in receipt of poor law relief. *Parliamentary Papers*, No. 121, 1923 and No. 172. Session 1922 establishes the same correlation for those years. Further data back to 1914 in the first reference establish the rates. We may accept them as proved.

Data as to the rural-urban incidence of feeble-minded are given in the *Report of the Royal Commission on the Feeble-Minded* published in 1908. This study, made in 1904, is probably the most accurate and painstaking study yet made of the mentally unsound (excluding institutional lunatics) within the entire population. Thus the report is the most authentic document yet regarding the rural-urban incidence of these diseases. Registered physicians made the study. The following types of sources were searched in detail: public schools, poor law institutions, workhouses, infirmaries, out-door relief agencies, charitable agencies, hospitals and dispensaries, refuges, homes for the aged and infirm, prisons, idiot asylums, police records, and homes for the inebriate. The original intention was to include Scotland and Ireland, but only Glasgow furnished the data for Scotland and those for Ireland were defective. Consequently, the final conclusions must be based on England and Wales alone. The following results appear, both for institutional and non-institutional population except "certified insane."

THE RURAL-URBAN INCIDENCE OF MENTAL DEFECTIVES OTHER THAN CERTIFIED LUNATICS IN ENGLAND AND WALES [20]

Area	*Per Cent Distribution of the*						
	Population	*School Children*	*Uncertified Insane*	*Idiots, Imbeciles, and Feeble-Minded*	*Sane Epileptics*	*Defective Children*	*Total*
Urban	57.9	54.7	52.4	46.0	53.4	65.8	53.7
Mining	5.6	7.1	1.6	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.4
Rural England	25.5	26.7	30.0	38.2	31.5	23.1	31.7
Rural Wales	11.0	11.5	16.0	13.2	12.8	8.9	12.2
All rural	36.5	38.2	46.0	51.4	44.3	32.0	43.9
All areas	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This table shows that the 57.9 per cent of the people, who were urban, had furnished 52.4 per cent of the uncertified insane (non-institutional), 46.0 per cent of the idiots, imbeciles, and feeble-minded (institutional and non-institutional), 53.4 per cent of the sane epileptics, and 65.8 per cent of the borderline children. On the other hand, the rural 36.5 per cent had 46.0 per cent of the uncertified insane (non-institutional), 51.4 per cent of the idiots, imbeciles, and feeble-minded (both), and 44.3 per cent of the sane epileptics (both). Taken at their face value, these figures seem to testify in favor of the urban population. Such a conclusion, however, would be fallacious because it does not take into consideration the different age and sex composi-

[20] Vol. VI, pp. 55 ff.

tions of the rural and urban populations in England and Wales. The city population in these countries has a much higher proportion of females and a notably lower proportion of the aged (50 years of age and over) than the rural population.[21] Meanwhile, it is well known that the females give a much lower proportion of the mentally diseased than the males, and the older aged groups give a notably higher proportion of the insane than the younger groups. This is responsible, in a great degree, for the higher rate of the mentally defectives in the rural parts of the country discussed. If the rates of the mentally defective were computed for standardized populations of the rural and urban parts, the difference in the rates would probably disappear. That this expectation is not a mere guess is shown by the rates of the mentally defective children: the rate of the rural parts for this standardized age-group is not above, but below, the rate of the mentally defective children of the urban parts. For these evident reasons the table cannot be used as a proof of the alleged higher mental defectiveness of the rural population compared with the urban.

Further, the factor of migration is to be kept in mind. One of the investigators was probably not very far from the truth in saying:

> It would seem as if more defectives are reared in towns but that at or after adolescence, men who are weak drift into the smaller towns or country districts, while women of a similar type remain in the cities; at the same time feeble-minded men, if born in the country districts, stay there, while those of the other sex are drawn into towns . . . in towns, the women of weak intellect can live as wives or paramours, while prostitution often enables them to eke out an existence.[22]

The final conclusions for England and Wales are that, while a prevalence of the non-institutional feeble-mindedness and epilepsy in rural districts is not proved, insanity is more prevalent in the urban and among the non-agricultural populations.[23]

Mental Disease in Other Countries. Data on the correlation between density and rejects for military service on account of mental disease for Belgium[24] show a slight positive correlation between density and mental disease. Since we have reason to suppose that the mentally defectives in institutions in Belgium are more from the cities, our final conclusion is that these data, at least, do not cancel the conclusions already reached for the United States and Great Britain.

[21] See *Census of England and Wales*, 1921. General Report, pp. 71 ff.

[22] Testimony of Dr. Potts, Vol. VI, Part II, p. 16.

[23] See also Tupe, D. H., *Insanity, Ancient and Modern*, pp. 95 ff. One for each 463 rural and 338 urban were found insane in institutions. Similar data for Scotland are given.

[24] Taken from pages 7, 153, 154, 155, *Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique*, 1923–1924. Data for 1923 and 1924 are also presented here but they are similar to these.

In the 29.52 per cent of the population of Sweden classed as urban (in villages or towns above 2,000 population) were allocated 16.5 per cent of the idiots, 14.4 per cent of the epileptics, and 26.6 per cent of the insane.[25] Insufficient data are given for the analysis of these figures as to their validity. However, they do not destroy the general order of the rural-urban incidence of the separate diseases, although the rural people furnish more of all than the urban.

For Denmark, the data concerning deaths from certain mental diseases by urban and rural areas during 1924, as far as they represent all mental disease, show the same results as was found in the United States and England. The grand total favored rural districts but they had higher rates for deaths associated with epilepsy. Nothing is given concerning feeble-minded.

In France for the preceding period E. Levasseur's study has shown a high prevalence of insanity in the urban and some prevalence of feeble-mindedness in the rural population.[26] In Germany, G. Von Mayr's Study (1877) showed also that per 10,000 of each of the occupations there were 14.71 insane in professions, 8.26 in commerce and transportation, 7.01 in trades, and 6.55 in agriculture. The rates of feeble-mindedness were reversed: 5.26, 9.26, 10.13, and 13.81 correspondingly.[27]

The 1921 census of India gives data for the amount of insanity per province or state and the proportions of each state classed as urban.[28] When ranked according to urbanization, their rates for insanity show no apparent correlation between urbanization and total reported insane. However, no data are given as to the reliability of the figures, and until further information is to be had, these cannot take precedence over tested figures for America and Great Britain.

The Canadian Yearbook for 1926 gives the per cent of the population urban in each province and the number of mental defectives in each province.[29] These data show that if the province of Prince Edward Island be omitted, there is apparently a small positive correlation between urbanization and insanity. That is all that could be expected using these rough measures. Prince Edward Island has had a declining population since 1890. No data concerning the age and sex distribution of the population is had for purpose of standardization of these rates.

Some Historical Data. Jacoby gives data concerning the death rates for meningitis, encephalitis, epilepsy, tetanos idiopathique,

[25] *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige*, 1927, pp. 5 and 17.
[26] Levasseur, E., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 345 ff.
[27] Mayr, G., *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 96.
[28] Computed from *Accounts and Papers*, Great Britain, Vol. XXIX, 1924–1925, pp. 2 and 53.
[29] *Canadian Year Book*, 1926.

alcoholism, delirium tremens, and some other diseases of the nervous system.[30] These are for the period 1840 to 1860, varying for different diseases. They compare London with the rest of England. All of them show higher rates for London. The difference may be due to poor registration of mental disease outside of London. Further, the statistics for various countries of the institutional patients with mental diseases show that, practically in all countries, their per cent of the population has been increasing during the last few decades with the increase of urbanization. In England per 100,000 population there were 159 patients in 1859, and 360 in 1908; in the United States, 81.6 patients in 1880, 217.5 in 1910, and 220.1 in 1920. Similar are the data for Germany.[31] Thus, in so far as the data correctly reflect the reality, mental diseases have been growing parallel with a progress of urbanization.

General Conclusions and Analysis. The attempt has been made in this chapter to find if there is a correlation between mental disease and urbanization. Before drawing any conclusions, it must be said that no single line of proof is conclusive. If the data be based on institutional population, it is unfair to urban districts. If it be based on non-institutional population, the comparison is unfair to rural districts. It is not always possible to add studies made on one basis to the others. If it is based on one type of disease it does not represent all types. Neither is one country representative for all. After the careful analysis we have made in the preceding pages of all data available, the following tentative conclusions are suggested: 1. The total of mental disease is greater in urban districts than in rural. This is apparent from nearly all studies of institutional cases. It is doubtful if the non-institutional cases will add to the rural so as to make its rate equal or higher than the urban. 2. With the exception of diseases connected with epilepsies and mental deficiency, urbanization increases all mental disease at a rapid rate. 3. Urbanization increases diseases connected with syphilis (general paralysis) and alcoholism at a rate much more rapid than all other mental diseases. Dementia præcox, paranoia, and psycho-neuroses also increase very rapidly with urbanization. 4. When the necessary standardization by age and sex is made, the comparative rates for mental deficiency and epilepsies remain unknown. The factor of migration increases the uncertainty still more. The theory suggested by Dr. Potts, that feeble-minded men have a tendency to segregate themselves in rural

[30] See Jacoby, P., *Études sur la Sélection Chez Hommes*, 2nd Ed., pp. 500 ff.

[31] See Weber, L. W., "Läst sich eine Zunahme des Geisteskranken feststellen," *Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschafts Biologie*, Vol. VII, pp. 704–721; Rüdin, E., "Über den Zusammenhang zwischen Geisteskrankheit und Kultur," *ibid.*, pp. 722–748; Pollock, H., and Furbush, E., "Patients with Mental Disease," *Mental Hygiene*, 1921, pp. 145 ff.

districts whereas the women make a living with their bodies in cities, should be investigated further. In addition there is considerable need for verification of the four theories predicted at the end of this section. Investigations which follow the same definition of disease, standardize the age and sex compositions of the populations compared, include all mental disease whether in towns or in country districts, institutional or non-institutional, and tabulate place of birth, occupation of father, in addition to the mobility and occupation of the defective, will be needed before this disputed and important question of the relation between urbanization and mental disease is settled. In addition, the practical and pertinent problems of paralysis, alcoholism, and feeble-mindedness face the social worker or practical sociologist. Many of the non-institutional defectives in both rural and urban districts need attention.

Probable Cause of Increase of Mental Disease with Urbanization. The question may be raised at this time concerning the reasons for this increase of mental disease with urbanization, and in countries which are becoming more urban. One of the factors in the prevalence of insanity in the city, compared with the country, *is a lower proportion of the married and a higher proportion of the divorced in the city than in the country.* It has been well established that the unmarried and the divorced have been giving a higher proportion of the insane than the married.[32] For this reason the cities have to have a higher proportion of the insane than the rural parts. In so far as the divorce-rate has been growing in industrialized countries for the last few decades (see chapter on the Family), this growth may be responsible for a part of the growth of mental disease. Such is one of the factors. We suggest further that the next significant factors are *the increased complexity of social organization which is associated with urbanization; and the increased mobility of the individual.* The characteristics of mobility and complexity have already been analyzed in the chapter devoted to the rural and urban worlds. This increased complexity and mobility of individuals calls for a greater mental strain, greater numbers of adjustments, and adjustments to a more intricate and fluctuating order of physical and social objects. Under such pressures greater numbers of individuals break down.[33] More of them become subject to fears, delusions, manias, and psychopathic states; more of them take to alcoholism, drugs, and other stimulants which quicken the mental abilities for the time but lead to a more rapid breakdown later and result in mental incapacity before the other parts of the bodily organism have reached the ends of their

[32] See *Insane and Feebleminded in Institutions;* Groves and Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships,* pp. 145–146.

[33] See Jaspers, K., *Psychopathologie générale,* pp. 578 ff.

spans of life. More of the dwellers in urban communities and urban societies lose their religious and moral beliefs; they come in contact with prostitutes; these prostitutes infect them with syphilis more often; [34] and in spite of the developments and use of salvarsan and curatives for syphilis, greater numbers are driven insane as a result. The loss of these religious and moral beliefs puts more of them on a "rationalistic" basis; with a purely "personal rationalism" they are unable to settle problems which would never occur to them in a homogeneous rural community with an accepted and unchallenged set of mores, faiths, and religious beliefs; as a result more of them lose "the peace of mind," their equilibrium, break down and increase the mental disease rates. This does not mean that those who break down under the strain of city life are as capable innately as those who do not break down.[35]

Mental Disease and Rural-Urban "Selective" Selection. Before this question may be answered, we should have some definite idea as to the relative amounts of innate and environmental factors in the various types of mental diseases. That we do not have. Any conclusions are in the nature of tentative hypotheses. With such a qualification in mind, the following conclusions might be suggested: 1. We suggest that the innate factors are about as important in the problem of insanity as in feeble-mindedness and epilepsies. When one considers all the populations subjected to the wears and tears of urban life and tries to explain why one specific group breaks down, whereas another, subject to the same phenomena, does not, logically the varying factor of innate differences must be called upon to settle the problem. These differences are greater than the specific variations of urban environment, especially when we limit the environment to certain classes, such as that, for instance, of college professors. It is generally recognized that innate factors are important for the prevalence of feeble-mindedness and epilepsies. But at the same time, it is logical to believe that innate factors are important for other types of mental disease, although possibly not as much. This differential in types of mental disease, as already suggested in the previous conclusions, has been used as an argument that cities are taking off the brighter and leaving behind the dull and feeble-minded. With our previous analysis in mind, how shall we answer this question? We suggest first that the urban selection of those who break down into various forms of insanity, at least to a considerable degree, compensate for those feeble-minded left behind in urbanization (if

[34] This may be one of the causes why the single and the divorced give a higher per cent of the insane than the married.

[35] See a development of these ideas in the quoted works of L. W. Weber, E. Rüdin, C. Rüse, Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, pp. 510–515; Buschan, G., "Kultur und Gehvin," *Archiv fur Rassen-und Gesell Biologieschafts*, pp. 697 ff., 1904.

such is generally true); second, that other compensations may take place such, as for instance, the greater selection of persons not feeble-minded and not geniuses, but on the border line above feeble-minded, and who enter the ranks of factory and unskilled labor in the cities; and third, the general correlation between urbanization and total mental disease does not prove that rural communities are suffering innately from "selective" selection. The reverse is not necessarily proved or true either. Finally, to repeat, we do not believe that these data, considered along with other data presented in previous chapters, prove any general "selective" selection of the brighter or the less capable by cities. If the totality of these data prove something it proves that the city selection is "non-selective."

Which is the More Intelligent—Rural or Urban? We have now gone in detail over the various proofs of greater or less intelligence of the rural and urban problems. What answer do we give to this question? Again cautioning the reader, that our conclusions are tentative hypotheses, and that he may make his own by scanning the data presented here, we suggest that the totality of data available do not show that the rural population on the whole is of less intelligence than the urban population, at least, the great bulk of the urban population. The actual achievements, and partly the mental tests of farmer-peasants, do not show them to be of lesser intelligence as summarized in the previous chapter. The survey of mental disease rates as given here do not show that the urban organism is any better adapted to its environment than the rural organism to its rural environment. We have analyzed the two different types of environment, and shown conspicuous differences. We have analyzed the two different types of behavior in the individual and collective attempts to accommodate to these environments. Our net conclusion is that the bulks of either population do not show greater ability, on the whole, than the bulk of the other to accommodate to these environments. The most important difference between the urban-rural intellects is that the intelligence of the urban population shows a greater variability or contrasts from that of the rural population. The cities have the greatest amounts of genius, on the one hand, and the greatest amounts of mental defectives on the other. The next chapter devoted to the Experience Worlds of the rural and urban groups, and the agricultural and non-agricultural classes, carries this analysis further.

CHAPTER XIII

THE EXPERIENCE WORLDS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES OF THE RURAL–URBAN POPULATIONS

The Experience Worlds of Rural-Urban Population. Previous chapters have shown for certain that farmer-peasant intelligence is not lower than those of the urban unskilled and semi-skilled classes. Probably it is even higher than those of the skilled and clerical employees. Leaving aside the selectional factors which may play a part in it, how may we explain such a result from the standpoint of the environments of the agricultural and the urban labor classes? This chapter, tending to show some important differences, partly answers the question.

Every man's total experience or knowledge may be divided into two principal parts: *direct experience or knowledge* through organs of sense obtained in the way of direct contact with a given object or event or human being and its actions; and *indirect experience or knowledge* obtained, not in "face-to-face" or immediate contact with the objects, events, or human phenomena, but indirectly through various secondary sources of information: newspapers, books, hearsay, movies, pictures, and so on, which depict, describe, or tell about the corresponding phenomena. If a man himself has dealt with a cow, has visited London or has driven an automobile, in other words, if he saw, heard, smelled, touched, or manipulated with the corresponding object immediately but not with a substitute, his experience concerning the object is direct, at least in part. If he knows about London or a cow or an automobile only from various descriptions, never having been in London, etc., his experience is indirect, received not from the corresponding objects themselves but from some substitute for these objects. Each of these classes of experience has various degrees of completeness or adequacy, beginning with the highest degree of superficiality and ending with a thorough knowledge—direct and indirect—of a given phenomenon. These two forms of experience are essentially different and have different cognitive values. Other conditions being equal, the direct experience is more important. On the whole it is more valuable, and is less liable to be fallacious.

The problem to be discussed now is the total relative amount of direct and indirect experience of the farmer-peasant class in com-

parison with that of the labor classes of the urban population. Is it greater quantitatively and different qualitatively? Any answer given to this question must be only tentative and, at the best, may embody only some outstanding differences. After this warning let us set forth the hypotheses which appear the most plausible. Discarding many individual variations and deviations from the rule, all in all, *the indirect experience of the urban man, on the average, seems to be wider and extends on a more numerous and various phenomena while his direct experience is rather narrower and extends on a less numerous and less manifolded phenomena than that of a farmer-peasant.* The substantiation of this hypothesis begins with the amount of indirect experience of an urban dweller and a farmer-peasant. That the indirect experience of an urbanite is wider and concerns more numerous and diversified phenomena, follows, in the first place, from the above established fact that the system of interaction or contact of an urbanite extends to a larger area and contains more numerous contacts with more varied phenomena than that of a peasant or farmer. (See Chapter II.) An urbanite's system of interaction puts him in contact with "the whole world" while a farmer's experience is limited primarily within his neighborhood and a few phenomena outside. If the proposition concerning the urban and rural systems of interaction is true, the statement concerning the comparative "volume" of the indirect experience of the city and the country man must also be valid. The second proposition is but a conclusion which follows from the first one.

A second corroboration of the proposition is the greater literacy of the urban and a greater diffusion of higher education within the urban population compared with the rural. It is reasonably certain that practically in all countries, when the native-born population is considered, the per cent of illiteracy is somewhat higher within the rural compared with the urban population. The following data for America and Poland shows this to be true.[1]

Comparative Indices of Illiteracy

Country	*Year*	*Urban*	*Rural*
U. S. of America	1920	5.1	10.1
Poland	1921	37.7 38.7	78.1 59.1 *

* Departments of Polesie and Wilno.

In Italy Dr. R. Bachi found the following per cent of illiterates in the population at the age 6 years and over in the city of Torino and the

[1] *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1925, p. 27. See also *Farm Population of the United States*, 1920, pp. 155 ff.; *Annuaire statistique Polonaise*, 1924, p. 21.

zones around the city according to their specified distances from it (1911).

PER CENT OF THE ILLITERATES FOR THE POPULATION AT THE AGE OF 6 YEARS AND OVER

Torino	*Both Sexes*	*Males*	*Females*
Zone up to 10 kilometers from the city	5	4	6
From 10 to 20 klm.	8.11	7.09	9.10
" 20 to 30 "	8.49	7.24	9.72
" 30 to 40 "	8.52	7.10	9.84
	10.56	8.77	12.18

Thus the diffusion of education appears more intensive in the city and "near by than in the country, and in the rural parts situated far from the city. The frequency of illiteracy gradually increases as one passes from the nearer to more remote zones from a big city." [2] Although there are some irregularities, as a rule, the diffusion of education is certainly greater in the city than in the country. In Russia the situation is shown by the following figures per 1,000 conscripted persons (1925) of each specified social class. There were the following per cents in each educational group.

DEGREES OF EDUCATION

	City Working Class	*Higher Employees*	*Peasants*
College	0.01	1.22	0.00
Secondary	3.29	27.58	0.55
Elementary	39.38	45.65	19.85
Uneducated	49.11	25.33	67.13
Illiterate	8.21	0.22	12.47

In Bulgaria, in 1920–1924, 34.6 per cent of the illiterates were in the country and only 17.7 per cent in the city.

What has been said for literacy, may be said of higher forms of education. As a rule, the city population, on the whole, has a greater per cent of people (according to age and sex) who have secondary or college educations than the country population.[3] The cities, up to the present time, have been the abodes of colleges and universities, and their students are composed in a greater proportion (in relation to the population) out of city people than country people.

[2] Bachi, R., "Influenze demografiche della grande città," *Giornale degli economisti*, Vol. 49, pp. 389–392; the data for Russia are taken from *Ten Years of Soviet Power*, quoted, pp. 76–77; for Bulgaria from *Annuaire statistique de Bulgarie*, 1926, p. 44.

[3] Even in the United States where the situation is much better, according to the findings of E. E. Windes based on the data of six states, "the percentage of the farm groups enrolled (in high schools) is 15.5 less than for the non-farm group." Windes, E. E., *High School Education*, Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Education, Bull. 1925, No. 6, pp. 5–6.

This category of facts testifies that indirect experience or knowledge is more diffused within the urban than the rural population because the ability to read and write, not to mention the higher forms of education, means an additional ability to get information (from books, papers, lectures, etc.) about the most various things, information which is unaccessible to an illiterate or less educated man at the virtue of his illiteracy or lack of education.

The same conclusion is suggested by the fact that, on the average, *the city population reads more newspapers and magazines, attends more movies, theaters, lectures, exhibitions, museums, and is served by a thicker net of telephones, telegraphs, radios and other means of diffusion of information than country people.*

Since these and similar instrumentalities of diffusion of information exist in the city in a greater number, and function more intensively, it is rather certain that the indirect experience of a city man is larger and richer and more diversified than that of a rural man, especially a peasant or a farmer. Daily observation seems to corroborate this conclusion. An urbanite is a man "who knows everything." He reads and follows the events in Nicaragua, China, Russia, and in other countries. From various sources of information throughout his life, he gets fragments of knowledge in chemistry, physics, biology, political, social, moral and other sciences. He is a kind of an encyclopedist whose "mental luggage" contains a bit of information about the most diversified of things, objects, events, and phenomena. Through his movies and theaters, radios and pictures he sees the most various countries, peoples, sceneries, dramas, comedies, types of men, human stories and what not. Through his contact with the most different people (his city neighbors) he obtains some knowledge of the nations, peoples, manner, mores, beliefs, social and political régimes, and so on and so forth. In all these respects, as a rule, the opportunities of a rural dweller are much more limited. For this reason his "mental luggage" is narrower and less diversified than that of an urbanite.

However, all this is true only of indirect experience or knowledge. When we take direct experience, and especially the combination of direct and complete experience, the situation is different. From this standpoint, the character and the volume of the direct occupational experience which daily puts a man in contact with real objects and events connected with his occupational work, and routine of life, are especially important. Compare from this standpoint a farmer or peasant, on the one hand, on the other, a city working man or clerk or practically the majority of the clerical, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled classes of the city. With some exceptions, their occupational "jobs" represent a series of manual or mental operations very

limited in diversity and relatively very monotonous, requiring, after they are learned, little exercise of mental capacity and initiative, and secluding them within a relatively narrow "occupational environment" (factory, office, shop) which hides, so to speak, the wide world from them, and does not put them into a direct contact with it. Indeed, from a realistic standpoint, the direct occupational work and environment of the bulk of the city population, especially now, when the division of labor is exceedingly great, is conspicuously narrow and poor and monotonous. From day to day he is in the same (or a similar) factory, shop, and office, often even a small corner of it. From day to day he carries on the same operations which, in modern factories or shops or offices, are exceedingly "specified" and often consist only in an automatic repetition of certain manual movements of certain parts of the body, or for clerks and salesmen, in a little more complex, but still monotonous, manipulation of their daily routine work. All this is done with the accuracy of an automaton, in performance, hours of work, and so on. The work itself, for the bulk of the employees, is planned beforehand. They have to execute only what is told them; no organizing capacity; no exercise of initiative or planning; no responsibility and risk for the fitness of the plan or organization is required from them. Such above direct experience is received only by a small group of "bosses." Modern industrialization, among other effects, has called forth in the cities the following results on the labor classes:

(1) "Machine tends to supersede human skill . . . and man, as the agent of production." (2) "The transformation of the working class from a discrete body of skilled men (at early stages of urbanization) of a relatively high type, into a concrete body largely composed of relatively low type." (3) "Transfer of the initiative of production from individual craftsmen to a financial operator—the manufacturer—controlling automatic machines and a large body of relatively unskilled workmen." (4) "The extinction of the craftsman and his replacement by the machine and the factory hands." (5) "The change of the character of the individual; a lack of 'handiness' and self-helpfulness." (6) "Lowering of the æsthetic taste and standards and substitution of æsthetic obtuseness and vulgarity of taste for fine taste and perfect æsthetic art; loss of culture, resulting from an individual's transference from the position of an executant to that of a passive spectator or listener." [4]

As a result, in occupational work and contact with occupational reality, the bulk of the city population is put under the conditions of

[4] Freeman, R. A., *Social Decay and Regeneration*, pp. 199–203 and *passim;* see also Patrick, G. T. W., *The Psychology of Social Reconstruction;* Waldt, "Die Fabrik als Unwelt des Arbeiters," *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, June, 1928; Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility*, pp. 516–519.

"robots," or automatons,[5] where their direct experience is exceedingly narrow and monotonous, their real occupational environment is still more limited and the direct contact with reality is incomplete and reduced to an insignificant fraction of the real world.

In a less degree the same may be said of many mental occupational groups of the city—its middle and upper strata. Take even such occupations as those of college professors or journalists. Their indirect experience is enormous. They read thousands of books. They study hundreds of problems. They seem to know everything. However, this "unlimited experience" is predominantly book-experience. It is derived not from direct dealing with reality but with "the shadows of reality," with various substitutes which, as a rule, are made "second-hand." Outside of the narrow strip of his specialty, a scholar knows other things only from "book-eating." A journalist who writes about everything, secures his "knowledge" from the same indirect sources of information, often quite inadequate, distorted, and unsatisfactory. Therefore their "real or direct experience" is again very much limited and often does not go beyond "book-eating." And the whole occupational work is practically reduced to the operations of reading, writing, and some financial transactions connected with printing and editing. They may write "excellently" about China or Russia, never having seen those countries; about labor conditions, never having worked in a factory; about a solution of the agricultural question, never having worked on a farm; about the best constitution, never trying to engage themselves in the work of a statesman; and so on. And they write about all those things, practically knowing very little, if anything, of them; and often they have a success among their urban readers regardless as to whether their statements are true or, what is more often, quite wrong because their urban readers know directly still less about those things and therefore are ready to swallow any nonsense if it is properly served.

In brief, the direct occupational experience of the bulk of the city population, at the present moment, is relatively narrow, monotonous, and limited. It is disproportionately small in comparison with the indirect experience. Of course, outside of the occupational contact with reality, the city man has other possibilities of acquiring some experience directly. But, as a rule, such experience is almost always quite superficial, fragmentary, distorted, and incidental because any serious knowledge requires some time and effort for its obtaining

[5] Shall we wonder since these operations are so narrow and monotonous, that they can be successfully performed by real automatons and, as a matter of fact, these "mechanical men" are replacing real men more and more in the performance of such work. The examples of the telephone, gas, and water supply industries where recently such a replacement of men by "mechanical men" has taken place, are typical.

and it is impossible to know anything thoroughly without a laborious and continuous effort to keep oneself in a direct contact with this "anything."

Turn now to the occupational world of a farmer or peasant. The totality of the occupational functions performed by him is much more numerous and the work is much more diversified and puts him into direct and substantial contact with more numerous aspects of the world of real objects and phenomena compared with the occupational direct contacts with reality by the bulk of urban population. Almost every farmer or peasant in this respect is an encyclopedist. Due to a less division of labor in agriculture, the average farmer or peasant performs very numerous and different occupational functions: fertilization of land, its clearing, its preparation for cultivation, plowing, sowing, mowing, taking the harvest, its transportation from one place to another; animal breeding, feeding of cattle, taking care of them; functions of preparation of milk, butter, and other dairy products; cutting wood and preparation of fuel; the farm family further takes care of such things as preparation of meals, and clothing; add to this that almost every farmer and peasant is in some degree a carpenter, a blacksmith, a woodcutter, a painter, a miller, and a mason; again every farmer is, to a degree, an organizer of his own business and in this capacity through selling and buying he is a salesman and consumer. Since he is, at the same time, an entrepreneur and a working man, he is not a stranger to the psychology of an entrepreneur, or that of a manual worker. His experience embraces the pains and pleasures of both these occupational categories. Add to this that many a farmer and peasant have, especially in the winter time, some subsidiary occupation, differing from agriculture properly (hunting, fishing, lumbering, various forms of home-manufacturing and home-industry). Without continuing this list, which enumerates only a few of the usual occupational tasks and experiences of a farmer-peasant, one scarcely may doubt that his direct-occupational experience is very substantial, and manifolded; it is rather richer, less monotonous, more diversified, and concerns more numerous sides of the real world than that of the bulk of the city population.

The farmer is, not indirectly but directly, to some extent a meteorologist, geographer, geologist, chemist, botanist, zoölogist, economist, not to mention a politician and citizen. His occupation forces him to be in a direct and incessant contact with the most different sides of the world. His "shop" is not a small place in a corner of a building, but the whole space surrounding his farm, from the sky to the soil and subsoil; everything that happens there—rains, tornadoes, changes of temperature, dryness, invasion of various enemies of the crop, and so on—concerns his work directly, is to be

noticed and counterbalanced immediately, and has been familiar and known to him since childhood. Correspondingly, in a practical way, all these enter as constituents of the direct and substantial experience of the farmer; the same may also be said of many biological, social, and economic phenomena. All these various phenomena are studied by the farmer not from books and other indirect sources, but by incessant direct dealing with them. He learns these real things, so to speak, with his whole body, feet, hands, and muscles. Certainly his "bookish" and "terminological" knowledge of even those phenomena is often "childish" and yet, his knowledge of "how they behave and change and what are their particular qualities and characteristics" (of a tree, locality, cow, horse, aspect of the clouds, quality of a crop and so on) is remarkable. It is far better than that of an urbanite and sometimes even of a specialist. In this sense, it seems probable that the totality of the direct experience of a farmer is richer and more substantial than that of an urbanite. Anyway, proportionately to his indirect experience, it is much greater than that of an urbanite. Thus, in the field of indirect experience the superiority seems to belong to an urbanite; in the field of the direct experience it rather belongs to a farmer. The city dweller knows everything from indirect sources; his mental vistas are broad; he talks about and can talk about the most different things; he is versed in world-politics, philosophy, arts, sciences, fashions, economics, and what not. But all this is known to him quite superficially and in a fragmentary manner; often the knowledge is a mere pseudo-knowledge, scraped from some "popular" or "yellow" article or incompetent lecturer, or some similar sources.[6] Therefore, one understands that such half-knowledge is often pseudo-knowledge, scarcely better than complete ignorance. The farmer's outlook, from the standpoint of indirect knowledge, is much narrower; he often does not know anything that is going on outside of his country or province; he is quite ignorant in many fields; and a snappy urbanite may successfully shine before him in all the brilliancy of his "education" and "omniscience." Nevertheless, in the field of direct experience, the farmer's share is rather better than that of an average "proletarian" with his very narrow field of direct and substantial dealing with realities.

From this fundamental difference a series of other differences follow. *In so far as the farmer has a very narrow field of indirect knowledge he very easily may be misled or imbued with the most fallacious opinions, superstitions, and prejudices concerning all the phenomena which lie beyond the boundary line of his direct knowledge.* He does not know anything about those phenomena and for this reason, may accept

[6] Compare L'Houet, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–51. See also C. H. Cooley's excellent remarks in his *Social Organization*, p. 99.

any opinion which does not contradict his other opinions. In this respect he is less sophisticated than an urbanite and is more open to propaganda for the most fallacious theories and beliefs. On the other hand, *the wider range of direct experience of a farmer-peasant makes him more resistant to many inadequate and wrong theories, beliefs, and propaganda which may find considerable following within the bulk of the city population on account of the narrow character of its direct experience.* The wider range of direct experience of the farmer gives him a wide "common sense." Since it is derived from direct contacts with realities, it is adequate. Since it is adequate, it does not need great or rapid changes and corrections. *For this reason and also because his indirect knowledge is not disproportionately developed, the farmer-peasants' mental luggage is more stable and less fluctuating than many attitudes and convictions of the city population, often based on an inadequate and overdeveloped indirect experience, which inadequacy makes many changes necessary in order to correct or to replace one attitude, opinion, or belief with another.*

Some Other Psychological Characteristics. In the preceding discussion, we have paid particular attention to the intellectual side of the rural-urban mind. Are there some general differences between rural-urban classes in other psychological processes and traits: in perception, representation, association, emotionality, character, and temperament? Very little that is certain may be said about these points, partly on account of a lack of studies and objective data, and partly on account of the difficulty of the problem itself. With this reservation and warning, we shall try (quite tentatively) to outline some differences which to us appear probable and significant.

Perceptions, Representations, Memory, and Associations. "Any occupation requires (from one who remains in it for a long time) not only physical but also psychological adaptation for its performance. From a musician, his occupation demands a special musical ability; from a painter, a sharp sense of color and forms; from a bookkeeper, accuracy; and from a prostitute, a suppression of the usual repulsion of being handled by everybody. Without a corresponding psychical accommodation, one cannot successfully perform his occupational work and either will be fired or will quit it himself. Therefore, all the psychological processes of any member of an occupation undergo modification, especially when one stays for a long time in the same occupation. The processes of perception and sensation, attention, imaginative reproduction, and association bear the marks of a corresponding occupation." [7]

This general statement gives a key for an understanding of the differences now discussed. As a general rule it is possible to state

[7] Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility*, p. 321.

that in *perception, sensation, attention, imaginative reproduction, representation and associations, the farmer-peasant mind or nervous system is more sensitive regarding the objects and phenomena connected—directly or indirectly—with its occupational world and less sensitive in regard to many urban phenomena which are relatively strange to the farmer-peasant occupational environment.*[8] In the same combination of stimuli, for instance, in the same landscape, the attention of a farmer is attracted by "agricultural aspects" of the landscape, by its soil, suitability for cultivation, its profitableness from the standpoint of agriculture, its fitness for farming and the farmhouse, for cattle breeding, and so on, while the attention of an urban man, whether a manufacturer, workingman, poet, historian, or salesman, would be attracted by different aspects of the landscape. The farmer would notice a series of characteristics there which would be missed by the urbanite, and would miss many traits which would be noticed by the urbanite. Both, objectively, have the same combination of stimuli, or the same view, but each, according to his occupation, sees and perceives different things. The same may be said in the realm of memory and the stream of associations. If the processes of sensation and perception—or the nervous receptors—of the farmer are particularly sensitive toward the phenomena connected with his habitual and occupational environment and are relatively dull in regard to the other objects, his processes of reproduction and memory and association are also "colored" by agriculturism. He is liable to remember, out of the infinitely numerous perceptions, particularly those which have a bearing to his occupation and which, as such, were "attended" and noticed and were registered intensively by his nervous system. On the other hand, many phenomena, heterogeneous to his habitual and occupational world, though they are "perceived," are likely to disappear quickly from "his mind" and memory. In a similar way, the stream of associations in the farmer-peasant mind is also "colored" with agriculturism. The flow of various images and representations in his mind are all the time "colored" and "crowded" mostly with images of various agricultural objects and phenomena—wheat, hay, grass, cattle, fields, rain, thunderstorms, plows, various agricultural operations and so on. In the mind of a banker, mechanic, teacher, or merchant, the same stimuli (objectively) would call forth associations quite different in character in which "agricultural objects and phenomena" would play very little part, if any. This difference in its concrete form may have very numerous variations; nevertheless, in the sense outlined, it is general and constant. All these processes are the same in the farmer and, at the same time,

[8] This is the answer we suggest to the old question as to which, rural or urban, are the more "suggestible."

quite different from the social groups of different habitual and occupational pursuits. The "agricultural coloration" makes this constant difference.

As to *the comparative velocity of movement* of these processes in the nervous systems of farmers and of the urban classes, nothing certain may be said. It may be probable that, all in all, the velocity of the *mental processes of the farmers* is somewhat slower on account of the slower rhythm of rural life compared with urban. A series of general considerations seems to suggest this. The very complexity and fastness of urban life requires a quickness and plasticity of responses on the part of the urbanites. The whole of city life is permeated by hurrying, rushing, and by a maddening pace. For this reason an urbanite's reactions are to be expected as faster and the processes of perception and association, as prerequisites or satellites of the responses, must be faster also than in the rural dwellers. Rural life is much more free from this rush. One cannot hasten the processes of nature much; the country path or road is generally free from any great amount of hurrying traffic; the work itself requires not so much rushing, persistency, and patience. Hence the difference as discussed. However, the hypothesis is to be tested before it has any claim for validity.

Emotionality and Character. The complex totality of psychical processes and traits designated imperfectly by the term character, emotionality, will-power, and so on, is too little analyzed, as yet, and practically has not been studied at all from the comparative standpoint. Therefore, we do not know whether there are some general differences, in this respect, between the agricultural and non-agricultural classes. Ordinary observation shows that among farmers and peasants there are "emotional" and "unemotional," "extrovert" and "introvert," types of personality; men with "strong" and "weak" characters. Whether the proportion of each of these types among the agricultural population is different than among the urban classes we do not know. In a purely tentative way, and as a deduction from some environmental conditions of the class studied, it is possible to set forth the following hypothesis. As the material standard of living of the farmer-peasant class is much less comfortable than that of the city upper and middle classes; and as in comparison with all city classes, there is less use by the farmer-peasants of "softening" and "feminine" objects—perfumes, candies, face-powder, lipsticks, tender and soft clothes, "overdone food," "soft drinks," "alcoholic beverages," "overcomfortable bed," and so on—we must conclude that the material and economic conditions of the rural class are more devoid of many "softening" and "comforting" conditions present in the cities. In so far as such fundamental conditions of habitual

environment must exert some influence on the psychology of the people living amidst them (and are also indices of their character at the same time) we must expect that *on the whole, in comparison with the bulk of the city population, the farmer-peasant personality is less "soft" and "feminized" and more stern and austere or "puritanic."*

The same conclusion seems to be suggested by the nature of occupational work of the agricultural class. It deals not with plastic, mild, and yielding human materials or with changeable and fanciful products of human activity but directly with nature and its forces. Farmers or peasants incessantly, and under all conditions, are face to face with formidable, indefatigable, natural powers, devoid of all sentiment, with rigid laws and changes going on regardless of human desires and interests. Some aspects of nature may call forth tender and fine feelings in man, but nature itself is never soft; it answers to neither requests and supplications, nor flattery and diplomacy; nothing but effort, work, patience and proper adaptation to its laws can make it adapt its course to the happiness and welfare of man. Incessant dealing with such a power correspondingly stamps the personality of the cultivators with corresponding marks of stern and virile characteristics. Further, the work itself consists largely in hard, sometimes rough and exhausting, physical operations where there is very little softness and fineness. Sometimes natural conditions require from the farmer a display of extraordinary *patience;* sometimes, especially in harvesting, an extraordinary *release of energy, strenuous efforts, and endurance;* and always it exacts *common sense* and some *thoughtfulness.* Without the above the cultivator is doomed to fail in his relentless struggle for existence. And note: he must display these qualities not once or twice or for some short moment or moments like various urban champions of the prize ring, or aviation, or inventing, or "kings of finance," but incessantly throughout his life. This statement is not intended to minimize the years of patient struggle back of most urban achievement, whether in the prize ring, in aviation, in science, or on the market. It is intended merely to call attention to the fact that success as a cultivator is a continuous process of struggle. No one lucky stroke can make or break a farmer or peasant. No single market judgment or invention or flight will make him successful. He must struggle on and on throughout life. *Thus, the above traits of virility, sternness, austereness, patience, endurance, and ability for continued effort must be conspicuously developed in the farmer-peasant personality type.*

He has all the virtues of life spent in constant battle with the forces of nature. As tenacious as he is patient, the more he is buffeted, the harder he works. . . . Like the winter stream of the river upon which he often lives, he may be sluggish in mind, but, like the

same river in summer, when roused he will overflow with an energy and force that make him occasionally as dangerous in peace as he is always formidable in war. He will then stick at nothing. Otherwise he is sober enough, with a shrewd, picturesque humour which makes his language a joy to those who delight in vivid expression. He is rarely extravagant; and in his way he is industrious, toiling, if need be, under a sun that would kill the thin-skulled" (urbanite). "To three things he is passionately attached: his religion, his family, and his land; and for one thing he cares little: politics; while there is one person he hates: the money lender." [9]

This brief description of the character of the Punjab peasant, with slight changes, may be applied to the type of farmer-peasant personality generally.

From the standpoint of these traits there is a great deal of truth in the contention that the mind of farmer-peasant is much nearer to the spirit of the Old Testament with its stern, austere, rigid, always virile and just, but never soft, moral code than to that of the New Testament with its soft, forgiving, extra-humanitarian and tender moral of love.[10] The first originated under the conditions of pure agriculturalism; the other was purely urban in its origin and early development.[11] We must not be surprised that the Roman peasants most stubbornly resisted Christianity; and that, even when it was accepted, under the name of the Christian religion, the real religious, moral, and social personality of the rural class remained still nearer to the spirit of the Old than to that of the New Testament.

The above differences are deductions. Nevertheless, in subsequent chapters which deal with factual data we shall see that these deductions are conspicuously supported by inductive materials. The Political, Religious, Moral, Family, and other attitudes of the class studied exhibit those characteristics quite tangibly.

Imagination. It is often said that farmer-peasant imagination and fantasy are much poorer than those of the city classes. Such a statement in this general form is scarcely acceptable. The history of literature and arts contradicts it very definitely. Indeed, the poems, ballads, fairy-tales, mythology, legends, and folk-poetry of the agri-

[9] Darling, M. L., *The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt*, pp. xiii–xiv. These traits were emphasized practically by all great writers of the past, such as Hesiod, Virgil, Horace, Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Varro, Cato, Columella, Tacitus, Pliny, Seneca, Ibn-Khaldun, not to mention the later writers. See their statements in the mentioned *Source-Book in Rural Sociology*, when it is published.

[10] See a very suggestive development of this theory in L'Houet, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 275–289.

[11] See Guignebert, Charles, *Christianity, Past and Present, passim.* "The most stubborn resistance to Christianity comes from the country people, the *pagani*. The word *paganus* means a dweller in the country (*pagus*). It has now been demonstrated that the hostility of the peasantry to Christianity gave the meaning of 'pagan' to *paganus*." *Ibid.*, p. 175.

cultural (pre-urban) period are marked by an unexcelled richness of fantasy and imagination. Take the *Iliad*, *Odyssey* and other mythological and poetical products of the Greek genius displayed at the predominantly agricultural stage; *Mahabharata* of the Hindu or the *Edda* of the Norse; or the Finnish epic of *Kalevala;* or the *Niebelungenliede* of the Teutons; or *One Thousand and One Nights* of the Arabs; or the series of Russian epical poems; or the folklore of many other pre-urban agricultural peoples collected by ethnographers and ethnologists; or *King Arthur's Tales;* or the mythology of China and India; [12] these and many other epics produced at periods of insignificant urbanization and in almost pure agricultural stages display an infinite richness of imagination and fantasy, such that it is hard to find literary products of later periods which can rival or excel them in these respects. More than that, many products of the rich imagination of later periods are rich often because they elaborate the beliefs, legends, tales, and narratives of the preceding, and predominantly agricultural periods.

This fact alone is sufficient to show the fallacy of the opinion discussed in historical perspective. In the same perspective it is rather to be expected that, in so far as the agricultural stages are nearer to man's childhood and in so far as childhood is richer in imagination than older ages, the agricultural peoples naturally display imagination and fantasy anyhow not less than the highly urbanized stages.[13]

The only probable difference in this respect is this: *the kinds of imagination and fantasy of rural and urban populations are likely to be different in their concrete forms—in regard to topics, images, associations, and combinations.* It is hard to expect a poem or a legend from a city mechanic or financier in which various spirits of corn, agricultural deities, agricultural landscape, and agricultural objects and events are the topics of his ideational creation and the constituents of his fantastic activity. He knows too little of these matters, and he is too little interested in them to be able to produce anything remarkable inculcating these scenes and characters. And *vice versa*, it is probable that the fantasy of a peasant would not be particularly productive in an elaboration of an epic whose topics are: engines, financial transactions, detective adventures, college teaching, or any other urban topic little known to him. The imagination of each is considerably stamped and colored by his environment. This we shall see in the chapters about Religion and Beliefs, and Forms of Arts of the rural classes. Since the rural-urban environments are different, different shall be the forms of imagination of the corre-

[12] See Frazer, J. G., *The Spirit of Corn, passim;* see further chapters about Religion and Arts in this book.

[13] This was excellently developed already by J. B. Vico in his famous *Scienza Nuova* and by Ibn-Khaldun in *Prolegomenés to the Science of Universal History.*

sponding populations. Besides this difference there are no valid reasons, as yet, to think that farmer or peasant fantasy is duller or poorer than those of the urban peoples.

Logic and Reasoning Processes. There is no valid evidence that the logical ability and the processes of thinking of the rural class are different in nature from those of the urban classes. The study of rural intelligence and mental diseases has not shown that the bulk of the urban population are in better shape than the rural. In so far as intelligence is another term for the designation of logical and thinking ability, this means that there is no ground for an assumption that these abilities of the rural class are lower than those of the bulk of the city populations.

There is also no valid reason to claim that the logical and thinking processes of the agricultural classes are different, "less scientific" or more faulty than those of the city classes, as has been claimed by some writers. These theories[14] either have been purely speculative and dogmatic or their evidences have been highly defective and unconvincing.[15] All that it seems possible to say in this respect is this: *farmer-peasant logic and reasoning are sound within the field of phenomena of their direct experience and knowledge, and often are defective, faulty and biased in the field of the phenomena outside of their direct experience and on subjects generally little known by them.* The same is true about any city group with the difference that the sphere of the direct and indirect experience of each of those groups is different. The judgments of experienced automobile mechanics about car construction, engines, and so on would certainly be more adequate than that of an ordinary farmer; but the farmer's judgments about many agricultural phenomena would certainly be much better than those of a garage man.

Each group has its own strong and weak points. The following cases give an illustration of the above statements about the soundness of farmers' judgment in the field of their direct, and the faultiness in the field of their indirect experience. In the field of direct experience the class studied shows a remarkable ability to think and, what is more, to change vital practices according to the "commands of sound reason." For instance, in Denmark about the middle of the nineteenth century there appeared a need for agricultural savings banks. In 1850 there appeared 37 of these banks; in 1865 there were 76; and in 1886, as many as 496. About the same time it became necessary to change fundamentally the entire system of agriculture. The result was that "with unique ability and alacrity, the Danish peasantry obeyed the demands of the new circumstances." [16] Or,

[14] See for instance Carli, F., *L'equilibrio delle nazioni*, pp. 187 ff.

[15] See the criticism of such theories in Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 413 ff.

[16] Manniche, P., *op. cit.*, pp. 130–131.

another example, in America, when some new and sound methods of farming and home-economics were shown to the farmers by the extension division agencies 74 per cent of all the farms reached by the agencies adopted these new methods.[17]

Zimmerman and Black attempted to make a quantitative and statistical analysis of the thinking and attitudes of Minnesota farmers regarding the various problems concerning the phenomena of coöperation in marketing.[18] On the basis of this analysis a few theories were suggested as follows:

Rural attitudes are of two general classes—realistic and non-realistic. That is, the one type includes those objects concerning which the farmer can get some first hand experience and the other includes phenomena that are removed from his environment either by complexity or by geographic or social distance. An illustration is the use of legal contracts as the *main* type of control of membership by a coöperative. Moorhead, a community without coöperative experience, was organizing for coöperative marketing for potatoes. Seventy per cent of the farmers favored the use of the contract and yet when they attempted to do business, this was one of the more troublesome communities of contract breakers.

The following table gives the correlation between coöperative experience and attitudes favorable to certain types of business practices by coöperatives:

Correlations of Coöperative Experience with Attitudes Favoring Certain Organization Business Practices[19] (345 Cases)

Type of Coöperative Business Practice	*Gross Correlation Coefficient Between Favorable Attitudes and Experience*	*Three Times the Standard Error*
Use of membership contracts	+0.466	0.126
Use of capital stock in organization	—0.015	0.161
Dealing with non-members	+0.587	0.106
Pooling of sales-product	+0.907	0.028
Use of federated types of organization	+0.533	0.116
Use of supply and demand price	+0.452	0.128
Central control of quantity of production	+0.701	0.082
Central control of quality of production	+0.581	0.107

[17] Wilson, M. C., "The Effectiveness of Extension," etc., *U. S. D. A. Bull.* No. 1384, 1926, p. 19.

[18] Zimmerman, Carle C., and Black, John D., "The Marketing Attitudes of Minnesota Farmers," *Minnesota Technical Bull. 45, Agricultural Experiment Station, 1926;* Zimmerman, Carle C., "Types of Farmers' Attitudes," *Social Forces,* Vol. 5, 1927, pp. 591 ff.; Zimmerman, Carle C., and Anderson, Arnold, "Attitudes of Rural Preachers," *Journal of Applied Sociology,* 1927; *Proceedings of American Sociological Society,* Vol. 32, 1926, p. 271.

[19] See Zimmerman, C. C., *Social Forces,* Vol. 5, 1927, pp. 591 ff.

This table shows definite tangible correlations with experience for all of these attitudes except the use of capital stock in organization, The peculiar relationship regarding this factor might be due partly to a recent attack which had been made upon this type of organization by some proponents of another, non-capital stock, type of organization, and partly to the failure of numerous capital stock organizations promoted between 1919 and 1924 under the auspices of the Non-Partisan League. Again, this was a direct experience with negative results. The following table gives the definite relationship between coöperative experience and the so-called favorable attitudes regarding coöperation. Of course this represents some selection of favorable persons but at the same time it also means that practical experience is a big factor in the attitudes. Positive results of the direct experience increased the favorable attitudes to coöperation; lack of such experience is a partial cause of negative attitudes to coöperation.

Relationship Between Coöperative Experience and Attitudes Favorable to Coöperation [20]

Amount of Experience in Years	*Number in the Group*	*Per Cent Favor Coöperative Selling*
None	32	16
1–5	96	73
6–10	67	82
11–15	54	91
16–20	19	95
21–25	19	95
26–30	18	100
31–35	13	100
More than 35	27	100
Total	345	79

The alleged stubbornness of the class studied in regard to "scientific" novelties or new ideas or its inability to "think scientifically" is either a pure myth, or—in many cases—a mere lack of diffusion of such new things within the rural people due to the isolation from the agencies of diffusion; or, finally, a sound unwillingness to try a novelty whose positive values are not certain. Even such, on the first approach, "unscientific" agricultural practices as those of the Oriental peasantry, after a closer examination appear in quite a different light. Thanks to these practices "nearly 500,000,000 people (in China, India, Japan, and Korea) are being maintained chiefly upon the products of an area smaller than the improved farm-lands of the United States." [21] That is, these practices in fact are highly scientific and reasonable under the circumstances.

[20] From Zimmerman, *Social Forces, op. cit.*, p. 593.
[21] King, F. H., *Farmers of Forty Centuries*, pp. 17–23.

Attitudes of the less-realistic type may be illustrated by the ideas of the farmers concerning tariffs on imported goods. It is impossible for farmers to have much experience with these tariff duties because such are far removed from the individual and their effects reach the individual in a very indirect manner. In such cases tradition and many incidental circumstances become the dominant factor in the attitudes and the attitude itself relatively unstable and different in the various farmer groups. In the United States it happens that one phase of nationalism is put over to the public in the shape of arguments for the tariff. We have the peculiar situation in that farmers in the cotton states are free traders, those in the north and west are protectionists, and those across the line in Canada are free traders again. In this case there is a combination of factors such as traditions, organizations of parties, and the so-called psycho-social organization of beliefs. These bring about different results in different communities. For Minnesota they may be summarized as follows for the same 1924 study:

Attitudes of Farmers with Respect to Tariffs (345 Cases)

Type of Tariff	*Per Cent Favor*	*Per Cent Opposed*	*Per Cent No Attitudes*
For manufacturers	53.8	28.6	17.6
For farmers	70.4	17.6	12.0

Some of the general faults of farmer thinking (as well as of the urban people) in the field of the indirect and inadequate experience are as follows:

(a) The majority reason from particular phenomenon to general principles. They favor high tariffs in Minnesota because, as one put it, during Grover Cleveland's term of office, both tariffs and prices were low.

(b) The majority reason from simple analogy. They say farmers should organize because urban workmen are organized and, as a result, secure good wages.

(c) The greater number think that correlation means causation. The last Minnesota potato marketing organization existed during declining prices. Therefore, the conclusion was that the association was to blame. Some of the tobacco marketing associations in the south were organized on rising prices and secured the credit for such unavoidable success.

(d) They often reason from "Universal Truths" which are not proved. Needless to say that many of these universal truths are not true. One such common maxims among farmers in America, at least, is that farmers are the only producers. In this respect farmers are not so far from other groups. A good illustration is Karl Marx's labor theory of value.

(e) They often use vitalistic interpretations of economic and social forces. Farmers live personal lives. Their families and community organizations are essentially personal. As a result their customary method of interpreting economic and social forces is essentially vitalistic and personal. They often blame the market-men for low prices. If the cream test is low, they oftentimes blame the butter-maker rather than themselves or their cows. The ruling political party is often held responsible for the price level.

These and many other mental procedures must be reckoned as big factors in the development of the so-called less-realistic type of attitudes, where the full direct experience is lacking, no matter whether it concerns rural or urban people. Farmers think and behave according to the same principles as characterize other peoples, if the important differentiating factor of the occupational environment be given consideration.

To this it is possible to add one more remark. Many city groups—newspaper men, journalists, preachers, teachers, even college men, politicians, and so on, at the virtue of their occupation, are incessantly passing their judgments about all possible-existing and non-existing—things, objects, and events.[22] They have to do it. It is their business. They are forced to pose as the miraculous encyclopedists, who in their pocket, have a ready answer to all problems. Such a miracle, of course, is really impossible. Their real knowledge is very limited, and sometimes it is beggarly scarce. Therefore it is probable that in the majority of the judgments passed there is very little logicity and soundness. For this reason, the farmer-peasant class which is much less talkative; and is not forced to produce speech-reactions incessantly; and, as a matter of fact, even rarely pretends to talk about things which it does not know, is likely, in the total sum of its judgments to have higher proportions of sound and adequate judgments than the proportions of sound conclusions in the totality of the judgments of the urban classes.[23] This may appear paradoxical, and yet, it is likely to be true.

[22] Illustration: We took the copies of the *American Mercury* and tried to see the topics of the phenomena and books discussed by its editor. Within one year they ranged from the problem of gardening and architecture, to those of crime, family, sex, revolution, literature, constitutional law, banking, agriculture, painting, and so on. We are willing to recognize the talent of the editor, but we are certain that in the majority of the problems so unhesitatingly discussed by him, his competence was more than questionable; to be frank it was lacking. And yet, he unhesitatingly passed quite definite judgments, assailed a series of phenomena and recommended a series of other phenomena. In a similar manner all the above groups of "producers of speech-reactions" have to have at any given moment a ready answer and advice about any possible and impossible problem.

[23] From this standpoint newspapers and popular magazines dissipate not so much real knowledge as pseudo-knowledge, that is, ignorance, prejudices, superstitions, biases, and all kinds of nonsense "cooked" in a literary or scientific style.

After these general outlines of the mind of the class studied in its formal aspect let us turn now to a factual study of its "contents"—to the study of important attitudes and psycho-social characteristics of rural-urban peoples and cultures. In subsequent chapters after a concise survey of the theories in the field, we shall take, one after another, the field of intelligence, moral, social, religious, political, family, national and international, individualistic and coöperative attitudes of the farmer-peasant and urban populations and, on the basis of the factual data, shall see, first, what are the differences in these fields and, second, to what extent the data support the above schematical outline of the mental differences in the populations compared.

PART IV

A CROSS-SECTION OF RURAL–URBAN BEHAVIOR, INSTITUTIONS, AND CULTURE

CHAPTER XIV

SOURCES AND THEORIES CONCERNING THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL TRAITS OF FARMERS AND PEASANTS

Three Types of the Sources. Are there some differences in the psychological, moral, cultural, and social traits of the rural class in comparison with the city population? If so what are they? These are the problems to be analyzed now. It is evident that this field of study is very perilous. The phenomena are so complex, elusive, variable, and often intangible that the investigator often finds himself amidst a dark and wild forest without any compass, map, or path. For these reasons a great amount of caution is needed. For the same reasons even such cautiousness does not guarantee that an investigator will not make many blunders. This is to be stressed at the very start in order to warn the readers about these dangers, and to show that, although we set forth several statements and principles, these statements are not regarded by the writers as infallible truths. These same difficulties make the authors take a definite path in the study. We prefer to set forth less, but relatively more valid, statements than more numerous, but relatively less certain, generalizations. Where certain traits appear highly problematic we prefer to abstain from a denial or an assertion.

As an introduction to the subsequent analysis, it is advisable to cast a glance at the sources of the material which is used as a basis for the numerous theories in this field. These sources are various. In the first place, as far as various overt actions, forms of conduct, and the transubjective phenomena of rural culture are concerned, *an enormous bulk of various historical and statistical data offer a basis which permits the testing of corresponding hypotheses.* In subsequent chapters this material is used extensively and for this reason we need not survey it here. As far as psychical and mental characteristics of the rural class are concerned, the principal sources of information are the following: first, *a huge bulk of farmer-peasant characters, types, personalities and their traits given in stories, novels, poems, poetry, and literature.* This material represents an incorporation of the observation and understanding of farmer-peasant mind and soul by various writers and story tellers. A second source is given by the *statements, songs, stories, and letters, and so on, of farmers and peasants themselves.* These show what peasants and farmers themselves think about their own mind, character, personality, and life. *A third class of material*

is represented by numerous theories of investigators of the farmer-peasant mind and personality—by the theories of rural sociologists, rural economists, social psychologists, and so on. Our survey of the sources must concern itself with these three classes of material. Let us glance at each and see to what extent the material may serve as a solid basis for a construction of valid judgments about the phenomena under discussion.

Literature as a Source for a Sociological Study of the Psycho-Social Peculiarities of the Farmer-Peasant Class. For an understanding of a single case, various literary characters may be helpful, but for the construction of a theory of a "typical" rural mind and its constant differences from the urban mind this source, with a very few exceptions, is useless. First of all, any such literary character represents a subjective view of the writer and not an objectively described reality. A study of this kind of data is not a study of the reality of farmer-peasant psychology but that of the psychology of the writers themselves. These two phenomena are quite different and may not be identified. Second, it is sufficient to go through the characteristics of the class studied given by different writers, and sometimes by the same writer in different places, to see that they often depict the rural mind in quite an opposite way and ascribe to it so numerous and so different traits that no generalization is possible. Further, no criterion is given to judge whether the picture of any one writer is typical in contradistinction to the pictures of other writers. Besides, the characterization of peasants and farmers given in various literary sources shows such a dependence of these pictures on the personal and social status of the writers (who in their bulk are city men) that an investigator becomes aware at once that the writers reflect their own personality and the fashion of the time rather than the peasant or farmer as such. For instance, medieval literature almost uniformly depicts peasants as an incarnation of stupidity, as coarse and clumsy blockheads, while the bucolic literature of the eighteenth century and partly of the beginning of the nineteenth, depicts rural life as an incessant idyl, with happy, innocent and perfect rustics framed in an idyllic pastoral paradise. Even in the literature of the nineteenth century there were periods of enthusiastic and quite positive idealizing of the rustics and periods of pessimistic and negative characterization of the same class.[1] It is evident that such fashionable fluctuations are nothing

[1] See the facts in the history of literature of practically any European country. Samples of special monographs in the field which show this are given by the following works: Meissner, P., *Der Bauer in der englishen Literature*, pp. 1–26, 64–65, 166, and *passim;* Eckhardt, E., *Die lustige Person im alteren engl. Drama.* Palästra XVII; Dibelius, W., *Charles Dickens;* Skabitchevski, *Russian Literature* (Russ.); in America we have the contrasting types as illustrated by the chief characters in M. Ostenso's *Wild Geese* and *Dark Dawn*, and E. O'Neill's *Desire Under the Elms*, on the one hand, and the positive characterizations in the works of Willa Cather (see especially *My*

but fluctuations in the vogue of urban literature and not an objective reflection of rural people and rural life. The variety of views, and characteristics ascribed to farmer-peasant people by the same or various authors may be seen from the following abbreviated list of traits given by various writers to farmers and peasants. For the sake of brevity, only samples from American, English, and Russian literature are used. The same may be said of any other literature.

Superstitious Stupidity: Peasant character in the medieval *Towneley Play*, *Mankind*, John Pikering's *Horestes*, *How the Plowman Learned his Pater Noster;* peasant characters in the works of subsequent centuries, in a comedy *Misogonus;* (1560); Greene's *The Honorable History of Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay;* Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus*, *Antony and Cleopatra*, *Love's Labour's Lost;* some of Robert Burns' characters; some of W. Scott's characters; George Grabbe's descriptions; some of Thomas Hardy's characters. In Russian Literature: peasant characters of Chekhov (*Moujiki);* of Bunin (*Derevnia);* of Gorki; of Rodionov; of Poddiachev; of Pilniak; and of others. In American literature see the majority of the characterizations in J. Peterkin's Gullah Peasant Story, *Black April.* Some of the rural characters in S. Anderson's *Winesburg, Ohio;* one or several characters in most of Sinclair Lewis' books, especially *Main Street*, *Babbitt*, *Arrowsmith*, and *Elmer Gantry* and the entire characterization of farmer-peasants by H. L. Mencken and his followers. There are numerous others.

Supreme and Simple Wisdom: William Langland's *Piers the Ploughman;* Steeles' *Guardian* (1713) with its motto that happiness is found only "in the innocence and simplicity of country life" and that "the country hath the greatest share in an incorrupted life." R. Bloomfield's *The Farmer's Boy;* some of Robert Burns' farmer characters; William Wordsworth's characterization of farmers; Thomas Hardy's assertion of a perfect knowledge of nature by farmers. In Russia peasant characters and their philosophy in Gleb Ouspenski's, Slatovratski's, and Zasodimski's novels; L. Tolstoi's Platon Karataieff, and several other peasants' types. In America Edna Ferber's *So Big* (the mother); Ellen Glasgow's chief character in *Barren Ground;* Cannon's *Red Rust;* some of the characters in Peterkin's *Black April;* the country girls in W. Cather's *My Antonia; Marie Chapdelaine;* and dozens of others.

Happiness, Innocence, Morality, Sociality, Honesty, Spiritual Peace, Religiosity, Family Attachment, Piety, Loyalty, Love and Sympathy to Animals, Hospitality, and so on: *Piers Plowman's Crede* (1394), *The Plowman's Tale* (1395), and *God Spede*

Antonia); E. Ferber (see especially *So Big);* the chief characters in Cannon's *Red Rust;* Ellen Glasgow's *Barren Ground;* Cyril Hume's *Golden Dancer* and Sherwood Anderson's *Poor White* are also illustrations of the idealization of the creative farmer-peasant type.

the Plough; Chaucer's Plowman in *Canterbury Tales;* some of the poetical descriptions of Robert Fergusson; Steeles's types; some of Goldsmith's characters and sceneries; James Thompson's poetical statements; William Cowper's key-motive with the motto: God made the country, man made the town; the general tone of Robert Burns' and William Wordsworth's poetry; some of Walter Scott's characters; some of George Eliot's and Thomas Hardy's farmer personalities. In Russia, the majority of the peasant characters in the novels of I. Tourgeniev; L. Tolstoi; Gleb Ouspenski; Zlatovratski; Zasodimski; and many other Russian writers of the period from 1850 to the end of the nineteenth century. In America we have some of Herbert Quick's characters; Harold Bell Wright's idealizations; Rolvaag, *Giants in the Earth;* some characters in Marie Chapdelaine and many others.

Ignorance, Cruelty, Bestiality, Egotism, Materialism, Vice, Dirtiness, Sensuality, Narrow-mindedness, Moral Indifferentism, Coarseness, and Other Similar Characteristics: The dominant motives in the poetry, stories, and statements of George Grabbe ("All is want and wretchedness"); Maria Edgeworth; Charles Kingsley; Emily Brontë; some of the farmer characters of G. Eliot; T. Hardy. In Russia, the dominant motives of I. Bounin's; A. Chekhov's; Rodionov's; Podiachev's; and other modern Russian writers' peasant characters. In America see Caleb Gare, the old man in *Desire Under the Elms*, and numerous others.

In a similar manner, many other characteristics such as servility and haughtiness, alcoholism and soberness, hatred of the city and its admiration, cupidity or avarice and indifference to money, the spirit of revolt and unlimited patience, individualism, and collectivism, love of knowledge and indifference to it, and so on, are ascribed by various writers. This is true in the literary descriptions of peasants and farmers not only in American, English, or Russian but practically in the literature of all European countries. Since there is such a variety and contrast of farmer-peasant types in literature, we have no criterion for judging that one but not another literary type is general or typical for the farmer-peasant personality. Each of the great writers probably gave some real characterization but to what extent the traits are general the literature does not help to answer. This explains why this source is not particularly helpful for our purposes. It entitles only one conclusion, namely, that among farmers and peasants there are a great variety of characters and different personalities. In addition, some of the characteristics such as family attachment, attachment to the land or farm, and religiosity, are stressed rather uniformly by almost all writers. This argument suggests that these traits are really typical for the class studied.

This is practically all that may be ascertained from this source for our purposes.

Farmer-Peasants' Statements—as a Source for a Sociological Study of Their Psychology and Character. This source seems more reliable for our purposes. Indeed, on the first approach, what may be more authentic than statements of the members of the rural class themselves. In difference from the subjectivity of pictures drawn by literary men, the statements of the farmers and peasants are genuine. At the present moment we have rather abundant materials of this kind. Such are given in the letters of the people belonging to the farmer-peasant class. W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki give a sample study based on such material in their *Polish Peasant.* Further, we have many authentic opinions, beliefs, convictions, tastes, and other psychical experiences of farmers in their own statements, accurately described interviews, their own articles and publications, and in many similar forms. The publications like: *What Farm Women Think About Farm Life;*[2] *The Advantages of Farm Life;*[3] and *The Farm Woman Answers the Question,* may serve as a sample of this kind of material. Many publications of farmer-peasant songs, like Johannes Bolte's *Der Bauer in deutschen Liede,*[4] are other samples. These publications contain a summary of the opinions of several thousands of farm people about various important problems. There are, of course, many similar publications.[5]

To what extent may these publications and the opinions of the farm population be helpful as a reliable source in our study? If the genuine answers were not spoiled by various "literary editors" and the "scientific publishers" of this kind of material, they certainly would have some value. Unfortunately, the publications which contain the material are ordinarily considerably spoilt by "editors" and "publishers." Take, for instance, the publications mentioned above. Not a single one of them gives an "unselected" reproduction of all of several thousands of letters of farm women. Only a few dozens of letters or views which were "the prize winners" or for this or that reason pleased the selectors and editors are produced. Such an arbitrary selection, plus the easily detected "political motives" of the selection, make the whole publication scientifically almost valueless: we do not know the views of the majority of the letters, or which of them are "typical" and shared by the majority; in brief, we do not have the slightest evidence that the selection was by chance or typical. From this standpoint we do not know whether the selected

[2] Publications of *The American Country Life Association* and *The Farmer's Wife Magazine.*

[3] U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, 1924.

[4] *Acta Germanica,* Vol. I, Berlin, 1890.

[5] See many of them in the chapters about Arts and Religion in this book.

published fragments give an accurate idea of the opinions of farm people.[6]

But granting that such spoiling of the material by various "enlightened editors" had not happened, could we then say that the material is adequate for a basis of sociological theories in this field? By no means. In the first place such opinions of the class studied rarely embrace a group sufficiently numerous to be representatives of the whole class of a given country. Usually the publications give the opinions of few dozens or hundreds and rarely a few thousands of the farmer-peasant population. Besides, the sampling of the group, whose opinions are asked, is rarely really random. Therefore, at the best, the opinions may be taken as valid only for the individuals studied and they may not be extended as typical for the great masses of the farmer-peasant population. More than that: these opinions practically never are identical. They almost always differ from one another and often are quite contradictory. Under such circumstances, an investigator does not have any criterion which would entitle him to say: "this opinion is typical for the class and this is not typical." As a result, the data are valid at the best in regard to the group of individuals whose opinion is obtained, and do not permit any generalization whatsoever. Only in a very few instances do we have the opinions of the bulk of the class studied and these concern principally political matters. They are expressed in votes and similar forms. But this material is different from the sources under discussion and for this reason does not belong directly to it.

Aside from these defects the "opinion material" has another shortcoming which greatly reduces its value. We know that opinions of the same persons are, as a rule, exceedingly variable and changeable. To-day one feels "happy," and to-morrow "unhappy." After reading one brilliant article we are convinced by its arguments, and if we are asked to give our opinion immediately after we are likely to give an opinion similar to that in the article read. The next time, after reading a paper which, with equal brilliancy sets forth quite an opposite claim, we may be influenced and inclined to "change our opinion." Such "changes" of opinions are quite common with almost

[6] In the cases of the publications mentioned above, the authenticity of the material is spoiled also by the fact that the letters were offered in contest for a prize, a condition which is likely to disfigure the accuracy of an unbiased description of the situation. These letters further were selected by a committee as prize letters. Many of them are too literary to be written by plain farm-women. For this reason, they do not reflect the opinions of farm people but of other persons who do not belong to the agricultural class. In a similar way, the opinions expressed in *The Farm Woman Answers the Question* are expressed by a few "leaders," again selected by some committee. Some of these leaders, at the best, have only remote and indirect relationships to real "farm-women." They are not farm-women themselves. These considerations indicate that these and similar materials are far from being authentic as the expressions of farm-folks themselves.

all people. For instance the great variations in political votes for different parties or propositions, sometimes within a few months, are examples of this great flexibility of opinions. Changes of opinions of several congressmen in congressional votes, sometimes separated from one another by only a few hours, is another example. As a rule, it is sufficient that some conditions of an individual change in order to produce notable changes in opinions, particularly in the field of changing conditions.[7] Often a man styled yesterday as "a fine man" is to-day styled as "a scoundrel" or "cat." A thing admired yesterday is hated to-day and *vice versa*. When one is hungry, even a piece of poor bread is styled as "delicious." When one is not hungry, even a fine meal is styled often as "not tempting" or "nauseating." In brief, our opinions in regard to many things are exceedingly variable and remind of a "one-day butterfly": to-day they are alive, to-morrow dead. Such a flexibility of opinions makes even the most accurate momentary photography of them very short-lived in its validity. Granting that such a photograph reflects properly the opinions of the people studied for the moment when it is taken, there is no guarantee that it will reflect accurately the opinions of the same people a few days or weeks or months later. Again, it is highly important under which conditions, by whom, for what purposes, and so on, the opinions are taken. Leaving aside such important factors as insincerity and misunderstanding, the conditions of recording the opinions, the persons and institutions which record them, and hundreds of similar circumstances have most important influences upon the character of the opinions given by the same persons about the same matter.

These considerations show that even an ideally accurate census of opinions, which has never been realized, may have only a very limited and a very relative value, and that for a study only of the opinions themselves. When (as the majority do) the investigators make conclusions from the opinion-material about forms of behavior and conduct of the people under study; in other words, when they identify the opinions and "attitudes" and forms of behavior and postulate that a high correlation exists between opinions and actions; the results are quite inadmissible scientifically. The point is that "the opinions" (even sincere ones) of a person are not necessarily and not always an accurate reflection of his actions or behavior. Often between "the opinions" and actions of a man there is a conspicuous discrepancy. At the present moment we have more than

[7] See about this great unstability or variability of opinions in Pareto, *Traité de sociologie générale*, 2 vols., *passim*. The average length of time within which political opinions of the populations of Great Britain, France, Russia, the United States of America change are given in Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility*, pp. 405–409; Sorokin, P., *The Sociology of the Revolution*, Chaps. III, IV.

sufficient data to claim this. From the standpoint of opinion "a Christian is a man who, being smitten on one side of his face, humbly offers the other cheek for a slap." In addition, he is supposed to be highly altruistic, social, ungreedy, and so on. We know, however, that there are very few Christians who correspond in their actions to this "opinion-picture." According to the clamorous phraseology many revolutionaries and reformers are highly moral and altruistic persons; according to their actions they, as a rule, are highly cynical, cruel, and bloodthirsty. In their sincere opinions many failures are the most talented and capable heroes; many a fool thinks of himself as a great sage; and many a "cheat" as quite an honest person. In brief, "the rationalization," "beautification," and "disfiguring" of actions in our "opinions," and some degree of discrepancy between the two types of behavior is a well established fact.[8] For this reason it is inadmissible to conclude, on the basis of the opinions obtained, the corresponding behavior and actions of the same persons. Therefore even when authentic opinions exist for the rural class, this does not entitle the conclusion that its real behavior exactly corresponds to the opinions. In order to know something valid of the real actions, we must study them as such, regardless of the opinions given.

These considerations show the limitations of this source and its very relative value and reliability even when "the opinions are photographed with ideal accuracy."[9]

When, as is the case, there is a very imperfect "photography" of opinions, which is disfigured besides through the selection and the polishing by various editors and politicians, the value of the material becomes very limited—almost nothing. As an example of this imperfect and polished "photography of opinion," the bulletin already mentioned, *The Farm Woman Answers the Questions*, will serve. The objective of the whole conference on "Farm Women" organized by *The American Country Life Association* and *The Farmer's Wife Magazine* was to find "What do Farm Women Want?" We need not

[8] Experimental studies of this phenomenon have yielded quite similar results, namely, the existence of a conspicuous discrepancy between opinions and corresponding actions of the same persons even when there has not been present any particular intention to "lie" or to be insincere. See the results of such experimental studies in Sorokin, P., "Experimente zur Soziologie," *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, 4: 1–10, 1928; Hartshorn, H., and May, A. M., "Testing the Knowledge of Right and Wrong," *Religious Education*, XXI, pp. 621–623, 1926; XXII, p. 523, 1927.

[9] For these reasons, one may see how limited is the value of hundreds of works whose main topic is nothing but a survey of opinions; and how funds are wasted unproductively by various private, governmental, and scientific institutions in such surveys of "attitudes," "opinions," and "ideas." The above also shows that we must be on guard concerning any conclusions made on the basis of opinions obtained from letters, interviews, questionnaires, and similar sources. Even such a relatively good work as that by Thomas and Znaniecki, in so far as its conclusions are based principally on the letters of Polish peasants, is not free from all the shortcomings mentioned and is to be questioned in many points.

mention that the objective itself is too fanciful and capricious to be studied scientifically and that scarcely any sober scientist would try to take such a topic for study. The organizers brought together some two dozens of "Farm Women," a considerable part of whom were either teachers of home economics in colleges, social workers or other non-farming types. Further, as we are told, "probably the first time in the history of the world such a conference" was opened and the members of the conference began to pour out the answers to the question " What do Farm Women Want?" If the reader wishes to know what they want, he may read the following answers to the editors of the *Farmer's Wife Magazine* and the *American Country Life Association*" and be satisfied that he is not one of these alleged "farm women with under-nourished wishes."

"Better sanitary conditions; Contacts; More conveniences in homes; Time; Ability to plan; Poise; Reforestation; Picnics; Loan funds for girls desiring to enter college; Spiritual help; Better roads; Social responsibility; County health nurses; A chance to get away from home; Cheaper linoleum that will last just as long; Better movies; Sense of relative values; Sunday; The beauty of ugliness; Glorification of our job; Interest in public progress; A new spiritual power to meet the new age; The radio; Better entertainments; Rural self-determination; A greater joy in our job; More auto and camping family trips; Stimulation of biographies; A chance to have her hobby materialize; An attractive dining room; Transfer of center from outside activities to the home; The love pats distributed throughout life; The fancy things; The Charleston; Spiritual uplift and dancing mothers; And so on and so forth (The list of 'wants' is very long); finally, 'The Farm women want what other women want.' " [10] The reader knows and may now judge for himself, "what do farm women want." It seems really that they want what other women want. That is the total result of the whole conference, plus that some of "the farm women's wants" seem to be highly philosophical. We are forced to suppose that these "farm-women" have studied thoroughly epistemology, history, philosophy, ethics, sociology, and other highly sublime disciplines. Without such an orientation into knowledge, one scarcely could formulate such "wants" as those just indicated.

After what has been said above, it is unnecessary to dwell long over these "wants" to see that, in the first place, they are in a considerable part not the "wants" of farm-women but those of professional, highly educated, and "high-brow" ladies; second, the remaining "wants" are those that not only farm-women but all other women desire. In this sense, the conference was useless. Third, even granting that the multitude of opinions about the "wants" has some

[10] *Op cit.*, pp. 13–15.

connection with the opinions of farm-women, may one say, on the basis of these "wants," which are more or less urgent, which are individual and which are shared by great majority of the real farm-women, and which of contradictory opinions are valid?[11] No, the material does not give any key for this purpose. For this reason it is also quite useless for any scientific study of the typical farmer opinions, wants, and "attitudes." Other materials of this same type show, fortunately in a less degree, similar defects.

For the reasons given it is clear that this source of materials has only a very limited value for our purposes. It does not furnish an adequate basis for a construction of scientific hypotheses about the farmer-peasant mind, character, beliefs, psychology, ideology, and, especially, behavior. At best, it serves only (and then only in its most authentic forms) as auxiliary material to illustrate and reinforce propositions obtained on the basis of other data. That is all. Let us turn now to the third source of information, to various theories and opinions set forth by investigators.

Theories of Various Investigators of the Farmer-Peasant Mind and Character. These theories are very numerous. A complete survey would take enormous space and besides would not be particularly profitable because many of them are simply repetitions. For this reason we shall limit the analysis to several typical examples, whose characterization gives a sufficient idea of the present situation of the knowledge in the field. Here the task is limited to a mere characterization of the theories without much substantial criticism. Where our ideas differ from these given here they may easily be deduced from the preceding and subsequent chapters of this book. The theories may be divided into two principal branches: *instinctivist and acquired psychical* differences between the farmer-peasant class and the classes of the urban population.

Instinctivist Theories. The fundamental claim of these theories is the existence of innate psychical differences between the farmer-peasant class and the urban population. Such innate differences—in instincts, in reflexes, in prepotent drives, in intelligence, emotions, energy, and talent—are due to the fact that the city attracts predominantly one type of persons with specific innate characteristics, while the country keeps a different type. Thanks to this "specific selection" of the city and the country the bulks of the rural and urban populations are composed out of persons innately different. As a

[11] For instance these "farm-women" most extensively and sharply disagreed as to whether farm-women had "an inferiority-complex" or not. It seems, besides courses in epistemology, they had taken courses in psycho-analysis and Freudianism. One cannot help thinking that if we have to judge about farm-women in America on the basis of these "farm-women," farm-women are more educated than the average college student and even college instructors.

sample of this type of the theories we will present first several generalizations of Ammon and Lapouge, who claimed that the city selection of immigrants from the country was specific. Ammon and Lapouge claimed that the dolichocephalic people were attracted more to the cities than the brachycephalic. They thought also that brachycephaly and dolichocephaly were correlated with certain innate psychical differences:

A dolichocephal has great wishes and incessantly works to satisfy them. He is capable rather of gaining then of preserving wealth. Being audacious in his temperament, he dares everything, and through this audacity achieves an incomparable success. He fights for the sake of fighting without a back-thought of profit. The whole earth is his own. . . . His intelligence may vary from dullness to genius. There is nothing he does not dare. . . . Progress is his most intense need. In religion he is a Protestant. In politics he demands from the State only a respect for his activity, and tends rather to rise himself, than to oppress others.

Brachycephalism, embodied by the Alpine race according to Lapouge, is correlated with the following characteristics:

Homo Alpinus is frugal, laborious, remarkably prudent, and does not leave anything to chance. Not lacking in courage, yet he does not have a militant proclivity. He loves land and especially his native place. Being rarely a nullity, at the same time he rarely rises to a level of talent. His mental vistas are limited and he patiently works to realize his moderate purposes. He is a man of tradition and common sense. He does not like progress. He adores uniformity. In religion he prefers to be a Roman Catholic; in politics he craves for State protection and interference, for equality and levelling. He sees excellently his personal interests, and partly those of his family, but the interests of the whole country are beyond his own mental perspective. [12]

Since, according to the authors, the dolichocephals are attracted more to the cities than the brachycephals, and compose a higher proportion in the city population than in the rural population, the above characteristics of the dolichocephals and the brachycephals are, at the same time, the predominant characteristics of urban and rural psychical differences. Since these characteristics are innate, connected with the shape of the head, the whole theory is a sample of an instinctivist theory in this field.

Critical remarks concerning the theory may be brief. In the chapters of this book devoted to an analysis of the bodily traits of urban

[12] Lapouge, G. Vasher de, *Les sélections sociales*, pp. 13–18, Paris, 1896; see about Lapouge's and Ammon's theories in Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 233 ff.

and rural populations and the city-country migrants, it is shown that the assumption of a predominant dolichocephaly of the urban population is not a general rule. For this reason, the very basis of the above psychical urban-rural differences is unfounded. Further, the assumption of a close correlation of the cephalic index with certain psychical characteristics ascribed to the dolichocephals and the brachycephals is more than questionable.[13] Further, such statements as an urban or a dolichocephalic inclination to Protestant and a rural or brachycephalic inclination to the Roman-Catholic religion, as we shall see in the chapter on religious attitudes of the urban-rural population, are not supported by the facts. The same is true of several other differences indicated in the above quotation from Lapouge. Thus, nothing remains of the claim that the above differences exist and that they are innate. The remaining parts of the theory (traditionalism, and one or two other characteristics), in so far as they are accurately described, may be explained more easily and successfully through environmental differences between the city and the rural community. On the whole, the theory is in part fallacious, and in part an unproved speculation.

Almost the same may be said of many similar theories, which claim that migration to the cities is uniformly selective. The majority of these theories claim that the migrants are "adventurous, restless, action-loving, energetic," "seeking fame and fortune" (H. Hart); that they are predominantly those who have "the spirit of initiative"; (E. A. Ross) and that those remaining in the country are predominantly "the indolent, the alcoholic, the feeble-minded and the ne'er do well" (Charles Davenport); and so on.[14] For this reason, according to these theories, we may expect to find the city people more energetic, adventurous, restless, action-loving, with great initiative, more sober while the country people are to be marked by the opposite characteristics. According to these theories, the cities select these types of people and their traits are supposed to be innate. Thus these theories belong to the instinctivist branch.

Though *a priori* these views seems to be very convincing, nevertheless when one tries to check the evidences he is surprised by finding that they are either wholly lacking or very thin. The theories are dogmatic. In previous and subsequent chapters, and especially in the chapters devoted to rural-urban migrations, it is shown that such

[13] See Musselman, J. R., "On the Correlation of Head Measurements and Mental Agility," *Biometrika*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 195–206, 1926; Harmon, G. E., "On the Degrees of Relationship Between Head Measurement and Reaction Time to Sight and Sound," *ibid.*, pp. 207–220; Pearson, K., "Relationship of Mind and Body," *Annals of Eugenics*, Vol. I, pp. 382–406, 1926; see other evidences in Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 226–279.

[14] See Ross, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 23–24; Davenport, C. B., *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*, pp. 211 ff.; Hart, H., *Selective Migration*, pp. 80–81. Similar opinions are set forth by a great many other writers.

"clearly cut and straight" hypotheses cannot be accepted as possessing any great validity. If they contain any truth, they require many limitations and reservations. Finally, the assumption that the above differences are due to selection and consequently to heredity, is very questionable. Necessary evidences of their "innate" character are lacking. For these reasons, we cannot accept the theories without testing them. This is done in other parts of the work. Here we may say only that many of these statements are contradicted decidedly by factual evidences.[15]

Groves[16] reached the following chief conclusions in a book upon the rural mind. Country life does not develop the herd or gregarious instinct. The city is a magnet for those with the greater herd instincts and the greater instincts for self-assertion.[17] The country attracts those with the greater parental instinct. Concerning the sex instincts, the author is, at first, more or less non-committal as to relative satisfaction in city and in country. Later he points out that there seems to be no difference in the rural environment.[18] The development of the fear instinct in a meager and routine life explains the conservativeness of rural people. They are afraid of new things. The instinct of pugnacity is overdeveloped because country people deal with dumb animals that cannot be reasoned with like the human animals in cities. The instinct of curiosity is overdeveloped through gossip. City people have bigger things to talk about. The instinct of workmanship is more greatly developed in the country, yet city work is more permanent because it is in iron and stone. Acquiring farm land makes rural people overdevelop the instinct of acquisition. Rural people lack play experiences, consequently they are not able to coöperate in later life. Thus we see that *country people are normal as far as the instincts of sex and workmanship are concerned, but their instincts of parenthood, fear, pugnacity, curiosity, and acquisition are overdeveloped and those for herding, self-assertion, and playing are underdeveloped.* The final conclusions are that these "instincts" should be developed by inducing country people to play together under local leadership. That being done, the under-developed instincts would be given more nourishment.

These statements are very questionable. To begin with, the term instinct is used by Professor Groves in a very loose way: in his manipulation of the term, instinct is something which is partly inherited, partly acquired, and for this reason may be strengthened and weak-

[15] See, for instance, the data concerning rural and urban rates for alcoholism, criminality, idiocy, indolency, pauperism, and so on, which decidedly disprove the statements similar to those of Dr. Davenport.

[16] Groves, E. R., *The Rural Mind and Social Welfare.*

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 71–73.

[18] *Ibid.*, Ch. 8, especially the latter part.

ened, or over and underdeveloped. Such an indefinite conception of instinct may scarcely be accepted and used as a basis for the building of a series of valid contentions.[19] Second, the very classification of instincts by Groves is more than questionable. Such instincts as "workmanship," "self-assertion," "playing," "acquisition," or "herding" are scarcely recognized as instincts by a majority of contemporary psychologists and biologists. If some of these "instincts" are recognized as really existing, each of them requires a more clear definition than the use of these indefinite terms ("workmanship," "parenthood," "herd," "play," "self-assertion"). The author did not attempt to define them more clearly; he did not try to separate what in the so-called parental, play, herd, or self-asserting activities is really instinctive (innate or unconditioned reflex) and what is acquired. Without such efforts, all assertions connected with such "instincts" are doomed to be vague and speculative. In the third place, granting even that the above defects do not mar the constructions of Groves, his statements about the over or underdevelopment of certain instincts in the country and in the city population are almost purely dogmatic, based on nothing but speculation. As such, they cannot pretend to have any scientific validity. In the fourth place, the bulk of his arguments are more than questionable. One cannot take seriously such statements that the instinct of pugnacity is overdeveloped in country people because they have to deal with dumb animals (as though dealing with human beings and machinery does not require any strain, or fighting, or pugnacity); that the instinct of curiosity is overdeveloped in the rural population because of gossip (as though gossip does not exist among city populations in the usual form and in the form of newspaper organized gossip, political and social gossips, and so on); that the instinct of acquisition is overdeveloped in the country population through acquiring land (as though somebody has proved that only land possession develops such an instinct and the possession of buildings, money, factories, and other valuable things does not develop it at all); that rural people are incapable of coöperation (while as a matter of fact the biggest coöperative organizations have been developed exactly within rural but not urban populations);[20] or that the sex activities are satisfied

[19] See the literature and criticism concerning instincts in Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Ch. XI; Bernard, L., *Instinct*.

[20] It is sufficient to indicate that pre-revolutionary Russia had an agricultural cooperative organization with more than 10,000,000 members. The same is true of many other countries, as well as of the United States. See the *1925 Reports of the Bureau of Coöperation of the United States Department of Agriculture; Technical Bulletin No. 40, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1928*, by Ellsworth, R. H. In 1925, for instance, the 188,231 farmers of Minnesota purchased coöperatively $3,834,614 and sold coöperatively $73,260,576 of products, which amounts to $400 per farm. See further, the chapters about the "Collectivistic and Individualistic Attitudes of the Farmer-Peasant Class."

in the same degree in the city and the country and that there is no substantial difference (it is shown in the chapter on the rural and urban family of this book that there are very conspicuous differences due not so much to differences in sex-instinct as to differences in a series of environmental conditions of the city and country). In brief, in spite of the interesting hypotheses of Groves, his work has not supplied any valid evidence in favor of the claim that there are "instinctive differences" between the urban and rural populations.

Several other authors have tried to find some instinctive differences between urban and rural populations. For instance, A. L'Houet stresses several times in his valuable book that such traits of peasants as moderation, traditionalism, perseverance, steadfastness, and solidity are almost instinctive.[21] However, the author uses the term in rather a figurative sense and does not elucidate clearly as to whether his term instinctive really means something innate and due to heredity or a strong habit or "prepotent reflex" (in F. Allport's sense).

Without giving other samples, we may conclude that, as yet scarcely any study has succeeded in showing convincingly any instinctive or innate differences in the psychology of urban and rural populations. Such differences may exist. The attempts may have been unsuccessful because it is exceedingly difficult to detect them. However, until such differences are proved, we are not entitled to admit or to accept them. Otherwise, instead of a science we should have a series of dogmas admitted without test and evidence, that is, a pseudo-science. So much for the "instinctivist" theories. Let us turn now to other theories which are either environmental or mixed. They view the differences found as a result of differences in the city and the country environments or a result of these and the factor of heredity.

Environmental and "Mixed" Theories. The proponents of these theories indicate some psychical differences between rural and urban populations, and these either stress that they are due to environmental conditions, or claim that both factors,—heredity with selection and the urban-rural environments are responsible for them. A complete survey of the theories would occupy a large volume in itself. Here it is sufficient to trace briefly the principal of them and to give a few representative samples. In the first place, since ancient times there has been two streams of thought, one in favor of the agricultural class, the other in favor of the city population. The writers who belong to the first group have bestowed all the principal virtues—health, vigor, virtue, bravery, perseverance, honesty, stolidity, broad-mindedness, and so on—on the rural populations. Such, for instance, are the opinions in many of the *Sacred Books of the East,*

[21] See L'Houet, A., *Zur Psychologie des Bauerntums,* pp. 27 ff. and *passim.*

of Confucius, Xenophon, Euripides, Socrates, partly Plato and Aristotle, Cincinnatus, Cato; and later of Ibn-Khaldun, partly J. B. Vico, of the elder Mirabeau, Quesnay, and many others. The writers of the opposite school have bestowed all positive characteristics—energy, initiative, courage, open-mindedness, love of progress, creative spirit, freedom, democracy, sociality, and so on—to the urban populations, and especially its upper, intellectual, and ruling classes. Since several statements of this type in the *Sacred Books of the East* and up to the present time, this opinion has been sustained side by side with the opposite one.[22] Leaving aside all the opinions as to whether the city or the country population is better, a dispute which does not keep to promote our knowledge of the psychical differences of the two groups, let us survey briefly some of the representative contemporary theories which try to indicate more definitely the specific traits of the urban and rural minds.

Some of the best works in this field are W. H. Riehl's *Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes* [23] and *The Psychology of Peasantry* by A. L'Houet.[24] The leading ideas of the authors are similar in many respects. According to L'Houet in its substantial characteristics, peasant psychology compared with that of the urban population, displays the same differences as between the psychology of youth and that of old age. Correspondingly, in spite of the most unfavorable conditions, the typical peasant possesses "an excellent health in spite of a lack of hygienic conditions." It displays a remarkable steadfastness, durability, perseverance, and solidity in its behavior. In connection with these traits the most conspicuous are traditionalism, lack of individuality, and presence of impersonality, and the collectivity of the peasantry. Simplicity, genuineness, and solidity are further typical rural characteristics. Similar to youth, the peasantry possesses strong nerves, and abundance of playful energy, naïvety, and imagination. This imagination manifests itself in the peasant's bent toward mysticism, in his belief in the supernatural, in his highly imaginative religion, and in a lack of sophistication in his thinking, beliefs, and conduct. Like a youth, the peasant is sincere, somewhat boorish, but possesses an inner impulse for freedom. He is patriotic in the sense of a deep attachment to his native place. He is much more religious than the city man but at the same time is not interested in the abstract controversies of theology. His mental horizon is somewhat limited: he

[22] See a somewhat more detailed, though very incomplete and fragmentary, survey of these opinions in Thompson's *Urbanization*, Chaps. I, II. A complete history of the theories will be given in the mentioned "*Source Book*."

[23] Four volumes. In each volume many chapters are devoted to the psychology of the peasantry. We quote the ninth and tenth editions. See especially Vol. II, pp. 41–123.

[24] L'Houet, A., *Zur Psychologie des Bauerntums*.

has little interest for anything which happens beyond his own "sphere of life" and neighborhood. He has little interest in the majority of the disciplines taught in the schools because these disciplines—be they history or geography or poetry—are quite "urban" and as such are quite useless for the peasant. But in anything that concerns the peasant's life and activity he displays a remarkable interest, insight, and common sense. Family life of the peasant is more stable and clean than that of the city dweller. From a moral standpoint again the peasant is more sincere, and less criminal than the bulk of the city population. The peasant is marked by greater moderation, is more stoical and stern; while the urban population is more Epicurean, soft-hearted, and mollified. In this sense, many attitudes of the peasant are much nearer to the philosophy of the Old than the New Testament. Politically, the peasants are very conservative; socially, they are the uniting power which prevents the disorganization of society; and its dismemberment. Racially, they are less diluted by heterogeneous blood, and from this standpoint they reproduce much better than any other class the typical racial characteristics of each nation as it was many centuries ago. On the whole, the peasant displays conspicuously many traits typical for a youthful age and for the Middle Ages while the city population is stamped by modernism and the traits of old age.

Such is the skeleton of Riehl's and L'Houet's works. For an explanation of those differences, both authors assume the environmental standpoint principally and view them as a result of the historico-social conditions of rural life and environment (isolation, hardships of peasant life, the nature of agriculture, life in closed peasant communities, and so on).

L. L. Bernard has characterized the farmer as follows:[25] There are no inherent rural-urban differences. Existing differences are of "attitudes" not "mind." In other words, these differences are acquired, not native. These differences are "conservatism, more or less disregard of the scientific method, religious and political orthodoxy, emotional intensity with consequent high suggestibility along the lines of his conventional interest and attitudes, individualism, a certain inaptitude for so-called finer distinctions of humor and sentiment, and a frugality and thrift which sometimes borders upon parsimony. . . ." Bernard adds later "the relative hardness of his (peasant's) life impresses him strongly with the stern and puritanical attitude of the powers which watch over him." Bernard sums up the character of the farmer as follows: The demagogue in his appeals to the farmer should appeal to (1) self-interest of the farmer rather than

[25] Bernard, L. L., "A Theory of Rural Attitudes," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 22, 1916–1917, pp. 630 ff.

social welfare, (2) personal sympathy rather than social utility, and (3) religious and political convictions and in terminology of catch phrases rather than in scientific principles.

The causes of these characteristics of the farmer's mind according to Bernard are seven in number. They are:

1. Farming has been a "traditional industry."
2. Farmers are "culturally" isolated by geography.
3. Farmers are occupationally isolated.
4. Farm work is confining and seasonal.
5. Farmers are vigorous and active because of the outdoor life they lead. Relatively they do not read as much.
6. Their work does not require mental vigor. This makes them less subtle in their thinking.
7. Farmers are "conservative" for the same reasons as the industrial capitalist in that political and social changes affect their business profits.

In a later paper, Bernard has added a few other characteristics to those already attributed to the mind of the farmer.[26] The list enumerated this time consists of "conservatism, individualism, heightened suggestibility, mysticism, shyness, suspiciousness, introvert personalities, personal democracy, sentimentality and the like." He adds later that the introvert personality is more prevalent in rural life because of its "monotony, isolation, dogmatism, conventionality, lack of cosmopolitanism, its transparency, its rigor, and its consequent Puritanism." All of these are supposed to inhibit the extrovert type of personality and produce instead the repressed and introvert character. In a further paragraph he says, women, old people, and children in rural life are especially prone to develop warped and introvert personalities. Following this, certain conditioning factors which permit the better development of children in rural life are elaborated, as an offset to the previous statements.

We cannot discuss the validity of these statements because no factual data or experiments or references to either are given in proof. True or not, they cannot be accepted until proved or made logical by facts, experiments, or historical references. Let us turn to others who characterize the farmer's mind.

John M. Gillette gives the same analysis of the rural mind as Bernard with a few exceptions and additions.[27] He uses the word "fatalistic" and seems to tie it up with the fact that the farmer deals

[26] "Research Problems in the Psychology of Rural Life," *Journal of Social Forces*, March, 1925, Vol. III, pp. 446 ff.

[27] Gillette, John M., *Rural Sociology*, Revised Edition, 1928, pp. 50 ff. This whole matter of the conflicting opinions of Gillette and Bernard concerning nature, social agencies, and the farmer is discussed at length in Engberg, R. C., *Prosperity and the Farmer*. The statistical analysis of Engberg upholds Gillette's side of the controversy.

with nature. The statement that the farmer feels that nature is in partnership with him and that social agencies and efforts have little import in his business successes and failures is also made. If this is true, it conflicts with the seventh reason given by Bernard for the so-called conservatism of the farmer because of his similarity to the business capitalist. In a later paragraph, Gillette discusses the problem of the suggestibility of the farmer but comes to no conclusion as to its relative amount.

C. J. Galpin has made a careful and well-outlined analysis of the mind and character of the farmer in two of his books.[28] In addition to some of the characteristics already discussed in this chapter, he indicates two others. One of these is animism. Animism technically means the giving of a spirit or a human power to an inanimate thing. Galpin seems to think the farmer is animistic because he deals with things of nature, whereas the city man is materialistic because he deals to a greater extent with materials which have lost the first touch of nature, and are made by man—if we may be allowed to separate the things of nature from those of man. The farmer deals to a greater extent with forces over which he has no control. The other trait which Galpin gives the farmer (in addition to some already discussed) is a relative lack of precision in the use of his finer muscles. Since thinking, according to Galpin, is correlated with the utilization of the small finer muscles of the hand and arm, neck and face, and the farmer uses these finer muscles least, the farmer has less of the cunning of the city man. By different methods L'Houet, Galpin, and Bernard arrive at the same conclusion, the farmer lacks a certain aptitude for the so-called finer mental distinctions at least in some fields of thinking. Galpin believes, however, that the change from the hoe farmer to the machine farmer type will remedy much of this.[29]

Carl C. Taylor has characterized the rural mind as follows, based partly upon observation, partly upon some data he has collected and partly upon an interpretation of some of the realistic art of rural life.[30] The farmer must adjust himself to inanimate or non-conscious things. Some of these he masters and others are his master. The second characterization is that the farmer has had to adjust himself to these hard forces of nature consequently he is a hardened and stern character. Third, he differs from the upper classes in city life because less of his adjustments are "social" and from the machine workers in urban life because he is not a slave to the machine. Fourth, the farmer is a fatalist because he must adjust himself to the stern forces of the

[28] Galpin, C. J., *Rural Life,* Chap. II, and *Rural Social Problems,* Ch. II, pp. 22 ff.
[29] Concerning these statements see Bartels, A., *Der Bauer in der deutschen Vergangenheit,* Leipzig, 1900.
[30] See Taylor's *Rural Sociology,* Ch. 21.

weather. Fifth, the farmer is meditative because he works in solitude. Since no one challenges these "meditations" of the farmer, he develops deep convictions. Sixth, the occupation of farming is based upon a stock of experience which is handed down from father to son, whereas the urban laborer is in an atmosphere of change. The farmer is more or less secure, whereas the laborer is always insecure. As a result the farmer is more or less opposed to changes, he develops an attitude of independence, and forms judgments of his own to a relatively greater extent than many city classes. And lastly, the farmer is not a man of the crowd. Consequently, his behavior is more rational and less emotional than that of the city populations. This conclusion is supported by some data concerning advertisers' opinions of the farmer as a purchaser of goods. Thus we see that Taylor contradicts Bernard by claiming the farmer is not as emotional as city people, and further that the farmer is a deeper thinker than many of the city classes, especially those that do manual labor.

A. F. Weber devotes a few paragraphs to the effect of urbanization on the mind of the populations. We may analyze this because it gives us the reverse of the effect upon the country.[31] According to this author, city life has developed class antagonisms, which are the result of the extreme individualism of city people. Close contact removes prejudices and engenders liberalism. Always the cradles of liberty, the cities have now become the centers of radicalism. "Every man of the world knows that isolation and solitude are found to a much higher degree in a crowded city than in a country village, where one individual's concerns are the concern of all." "The cities, then, are favorable to free thought and the sense of individual responsibility." Thus we see this author, in a monograph which is probably the most brilliant in this line that has been written in America up to to-day, comes to conclusions just opposite from some of the writers previously discussed concerning relative individualism and isolation in cities and rural districts. Further, he states city life has developed class antagonisms in one sentence and removed prejudices and engendered liberalism, in the next.

Warren Wilson wrote a book on the evolution of the country community, in which he characterized the American farmer by several stages called the pioneer, the land farmer, the exploiter, and the husbandman.[32] Each of these separate types had its own "mind" and peculiar psychological characteristics. Much of his analysis is based upon a study of agrarian changes in the middle west by J. B. Ross.[33]

[31] *The Growth of Cities*, pp. 432 ff. Concerning individualism, see Spykman, Nicholas, J., "A Social Philosophy of the City," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 21, pp. 46 ff.

[32] *Evolution of the Country Community.*

[33] "Agrarian Changes in the Middle West," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1910, Vol. 25, pp. 625 ff.

But in addition to this, Wilson gave a few psychological characteristics to each type. The characteristics of the pioneer were excessive individualism, a religion of personal salvation, introspection, melancholy egotism, a high degree of emotion and at the same time stolidity. Boiled down to two characteristics, the pioneer was individualistic and emotional. These are not materially different from the same characteristics attributed to all farmers, and partly city people, by writers. Wilson presents as proof of his statements the fact that contemporary religious leaders referred to the great amount of drinking, the lawlessness, and the emotional religious outbursts.

As is shown elsewhere in this book, alcoholic consumption is much greater in the cities. City life rather than the diverse activities of the pioneer farmer induces alcoholic consumption. Further, the fact that the pioneer farmer had the annual religious revivals does not prove that he was more emotional than city populations. He may be emotional about different matters than the city population or his emotion may be concentrated in a few weeks of time. The writers have observed the native isolated mountaineer in his religious revivals and also the revivals in the urban communities of the same regions. For instance, who can say that there is any fundamental difference in emotional intensity between those revivals in the isolated parts of the South and those in Raleigh, or Wilmington, or Fort Worth. Who can tell any fundamental differences between those held on campuses of colleges in the South and those held in the most isolated mountain parts, far from any railroad or hard surfaced road. The same applies to other sections and countries. Further, the careful studies of contemporary artists such as Louis Hemon, O. E. Rolvaag, Herbert Quick, and others who know contemporary urban civilizations as well as rural, rather paint the pioneer farmer as a man of great fortitude and complacency of life.[34] To quote from Hugo P. Thieme, "In the eighteen months of life with them (French Canadian Pioneers) Hemon had divined the rugged honesty, the complacency with which they meet life, the devotion to their religion, all the deep ingrained characteristics of the French peasant, alive in these French Canadians to-day." This statement concerning a race which is known for its emotionality may be significant.[35]

[34] See *Maria Chapdelaine, Giants in the Earth,* and *Vandermark's Folly.* Many other studies of a similar nature should be consulted such as *Desire Under the Elms, Growth of the Soil,* and Olive Schreiner's *Story of the African Farm.* All of these deal more or less with pioneer conditions. As an illustration consult the chapter which deals with the healing of Maria Chapdelaine's wounds after her first lover froze to death in the storm. (English version by Blake, W. H.) Compare this with the emotional intensity in Ludwig Lewisohn's *Upstream.*

[35] Macmillan's French edition of *Maria Chapdelaine,* edited by Hugo P. Thieme, p. XIV.

Following this analysis of the pioneer, Wilson proceeds to an analysis of the land farmer. The land farmer differed from the pioneer by five main characteristics. These are, first, he took the initial utilities of the land and soil without regard to replacement; second, he had a family; third, he owned his home; fourth, he had neighbors; and fifth, he competed with his neighbors by family groups. This land farmer is the type recognized to-day in the general characteristics attributed to farmers. Later, the author adds that the land farmer moves on when the soil is exhausted. It was during this land-farmer period that the small one-room schools and competing country churches appeared.

The next type of farmer is called the exploiter. He is the capitalist who appears between the land farmer and the husbandman. Everything, including his religion and charity, is valued in dollars and cents. Market values of land increase and absentee ownership begins. Tenancy and retired farmers appear.

The last stage is marked by the husbandman or economist and agriculture. This farmer is the scientist who reasons everything out rationally and, at the same time, farming is his religion and the soil and its values are sacred. His household enlarges to the community; at the same time this type of farming community possesses a certain amount of austerity; the communities operate on a certain amount of communism in that they determine who are to be their neighbors or the other members of the community; and lastly, the husbandman follows the leadership of the learned men in the community so that a certain progress in newer methods is made.

Some criticisms of this scheme of classification of mental types in American agriculture have already been given. Others may be stated as follows. Capitalism and large holdings developed in the agriculture of the United States at the very beginning and did not wait for its appearance at the end of the so-called exploiter and farm stages. Most of the original grants of land in this country were in large feudal tracts and in nearly all the states except those of New England, capitalistic agriculture was fully developed by the time of the American revolution. Nearly all of these feudal land arrangements were cancelled in the upheaval of the American revolution. But many of the early leaders, including Washington, Franklin, Patrick Henry, and others, were speculators in lands to the west and held these lands for pure capitalistic purposes.[36] Second, most of the settlers who went direct to agriculture, at least after the first wave of settlements on the Atlantic seaboard, were family men. They either took their families with them like the characters discussed in *Vandermark's Folly* or *Giants in the Earth*, or soon married,

[36] See Beard, Chas., and M., *Rise of American Civilization*, Book I.

or sent back for their families as did General Sutter.[37] This of course does not mean that a disproportion of sexes did not exist, but in the main the agricultural settlement was a family settlement. Thus the statement that the second or land-farmer stage was the family stage is decidedly dubious. Third, the attribution of family morality and organization to one, and one only, stage in agricultural organization is decidedly questionable. Family morality, family organization, and family life is, has always been, and will probably continue to be, the chief form of social organization in agriculture. Another chapter discusses this.

The discussion of Wilson's analysis may be closed by the statement that the chief factor which it gives to the farmers' mind is its religious orientation.

The first big characterization of the peasant mind is family attitudes, according to W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki.[38] They state that this familial solidarity is totally different from territorial, religious, economic, or national solidarity though these promote or cause the breakdown of family solidarity. This family solidarity represents itself both in assistance rendered to, and in control exerted over, any member of the group by any other member representing the group as a whole.[39] The changes which came about in this group with urbanization are the breaking down of this family organization, the family mind, and the breaking up of these family controls. "The traditional form of the Polish peasant family can evidently subsist only in an agricultural community, settled at least four or five generations in the same locality and admitting no important changes of class, religion, nationality, or profession." [40] We may conclude from this that these authors believe that peasants are more family minded and more under the controls of the semi-patriarchal family of the rural districts.

The second characteristic they give the peasant mind is that of traditionalism and conservatism. By this is meant that the social organization of peasant classes and communities is determined more by traditions and previous factors than present factors. The peasant nobility and social classes created in the wars of the 14th and 15th centuries still continue in spite of the fact that many of these peasant warriors have lost the lands given them in the earlier centuries. Still the class continues and is recognized. It is held up by family and territorial organization. On the other hand, the city classes are

[37] See *Sutter's Gold* for a story of the far western settlements. In this respect of family migration, agriculture is distinctly different from mining or the lumbering industry. We must not confuse the two.

[38] *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, in 5 vols.

[39] Volume I, pp. 89 ff.

[40] Volume I, pp. 98 and 99 ff.

based upon immediate circumstances to a greater extent. While some change is always going on in rural communities, yet it is slow compared with urban communities. Urban classes conform more closely to economic and money differences. Traditions and other non-pecuniary values have less effect.[41]

The third characteristic of the peasant develops out of his local or primary group environment with which he has close contact once he steps out of the ordinary family relationships. This is known as "the country around" and it means the social as well as the geographic local groups.[42] This control by the local group gives the peasant his provincialism. Further, this local environment is so simple and so well understood that gossip is relatively reliable and the control it exerts over peasant life is not far wrong. Urbanization with its anonymity breaks up this local control and at the same time makes the environment so complicated that local opinion concerning behavior is relatively unreliable.

The main economic category in the mind of the rural classes is land. That is the most essential portion of his property. It is family property in Poland and as other studies have shown it to be in most countries from the time of the development of early tribal customs and law.[43] Land gives the family its social prestige and rank. Peasants are opposed to mortgaging the land and prefer a personal loan at a high rate of interest in the long standing state amortized loans. The first money they receive goes to pay off this mortgage. (This same characteristic has been found in the United States.[44]) This land has many other values to the family.[45] With urbanization, the attitudes change from the property concept to the income concept, and from family income to individualized income. The effect of urban districts upon the peasant is to give him a slight leaning toward these new ideas. Many of the socialistic doctrines, such as economic determinism, could not arise without these changes in economic organization which come with urbanization of the peasant, according to these two authors.

The next primary characteristic of the peasant mind is that body of theory and practice called religion. Since a special chapter is devoted to this one topic, it will not be elaborated further here. The last is the type of logic which arises primarily out of his provincial

[41] See Volume I, pp. 128 ff.

[42] See Volume I, pp. 140 ff.

[43] See the three volumes by Vinogradoff, P., on the *Origins of Early English Law* and *Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence*, Vol. I. See also Seebohm, F., *The Village Community*, chapters on tribal origins; Irvine, H. D., *op. cit.*, Ch. III; and dozens of others.

[44] See *Minnesota Experiment Station*, Bulletins 234 and 246 by C. C. Zimmerman and J. D. Black.

[45] See the discussion on pp. 156 ff. in Volume I.

and occupational setting. The authors give the thought processes of the peasant groups the following characterization: "There are three primary forms in which theoretic interests are manifested in the peasant—the schematism of practical life, interest in new facts and interest in religious explanations of the world" (pp. 288 ff.). This schematism of practical life arises out of the relatively simple environment of the peasant. It is a systematization of rules which suffices for practical behavior. Oftentimes these rules are contradictory but in the main they suffice. New situations such as urbanization or changes in business or social conditions cause some confusion until the matter is met and adjusted by other rules or a more complex type of logic. The interest in new facts also arises purely out of the stable environment. At this place the authors make the statement that the peasant is not primarily a fiction reader—unless it be realistic fiction. He is interested primarily in facts—unless the fiction gives him a description of other peoples and societies concerning which he is relatively little acquainted.

The situation is quite different among city workers and the lower middle class, where fiction-reading assumes enormous proportions and a powerfully developed interest for plot has favored the recent success of sensational literature. This difference of interest between the country and city population is certainly due to a difference in social conditions. The city inhabitants have not as keen an interest in new facts as we find in the country because city life gives them a superabundance of new facts and the receptivity is deadened, and because the additional excitement which the peasant gets by sharing the news with his community is here almost lacking. [46]

Thus, on the one hand, we have a rural population attempting to add to its reality, if this analysis be correct, and an urban population which is attempting to escape its reality. One is realistic and the other romantic. A short summary of peasant mind and character as developed by these two authors brings out the influence of family life, traditions, stability, local primary group environment, land and property, religion, and a sort of class or occupational logic. All these factors interweave to make the "rural mind."

Another writer, James Mickel Williams, has attempted to analyze the mind of the American rural classes in a similar manner as Thomas and Znaniecki. In this case rural New York has been made the basis of the study.[47] Let us examine these to see how far he corroborates, adds to, or criticizes the earlier Polish study. A close examination of his works finds that he corroborates Thomas and Znaniecki in all

[46] Pages 295–296.

[47] See Williams, J. M., *Our Rural Heritage and The Expansion of Rural Life.* An earlier study, *An American Town,* deals with the same community.

the above characteristics of the rural mind.[48] Some additional material is presented later which we will examine in detail.

A chapter is devoted to the relation of the rural mind to climatic factors. He finds first of all that the cold has increased the attitudes of self-restraint concerning many problems of life. The second factors in New York have been the humid atmosphere and cloudy sky, which the author claims were responsible, in part at least, for the conservatism of the farmer. (But since many rural civilizations in warmer climates and in countries of less rain and more sunshine possess these same characteristics, this theory is to be doubted.[49]) Williams finds further that the valley farmers were more persistent in work and the hill farmers had more resignation. Further, the hill farmers were more custom bound. Concerning this theory we may say that these geographical correlations merely are used to explain variations among farmers rather than the peculiar characteristics of farmers. If they are generally true, they should be significant for rural-urban differences. City populations certainly get less sunshine —yet they are certainly not conservative. On the other hand, there may be some little validity to the theories. Williams' further discussion of geography and nature in regard to the farmer finds that the fortuitous characteristics of the climate and seasons has given a slant towards fatalism, mysticism, and magic, and may be a partial explanation of the farmer's attitude favoring hard work. It is also used as partial explanation of the political docility of the farmer. No matter what explanation be offered, the fact remains that this writer is characterizing the farmer as fatalistic, mystical, hard working, and politically docile.

In a later chapter on economic attitudes, the farmer is again characterized as a "mighty worker" with such additional virtues as individual initiative and self-reliance. However, the author says individualism was primarily a matter of working alone and was "within the limits set by the customs of the community." Thus the individualism which Williams attributes to the farmer is different from that imputed by other writers. These economic ideas are tied up closely with land ownership. Farm work in the early days required "a good deal of technical knowledge" and "the farmer prided himself on his craft, knowledge, and skill." This is somewhat different from Galpin's hoe farmer analysis. Further he adds stolidity and later emotionalism. The writers do not see how these two opposite characteristics are to be reconciled unless the farmer is stolid about some things and emotional about others. In such cases we have no right to use the

[48] See *Our Rural Heritage.*

[49] See Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* Chap. 3, for a severe criticism of these geographical hypotheses.

blanket terms to characterize rural classes. A later characterization by Williams finds the farmer "rigorous" in his treatment of the boys and hired man about the farm, kindly in his coöperative dealings with his neighbors, "out and out" in his honor and honesty, and placing a low value on services since he himself primarily produces material goods.

One chapter is devoted to juristic attitudes. The author asserts that the farmer had a great deal of respect for law, especially criminal law. Rural classes do not believe much in new laws. Their general feeling for the law is one of awe. Political attitudes of the farmer were affected by traditions, by the humanness of the candidate, and by the logic and the proposed measure. If the measure had the proper moral and nationalistic logic behind it, its support was more or less assured. Each neighborhood tended to stay by the party of the forefathers.

Summary and Conclusions Concerning the Theories About the Rural Mind. This portion could be lengthened by the addition of more students who repeat, to a considerable extent, the ideas already discussed.[50] But these are sufficient to cover the principal suggestions in this field. What conclusions may be reached?

1. Many of the attributes given to the mind of the farmer are so broad and undefined that no one can tell what is meant by the author and it is impossible to examine and criticize the concept. Such are individualism, conservatism, emotionalism, magical mind, and so on. Without a proper definition of the terms, their vague and manifolded meaning makes the statements very vague also.

2. Many of these students deny their own statements by opposite statements on another page. Warren Wilson makes farmers individualistic on one page and on the next has them competing by family groups. Is it possible for a man to be an individualist and at the same time thoroughly bound up in family organization? The students who have used these terms have not defined them. A. F. Weber makes city people unbiased in one sentence and the genesis of the class struggle in the next. Can both be true?

3. Many students, as pointed out from time to time, claim just opposite characteristics for the rural mind. One says they are altruists and another selfish. Which is right?

4. No one of these students gives sufficient data to prove his statements. For these reasons we are forced to conclude that, as yet,

[50] For further studies, see Bláha, A., *Sociologie sedláka a dělníka*, pp. 121–194; Vogt, Paul, Hawthorne, H. B., Lundquist, G., and Carver, and Sims, N. L., *The Rural Sociologies*. See also Galpin, C. J., *Rural Social Problems;* Phelan, J., *Readings in Rural Sociology;* Sims, N. L., *The Rural Community;* Gras, N. S. B., *History of Agriculture;* and numerous magazine articles such as that of Sims in *Pol. Sci. Quarterly* for 1920, Vol. 35, pp. 54–76.

in this field, there is very little established or that is certain or valid. Whether this is due to an extreme complexity and variability of the phenomena studied or to a lack of a proper method of approach and available material, no one can tell. Anyhow this field is still open for study. And the study is to be continued without any guarantee of obtaining better results.

Thus all the three sources surveyed give some insight into the problem and throw several enlightening suggestions concerning the mind and the character of the rural class; and yet they yield very little which one may claim as typical of the rural mind and which is proved.

Under such circumstances every investigator who wishes to obtain something relatively more certain in this field and who wishes to be as free as possible from assumptions, preconceptions, and speculations in his statements, has but one way to proceed. This way consists, first, in the limitation of the number of characteristics to be studied; second, in a relatively rigorous definition of the terms used, when the terms are vague in their common use; third, in a careful study of all the available factual data in the given field to check the investigator's biases and to build the conclusions on something more valid than speculation or distorted fragments of factual data. The first requirement means that on the basis of present knowledge we are entitled to attack only some of the problems of the rural culture and must give up many other problems because of a lack of a valid method or reliable material. "*Non multa sed multum.*" For this reason, in the subsequent parts we discuss only a few of the problems, those about which it is possible to say something at least tentatively valid, and we pass by many other problems frankly admitting we do not know sufficient to solve them. For the second and third reasons we take the pains and impose them on the reader to go through the principal statistical and historical data relevant to each problem discussed. Although we give in the text only a small portion of the data, referring to others in the footnotes, nevertheless, even this portion considerably lengthens the book and tempts the patience of the reader. In spite of this handicap we prefer that the data and the facts speak for themselves rather than more eloquent and entertaining speculations of our own. This explains the character of the subsequent chapters devoted to a characterization and explanation of some of the most important psycho-social differences in the attitudes and behavior, in institutions and types of culture of the rural and urban communities.

CHAPTER XV

THE RURAL AND URBAN FAMILY

The Family and Its Social Functions. In order to grasp the cultural characteristics of the rural and urban communities—their institutions, cultural patterns, attitudes, behavior, and social relationships—we shall begin with an analysis of the family organization in both of these groups. The family represents the most elementary and the most important group from many standpoints. It is the first social environment in which the newborn child is placed. It is the first human sculptor which shapes out of the newborn a future member of a society. In the past, and to a less degree in the present, it has been the first agency which has determined the essential forms of conduct of a child, and inculcated the fundamental patterns of his responses and actions, attitudes and beliefs, tastes and opinions, convictions and evaluations. As a rule, one has had the language, the religion, mores, tastes and patterns of behaviors of the family in which he was born and reared. It is natural that the characteristics of the family leave a lasting stamp on the whole personalities of the children. Even now, in the city where the influence of the family is less than in the rural parts, the family still has a greater influence on the children than any other agency. Knowledge of right and wrong, among city children, shows that they exhibit the greatest likeness to the parental ideas of right and wrong. The coefficients of correlation in likeness are as follows: with parents, .545; with friends, .353; club leaders, .137; public school teachers, .028; Sunday school teachers, .002.[1] From this standpoint, there is a great deal of truth in the statements of Confucius and the Le Play School that *what the family is such will the society be.*[2] From this standpoint it is very important to investigate whether there are some important differences between the typical rural and urban families; and if there are, to what are they due. An adequate characterization of the differences may throw a great deal of light on many differences in the typical urban and rural personality, and the urban and rural populations generally.

It is understood that we are not so much interested in small, local, and temporary differences, but in those which are fundamental

[1] Hartshorne, Hugh, and May, M. A., "Testing the Knowledge of Right and Wrong," *Religious Education*, Vol. XXI, p. 545.

[2] See the details and the literature in Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Ch. II.

and constant in space and time. In other words, we are interested in family differences which, as long as conspicuous other differences exist between the city and the country, tend to exist also.

Gross Differences Between the Rural and Urban Families. The Family represents a legal union of a husband (s) and wife (ves); the parents and the children; and the relatives. Its principal functions have been as follows: a. "production" of human beings; b. their training, education, and preparation for life in a society, as *socii;* c. securing the means of subsistence for its members, especially for the infants and the aged—in this respect it has been functioning as a real economic unit; finally, d. recreational functions. Now let us compare the rural and urban family in all these respects. We shall begin with the family as the union of a husband and a wife.

The Rural Family, as the Union of a Husband and Wife, has been more Stable than the Urban Family. Such is the first general difference between the rural and urban family. It means that the family ties which bind the husband and wife into one union are much stronger and are broken more rarely in the rural family compared with the urban. This signifies that the rural family is much more integrated than the urban. What facts testify that the husband-wife union in the rural family is really more stable and integrated than the urban? The first objective evidence is from *statistics of divorces, separations, and desertions.*

Divorce. Statistics of divorces, separations, and desertions cannot show whether the rural or urban family is more harmonious and happy but they show which is more stable and in which the family ties between husband and wife are broken more often, that is, in which the family is disintegrated more easily. *The existing statistics of divorce permit no doubt of the facts that in practically all countries, the divorce rate has been higher in the urban than in the rural population and that the agricultural class has rates for divorce possibly lower than any of the large urban occupational classes.* A few representative figures show this. Other figures may be found in the references given.

In *Belgium* during the period from 1887 to 1906 there were 34 marriages to one divorce in the cities with populations of 100,000 and over, and in the whole provinces 89. In 1925 per 100,000 inhabitants there were the following numbers of divorces: [3] cities with populations 25,000 and over, 66.07; from 5,000 to 25,000, 30.58; from 2,000 to 5,000, 14.89; and in communities with less than 2,000, 9.27. More than 80 per cent of all divorces were in the communities above 5,000, while their total population composed only 57.52 per cent of the

[3] See Department of Commerce and Labor of the U. S. Special Reports. *Marriage and Divorce,* 1867–1906, Part I, Washington, 1909, p. 442; *Annuaire Statistique de Belgique et du Congo Belge,* 1926, Bruxelles, 1927, pp. XXXVII and XIX. See also Jacquart, C., *Le divorce et la séparation de corps. Essais de statistique moral.*

whole population of the country. Geographically, the most industrialized and densely inhabited districts—Liége, Brabant, and Hainaut—furnished more than 80 per cent of all divorces in the country.

In *France*, per 1,000 marriages there were the following numbers of divorces and "séparations de corps" in the period from 1860 to 1879: Paris and the department of Seine, 24; Urban and industrial districts 14; and Rural districts 1 or 2. The same relative differences were found for 1887–1905 and for 1909.[4]

In 1905 in Prussia, for each 1,000 marriages celebrated there were 35.7 divorces in the cities and 10.1 in the country. Per each 100,000 population there were 24.6 divorces in all Germany, 1909–1913, and 101.6 in Berlin. The same relative differences were true for every year between 1913 and 1926.[5]

In *Sweden*, divorces per 1,000 marriages for 1881–1890 were 4.8 rural and 20.3 urban; for 1901–1910, 7.6 and 32.8; and for 1921–1925, 22.8 rural and 74.3 urban. Divorces per 100,000 inhabitants show the same results.[6]

In *Norway*, marriages to *one* divorce were in 1894, 71 for all Norway and 26 for Christiania alone. In 1896, 1901, 1906, and other years the results were similar.[7]

In *Bulgaria*, during the period from 1894 to 1900 the rural population furnished 55.5 per cent of all divorces while it composed more than 80 per cent of the whole population of the country, a difference far greater than that which could be ascribed to the differences in age-compositions of the city and the country populations.[8] Per 1,000 population at the ages from 15 to 69 the number of the divorced who remarried was 201.8 in cities (1909–1912) compared with 163.7 for the rural districts; the same relative difference existed for 1919–1922.

In *the United States of America*, per 100,000 population there were the following numbers of divorces in the counties which had cities:

	1900	*1890*	*1880*	*1870*
With populations of 100,000 and over	72	53	44	34
In other counties	68	51	38	31[9]

[4] Levasseur, É., *La Population Française*, t. II, pp. 91–93; Von Mayr, G., *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre*, v. III, p. 201. The above report: *Marriage and Divorce of the U. S. Dept. of Commerce*, pp. 438–443; *France Annuaire Statistique*, p. 24, 1910.

[5] Von Mayr, G., *op. cit.*, p. 201, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1927, pp. 44–48–49. See also the above quoted *Report of the U. S. Dept. of Commerce*, p. 453.

[6] *Statistisk Årsbok for Sverige*, 1927, p. 56.

[7] *Report of the U. S.*, pp. 491–493.

[8] See *Report of the U. S. Department of Commerce*, p. 425; *Annuaire Statistique de Bulgarie*, 1927, p. 41.

[9] The *Report*, pp. 17–19. See also Wilcox, W., *The Divorce Problem—A Study in Statistics*, Columbia University Studies, v. I, p. 33; Wilcox, W. F., "A Study in Vital Statistics," *Political Science Quarterly*, v. VIII, p. 83.

The difference here is not so great and perhaps may be explained by the differences in the age-compositions of the city and country populations. More probably it shows higher divorce rates in the cities than in the rural parts as was stated by the *Report* and by Professor W. Wilcox. This conclusion is also supported by the divorce rates of the agricultural occupation (see further) and by the following recent data.[10]

NUMBER OF MARRIAGES PER ONE DIVORCE

Population Unit	*State*	*Urban*	*Ten Non-Urban Counties*
California	5.2		10.5
Los Angeles	—	4.5	
San Francisco	—	3.4	
Illinois	5.7	—	7.0
Chicago		4.8	
Maryland	16.0		29.3
Baltimore City		6.5	
Michigan	4.9		23.2
Detroit		3.9	
Minnesota	8.9		10.5
Minneapolis		4.7	
St. Paul		7.1	
Missouri	4.2		5.9
Kansas City		2.4	
St. Louis		3.0	
Virginia	7.2		16.0
Richmond		4.6	
New York	23.6		15.7
New York City		26.8	

These are not pure "rural" and "urban" groups but counties which are predominantly rural and predominantly urban. And yet, with the exception of the counties, whose central part is composed by New York City, all give results consistent with the above figures. If we could separate the pure farm population from the pure urban groups, the difference would increase and even the exception mentioned (due in a large degree to a high proportion of immigrants, Roman Catholics, and Jews in the population of New York City, groups which usually have low rates of divorces) probably would have disappeared. Divorces are also greater in the urban districts of Holland,[11] Rumania,[12] Denmark, and Switzerland.[13]

The above gives an idea about the differences in the intensiveness of the divorce rate in the city and country populations. *As a general conclusion, we may say that the stability of the family, as a union of parents, in the cities and industrial districts is considerably less than*

[10] Computed from U. S. Census, *Marriage and Divorce*, 1925.

[11] *Annuaire Statistique des Pays-Bas*, 1927, pp. 5–21.

[12] *Annuaire Statistique de la Roumanie*, 1925, pp. 15 and 27.

[13] *Statistisk Aarbog*, 1927, pp. 5, 28; see also von Mayr, *op. cit.*, and *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*.

in the rural districts. Similar are the results given by the rates of divorce in various occupational classes.[14] The agricultural class gives the lowest rate of divorce of any large urban occupational class in Italy, France, England, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Russia, and some other countries.

In the United States the maximum divorces here are given by actors and showmen, musicians and commercial travelers, barbers and telephone or telegraph operators, and physicians and surgeons. Minimum divorces are given by clergymen, agricultural laborers, and farmers and planters.[15]

Without adding other figures, we may conclude: first, that family stability is the highest among farmers, peasants, and other groups engaged in agricultural pursuits; this conclusion is corroborated by the lower divorce rates in the country. Second, it is lowest in the group of public service, officials, and professions, as well as in those of trade, industry, and personal service or in general, in typically urban groups.

Desertion. Although the statistics of desertions are very fragmentary, nevertheless the studies seem to show that desertion is more common in the cities than in the rural parts.

The totality of the above data do not leave any doubt as to the greater stability of the rural family, as a union of the husband and wife, compared with the urban family. They testify that marriage bonds bind the mates stronger and for a longer time in the rural family than in the urban. The marriage vow has meant a union for life in the rural family; in the modern urban family it tends to become a union for a shorter and shorter period of time.

The Rural Family, as the Union of the Parents and Their Children. *It has been yielding a less proportion of the "fatherless" and "parentless" children than the urban family. In so far, the rural family, as the union of the parents and the children, has also been more integrated and stable than the urban family.*

Postponing a complete analysis of this difference to later pages of this chapter, we shall touch it here only in one specific aspect as shown by the statistics of illegitimate births. As a rule, the illegitimate child

[14] See many other statistics about this point in the works of Bosco, A., *I divorzi e le separazioni personali dei conjugi;* Bertillion, *Étude demographique de divorce;* Bockh, R., "Statistik der Ehescheidungen in der Stadt Berlin in den Jahren, 1885 bis 1894," *Bulletin de l'Institut International de Statistique,* t. XI, pp. 251–281; Yvernes, M., "Les divorces et les séparations de corps en France depuis, 1844," *Journ. de la Société de Statistique de Paris,* 1908, pp. 101 ff.; Oettingen, A., *Die Moralstatistik,* pp. 182 ff., and the sources quoted above.

[15] *Report; of the U. S. Dept. of Commerce,* quoted pp. 42–47. See Paterson, S. N., "Family Desertion and Non-Support," *The Journal of Delinquency,* Sept.–Nov., 1922; Colcord, J. C., *Broken Homes;* Eubank, E. A., *Study of Family Desertion;* Sherman, C., "Racial Factors in Desertion," *The Family,* Vol. III, 1922–1923.

means a child without legal and factual union with his father. Often the union between the child and his mother is broken also, either immediately after the birth when the child is taken from the mother by, or given by the mother to, some institution, or later on. For these evident reasons the rates for illegitimate children serve as one of the important "thermometers" of the strength of the family as the union of the parents and the children. At the same time they are indicative of the duration and stability of the family as the union of the mates. The very fact of the illegitimate birth, as a rule, signifies that the union of the parents of the illegitimate child had been broken before the child was born; that in other words, it was a very short-lived union, sometimes broken as soon as "the fall" happened. Therefore, other conditions being equal, the greater the number of individuals who have sexual life outside the family institution and the greater the number of illegitimate children, the weaker is the stability and cohesion of the family institution as the union of the parents, and the parents and the children. If we were able to secure valid and sufficient data regarding the number of persons living sexually out of the family and the number of prostitutes, these data, together with the rates for illegitimacy, would serve still better for diagnosing the comparative stability of the urban and rural family in the aspects analyzed. Since there are no valid data for extra-familial sex behavior, and the data regarding prostitution are very unreliable and fragmentary, we may take only the data concerning illegitimacy as they are relatively less defective.[16]

With the exception of the colored people in the United States, and the countries of England and Wales and Scotland (where the illegitimacy rates in the rural parts are either a little higher or about those of the urban districts) all countries show rural rates below those of the urban. The larger cities give still higher rates. The rates for

[16] There are many studies and they almost unanimously show a prevalence of sex immorality in the cities. Nevertheless, the very nature of the problem makes it very difficult to secure adequate data. See a few of them in Lundquist and Carver, *Principles of Rural Sociology*, pp. 192 193. See further the chapter about Criminality which give some data about sex-crimes. See *Birth, Stillbirth, Infant Mortality Statistics*, pp. 22 23, Washington, 1926. See also Mangold, G. B., *Children Born out of Wedlock*, where are collected many other data for the U. S.; see Giusti, Ugo, *Le Grandi citta Italiane*, p. 17, 1925; *Annuaire Stat. de Bulgarie*, p. 81, 1926; *Annuaire Stat. de la Roumanie*, 1926, p. 81; *Stat. Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1926, pp. 61, 94; *Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa*, 1910 1925, p. 898; Mayr, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 139; *South Australia Statistical Register*, p. II, 29, Adelaide, 1927; *Stat. Arsbok*, 1927, p. 46 (for Sweden); *Sixty-fourth and Sixty-fifth Annual Reports of the Registrar General for Scotland*, 1918, pp. X XI, 1919, pp. X XII; *Eighty-second Annual Report of the Registrar General*, 1919, p. XXXVI; Levasseur, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 33–34, 1891; *Annuaire Statistique* (de la France), 1910, p. 24; Mayr, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 139; *Stat. Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1927, p. 27; *Stat. Jahrbuch deutschen Städte*, 1927, p. 344; *Stat. Jahrbuch für den Freistaat Bayern*, 1919, p. 55; *Annuaire Stat. des Pays-Bas*, 1927, p. 18; *Annuaire Stat. de la republique Polonaise*, p. 95, Varsovie, 1927; *Annuaire Stat. de la Belgique*, 1924–1925, p. XXXII.

recent years and earlier periods show this conclusion in many countries.

To what extent does the face-value of these figures reflect the reality? Several authors claim that the elevated rate of the cities is due not so much to the immorality of the city residents, as to the fact of migration of prospective mothers from the country to the city. This migration, in their opinion, is largely responsible for the above high city results. It may be granted that, to some extent, such a migration of females who have "sinned" in the country and who go to the city to conceal their sin, raises the urban rates of illegitimacy. And yet, this is mere hypothesis which never has been backed by real facts. Further, it is scarcely possible to account for the whole difference through this factor. The fact that the rate systematically increases with the increase in size of the cities is hard to reconcile with the above migrations because no one has shown that "the sinful rural females" migrate more often to cities larger in size. Even granting that there is some truth in the contention, a series of other considerations compensate for this elevation of urban rates through migration of the country girls. First, the "innocent" country girls who migrate to the city and become pregnant after reaching there, naturally are to be regarded as urban but not rural "victims." Second, if, to some extent, the city rate is elevated by the migrations of "sinful" rural females to the city, we must not forget that many country females become illegitimate mothers in the rural parts owing to contact with city males (various urban dealers, tourists, travelers, merchants, writers, leisure people, and so on); this may compensate for the above elevation of the urban rate through migration. Third, the results of illegal sexual life in the cities are concealed much more by the practice of "birth-control," and particularly abortion, which are incomparably more prevalent in the cities than in the country.

Thus, when all factors are taken into consideration, one must admit that, with the exceptions mentioned, the urban rates of illegitimacy seem to be higher than the rural. Even these "exceptions" are doubtful when the above circumstances are borne in mind. There is no basis for a different conclusion. In so far, these rates support our claim of a greater stability or "cohesion" of the rural family as the *union of the mates and the parents and their offspring.*

As a Social, Economic, and Educational Agency. *The rural family has been integrated more than the urban family; in all these respects it has shown a greater cohesion of its members and more vigorous functioning and has exerted a greater influence upon its members than the urban family.*

Economically the rural family has been a much more integrated unit than the urban. If in the time of feudalism, not the individual

but the family was generally the social unit, this was particularly true in regard to the peasant family. When this family solidarity died out in the cities, in the peasant class it survived for a much longer period. Almost to the very beginning of the nineteenth century, and in many European countries up to its end, the family as a basic social and economic unit was common enough among the peasantry. And what a family! "Families of more than one hundred persons of the same blood were living in common, as in a college." [17] "The families were not small units, composed of a husband and wife and a child or two, but great patriarchal groups, aggregations of several families, connected by ties of blood, who collectively worked a farm of which they were tenants. Usually it was let to the whole group or clan, and they obeyed the orders of their chief, the father, grandfather, or great-grandfather. What a nestful of children!" [18] "The Polish peasants have large families and the land is worked by the members of the family. The patriarchal system still prevails, and married sons and daughters bring their wives and husbands home as a matter of course. A certain sum is set by for the purchase of stock and agricultural tools, and the balance is divided equally amongst the family." [19] The same may be said of the peasant family in Europe generally and in the Orient particularly. Up to the present time such families with common property and common economic functions have survived in some of the Slavic countries in Europe and they are rather common in India, China, and other Asiatic countries. The above brief characterization gives an idea of the high economic integration of the rural family in the past and its enormous power for the attraction and keeping together of its numerous members. It has functioned as a real economic unit; its property has been not the property of this or of that member, but of the whole family; the work of the members of the family were not independent works of individuals but those of members of a whole social organism controlled and directed by it; their incomes and expenses were not something determined by their individual efforts, but only shares from the common pot or controlled by the family. In brief, economically the rural family has represented a real social organism in which the individuals have been, so to speak, entirely melted. They have been but only parts of a family collectivity.[20]

At the present moment such a conspicuous family collectivism has, of course, disappeared in many countries. Nevertheless, as an economic unit, the rural family is still more alive and more strongly

[17] Babeau, A., *La vie rural dans l'ancienne France*, p. 227.
[18] Jacini, S., *La proprietà fondiaria*, p. 81, 1856.
[19] Quoted from Irvine, H., *op. cit.*, p. 39.
[20] See the details in Irvine, H. D., *op. cit.*, Ch. III; see there the literature and bibliography.

integrated than the urban family. The institution of family common ownership is preserved more in the rural than in the urban family.

"Land property is essentially familiar; the individual is its temporary manager. Who manages it is, therefore, not essential, provided he does it well. It may be the father, the oldest son, or the son-in-law. Other members of the family have the right to live away from the farm, but they have an obligation to work for the farm. The farm is the material basis, the expression of the unity of the (family) group in the economic world." [21]

The economic functions of the rural family—cooking, baking, churning, sewing, and other domestic industries—are still existing within the rural family more than within the city family. Cafeterias and restaurants, department stores and laundries, and similar institutions of the division of labor and marketing have replaced them in the city to a greater extent. In brief, even now the rural family is relatively a more collectivistic group than the urban. In other words, *the rural family still is much less free for the economic individualism of its members than the urban family.* Correspondingly, the vitality of the family as an economic unit is conspicuously greater in the rural than in the urban communities.

The same may be said of a great many other social functions of the family and of its integration. Hundreds of the most important facts show that in the rural family, the family as a unit is on the first plane and its individual members on the second; while in the city family the picture rather tends to be reversed. While the members of the city family have a choice in many of their actions, free from the rigid control of their families, beginning with the economic callings they follow and ending with the choices of mates, in the rural family many of these actions are still under the strong control of the family and "the freedom" of its members is still more limited. As a result, in the city family, the individual but not the family bears the principal responsibility for the success or failure of his free actions; in the rural family, on the contrary, the personal responsibility of the members is more limited, and the responsibility of the family more developed. All this means, that the family ties which bind the members of the urban families into one unit are less numerous, shorter, and less rigid than the ties in the rural family. Many functions, which are still performed by the rural family, have already disappeared in the urban family or are taken over by other than family agencies. The social collectivism of the rural family is more and more replaced by the social individualism of the members in the city family. The following examples—a few of many—illustrate the above statements.

[21] Thomas and Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 158–159. Compare L'Houet, Irvine, and others.

In the urban family the merits and the shortcomings of an individual are ascribed to the individual himself and to a very small degree to his family; the individual himself is evaluated primarily on the basis of his personal virtues or failures. In the rural family the situation is considerably different.

In peasant life all the attitudes of social pride are primarily familial and secondarily individual. When a family has lived from time immemorial in the same locality, when all its members for three or four generations are known or remembered, every individual is classified first of all as belonging to the family, and appreciated according to the appreciation which the family enjoys. [22]

This has been emphasized uniformly by all investigators. In the past, this engulfment of the individual by the family in agricultural societies was still greater, and the patriarchal type of family predominated amidst such societies.[23]

The same greater engulfment of the individual by the rural family compared with the urban is manifested in many other forms. Take, for instance, such an action as marriage. In the contemporary urban family, as a rule, to marry or not to marry is a matter which the individuals involved decide. Family opinion is but of secondary importance. Often it is not asked for or not followed. In the rural family the decision still depends greatly upon the family. Since the individuals involved are regarded primarily as mere extensions of the family their marriage naturally becomes a matter in which the family has a voice. And marriage itself is viewed from the standpoint of the interests of the family, as such, in a much greater degree than in the urban family. In such predominantly agricultural societies as those of India or China, with their cult of the ancestors, "no branch of any family should be allowed to be without its living representative, in order that the ancestral rites may be duly performed." Hence, the family imposes the marriage obligation on its members; and decides whom, when, and under what conditions the member of the family marries. The rôle of the individual involved, in comparison with the rôle of the family, is quite insignificant. (The reader need not interpret this as a "tyranny" of the rural family; see next pages of this chapter.) As a result of this social system "the boy and girl who are married are not a new family, but the latest branch in a tall family tree, independent of which they have no corporate existence." [24]

[22] Thomas and Znaniecki, Vol. I, pp. 96–97; the best analysis of this was given by F. Le Play. See his *Les Ouvrières Européens*, all six volumes.

[23] L'Houet, pp. 42 ff.; Irvine, Ch. III. For China, Smith, A. H., *Village Life in China*, pp. 237 ff., 248 250. In India the composition of the family almost entirely determines the social status of the individual. See further the works of F. Le Play, Durkheim, Tönnies, Bouglé, Kovalevsky, and others.

[24] Smith, A. H., *Village Life in China*, pp. 248–251.

A similar situation was found among the early agricultural states of Ancient Rome and Greece and in the rural families of almost all European countries up to recent times. At the present moment in Western countries, the situation is naturally different; and yet, in a milder form it still exists among rural people of many countries. In all the problems of marriage the rôle and the interference of the family is still much greater in the country population than in the city. The following illustrations give an idea of the family rôle in marriage.

The whole system of attitudes involves absolutely the postulate of marriage for every member of the young generation. A person who does not marry within a certain time . . . provokes in the family-group an attitude of unfavorable astonishment. . . . It is better to make a bad marriage than not to marry at all.

The family not only requires its members to be married, but directs their choice. This is neither tyranny nor self-interest on the part of the parents nor solicitude for the future of the child, but a logical consequence of the individual's situation in the familial group. The individual is a match only as a member of the group and owing to the social standing of the family within the community and to the protection and help in social and economic matters given by the family. He has, therefore, corresponding responsibilities; in marrying he must take, not only his own, but also the family's interests into consideration. . . . "The boy or girl ought to come at least from a good family."

Economically "the question of property in land is not in peasant life a merely economic, but a social question. . . . Both families are obliged to contribute to the economic existence of the newly married couple by giving dowries corresponding to their situation."

Sexual life. "Illegal sexual relations before marriage are relatively rare. . . . Sexual intercourse before marriage is normally and immediately treated by the boy, the girl, the family, and the community as an illicit extension of the sexual preliminaries of marriage. . . . The idea of sexual intercourse *per se*, without relation to marriage, plays hardly any part in the primitive peasant organization of life. . . . An immediate falling in love (in marriage choice), leading directly to engagement, is psychologically impossible. All the possible partners are known from childhood—which is evidently an important obstacle to a rapid infatuation. . . . Careful selecting, taking of all possibilities into account, are traditional attitudes, originating in familial considerations, but transferred to matters of love. . . . For the normal young boy or girl, therefore, there are a certain number of persons of the other sex more or less pleasing, and all of them are sexually acceptable. The ultimate choice is then made under the influence of the family." [25]

[25] Thomas and Znaniecki, Vol. I, pp. 107–108, 117, 123, 126. We do not intend to give the impression that there is no illicit sexual intercourse in rural communities. These matters are relative; the mores against such are stronger in the rural areas;

"For what reasons does a peasant marry? Not so much for love. The poetry of love remains somewhat strange for him as that of a kiss. In the first place he looks for a wife fit for his whole family." [26]

In a greater or a less degree, a similar situation has been unanimously stressed by a great many authors.[27] In such countries as the United States, where the rural-urban contrasts are already obliterated considerably, individualism has made considerable progress in the farm population; nevertheless, it is probable that family interference is still greater in the country than in the city.

What has been said of the family rôle in the matter of marriage may be said of many other actions of the members of the family, their occupation, education, religious and political affiliations, their expenditures, recreation, and so on. In all these respects the rural family plays a more decisive rôle in determining the behavior of its members than the urban family. All this means that the farm family is still more integrated than the urban and that it performs all these functions more vigorously than the urban family.

The rural family has been more efficient in production of human beings than the urban family and the rural population has been producing a less proportion of human beings outside of the family than the urban population. The second part of the statement has been demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs. The first part of the proposition is demonstrated by the data concerning rural-urban birth-rates, given above, by the data of the comparative size of the families, and by the proportion of the childless marriages and marriages with one or two children in the total number of the urban and rural marriages. These data show that the average number of children born in rural families is higher, the proportion of childless marriages, or marriages with one child, is lower while the proportion of the marriages with many children is higher than in urban families. One of the main functions of the family has been the production of human beings. Prosaically speaking, the family has been almost an exclusive factory for such production. If the efficiency in this field is declining, and if the proportion of childless marriages is increasing, this is a symptom of deep transformation in the existing family institution: *the family as a union of parents and the children tends to disappear under such circumstances;* that is, it loses one of its most important characteristics, without which it is no longer a family as it has been, and becomes something

and the obligations to cease, reform, and later settle down to a virtuous married life are more pressing. See Reymont, L., *Peasants* (in four volumes), Knopf, 1925, for an analysis of this in certain rural communities.

[26] L'Houet, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–64.

[27] See for instance, the works of Irvine, Le Play, and others quoted. See also Riehl, W. H., *op. cit.*, Vol. III, *passim;* Rosch, M., "Die adligen Bauren," *Zeitschrift d. Vereins für Volkskunde,* 1896, p. 203; Wiese, L., *Das Dorf als soziales Gebilde,* Ch. VII.

quite different. The same may be said generally of the tendency to decrease the size of the family. This explains why, from an objective standpoint, the number of the children born is one of the symptoms of a comparative stability and vitality of the family institution, as it has existed within the Western, and partly Eastern, countries throughout centuries and even thousands of years. The decreasing efficiency of the urban family in this respect indicates the growing transformation or disorganization of the institution of the family itself.

Thus, from whatever viewpoint we take the rural and urban families, we have to recognize that the rural family as a union of husband and wife, as a union of parents and children, as an economic unit, as a social unit, as an institution for procreation and education of the children has been more stable, integrated, efficient, and has disintegrated in a less degree in all these respects than the urban family. The urban family has already lost some of these functions; others are considerably atrophied; the size of the family itself is shrinking more and more; and the family unity is decreasing more and more. In brief, according to all evidences, the urban family is in the process of decay; and this decay has some causal relationship with the process of urbanization itself.

This conclusion, analyzed further, is supported by historical evidence. The present situation is a mere repetition of what has happened in the past. The progress of urbanization in ancient Rome and Greece led exactly to the same results in those past societies: to a transformation of the family from an indissoluble union of husband and wife, parents and children (marriages *cum manu* and with *patria potestas*) into dissoluble marriages *sine manu;* to an enormous increase of divorce; a falling birth-rate; the growth of sexual freedom and sexual individualism; the waning rôle of family influence and interference; the "emancipation of women" and, generally, of all of the members of the family from family control; and disorganization of the family as a social, religious, economic, and educational unit. Present urban-rural differences are practically identical with those in ancient urban societies; and the recent trends in the family institution are in essence identical with the trends which took place in Rome and Greece parallel to the growth of urbanization in those societies.

Before proceeding to an analysis of other, more intimate, differences between rural-urban families, let us give the necessary interpretation and explanation of the differences outlined. After that we shall resume the analysis.

Interpretation of Gross Rural-Urban Family Differences. It is not difficult to indicate the principal factors responsible for the above

differences. They are to be found partly within the type of organization of the rural and urban families themselves, and partly outside of the families, in the character of the fundamental conditions which compose the rural and urban worlds amidst which the rural and urban families are placed. We shall take, one by one, the above differences in the type of the families studied and indicate briefly the principal factors responsible for each of these differences.

The factors responsible for the *less efficiency of the urban family in the production of human beings*, for a greater proportion of childless marriages and a lower proportion of marriages with many children in the urban family, are the factors responsible for a lower birth-rate among the city population. They were discussed in the chapter about birth-rates and for this reason need not be repeated here.

In addition to a series of factors indicated further, the specific factors responsible for a higher rate of divorce, desertion, and separation in the cities are as follows.[28] The first is the predominance in the city of childless marriages and marriages with a few children. An analysis of divorce factors shows that childless marriages give higher divorce-rates than marriages with children. For this reason the predominance of childless marriages in the city facilitates divorce in the city. Second, the study of divorce factors shows that marriages between biologically and socially heterogeneous parties, when the parties belong to different races, nationalities, religions, economic statuses, occupations, age-groups, and so on, generally give a higher rate of divorce than marriages between more homogeneous parties in all these respects. We know, that the city population is more heterogeneous than the rural population. The proportion of "heterogeneous marriages" in the city seems to be somewhat higher also, than in the country. Hence, the heterogeneity of the urban population is one of the factors contributing to an increase of divorce in the cities. Third, we know that the Roman Catholics give a lower rate for divorce than Protestants, and both give a lower rate than freethinkers for whom marriage and the family are but "conventional and companionate institutions" stripped of any "sacredness." Since marriage is a mere matter of "companionate convenience" among freethinkers, as it becomes "uncomfortable" it tends to be dissolved. The cities seem to have a higher proportion of such "freethinkers." (See the Chapter on Religion.) Ergo, this is one of the factors contributing to an increase of the urban divorce-rate. Fourth, among the "causes" of desertion or divorce, a considerable rôle is played by

[28] See the data and the evidence for the subsequent statements about the factors of divorce in the works of Mayr, Bosco, Bock, Gianturco, Yvernes, Willcox, Bertillon, and the *Report of the U. S. Census*. See also Lichtenberger, J., *Divorce*, Drachsler, J., *Intermarriage in New York City*, pp. 16 ff.

alcoholism and narcotics, venereal diseases, and enforced prostitution. These phenomena, as we already know, are more widespread within the city than within the country population. Hence, these factors are to be mentioned also. Fifth, it is reasonable to expect that hasty marriages, in which the parties marry knowing very little of each other, would be less stable than marriages concluded by well-acquainted parties. The data of desertions show, that in about one-third of the cases, the married couples knew each other less than one year before marriage. Generally, the majority of the desertions are composed out of marriages in which the parties knew very little of each other.[29] There scarcely is any doubt that such hasty marriages are more common in the city than in the country. The very fact that country marriages are concluded after the careful deliberation of the whole family, makes hasty marriages less possible than in the city where the decision is made more often by the individuals involved and often under the influence of occasional and fanciful circumstances. In so far, this factor also works in favor of an increase of the city rate of divorce. These factors, together with those indicated further, make the higher rate of urban divorce quite comprehensible. It agrees with what we expect from our knowledge of divorce factors.

As to the general factors responsible for the greater stability of the rural family and other differences between the rural and urban families, these are exactly the fundamental conditions in which the rural world differs from the urban. The nature of the agricultural occupation, lower density, smaller size of community, lower mobility, lower division of labor and social stratification, greater homogeneity of the population, a less complex, less wide, and less intensive system of interaction in the country, are responsible for the greater stability and efficiency of the rural family. The series of concrete conditions indicated further are mere, direct or indirect, modifications or manifestations of these factors. For instance, the greater density of the urban population has led to a greater division of labor in the city; this, in its turn, has led to a dispersion of the members of the same family throughout different occupational places in the city; this, in its turn, has made it impossible for these members to spend the greater part of their time together "at home"; this facilitates the weakening of family ties and leads to family disintegration. This illustrates the statement that all the concrete factors responsible for family stability in the country and its instability in the city are nothing but concrete forms of the above basic conditions which compose the urban and the rural worlds. After this explanation, let us enumerate briefly the concrete forms of these general factors.

First, thanks to the nature of the agricultural occupation and its

[29] See about this in Patterson's study, quoted, pp. 301–307 ff.

less division of labor, the members of a rural family spend much more time together than the members of the urban family. In the urban, especially at the present moment, the members meet one another only in the morning and at night. In the daytime the father is at his office, factory, or shop, the older children at school or at their own jobs, and the mother either is working outside the home, too, or remains alone with the other children. When work time is over, the members go to various places of recreation outside of the family and, in this way, are separated again. As a result the urban home is only "a parking place over night" or[30] a "place for the changing of clothes." In the rural home the situation is quite different. Its members are together most of the twenty-four hours in a day. They work, eat, and play together. In brief, their direct-face-to-face-contact is more incessant, and permanent. Under such conditions the community of feeling, believing, rejoicing, suffering, thinking, and living is much stronger in the rural compared with the urban family. Family ties bind more strongly than under urban conditions where the members live much more "independently" from one another. Such co-living is a factor which binds any group particularly strongly.

Second, thanks to the above basic conditions of the rural world, the economic functions of the rural family lead to the same result. Its members are engaged in the same work, they are partners in the best sense of the word: their economic interests are identical because all work for the same family unit; the whole family is as one working team trying to secure its means of subsistence by a community of effort. Such "family communism" or real partnership[31] again ties its members much stronger than the individual independence in economic activities of the members of the urban family. Working separately, often being engaged in different occupations, they cannot have, as a rule, such a close "partnership" as in the rural family.

Third, *the younger generation in a rural family is under exclusive family influences for a longer time than those of the urban family. The rural family has less numerous agencies competing with it in the "shaping" and educating of the younger generation than the urban family.* Thanks to the less accessibility of various educational agencies in the rural areas, the family has been the kindergarten, the school, and the moral and religious agency for its younger members to a

[30] Hayner, N. S., "Hotel Homes," *Sociology and Social Research*, 1927, Vol. XII, p. 131. "Hotel Life and Personality," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 784–795.

[31] See *The Advantages of Farm Life*, pp. 4–10. See similar opinions unanimously stressed by 94 per cent of 7,000 answers of farm women, in "*What Farm Women Think About Farm Life.*"

greater extent. In the city, on the contrary, a child is taken early from the exclusive influence of its family by kindergartens, schools, various similar agencies and institutions. They begin to exert their influence much earlier and compete with the family. This very shortness of the exclusive influence of the city family over its children, and the early interference of other agencies in the social training, education, and shaping of their personalities, naturally gives less opportunity for the urban family to "shape" them according to the desires and objectives of the family. In this way, this circumstance favors a less likemindedness of the members of the urban family, less "community of co-living," less cohesion, and less solidarity.

Fourth, *in the rural environment, especially in that of the open farm, it is much more difficult to find a crowd or a group of people where an individual may find other than family shelters against isolation and lonesomeness.* In the country there are less people, fewer opportunities for recreation, and fewer opportunities for finding extra-familial "friends," "gangs," "companions," "fellows," and so on. The family is thus psychologically more necessary than in the city. For this reason it again stamps and binds its members much more strongly than the urban family.

Fifth, in the rural areas a member of a family has not so many opportunities to "go astray" especially the husband, and wife, or even the children, because there are not so many temptations, particularly for breaking of the marriage vows, for indulging in vice, or for throwing away the family protection and ties. Further, the possibilities of self-support outside of family organization are less in the rural areas. The city environment with its theaters, sex-movies, vaudevilles, Coney-Islands, Luna-Parks, saloons, dancing halls, books, magazines, papers, legal and illegal prostitutes, and other "similar stimuli" is packed with temptations, especially in regard to sex. This naturally increases the chances of a disruption of family ties between the husband and wife in the city. The same, in other forms, is true of the union of the parents and children. The individual—be it husband, wife, son, or daughter—put outside of his family in a typically rural population, especially in the past, was a kind of an "outcast," homeless, friendless, censured by neighbors, and avoided by the community. In the city there are more avenues open for self-support by such a member and more anonymity. He may carry on without any substantial inconvenience. For a woman particularly the rural community gives less opportunity to be independent and to "earn" her living independently. She is much more pressed to be a wife or a member of a family there than in the city. The city opens more avenues for her independent existence. Having this, she can more easily afford to satisfy her sex impulses

without a legal marriage. The same may be said of other members of a family. This again ties the rural population back to family organization and makes them stick more strongly than in the city.

Sixth, *thanks to the less division of labor within the rural population, the family is more indispensable for the satisfaction of almost all necessities than in the urban.* For the satisfaction of hunger in the city there are cafeterias and restaurants; for housing, rooms and apartments for rent; for washing, laundries; for drinking, the soft-drink parlors, saloons; for medical care, nurses and physicians; for recreation and rest, theaters, movies, clubs, associations, dancing halls; for sex, "occasional" women and commercialized prostitutes; and so on. The social division of labor in the cities makes it easy to satisfy almost all the necessities outside of the family. The situation is opposite in the country. There these necessities often may be satisfied only through and within the family owing to a lack of the other agencies. Such greater indispensability of the rural family binds its members together much more than the members of the urban family.

Seventh, we have seen that the mobility of the urban population is greater than that of the rural. This means, *that on the average, the members of the rural family in one or in several generations stay together at the same place in a greater proportion and for a longer time (within one and several generations) than the members of the urban family.* While in the city, with perhaps the exception of a small group of the wealthy and aristocratic groups, a family rarely resides in the same home, apartment or room for many years. They usually shift from place to place. In the rural family, as a rule, the family has the same house or farm or abode sometimes for several generations. The "home" life-history is inseparable from that of the family. This permanency of the home and its surroundings, in their turn, give the family unity, oneness, and integration. Since the dwelling and surroundings are saturated with the life-history of the activities of the members of the family, they incessantly remind of and reinforce family unity. Like the standard of a regiment, or the heraldic arms of an aristocratic family, this dwelling or family abode functions as incarnation of family history and unity, and as a material point of the family's attachment.[32] In the city such an incarnation is lacking. With it is lacking also the important material stimulus of family integration. The younger generation often does not have any material traces of the activities of its fathers and forefathers except a few photographs and fragmentary tales. "Butter-

[32] See *The Advantages of Farm Life*, pp. 2–3, 22–23. See other similar opinions in *What Farm Women Think About Farm Life, passim.*

flying" from place to place, it does not have a point of attachment like that of the rural family.[33]

On the other hand, *owing to the greater mobility, the members of the urban family of the same generation live together under the same roof for a much shorter period of time than the members of the rural family.* Having reached an adult age, members of the city family scatter sometimes throughout various cities, and more often throughout various parts of the city. They see one another more rarely, and, as a result, "go astray" more quickly, and lose the community of family feeling easier than the members of the rural family. Through this result of the greater city mobility, the unity of the urban family is made more fragile.

In addition, the greater urban mobility and complexity leads to an anonymity of the individual and his relations, and to his greater freedom to do as he pleases. Living in a rural community and being attached to his house for life, puts the individual under the permanent pressure of the mores. He has to reckon with public opinion, and has to restrain from many censured actions. In the city, the individual is free; he is very little known; if he does something not approved by his partners in the apartment house, he can easily move to other quarters where his actions are unknown. This anonymity of city relations and the possibility of hiding easily favors many sexual indulgences and thus weakens the family bonds. Even the motive "not to smear the family good name and prestige" by immoral actions ceases to be an efficient motive in the urban anonymity.

Take further the greater psycho-social (not physical) isolation, lonesomeness, and monotony of everyday life for a considerable part of the city population. As has been shown in another part of the book, these conditions are more common in the city than in the country. Persons rarely bear easily such lonesomeness and drudgery. They need some friend to whom they may tell their pains and sufferings, who will divide their joys, from whom they may find a lively response to their sympathies, feelings, and worries. They also need some romance and adventure to break the deadening drudgery of the everyday life, and often quite monotonous work in factories, offices, or shops. In the rural environment, individuals have their family to satisfy all these cravings. And the family is probably the most satisfactory and efficient agency for such satisfaction. In the

[33] Several studies also show that there is a tangible correlation between territorial migration and the divorce-rate. H. Hart found that the coefficient of correlation between the per cent of native-born whites, who were born outside of the state of residence, in the total population of the state and the divorce rate was (by states) $684 \pm .050$ (for 1890). In other words, the states in which 80 per cent of the population was composed out of migrants the rates for divorce, per 100,000, were 327.1, while states with insignificant per cents of migrants gave corresponding rates below 100. Hart, H., *op. cit.*, p. 55.

city a great many individuals do not have their families. They are left somewhere far from the city. They do not have any mates or friends with whom they have grown up together and whom they have known since childhood. Naturally, therefore, they have to go to crowded places, like dance halls or theaters, to look for substitutes for these life-mates and friends. In this way, thousands of "stories," "adventures," and "romances," sex-connections, pregnancies, and forced marriages are started; and thousands of those started on such a substitute basis are short lived. The mates do not have any possibility of knowing the whole personality of the other on such short acquaintanceship and in such surroundings. All this again works against the stability of family in the city and favors its disruption.[34] In the upper and the middle urban classes there is a great deal of leisure for women and an environment which early awakens sexual impulses. Such circumstances, plus night parties, vaudevilles, drinking, reading of various "modern" literature, financial opportunities for "buying love," chorus girls, chorus boys, and so on, represent a complex of the stimuli incessantly tempting sexual purity or marriage faithfulness of the males and females of those classes. Hence we find various scandals, elopements, breaking the marriage vows, in brief, a weakening family institution within these classes.[35]

Add to the above that a great many people in the city dwell in rooms of the same apartment or apartment house. Only a door or a screen separates a girl from a lad, or a woman from a man in such apartments and tenement houses. They often use the same bath and toilet rooms. This lack of spatial separation is again a powerful inducement to occasional sexual connections, abuses, seducements, and similar things which break the family purity and bonds.

Intimate work between men and women, other than in family relations, is more prevalent in the cities. The relationships between employer and employed, "boss" and stenographer, and clerks of different and similar ratings within the same employment places are more frequent. Such leads to the development and spread of a greater amount of extra-familial sex life.

Furthermore, the intensity of social climbing in cities tempts

[34] See details and data about hasty marriages, forced marriages, etc., in the works on desertion quoted. Microscopical investigations of these phenomena among semi-skilled and unskilled working men of the cities show that they are very common. A considerable licentiousness, obscenity, immorality, early sexual life, on the one hand, and on the other a high rate of forced marriages—such are these traits. See the studies of Watterroth, Bernays, M., and others in the *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, series *Auslese und Anpassung der Arbeiterschaft*, Vols. 133–34–35, 153; Booth, Charles, *Life and Labor of the People of London*, all volumes; and especially the final one; Rowntree, B. S., *Poverty*, Niceforo, A., *Les classes pauvres*, Part III; Lewis, E. L., *The Children of the Unskilled*, Ch. III.

[35] The situation is well reflected in the stories from urban life by G. Maupassant, A. France, O. Wilde, F. Wedekind, B. Shaw, and hundreds of others.

various individuals to use sex more as an agency to secure better jobs or a more easy life. This is at the expense of home and familial sacredness.

The above and similar circumstances explain why the ties between husband and wife and those between the parents and the children are much stronger in the rural family than in the urban; why the rural family is much more stable; why its unity and solidarity are greater; why the likemindedness and co-living, co-feeling, co-sympathy, co-believing, and common patterns of conduct are more intensive in the rural family; why the family traditions are more vital, longer, and more conspicuous; why the most important family functions, procreation, education, socialization, and economic are performed more efficiently in the rural and are lost or weakened less than in the urban family; and why, finally, the rural family institution is much less disintegrated than in the city.

Such are the general fundamental differences between the urban and the rural families. Whether the traits typical of the urban or the rural family are good or bad depends largely upon the tastes of an individual. Those who care for the purity and the survival of the family institution as it has existed before and who care for social stability, order and continuation of social traditions, must give preference to the rural family. Those "freethinkers" for whom all these and similar values are only "prejudices and superstitions," and who are inclined to regard high fertility, sexual purity, moderation, traditionalism, marriage-faithfulness and similar things as kinds of evil, will prefer the urban type of family.

Now when the fundamental differences are analyzed, let us glance briefly at other less conspicuous and more intimate characteristics of the rural and urban families as the unions of a husband and wife and the parents and the children.

Husband-Wife Relationships. Besides the above differences are there some other substantial differences in the rural and urban families, particularly in the relationships of the husband and wife and the parents and the children? It is hard to answer definitely questions on the account of lack of well ascertained data. Nevertheless, some tentative hypotheses have been set forth and need to be mentioned. The first claim consists in the statement that the *relationships between the husband and wife in the rural family are marked by a complete subjection of the wife to the husband and the females to the males, while the urban family is marked by an equality of the social status of the parents, by emancipation of women, and by the attenuation or annulment of man's domination in the family.* The hypothesis may be backed by a series of facts which show that in predominantly agricultural countries like China, India, Turkey or at the earlier agricultural stages of the

Western societies, women and wives are or were really subjected to the husbands or males, do or did not have any political rights, are or were secluded within the home, and in no way may have or had social, economic, and political independence. In the urbanized societies, on the contrary, the rights of the females are almost equal to these of the husband, and the women have social, political, and economic independence. In short, they are on an equal standing with men. In the past, for instance, in Ancient Rome and Greece, when urbanization progressed sufficiently, the emancipation of women was realized. Thus these and similar facts of history seem to support the hypothesis.

Nevertheless, a more rigid verification makes the hypothesis somewhat less certain. Doubt arises as to whether the emancipation of wives or women is causally connected with urbanization or whether it is the result of some other factors. Indeed, if urbanization is the factor of emancipation then we must find that emancipation of women is generally greater in the city than in the country, that the more urbanized societies show greater emancipation, and that among the predominantly agricultural communities and societies or at predominantly agricultural stages in any society, emancipation does or did not exist. Are these expectations corroborated by the facts? Not entirely. In order to make the discussion clear let us agree as to what we mean by female emancipation. Five relationships are particularly important in this respect: first, monogamy in the marriage (one husband, one wife and *vice versa*) because polygamy or polyandry are evident manifestations of the inequality of one of the parties to the marriage; second, equal rights in marriage dissolution because if the divorce is granted only at the will of one party this would be a great inequality; third, equal rights for bride and groom in the choice of a mate because if only one has such a right, or more preponderant rights, this would also be an inequality; fourth, equal rights to the property and its ownership and disposal by the wife and the husband because if one or the other becomes the legal owner of the common property this is a conspicuous inequality; and finally, equal political rights in suffrage and occupation of social, public, and governmental positions or the enjoyment of the rights and privileges of citizenship. These five forms of equality or inequality compose all the essentials of the equality of the sexes.

What has been the situation in the city and the country, in agricultural and non-agricultural stages in all these respects? Let us begin with monogamy, polygamy, and polyandry. A survey of the societies in which each of these forms of marriage exists or has existed shows that practically each of these forms exists or has existed in the predominantly rural and predominantly urban communities and

stages. First, consider polygamy. Among the simpler people we find it at all stages; lower hunters, higher hunters, pastoral, and agricultural peoples.[36] Thus even among simpler agricultural peoples, not all have this institution. And at later periods of agricultural development in the Western countries (Middle Ages and now) polygamy disappeared. On the other hand, in the past among the societies where polygamy existed, it existed side by side with monogamy, and not only in the country but in cities, too. In the cities its existence was in a rather conspicuous form. In other countries like Greece and Rome, at their pre-urbanized stage, marriage was monogamous. On the other hand, there have been many societies where polygamy existed in the cities even at a relatively developed urbanized stage. Ancient Rome, Athens, other large Roman and Greek cities, Bagdad, the cities of the Arabian Khalifats, the cities of China, India, and other, especially among Mohammedan, Hindu, and Confucianist, populations were marked by polygamy even more than the rural parts of such countries.[37] Even now, in spite of the high industrialization of Japan, polygamy still exists there, as it exists in the cities of Turkey, India, and various Mohammedan Arabic countries. This means, that polygamy is connected with the rural and urban stages, and with the city and country; for this reason we cannot say that it is something causally connected with rural civilization or population and which is absolutely incompatible with the city, or with urban civilization, and the urban stage. If we do not find it in Western cities now, we do not find it also in Western rural parts now or even many centuries ago, especially since the establishment of Christianity.

Similar must be the conclusions about monogamy. It has existed among the hunters and the simple agricultural peoples of the past; at predominantly agricultural and predominantly industrialized stages of corresponding societies. In Europe and Christian countries it was the predominant and the only legal form of marriage many centuries before industrialization and urbanization of these countries: and now it exists and, as we have seen, is probably stronger among the rural than among the urban populations. Thus in no way can the transition from polygamy to monogamy, in which the basic rights of women and wives are equalized with those of their husbands, be regarded as a product or result of urbanization. Finally, polyandry,[38] as a form in which the wife's situation is somewhat more

[36] Hobhouse, L., Wheeler, G. C., and Ginsberg, M., *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, pp. 232 ff. Westermarck still more warns against even a progress of polygamy from the lower to the higher agricultural peoples. *The History of Human Marriage*, Vol. III, pp. 27–30.

[37] See the details in Westermarck, E., *The History of Human Marriage*, Vol. III, Chaps. XXVII to XXVIII.

[38] See Westermarck, E., *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Chaps. XXIX–XXX. Briffault, R., *The Mothers*, Vol. I, pp. 675–714.

privileged than that of her husband's, exists not among the industrial and urbanized societies as much as among the pastoral and agricultural and generally pre-urbanized societies like Tibet, Lodah, Bhutan, etc.

If instead of a legal monogamy and polygamy, we take factual polygamy and the "double morals" of the men in our legally monogamic societies, we have all the reasons to say that it has been blossoming more in our cities than in the rural parts. Agricultural people—farmers and peasants—are not those who, in addition to one legal wife, have various mistresses and prostitutes, but various groups of the city people. The reverse is also true for women. Thus, in this field of equality which may be more important than equality in suffrage rights we do not have any reason to ascribe emancipation to urbanization, and "slavery" to the rural stage of society.

Turn now to *the equality in the right of marriage dissolution.* Here again the situation is somewhat similar to that of the form of marriage.[39] Even at the stages preceding any noticeable urbanization, the privilege of the husband in the marriage dissolution existed only among a small number of agricultural peoples.[40] The great majority of the peoples required the consent of both parties in the marriage for its dissolution. Some others gave the privilege to the wife. At later periods, but still before a conspicuous development of urbanization, if the right of divorce was introduced in some countries it was introduced on equal grounds for both the husband and wife, and in the city and the country population. In the countries where the divorce was abolished at pre-urban stages, as in Europe since approximately the eighth or ninth centuries A.D., it was abolished for both parties, and in the city and in the country.[41] If in the pre-urban stages in Europe, the upper classes had divorces, the husband and wife both had the privilege.[42]

In brief, we do not have any reason to believe that the pre-urban stage or agricultural countries show less equality of the parties in marriage. More than that. Some limitations on the rights of a wife in regard to divorce have been introduced into European societies rather during the last two centuries and exist still in highly urbanized

[39] Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–147 and 228 ff. See many details in Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Ch. XXXII.

[40] See Howard, G. E., *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, Vol. II, p. 34. Factual liberty is much more limited by various factors than its theoretical possibility, says Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 285–288.

[41] See Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Ch. XXXIII, pp. 331 ff.; Howard, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 71 ff.

[42] Among the seniores "the Noble Dames acquired the habit of changing masters. To have three or four husbands was a minimum." Luchaire, A., *Social France at the Time of Philip Augustus.*

societies. In England the law of 1857 grants divorce to a husband whose wife was guilty of simple adultery while the wife was granted divorce only when her husband was guilty of incestuous adultery, bigamy with adultery, rape, sodomy, bestiality, or adultery coupled with cruelty. In France, according to the law of 1804 "a husband can always obtain a divorce from his unfaithful wife, but a wife from her unfaithful husband only when he kept his mistress in the common house (with his wife). This difference has been existing in the law of such a highly industrialized country as Belgium. A similar inequality exists in the law of divorce of Victoria, in several states of the United States of America (Texas, Kentucky, Louisiana), in many contemporary Roman Catholic countries (particularly for a separation of the husband and wife). In this respect in the past, before a highly developed urbanization, the equality of the parties was rather greater than it has been in recent time with its developed urbanization. And even at the present moment the laws of divorce of many predominantly agricultural countries (pre-revolutionary Russia, Balkan countries) were more equal to husband and wife than the corresponding laws of several much more urbanized countries.[43]

This cursory survey is sufficient to establish the claim that, in regard to this right, urbanization has not been a factor in an equalization of the sexes. If it has not been a factor in the disfranchisement of women in the field of divorce rights, it has not increased these rights. This means that there probably is not any tangible correlation between the equality (or inequality) of the parties in regard to divorce and urbanization or ruralization. It does not permit the claim that the right of a wife in a rural family is more limited than in an urban family or that in this form the rural families have been less emancipated than the urban.

Similar conclusions must be reached concerning equality in the choice of the mate or consent to marriage on the part of the brides in the city and the country, in predominantly rural and urban societies and at agricultural and urban stages of social evolution. A survey of the situation shows, first, in the pre-urban stages there are many peoples among whom the consent of the bride is required and many peoples where it is not required. Similar situations have existed and exist in the highly urbanized societies, with this difference, that there the compulsion to take a prearranged bridegroom or bride is somewhat more hidden and not so overt, although in fact, it is as pressing as in several primitive groups. Comparing the degree of liberty of the girls in the choice of their mates among the primitive, simple, and pre-urban peoples with the peoples with more developed urban-

[43] See details in Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 339 ff., and Ch. XXIII.

ization, competent investigators are somewhat inclined to the conclusion that, in the pre-urban groups, such female liberty was, on the whole, greater.

There are strong grounds for thinking that in the most primitive forms of human society the initiative and choice was generally exercised by the woman and not by the man. The deference paid to the personal objections of the young man, and more especially of the young woman, is indeed much more marked in primitive society than in most civilized communities where pre-arrangement of marriages is the rule. [44]

In a similar way Westermarck says that "the woman's wishes seem to be consulted among the majority of the primitive peoples" and at the pre-urban stage. In the earlier stages "woman was much freer in her choice of partner than she was at later stages" or is even now in many societies.[45]

At the rural stage in the United States "there were no social or economic bars to free choice in marriage. A man was free to marry the girl of his choice, if he could win her, and she was free to accept or reject a suitor." [46]

At the present moment in Western societies, legally, the consent of the bride is required in most of the predominantly rural and predominantly urban societies; factually, the prearrangement of the marriage and pressure on the bride to marry an economically or socially profitable husband (for the sake of the family finances, prestige, career, and other benefits) are found in both city and country families. In which of these families such pressure and limitation of choice is most often, no one can tell. But there are no valid reasons to believe that such cases are more often in rural families or that, in this respect, the urban bride is more independent than the rural bride.[47] Such an assumption is no more valid than the opposite.

In regard to *equality of the property rights of the husband and wife,* the existing civil laws and civil codes do not permit the claim that a wife in the city has greater rights than the wife in the rural family or that the more urbanized is the society the greater are the rights of the wife. Indeed, the corresponding laws in each country are the same for the wives in the rural and the urban families. On the other hand, in some rural countries, like pre-revolutionary Russia or even

[44] Briffault, R., *The Mothers,* Vol. 1, p. 548; see there the facts.

[45] Westermarck, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, Ch. XXII. See also Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *op. cit.,* tables concerning the consent of the bride. Similar is the conclusion of Howard. Howard, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, pp. 208 ff.

[46] Williams, J. M., *Our Rural Heritage,* p. 57.

[47] See Thomas and Znaniecki, *op. cit.,* pp. 320, 314.

ancient India [48] the wife was not dead under the law and was entitled to be the owner of everything which she brought with her in the marriage and obtained in other ways; while in several, much more urbanized countries, like France or countries where the Code of Napoleon has been introduced, after the marriage she ceased to be the juridical owner of her property, and her rights were transmitted to the husband who became the only proprietor because in their laws "the wife is dead in law." Such a situation makes it impossible to claim that urbanization is necessarily an equalizing factor and that without it the wives would be in a disfranchised situation, and that the rural families are marked by a less equality of the wife and husband in this respect than the urban.

What has been said of the economic rights may be said of several relations of the husband and wife. For instance, the existing civil codes do not show that as we pass from more to less urbanized societies the rights of a wife in regard to the custody of her own person and those of her children are progressively decreasing, or *vice versa*. As a matter of fact, there are rural countries, like revolutionary Russia or several Balkan countries, where the laws are as liberal in regard to the wife's rights, in those respects, as in a few of the most urbanized societies; and there are predominantly urbanized and rural societies whose laws give an incomparably greater right to the husband than to the wife in those respects. Such a situation does not warrant the hypothesis that the ruralization is causally correlated with wife subjection and urbanization with her emancipation.[49]

As to the *political rights, particularly the right of suffrage*, there seems to exist some correlation between an extension of women's rights in this field and urbanization. But again, for the relationship of the husband and wife in the rural and the urban family, it does not necessarily mean that at any given period in any given society the wife's rights are greater in the urban than in the rural family. Indeed, in the past there were highly urbanized "city-states," like Rome and Greece, in which, in spite of the urbanization, political rights of the women were very modest and in no way equal to those of the man or the husband. On the other hand, if these rights in our time are greater they are greater for the urban as well as the rural

[48] "In Hindu India the husband has absolutely no right to whatever a woman may have acquired by inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure, or finding. Besides, when the husband dies, sonless Hindu widows have for ages been entitled to enjoy the husband's property for life." Sarkar, B. K., *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*, p. 28. For Ancient Babylonia see *The Laws of Hammurabi*.

[49] This is still more corroborated by the fact that even among relatively simple peoples, who practically are entirely in the pre-urban stage, there are many peoples in which the wife's property rights are practically identical with those of the husband. See Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 97 ff., 362 ff.; Briffault, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. pp. 309–316; Howard, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 90 ff.; Vol. I, p. 63.

wives. There is no limitation for the rural wives in comparison with the urban. Furthermore, there is little, if any, correlation between the volume of political rights of the wives and the degree of urbanization in various countries of the present time. Meanwhile, the thesis of a greater emancipation of the urban wives in comparison with the rural wives would be proved only if it would be shown that, in a given society at a given time, the urban wives are enjoying greater privileges than the rural, or that at given periods in various societies the political rights of the wives are becoming greater with increases in urbanization. Neither the first nor the second propositions are true. Russia, before or after the Revolution, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Bulgaria, and Holland, have been or are less urbanized than England or France; and yet, the rights of the wives in the former group of countries have been and are less limited than in the second group of countries. The same is true in regard to the more and less urbanized states in the United States, in so far as the white population is concerned. As we are concerned only with the comparative relationship of the husband and wife in the rural and the urban families (of the same country and the same period because, on the contrary, the comparison would be misleading) we do not find any valid reason to claim a more emancipated position of the urban wives, in this respect, than of the rural.[50]

If we take for instance, *the female rights to education and to obtaining various occupational positions*, it is hard to prove that at any given period and in any given society the rights of the rural women are juridically more limited than those of the urban. Such discrimination along the lines of the "rural and urban" has scarcely existed. It certainly does not exist in the United States.[51] From the standpoint of education, the country girls are better treated than the boys. What has existed has been either that, factually in the city there have been greater opportunities for education of both sexes, or for the children to obtain a living independent from the family position. But this is true not only in regard to women but men also. Consequently it is not a disadvantage to the rural women in their status relative to the rural men, but it is a disadvantage of the rural population of both sexes in

[50] Let it be noted that the problem of the general situation of women compared with that of the men is much greater than rural and urban correlations among women discussed here. However, both of them are somewhat related. We believe that the position of women or wives (relative to men) in any society is determined not by one factor such as urbanization or ruralization, but by a series of many factors in which this factor studied may play only a very modest and sometimes an intangible rôle.

[51] Wilson, E. A., *Social Organizations and Agencies in North Dakota*, Bul. 22, North Dakota Agr. Exp. Sta., p. 23; Windes, E. E., "High School Education of the Farm Population of the United States," *U. S. Bureau of Education, Bulletin 1925*, No. 6. See also Diech, C. H., and Jones, E. E., "A Study of Distinguished High School Pupils in Iowa," *U. S. Bureau of Education, Bulletin 1923*, No. 46; Kirkpatrick, E. L., "Attitudes and Problems of Farm Youth," *Extension Service Circular*, 46, June, 1927, p. 6, U. S. D. A.

regard to the urban population. That is quite a different matter from women's relative relations to men in the rural and urban family.

Finally, as to the general position of women in the urban and the pre-urban societies, it is fallacious to think that such has become satisfactory only in urban societies relative to the position of men and that only there have women begun to have influence and equality. The real situation is that in many primitive and pre-urban societies their status relative to men has been, at least, as good as in many urban societies.

In the great majority of uncultured societies women enjoy a position of independence and of equality with the men and exercise an influence which would appear startling in the most feministic modern civilised society. A survey shows an even more extensive prevalence among primitive women of a status of independence, influence, and even of domination.[52]

Thus the above brief survey shows that there are no particularly valid reasons to think that the relationship between the husband and wife, in the urban family compared with the rural, or in urbanized societies compared with pre-urban and predominantly agricultural societies, is necessarily more equal or the wife is less subjugated or more emancipated. In regard to all the essential rights and privileges which compose what is styled "emancipation of women" the difference between the rural and urban population is neither definite, consistent, nor uniform. That which remains is the rather personal qualities of the husband and wife which, in both rural and urban societies, finally determine whether the husband or the wife is the family "boss." Whether the types of families in which the partners are of equal standing, or those in which the husband or the wife is subjugated to the other, are more frequent in the city or in the country, we do not know. It seems to be certain that in the urban families the ties between the partners are less strong than in the rural. But this has very little to do with the equal or unequal standing of the marriage partners in the urban and the rural families. It must also be emphasized that in the rural families there is more psychological unity, real partnership, and mutual fusion of the personalities of the partners, than in the urban families. When such a "mutual union" of individuals with one another does not exist, many occasions call forth incessant quarrels and complaining about the "violation of the rights" of the other party. These complaints and declamations of independence, equality, and so on, and the very fact of craving for them, often are nothing but a symptom of a lack of mutual adaptation

[52] Briffault, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 311, 316 ff. For similar statements see Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 97 ff. According to Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, in 19 per cent of the simple agricultural peoples, the position of women is good, in 8 per cent indifferent, in 73 per cent rather bad.

of the partners and their weak devotion to each other. When this mutual fusion of personalities into one harmonious unit exists, there is much less occasion for complaints about "the violation of the rights of the other party" and, respectively, much less need for declamation about equality of the sexes, exploitation of women and so on. And just the urban family shows this lack or lower degree of such a union or dissolution of the partners into one another. For this reason every trifle which is unnoticed in the strongly united families becomes inconvenient and is felt in the more "egotistical and individualistic" urban unions. Under such circumstances, every such trifle is felt by the other party as a disregard of its rights and an insignificant pretext becomes a sign of the "incompatibility" of the characters; hence, these clamorous speech-reactions about mutual rights, the emancipation of women, the necessity for respecting her rights or her equality and so on. Just the weakness of the marital ties of the partners in such a family; the very fact of the verbosity of city women and men as to their mutual rights; and the increase of "cruelty,"as one of the causes for divorce, suggest strongly that all this talk of a greater independence of the wives in the urban family is more a symptom of the lack of adaptation or of maladjustment of the partners rather than a sign of the lower status of country women. In only one respect does the city seem to give a greater independence to its women (and men also) namely, a greater independence not to enter the family tie or, after having entered it, of securing a divorce or otherwise breaking it. But this means only a greater instability of the city family and does not concern at all the relative nature of the relationship between the husband and wife *in the family* from the standpoint of domination or subjection.

Thus, in spite of the popularity of the opinion that the wife in a rural family is more subjugated to the husband,[53] we do not find any valid evidence of such. What we find is rather that, the rural family shows more unity and mutual attachment and engulfment of the personality of the partners into one "union of body and soul," while the urban family is marked by a much higher atomization, and weaker bonds between the partners which give the impression of greater equality of wife in her relationship to the husband. In fact, it means only a weaker union of both parties in the city than in the country. This fact has very little to do with the emancipation of the wife within the family.

The second possible difference in the relationship of the husband and wife in the urban and the rural family may be a greater division of labor of each party in the city than in the country. In the rural and agricultural family, the functions of the husband and wife, though they differ to some degree, nevertheless, are much the same. In

[53] See similar conclusions in L'Houet. A., *op. cit.*, pp. 219–220.

addition to housekeeping, washing, preparing of meals and other domestic duties, the rural wife is generally an active partner in almost all agricultural work. Often she helps in plowing, planting, seeding, harvesting, threshing, cattle-breeding, milking, raising chickens, and in the preparation of butter and cheese. In brief, she is doing essentially the same work as her husband and working most of the time together or side by side with him, in the same environment, at the same place, under the same climatic, social, and psychical conditions.[54]

In the cities the situation seems to be considerably different. In the upper classes, as a rule, "the occupational pursuits" of a husband and his wife are different. Wives of such classes are either not engaged in any gainful occupation and spend their time in "social life" and various social, philanthropic, political, artistic, and similar activities. Certainly they do not work regularly in the offices of their husbands. In the middle and the lower classes, in a different form, the division of labor between the husband and wife, even the girls and boys, is again much greater than in the rural family. Members of a family rarely work together, or at the same place (office, shop, factory) and at the same job. The wife or girl is either a clerk in an office, shop, or a store, or a hand in a factory of some industry. The husband or boys are again scattered throughout various occupations, and, as a rule, these occupations are different from those in which the female members of the family are engaged.[55]

[54] The survey of about 10,000 rural homes in 33 states of the United States made in 1919 by the Federal Department of Agriculture and the survey of the three townships in Iowa by P. S. Pierce have shown that the farm women does essentially the same job that is done by farm men. In many European countries, the peasant woman does practically almost all, even the physically hard, jobs which are done by her husband. See Ward, F. E., *The Farm Woman's Problems, U. S. Department of Agriculture,* Circular 148; "Social Survey of Three Townships in Iowa," *University of Iowa Monographs,* Vol. V, No. 2. This similarity of work of husband and wife and its many-foldedness is also conspicuously stressed by farm women. See the quoted *Advantages of Farm Life,* pp. 1–10; *The Farm Woman Answers the Questions Themselves, passim; What Farm Women Think about Farm Life; What Farmers Think of Farming* by W. F. Kumlien, pp. 10–14.

[55] Occupational statistics shows that the sexes are very unevenly distributed between various urban occupations. In the United States in 1920 there was the following distribution of the sexes in the occupations:

Occupation	*Males*	*Females*
Mining	99.7	0.3
Manufacturing	84.9	15.1
Transportation	93.0	7.0
Trade	84.3	15.7
Public service	97.2	2.8
Professions	52.6	47.4
Domestic and personal service	35.8	64.2
Clerical	54.4	45.6

Fourteenth Census. Vol. IV, Population, 1920. Occupations, p. 34; for other countries see Mayr, G., *op. cit.,* Vol. II.

The occupational functions and milieu of the men and women, of the husband and wife, in the city are probably much more heterogeneous than in the rural family. If this be true, then such a heterogeneity must stamp the body and the soul of the men and women in the city with many more different stigmata than those of the men and women in the country or in a rural family. We all know that the occupational environment and functions are possibly the most powerful agencies of the environment[56] in shaping the physical, vital, mental, and socio-moral characteristics of a person. If the division of labor between the husband and wife in the city families is greater, then this must lead to a greater difference in the personal characteristics of the family partners in the urban family. Strange as it may seem, the women in the city must be more "feminine" and men more "masculine" than in the country. The facts seem to support this. The use of face-powder and lipsticks, the tenderness and femininity of the body, the tender skins and corresponding forms of the body lines, movements, gestures, and patterns of dress—these and hundreds of other devices whose purpose has always been to stress femininity, have always been the requisites of the city women particularly, and have had much less use in the country, particularly among peasant and farm women. It is probable also that the differences in robustness, physical force, emotional and mental attitudes, in peculiarities of thinking and character have been less between the husband and wife in the rural family than in the urban.[57]

Such a situation, if it be true, exerts a tangible influence on the relationships of the husband and wife in the rural and urban families. Since the personalities of the partners in the rural families are more similar, there are less obstacles for their mutual understanding and adjustment. Identity of occupation helps this after the marriage. When, on the contrary, the personalities of the partners are very different before marriage and the difference is increased afterwards, due to the heterogeneity of the partners' occupations and their separate milieu, mutual understanding is much more difficult and the mutual adjustment of such heterogeneous persons, who are more specialized and narrowed in their characteristics, is much more difficult. The relationships between them are likely to be less "balanced" and more "uneven" than between partners of the first type. Hence, if in the rural family such relationships do show the most passionate and emotional "love" and "affection" less often, they are likely also to have highly emotional distastes, hatreds, angers, "in-

[56] See Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, pp. 317 ff.

[57] L'Houet studied on pictures and in reality the degree of similarity of male and female faces in the city and among peasants. He reached similar conclusions: Peasant male and peasant female are more similar in face than urban male and female. *Op. cit.*, pp. 25–26; see also Mikhailovski, N., *Struggle for Individuality* (Russian).

compatibilities," quarrels, and similar things less often. The city bride or bridegroom may have more often "the most heated passion" and "mad love" for the other party (because the opposite poles often attract and facilitate such an emotional tension) but such are likely to be shortlived and, after some time, to be replaced by "misunderstandings," frictions, hatreds, antagonisms, and similar things. These are the result of the more "specified types" of the personalities of the partners than in the country family. Every specified type may be adjusted only to a few correspondingly specified types of personality, and not to every type. Thus, for the above reasons, it is probable that the urban relationships between the husband and wife are less even, more variable, and more rich in the contrasts of "mad love" and "mad hatred" than those between the partners in a rural family.[58] Such instability of the emotional tone of the relationships in the urban family must lead to the disruption of the union more often. The facts corroborate the expectation.[59] Such seems to be the principal differences in the relationships of the husband and wife in the rural and urban families.

Parent-Children Relationships. The chief typical differences in the relationships of the parents and children in the rural and the urban family consist, probably, first, that in the rural family the influence of the parents over their children and in the shaping of their personalities and patterns of conduct and thinking is greater than in the urban family; second, that the mental, moral, and social similarity of the parents and children in the rural family is greater; and third, that the ties between these two generations and the unity and solidarity of the two generations is more integral. Correspondingly, the continuity of family culture—its language, traditions, beliefs, mores, tastes, and what not—are stronger in the rural family than in the urban.

We have already indicated some of the reasons for these differences. In the rural family there is a less competition with the influences of other social groups and agencies. "Furthermore, the parental control unites in itself several lines of influence. The parents are the directors of the daily work in which all participate. And the family

[58] See a development of this line of thought in Mikhailovski's work quoted; see also a highly suggestive study of Wiese, Das Paar, *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie*, v. 3, pp. 249 ff.

[59] It is interesting to note that as urbanization in the United States proceeds, the proportion of the divorces for reason of "cruelty" is systematically increasing. From 1887 to 1896 the per cent of the divorces granted for "cruelty" was 19.8 of all causes of divorce. In 1926 it grew to 38.7 per cent. Although the statistics of causes of divorce are very unreliable, nevertheless some significance must be attached to these figures as a symptom of the greater incompatibility of the partners in the urban family as discussed in the text. *Bureau of the Census, Marriage and Divorce*, 1922, p. 16, Wash., 1925; 1926, p. 38.

is not only an economic but also an educational organization. Until the establishment of the common school system, children got their education in the home. Even when they were sent to school, still the important training was the vocational, and the training in character acquired in the course of the work with the parents. The parents (often) were also the instructors in religion." [60] In all those respects even now the children of the rural family remain still under the more monopolistic influence of their parents and are less influenced by the non-family agencies, than the children of the urban family.[61] Shall we wonder, therefore, that this results in the series of differences enumerated in the beginning of this section? In the city, the child remains under the monopolistic influence of his parents a much shorter time. Very early the kindergarten and the school begin to give him the patterns of behavior which, in a rural family, are handled more by the parents. Moral education in the city is early taken into the hands of the church, gang, or somewhat occasional friends and others unavoidable in the city environment. Vocational and occupational training also go on not under the guidance of the parents but quite different and non-family groups, beginning with foremen, bosses, and ending with vocational teachers and masters. The young child is plunged very early into the conglomerate of various mores of a series of non-family groups whose rules of conduct are often quite different from those of the parents and familial organizations generally. Thus, while in the rural family, especially in the past, the parents are an integrated incarnation of the parental, economic, educational, vocational, religious, moral, and social authority whose field of influence on the children is rarely invaded or intruded into by other agencies in the city, the parents have lost the majority of these "authorities" for their children and succeed in retaining only "a weakened and faded paternal authority." This latter is something very meager in comparison with that they have had and to a considerable extent still retain in the rural family.

One additional question may be touched slightly. What are the effects of the above types of families on the development of initiative, energy, self-reliance, and the sense of responsibility in the city and the rural children? Which of these types of family stimulates the development of these traits most? A certain and uniform answer may scarcely be given to the question. All that may be said amounts to no more than an approximate schematic outline which may and may not be true. It represents the opinion of the

[60] Williams, J. M., *Our Rural Heritage*, pp. 65–66. This was especially well shown by Le Play, in his family monographs. See *Œuvres*, Vols. I, II, III, and VI. See similar opinions of farm women published in the quoted *Advantages of Farm Life*, pp. 7–10; *What Farm Women Think About Farm Life, passim.*

[61] Compare Wiese, L., *Das Dorf*, Chapter VII.

authors and is no more valid than their intuition into rural and urban character and life.

Whatever may be the "patterns of behavior and mind" of the rural family, all in all, its children come out of its hands with a more stable psycho-social personality than the children of the city family. The patterns of behavior, beliefs, mores, ideas of good and bad, and so on, of the rural children are expected to be more rigid and more validly ingrafted than those of the urban children. The reason is indicated above: the latter are growing up amidst heterogeneous and conflicting patterns and mores; as a result they cannot have, as a rule, the same stability in their conduct as the rural children. This is particularly true of the rural families of the conspicuously patriarchal type (in the sense given to the term by the Le Play school). The engulfment of the individual by the family community makes him quite traditional and trains him to rely, not upon himself, but upon the family community. As a result the children are trained to follow the traditional pathways and to make little effort to exercise their own initiative.[62] In a modern rural family on an open farm the situation is different, however. Traditionalism is much weaker there. And the ways of such a farmer are the ways of a man of the *particularist* type (in the sense of Le Play) [63] in which sound conservatism and fruitful traditionalism are luckily combined with the efforts to find new ways and to exercise initiative. Such a rural family is likely to develop in its children a stable, and, at the same time, a "progressive" type of personality.

As to initiative, it is likely that the rural family, by making its children more traditional and inculating more rigid patterns of behavior and thought, somewhat checks the originality of its children. The urban family (especially the upper) by making its children plastic and more free from paternalism and traditionalism, offers a greater opportunity for the development of their initiative in discovering new ways of living, thinking, and creating. However, this is only one side of the problem. There is the other side of it. The nature of agricultural work, which requires at all times a real touch with material and living objects, which are encyclopedic and manyfolded, and less specialized than the monotonous and very simple operations of a common worker in a factory or in the majority of the unskilled and semi-skilled manual labor in the city, works in favor of a greater development of the initiative of the rural children than the children of the lower urban classes. The same result is facilitated by a greater need for self-reliance and responsibility in the children of the agricul-

[62] See about this, Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 84 ff. See there the works of Le Play and his school.

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 85 ff.

tural classes than those of the laboring classes in the city. The latter, as their fathers, are going to be only "hands" in the institutions and business enterprizes controlled not by the workers themselves but by a small group of the bosses. As has been shown above, the psychology of managing, planning, organizing, and the corresponding responsibilities do not belong to them. The circumstances give very little chance for an exercise of such initiative, complex planning, scheming, and thinking, for the bulk of the city labor classes. This naturally does not stimulate much initiative, self-reliance, self-control, or the sense of responsibility. The situation of the rural children of an open farm is different in this respect. They know and they are trained in such a way that, as soon as they are adults, they have to start their own homesteads and farming. Correspondingly, very early they are trained to do all the essential functions of an independent cultivator with the responsibilities attached to it. The variety of such functions favors the development of initiative, cautiousness, and planning. By exercising all these functions, he develops his thinking, planning, and scheming powers rather more than a "hand" in the city. He must do it because, otherwise, he would ruin himself and his agricultural enterprise. The diversity of the functions, troubles, and cares therefore strongly favors the development of initiative and also the sense of responsibility.[64] Thus, this factor diminishes to some extent the negative effects of the traditionalism of the rural family upon the development of initiative of the children. A third factor is to be taken into consideration. In regard to the development of responsibility and initiative in children, the city environment has its own danger. In order that any plasticity of behavior may result in sound and creative initiative, it must have some unity and integrity and be backed by the sense of responsibility. If the patterns of behavior are too different and unstable, instead of a development of a creative and sound initiative, the city environment may develop bizarre, erratic, and restless human creatures who may shift from one thing to another, and from one enterprise to another, and not be able to complete anything (unstable type of personality in Le Play's sense).[65] Such erratic and queer types of personality, with hundreds of plans and with many attempts to do various things but in fact unable to achieve anything, seem to be more often developed in the urban family than in the rural. Such fruitless and restless wanderings of the mind have very little in common with a real and creative initiative. When these, and similar influences

[64] All this is unanimously stressed by farm men and women in their own statements. *Advantages of Farm Life; The Farm Woman Answers the Questions; What Farm Women Think About Farm Life; and What Farmers Think About Farming.*

[65] See Sorokin, *Contemp. Sociol. Theories,* pp. 86 ff.

of the city and the country are considered, one is not sure which of these families and environments really is more favorable for development of the initiative.

The most probable conclusions seem to be as follows: 1. The rural family generally develops the stability, integrity, and responsibility in the personality of its children more successfully than the urban family. 2. The conspicuously patriarchal rural family checks, to a considerable degree, the development of initiative in its children. The less patriarchal family of an open farm is more free from this and is likely to develop a type of personality in its children in which sound stability is combined with well-developed initiative (particularist type of personality). This is still more probable on account of the nature of agricultural work and environment which requires the exercise of brains to a very great extent. 3. The city family and environment potentially favors greater development of initiative in its children and often, especially in the upper strata, develops such greatly, in fact. This is less true in regard to the city labor classes. In addition, the city family facilitates the development of the type of erratic and unstable personality, without integrity of character, sound consistency in conduct, and persistence in effort. Such appears to us the chief kinds of human flour ground in the mills of the urban and rural families. The data concerning the intelligence quotients, the number of prominent men who have come out of the agricultural and the urban semi-skilled and unskilled classes; and the data on comparative rural-urban experience, criminality, suicide, and divorce, religion and culture, given in other chapters of this book, clearly support these conclusions.

CHAPTER XVI

COMPARATIVE CRIMINALITY, IMMORALITY, AND INTEMPERANCE

What Is Told by the Existing Data at Their Face Value. Is the city or the country, the agricultural or the non-agricultural, population more criminal and more immoral? An exact answer to the question is prevented partly by the lack of sufficient data, partly by the imperfect character of existing data, and partly by the fact that the data often concern not the pure rural and urban groups, but groups which represent only a relative and remote approximation to them. Nevertheless, these data give some approximate answer, at least, to the question and therefore are not quite valueless. Before making any generalization or conclusion let us glance at the data. After that we must interpret them, and in this way, arrive at the conclusions warranted by the existing information.

The following representative data give an idea about the situation. Some of the best statistics in this field are given *for Germany.*[1] Although they are imperfect, nevertheless the results, supplemented by the results of comparative criminality of the agricultural and the non-agricultural occupations, give an approximate idea of the real situation. The data for the period from 1883 to 1902 show that the wholesale criminality of the urban population, measured by the number of the criminals condemned, is higher than in the remaining, less urban and more rural, parts of Germany. Second, that, all in all, increases in the size of the city are associated with increases of criminality. Third, that city criminality is higher in all the principal forms of crimes given above, with the exception of assault and battery, crimes in which the less urbanized parts of Germany give higher quotas. Such are the suggestions given by this representative study. It shows also, that in the course of the twenty years studied, the differences between rural and urban criminality rates did not tend to decrease. Rather they increased. As these rates are per 100,000 of the adult, juridically responsible population, the difference could not be due in any considerable degree to the different age compositions of the city and the country population.[2]

[1] Mayr, G. von, *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre*, Vol. III, pp. 727–728, 1917.

[2] See Mayr, G. von, *Stat. und Gesellschaftslehre*, Vol. III, pp. 727–728.

Similar data are given in Aschaffenburg, G., *Crime and Its Repression*, pp. 63 ff.; Prinzing, F., "Soziale Faktoren der Kriminalität," *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Strafrechtswissenschaft*, Vol. 22, 1901–1902; Neese, Al., "Verbrechen und Vergehen gegen Reichsgesetze," *Statistisches Jahrbuch deutscher Städte*, X Jahrgang, 1902.

Complete data for more recent years are not available at the present writing. But in regard to murder (all types) some light is thrown by figures which give the number of the victims of murder per 100,000 population for the years 1905–1910.[3] The figures show that the number of murders per 100,000 population as measured by the number of victims, is also greater in the cities than in the country. However, in view of the difference in age-compositions of the populations, the data do not represent the situation adequately. Such are the essential data of comparative criminality for the urban and rural agglomerations in Germany. Let us now glance to what extent they are corroborated by the data of comparative criminality of the agricultural and the non-agricultural populations of Germany.[4] Per 100,000 adult population 12 years of age and over of each occupational group there were condemned in 1895 in all Germany for all crimes generally:

In agriculture, 808.8; industry, 1264.7; commerce and transportation, 1476.7; domestic service, 1086.9; others without occupations, 3401.3. The data for 1908 are similar.

Finally, the data show that among the offenders from the agricultural class there is a relatively lower per cent of repeaters.[5] On the basis of these and other data we conclude, that first, the wholesale criminality of the agricultural class is much below the average for the country. Second, that practically in all fundamental classes of crimes, the criminality of the agricultural group is below the corresponding average for the country. Third, in comparison with the big occupational groups (industry, mining, commerce, and transport), the agricultural class is throughout less criminal than those classes. Fourth, that the criminality of the independents in agriculture, all in all, is about the same as that of the "public service and professional group" (in some crimes higher, in others lower). Only the criminality of the "domestic service" group is somewhat below that of laborers in agriculture. The low criminality of this group is fictitious, however, to a considerable extent. It is due, first, to the fact that the group is composed from 92 to 95 per cent out of females whose criminality is generally—in all occupational groups—several times below male criminality. If the comparison were made between the females in agriculture and the females in domestic service, the results hardly would have been unfavorable to the agricultural females. Second, as Prinzing and Hurwicz rightly remark, many servants, especially repeaters, as soon as they are under the

[3] Mayr, *op. cit.*, p. 505.

[4] Mayr, *ibid.*, p. 18. See also Hurwicz, E., "Studien zur Statistik der Sozialkriminalität," *Archiv für Krim. Anthropologie und Kriminal Statistik*, Vol. 63, pp. 323, 326, 1915.

[5] Hurwicz, E., *op. cit.*, pp. 316, 318, 326.

danger of arrest for crime, give up their positions and shift to other occupations. Once arrested, they usually give this other occupation. In this way, this shifting artificially decreases the share of criminality of the group discussed and increases the share of other occupational classes.[6] Fifth, employers in agriculture, like those of other occupations with the exception of the commercial and transport group, give a much lower criminality rate than the laborers in agriculture. Sixth, the agricultural occupation yields a lower per cent of repeaters than any other group, with the exceptions of the professional and the domestic service group.

Such are the essential results of the German statistics taken at their face value. It is rather obvious that these data have several shortcomings. They do not give the quota for standardized sex and age groups for each occupation. These are necessary to obtain fair comparisons because the factors of age, and particularly sex, are very noticeably correlated with crime. They measure the criminality by the number of condemned people in the city and country (according to the residence) regardless to the real place of birth and rearing of an individual. A series of similar invalidities occur also in determining the occupation of many criminals. In brief, there are many circumstances which make the "face value" of the above figures somewhat uncertain and, at the best, only roughly significant. And yet, a rough and approximate significance may scarcely be denied to the results. This is because of the very similarity of the results for several years; the concordance of the city-country and the occupational data of criminality; and the extreme variation between criminality of the rural and urban occupational groups which is hard to account for through differences in the age and sex compositions of the populations of the city and country: these and similar considerations make it probable that a rough approximation to reality is given by the above figures. Anyhow, they do not give any basis for the statement that in the rural or agricultural class, the criminality is higher than in the important urban occupational classes.[7]

Similar are the results given by the French statistics. Here are some representative figures. In the years 1841–1845, per 100 convicted offenders, there were 38 from the cities and 58 from the country. The city population composed less than 25 per cent of the whole population and the rural more than 75 per cent. In the years 1881–1885, for each 100 convicted offenders, there were 44 rural while the rural population composed more than 64 per cent of the whole

[6] See Hurwicz, *op. cit.*, p. 317. See also Hurwicz, E., "Kriminalität und Prostitution der Weiblichen Dichstboten," *Archiv für Kriminal Anthropologie*, Vol. 65, p. 187, 1916.

[7] As a recent example of such fallacious statements one may read Ch. XX of J. G. Thompson's *Urbanization, Its Effects on Government and Society.*

population. In the years 1884–1886, on the average, there were 8 convicted persons for each 100,000 rural population and 16 for the same number of the urban population. In 1908, according to the place of residence of those convicted by *Cour d'appel*, the rural criminals composed only 33 per cent of all criminals while the rural population (5,000 and less) composed about 66 per cent. In 1910 there were 4 persons accused of felony and 316 for misdemeanor in rural parts, and correspondingly 10.5 and 523 in urban parts of France per 100,000 population. These figures are in a complete agreement with the above data of Germany. Furthermore, the German results are corroborated by the data of comparative criminality of various occupational classes in France.[8]

A confrontation of the occupational distribution of the offenders condemned by the *Cour d'appel* with the proportion of agricultural population among the population engaged in gainful occupations shows that, in this rough computation, the shares of criminality of all classes of the agricultural population are below their proportions of the total population engaged in occupational pursuits.

These and similar data (extensive tables in the original draft were omitted), taken at their face value, seem to indicate clearly that, at least quantitatively, the criminality of the rural and agricultural populations is conspicuously below those of the urban and of the other, particularly urban, important occupational classes. It is certain that the figures are very approximate and should probably be corrected through standardization based on the corresponding age-groups (some of the figures, as we saw, give the data separately for the sexes). Nevertheless such a correction will scarcely change their character. In view of the agreement of the data for various periods as obtained by various competent investigators; and in view of the concordance of the results of the comparisons of the "urban-rural" and the "agricultural and other occupational classes," we do not have any basis to declare them fallacious. This is more true that because there are no data which give opposite results; further, there are several others, particularly about the criminality of juveniles, which give a similar picture. The figures suggest further that the agricultural class participates more intensively in arson and crimes against persons than in crimes against property, a conclusion which

[8] See Levasseur, E., *La population française*; Vol. II, pp. 455–456, *Problems of Criminality* (Russian), p. 25. The data are taken from the investigations of E. Bertrand, Lagneau, Yvernes, Joly, and Levasseur and *Annuaire Statistique*, 1910, p. 87; See *Journal de la Societé de Statistique de Paris*, 1871–1872, Lagneau's article *France li Diction. encyclo. des sc. medic;* Levasseur, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 456–457; Corre, A., *Crime et Suicide*, pp. 494-499; Bonger, W. A., *Criminality and Economic Conditions*, p. 444, *Rapport au President de la republique française sur l'administration de la justice criminelle de 1881 à 1900*, p. XXVI.; Hurwicz, E., *op. cit.*, p. 362. See in these sources other, more detailed, data confirming the above figures.

was reached also by G. Tarde, A. Corre, E. Ferri, and many others, and which is corroborated by the data of some other countries. This does not mean that the rates for crimes against life and persons are higher in the agricultural class than in many other occupational classes (we saw it was lower), but that the class of agriculturists makes a relatively greater contribution to the crimes against persons and arson than to other types of crime.

The statistics of *Sweden* still more conspicuously stress the lower criminality of the rural population, in comparison with the urban. For a long series of years the data are similar in essentials. The criminality of the city population was more than ten times higher than that of the rural population. In the heaviest crimes (punished by capital punishment and hard labor) it was about five times higher than that of the country population. For homicides, 1916–1920, according to the place of their perpetration, the proportion in the cities was about or above the proportion the city population was of the total population of the country (33.0 and 29.52 correspondingly).[9]

In *Netherlands* [10] the difference is small, but, nevertheless, tangible. The slightness of the difference is probably due to the fact that the statistics do not separate purely rural districts from the cities of 5,000 and below. With this explanation, the representative data for 1912 show that, in spite of the mixture of the rural population with that of the small cities (which often are in a worse condition than the big cities or rural communities and have disadvantages of both), the wholesale criminality of the small communities is somewhat lower than for all the urban categories. The same is true in regard to the majority of the separate classes of crime. Here again we see that, with the exception of robbery (for which the data are rather incomplete), crimes against property, such as theft, embezzlement and fraud, decrease as we proceed from the larger to the smaller communities.

In *Bulgaria*, a confrontation of the proportion of crimes in various occupations to the total amount of crime with the proportion of the people actively engaged in these occupations to the total number of the occupational population gives results similar to those in the above countries.[11] Similar results are reached by the comparison of the distribution of criminality from the "urban-rural" standpoint, as well as from the standpoint of the distribution of criminality among not only the actively engaged but the whole population according to the occupation of the head of the family.[12] The quota of criminals from

[9] *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige*, 1919, p. 236; 1923, p. 211; 1927, p. 253. See there other data which give similar results. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[10] Mayr, *op. cit.*, p. 731.

[11] Computed from *Annuaire Statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie*, pp. 26, 546. Sofia, 1926. Data for 1910 give identical picture.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 532–533.

the agricultural class is conspicuously below, especially in the case of women, the quota of the agricultural population within the whole population of all occupations. The table is valuable also because of its separation of the sexes and the actively engaged from the total population.

In *Denmark*, the situation shows the proportion of the total population in the capital, the provincial cities and the rural parts compared with the proportion of the total number of crimes measured in different ways for these areas.[13]

	Total	*Population of the Capital*	*Population of the Provincial Cities*	*Population of the Rural Parts*
Per cent of the population of specified urban-rural groups in the total population of the country in 1925	100.00	21.3	21.8	56.9
Per cent of the crimes detected in each of these districts in the total crimes of the country	100.0	40.4	32.2	27.4
Per cent of all persons arrested for offenses in each of these districts	100.0	44.8	39.1	16.1
Per cent of all persons accused for crimes in each of these districts	100.0	35.8	29.2	35.0
Per cent of the criminals in 1925 in the total number of the criminals accused for the first time, according to the place of birth of the offenders	100.0	27.4	23.2	49.4

No matter what method of measurement is used, all give a higher rate of total criminality to the city than to the country. It is significant that the difference according to the place of birth of the criminals, is much less conspicuous than on the basis of the number of crimes or persons arrested and condemned; nevertheless, the difference in favor of the rural parts still exists. It rather underestimates the urban share of criminality because, as we saw from the German data, the country is giving a lower per cent of repeaters. They are not included in this data which divides the offenders according to the places of birth; for this reason the given share of urban-rural criminality, according to the birth-place of the criminals, is likely to be made artificially more favorable to the city and unfavorable to the country. If we glance at the qualitative side of the problem then the city excels the rural parts in all kinds of crime except arson (voluntary and involuntary) homicide (based only on a total for 1925 of 6 cases in the whole country, 5 of which fall in rural areas) and rape (one case for the whole country).[14]

[13] Computed from *Statistisk Aarbog*, 1927, pp. 5, 132–133.

[14] See *ibid.*, p. 134.

In *Norway*,[15] per 1,000 population (1922) the number of individuals condemned for felony (crimes et délits) in rural communities was 1.1 and in urban communities was 2.8; for misdeameanors (contraventions) the urban index exceeds the rural index of criminality still more.

In *Poland*, similar results are given by the data. While, in 1921, the population actively engaged in agriculture composed 74 per cent of all actively engaged, and the active and passive population (members of the family) in agriculture composed 65 per cent of all population, the agricultural occupational class supplied only 30 per cent of the total number of persons accused of crimes.[16]

In a similar way the agricultural population of *Rumania* gives a lower quota of crimes than it forms of the total occupational population of Rumania.[17] Criminal statisticians of *Russia*, before the Revolution, established very definitely that the total criminality of the rural population of Russia was much lower than that of the urban population. For instance in 1912, per 100,000 population, 74 persons were condemned in rural parts, 276 in the cities below 100,000, from 500 to 550 in the cities above 100,000 and 600 in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Only in the crimes of infanticide, assault, and arson did the rural population contribute about, or a somewhat higher rate, than the urban for that year. In all other crimes the urban population was more criminal than the rural.[18] This situation has not been changed in its essentials by the Revolution. Although the Revolution has led to an enormous increase of crimes,[19] and to an appearance of some forms of crime which were scarcely known before, (for instance, epidemics of collective raping of girls or women by 2, 3, 4, 7, 6, 17, 40 and even 62 men),[20] and has shifted somewhat the centers of higher and lower criminality, nevertheless, the essentials of the comparative criminality of the city and the country remain the same as before the Revolution.

In 1924–1925, per 10,000 population, in the 47 principal cities there were 134 detected crimes while the same number of the population in

[15] *Annuaire stat. de la Norvège*, 1924, pp. 186–188.

[16] Computed from the *Annuaire statistique de la république Polonaise*, 1925–1926, pp. 45–47, 468.

[17] See *Annuaire statistique de la Roumanie*, 1925, p. 17, 283.

[18] See a summary of the data in Gernet, M., *Moral Statistics; Problems of Criminality* (Russia), Vol. II, pp. 25, 16.

[19] See the data for the years 1917–1923 in Sorokin, P., *The Sociology of Revolution*, Ch. IX, and *passim;* and *The Problems of Criminality* published by the Soviet Government, Moscow, 1927 (in Russian), pp. 16, 25 and *passim;* Tarnovsky, E., "Statistics of Crimes for 1924–25," in *The Weekly of Soviet Justice*, 1926, No. 22 (Russian); Rodin, D. P., "Criminality of the City and the Country," in *Law and Life* (Pravo i Jysn), Vols. 3–4, 1926; Gernet, M., *Moral Statistics*. All of these latter are official publications of the Soviet Institute of Criminology.

[20] See *Problems of Criminality*, Vol. II, pp. 41–75.

the rural districts gave only 50 detected crimes.[21] While the urban population of Soviet Russia composes about 15 per cent of the whole population, the per cent of all crimes by males committed by urban males (in 1924) was 20.9. The corresponding proportions among the females were respectively 34.1 for the cities, and 64.9 for the rural parts.[22] Thus, these figures suggest a greater wholesale criminality in the cities in comparison with the country population. Practically in all fundamental classes of crimes, the rural population—males and especially females—gave quotas of crimes much lower than its quota in the total population of Russia. Only in crimes against the Soviet government and its political order, homicides and assault, is the quota of the rural males about equal to its quota in the total population of Russia. While in all other crimes, especially in crimes against property (with the exception of arson), the rural rate is much below those of the cities.[23] All in all, the data are in an essential agreement with those of other countries.

In *Belgium* [24] only the data of homicides are available to the writers. In 1924, per 100,000 population, the rates of persons indicted for homicides were: in communities 25,000 and above, 2.16; 5,000 to 25,000, 1.47; 2,000 to 5,000, 3.54; 2,000 and less, 3.14. Thus the highest rate is given by the smallest cities and the next by the rural parts. Rates for both are higher than the average for the whole country.

In *Canada* in 1921 the urban population (including villages of 500 and more) was about 49 per cent and the rural about 51 per cent. Meanwhile, according to the residence of the persons of indictable offenses, the urban population contributed 84 per cent while the rural population only 16 per cent of the criminals. According to occupation the population on farms (farmers, farm laborers and their families) composed about 50 per cent of the population of all occupations in Canada. Of all the persons convicted for indictable offenses (19,396) there were in 1921 only 1,034 persons (5.3 per cent) whose occupation before the commitment of crime was agriculture.[25] The rank order coefficient of correlation between the number of convictions per 100,000 in the ten provinces of Canada for 1921 and the per cent of population urban in these provinces is +.59.[26] Somewhat similar results are given by the data of the *Union of South Africa.*[27]

[21] Gernet, M., "Statistics of the Urban and Rural Criminality," *Problems of Criminality*, p. 16. See also the above mentioned other works.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 17–23.
[24] *Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique*, p. xliii, 1927.
[25] Computed from the data in the *Forty-Sixth Annual Report of Criminal Statistics*, Dominion of Canada, Ottowa, 1922, p. ix.
[26] Computed from *The Canada Year Book*, 1926, pp. 117, 959–58, 96, 256.
[27] See *Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa, Pretoria*, 1927, p. 327.

In a similar way, the population of *British India* actively engaged in agriculture composed, in 1921, about 72 per cent of the whole occupational population, while among all the convicts of the convict settlement of Port Blair, only 59 per cent had, before the conviction, agricultural occupations. Among the patients of the lunatic asylums (including criminals), the cultivators and laborers composed only 27.0 per cent in 1921 and about the same during the years 1912–1920.[28] The relevant data of *England* for a series of years also show a lower criminality of the rural and the agricultural population compared with the urban and industrial classes. For the years from 1857 to 1876 this was shown by the study of Leone Levi. He showed, first, that crimes, as well as offenses, were positively correlated with the density of the population: the rank order coefficient of correlation between the number of persons per square mile and number of crimes (1857–1876) for various parts of England, is +.85;[29] second, that the criminality index of the cities was higher than that of the rural parts; and third, that the agricultural occupation gave, all in all, a lower quota of criminality than the industrial. Per 1,000 of the occupational population, the agricultural class has 0.71 crimes and 13.84 offenses, while the industrial and manufacturing class gave .90 crimes and 23.81 offenses, and miners gave, respectively, 0.65 crimes and 30.55 offenses.[30] Data for recent year (1921) show a similar situation.[31]

Without giving the data, it may be said that the English figures give results similar in their essence to those of other countries. The data of *America* corroborate the conclusions given by other countries. In 1910 the farmer males composed 18.6 and farm laborer males 14.8 per cent of the total occupational population of the United States, at the ages of 10 years and above. The females engaged in

[28] Computed from the *Statistical Abstract for British India*, pp. 36, 110, 364–365, London, 1925.

[29] Computed from Levi, L. A., "Survey of Indictable and Summary Jurisdiction Offences in England and Wales, from 1857 to 1876," *Journal of the Royal Statist. Society*, p. 434, Vol. 43, 1880.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 434–435.

[31] Jones, D. Caradog, "Some Statistics Concerning Occupational Invalidity—Economic, Mental, and Moral," *Journal of R. Statistical Society*, Vol. 89, pp. 680–685, 1926. See there other details. Similar are the results obtained by other authors for the years 1902–1912. While the population actively engaged in agriculture was 88.3 per 1,000 they compose only 75.1 per 1,000 in asylum populations and 29.7 per 1,000 in prison populations. See Greenwood, R., Thompson, C. M., and Woods, H. M., "Heights and Weights of Patients in Mental Hospitals," *Biometrika*, Vol. XVII, pp. 247 ff. C. Goring's data concerning 2,984 convicts, show also, in spite of a mixture in one group—"laborers: agricultural, roads, quarries, railways," that while, per 1,000 of occupationally engaged adult males, this group had 324.1 individuals, among the convicts it had only 298.4 individuals—that is below their quota in the non-criminal occupational male population. If the agricultural group had not been mixed with other laborers, the results would probably have been still more favorable to it. Goring, Charles, *The English Convict*, p. 288, London, 1913.

agriculture composed 22.4 per cent of the total female occupational population.[32] Meanwhile, among the total number of male prisoners and juvenile delinquents committed in 1910, farmers composed only 3.3, farm laborers 2.9, and farm females about 1 per cent.[33] These are much below the agricultural quota in the non-criminal occupational population. The quota of the females, engaged in agriculture, in all crimes, without any exceptions whatsoever, is several times below their quota in the non-criminal female occupational population. The highest quota among the criminals (in homicides) is 13 for grave cases and 10 per cent for lesser cases (compared with 22 per cent, the quota of females engaged in agriculture among the whole female occupational population). In all other crimes the quota of the agricultural female group is only about 2 to 3 per cent. As to the male farmers and farm laborers, only in homicides do they give a quota near their quota in the total occupational population (farmers 18.6 per cent in grave and 19.8 per cent in lesser homicides and farm-laborers respectively 16.6 and 13.3). However, this is due, in a considerable degree, to the inclusion among the farmers of the negroes of the South among whom the rate of homicides is very high.[34] In all other offenses their quota is much below their proportion in the occupational population.[35] Other studies, not so large but somewhat more microscopical, have led to similar results. The data of the Department of Correction of Massachusetts for 1920 showed that, in the cities with 10,000 and more population, the arrests for all offenses are 2.5 times greater than in the smaller towns (under 10,000), for drunkenness five times, for crimes against property, 1.8, and against persons, 1.9 times greater.[36] Steiner and Brown's recent study of about 1,555 prisoners, members of the chain gang in twenty counties of North Carolina, gave similar results. The proportion of prisoners residing in cities is again far above the quota of the city population in the total population of the state.[37]

Similar results are given by the data of the industrial school for girls at Delaware, Ohio; those for boys at Lancaster, Ohio, 1913, and also in Michigan. In all these schools the quota of juvenile delin-

[32] *Abstract of the Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920, p. 482.

[33] The total number of female prisoners was 48,566. About 50 per cent of them had an occupation before commitment. The total number of farm prisoners (females) was 202. This gives about 1 per cent of the 24,283 female convicts. See *Prisoners and Juvenile Delinquents in the United States*, 1910, pp. 150, 153, 489 ff.

[34] That the rural rate of homicides per 100,000 is not higher than the urban rate is confirmed also by the data of Mortality Statistics. According to those we had, per 100,000 population, a death rate from homicide in 1925: in cities of registration states 9.6; in rural parts of registration states 6.4. Similar are the rates for preceding years. *Mortality Statistics*, 1928, p. 70.

[35] *Ibid.*, taken and computed from pp. 150–154–489–492.

[36] Sutherland, E., *Criminology*, p. 93.

[37] See Steiner and Brown, *The North Carolina Chain Gang*, pp. 131–132.

quents from the cities was far above the quotas of the urban population in the total population of the corresponding states. On the other hand, the quotas of the delinquents from the open country was far below the proportions of the rural population in the whole states.[38] However, it is necessary to mention that the computations are only approximate because of the difficulty in cutting off exactly the area of the population from which the juvenile delinquents come to the institutions. L. Mount's study of the commitments to Penal Institutions and Industrial Schools in Iowa, 1909–1914, showed that the open country gives the lowest quota of commitments.[39] E. Shideler's study showed that, in ten out of twelve states, the cities of 25,000 and more population contributed more than their share to the state institutions for delinquents.[40] Similar conclusions were reached by J. H. Williams, G. M. Fernald, J. F. Vuillenmier, and partly, by W. T. Root. The samples in these latter studies were not very large nor necessarily selected at random.[41] In W. T. Root's study, one point is particularly interesting, namely, the difference in rural-urban percentages of the prisoners according to their birthplace and the places of the commitment of the crimes. According to the birthplace of criminals born in Pennsylvania the quotas of the city and the rural parts is almost the same as the proportion of these classes in the general population of Pennsylvania.[42] However, according to the places of the commission of the crimes, 83 per cent were in the city and only 17 per cent in the rural parts.[43] Thus there is a great difference, which suggests, as in the case of Denmark (see above), that a part of the crimes perpetrated in the city, are performed by migrants from the rural parts. Further, the data of J. Vuillenmier show also that, among the urban criminals, the per cent of repeaters is higher than among the rural criminals.[44]

Thus the comparatively more reliable data of the United States

[38] See the data in Vogt, P. L., *Introduction to Rural Sociology*, pp. 205–206, 1920.

[39] Mounts, L., *Dependents, Defectives, and Delinquents in Iowa*, pp. 24, 39–40.

[40] Shideler, E., "Family Disintegration and the Delinquent Boy in the U. S.," *Journal of Criminal Law*, January, 1918, p. 729.

[41] See these studies in Sutherland, *op. cit.*, pp. 94–96. W. Root's study of the prisoners of the Western Penitentiary of Pennsylvania does not permit any definite conclusions in this respect owing to the fact that a large number of the prisoners were born outside of Pennsylvania, whose occupation or place of birth (rural-urban), is not indicated.

[42] In 1890, the year nearest to the average age-composition of the prisoners, the urban population in Pennsylvania composed 48.6 per cent of the total population. (*Abstract of the Fourteenth Census*, p. 79.) The ratio of the urban-born prisoners from Pennsylvania was 45.5 per cent. Root, W. T., *Psychological and Educational Survey of 1916 Prisoners in the Western Penitentiary of Pennsylvania*, pp. 187–188.

[43] Root, W., *ibid.*, p. 188.

[44] Vuillenmier, J. F., "A Comparative Study of N. Y. City and Country Criminals," *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, p. 534, Vol. XI, 1921.

also testify, at their face value, in favor of a lower criminality of the rural population compared with the urban and of the agricultural occupation compared with the averages for all as well as for the other important occupational classes.

In *South Australia* in 1925 [45] the per cent of agricultural occupied persons among convicted prisoners, was 4.0; while the per cent of agricultural population among the total occupied population was 10.6.

The data of *Italy* and partly *Austria* are somewhat contradictory and some of them represent a deviation from the results given practically by all the above countries. According to *Annuario statistico*, 1881 (p. 112) the quota of the urban population in the total population was 32, while urban criminality composed 43 per cent of the total criminality. This means that the urban population gave a quota somewhat above its share.[46]

From the qualitative standpoint, the data of 1909,[47] show that the quota of the agricultural class in such crimes as homicide, grave assault, rape, and robbery was somewhat lower than the quota of the majority of the big occupational classes. In difference from many countries, its quota in theft (not qualified) by agriculturists is relatively high.[48] According to these data the total criminality of the whole agricultural class with the dependents and laborers (1895) is below those of the classes of commerce, transport, navigation, and fishing and is near to or higher than those of the other occupational classes mentioned. According to the more detailed data of 1909 agriculture is lower than the quotas of the cattle breeders, forestry, butchers, transport, commerce, "other industries" and about those of the artisans, dress, and shoe industry. If, however, we split the agricultural class into the owners and dependents, then the criminality of the farmer-owners is the lowest among all the classes mentioned, including the proprietors in other occupational groups, professionals, rentiers, public service, and other groups. The validity of these data is confirmed by the results of the parliamentary investigation of criminality in Italy which is summarized by Professor F. Coletti in his book *La popolazione rurale in Italia.*[49] This investigation has shown that the geographical distribution of the criminality gives the highest rate in Lazio, the province in which the rural population is the lowest

[45] South Australia, *Statistical Register*, pp. II, 19, III, 17; Adelaide, 1927.

[46] Bonger, W., *Criminality and Economic Conditions*, p. 446. The low share of the domestic service group is due principally to its predominantly female composition.

[47] Hurwicz, E., *op. cit.*, p. 350.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 346.

[49] The original volumes of the parliamentary publication are unavailable so the data are taken from the work of this distinguished investigator who was one of the leaders of this investigation. See Coletti, F., *La popolazione rurale in Italia e i suoi caratteri demografici, psichologici e sociali*, pp. 73–119.

of all provinces of Italy and in which the capital of Italy, Rome, is situated.[50] From the occupational standpoint, the class of farmer-owners gave one of the lowest rates of criminality among all the occupations. On the other hand, the criminality of the farm-laborers, particularly day-laborers, is high, being above those in many non-agricultural occupational classes. However, in its character it is composed out of crimes of lesser gravity. This "high wholesale criminality," of the farm laborers, as Coletti rightly remarks, is due to the hard economic conditions of this group, and in a considerable degree, to the fact that these laborers represent a shifting stratum of the population composed of persons going from the country to the city and from place to place within the urban or rural area.[51] Thus, we seem to be justified in the conclusion that the agricultural class of owners in Italy is almost the least criminal among all other classes. As to the farm-laborers, their criminality is about the same as the laboring classes in cities. All in all, the data of Italy are partly in agreement with those of other countries and partly deviate from them. Nevertheless, they do not show the rural class, as a whole, as worse, than the whole laboring classes of the cities.

A somewhat similar picture is given by the data of *Austria* for 1900. These data show that the independents (owners) in agriculture gave the lowest rate of criminality among all groups with the exception of officials and professional occupations. This is true from the quantitative and, on the whole, from the qualitative standpoint. However, the laborers in agriculture give a rate somewhat higher than those of the laborers in industry and commerce.[52] Qualitatively, female laborers in agriculture gave higher rates for infanticide than female laborers in industry and commerce (among independents the situation is reversed. Male laborers gave a higher rate for grave assault and arson. In other crimes, there were no conspicuous differences.[53]

Intemperance and Criminality. Some authors, for instance, J. G. Thompson, contend that intemperance and alcoholism are probably more developed in rural than in urban populations. Not entering here into a criticism of this opinion, which by all the evidence seems to be fallacious, we shall note only that the statistics of various countries show that alcoholic criminality (that is offenses committed in a state of drunkenness) is higher in the cities and in the bulk of the large occupational classes of the city than in rural communities or in the agricultural occupation. Similar results were given in a very careful study by Dr. Horlacher, concerning *Bavaria*. In comparison with almost all big urban occupational classes, the agricultural class

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 74.
[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 74 ff., 94–95.
[52] See here Hurwicz, E., p. 340.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

gives one of the lowest quotas of such criminals.[54] The data show that only the group of officials gave a quota of alcoholic delinquents lower than the farmer and tenant quotas. These data do not seem to justify the above contention of a greater alcoholism in the rural population. Other existing data also support this conclusion.[55]

Principal Results of the Data. The most important results of the above data, taken at their face value, are as follows: First, the very fact and the number of commitments for crimes or offenses take place more often within the territory of the cities than in the country (per equal numbers of population). Second, according to the residence of the offenders, the city population yields a greater number of offenders than the country population. Third, according to the place of birth of the offenders, the data of Denmark and a few other countries show that the cities give higher rates of offenders than the country. But the difference in this case is much smaller than in the case of the rates of the offenders according to their city-country residence before the commitment of crime. Besides, the data about the place of birth of the criminals are scarce. For this reason, the real difference is less certain than in the cases of the share of crimes according to their place of commitment or the residence of the criminals. The reduction of the difference in the criminality of the city and the country, according to the place of birth of the offenders, means also that the city criminality is increased somewhat by the migrants of some country-born to the city. In other words, a part of the country migrants to the city become criminals and offenders in these urban places. Fourth, the data of comparative criminality of the agricultural occupation show also that, on the whole, it is one of the least criminal occupational classes or one of the most law-abiding groups of the population. This is particularly true in regard to owners and independents in agriculture, and less true, as a general rule, in regard to the laborers. The agreement of these data with those of the rural-urban territorial division mutually reinforces the validity of the data of either category. Fifth, the data suggest that, on the whole, the agricultural and the country-residing populations are more law-abiding than the urban-residing as a whole. Practically in the majority of the countries, the wholesale criminality of the agricultural and the country-residing populations give rates lower than the urban-residing population regardless of the birth-places of the city residents. In

[54] *Annuaire stat. de la Norvège*, 1924, pp. 186–188; *Statistisk Arsbok*, 1926, p. 220; Horlacher, Mich., "Alkoholstatistik und Alkoholkriminalität mit besonderer Berucksichtigung Bayerns," *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv*, Vol. 10, p. 181, 1916–1917.

[55] See Chapter VI of this book which shows that alcoholism prevails greatly in the cities. See also British Government, *Accounts and Papers*, 1923, Vol. XXIV, sessional papers Tables A and H (and 1926) for an analysis of density of population, liquor licenses, and drunkenness.

all the important major classes of crimes, the criminality index of the country-residing and agricultural populations is either below or not higher than that of the urban-residing population taken as a whole. Sixth, the city classes of professionals and officials are definitely less criminal than the agricultural class as a whole. This means that the urban population shows again a greater contrast than the rural population. Seventh, in the majority of the countries the criminality of the rural-residing or agricultural class is somewhat stronger manifested in the field of crimes against persons, particularly in homicides, infanticides, and grave assaults, than in the field of crimes against property, with the exception of arson and cattle stealing, which are predominantly rural crimes. However, there again are exceptions; in some countries the situation is different and the rule is not general. Besides, this must not be interpreted that, in those crimes against persons, the rural or agricultural classes, as a rule, give higher rates than the urban-residing population. On the contrary, in many countries the rural rate still remains below the urban rate: in other countries it is near to the proportion of the rural (agricultural) population in the total population of the country; and finally, only in a few (two) countries, is the rural share in those crimes slightly above the urban share. Eighth, if we analyze the crimes by types or kinds then we may indicate several crimes which are predominantly rural or urban. Those predominantly rural are arson, cattle stealing, infanticide (partly), and various violations of the rules which concern utilization and distribution of land. Those predominantly urban are various crimes against property, especially theft, fraud, forgery, and embezzlement; abortion (instead of infanticide), prohibited forms of vice, intemperance, political crimes, transgression of the rules of the press, traffic ordinances, and so on. This means that the old observation of the criminologists, that the cities are marked by a technique of crime perpetration which requires a great deal of strategy, deceit, scheming, lies, and so on, while the country technique of crime perpetration is more direct, naïve, less deceitful, and less strategical, is still close to the truth. Ninth, the city-residing population seems to yield a greater number of repeaters than the country population.

Validity of the Data and Results. The above conclusions are given by the data taken at their face value. But are they really valid? Can we be sure that they sum up the situation correctly? We must recognize at once that they have many shortcomings. Probably not all cases of offenses are registered. Probably the accuracy of the registration fluctuates considerably from area to area and from country to country. Further, it is probable also that the intensity of the arrests and commitment of the offenders varies somewhat in the city and the country. Further, almost all the data measure the com-

parative criminality per 100,000 population often without any standardization according to age and sex. This defect is particularly important because the share of criminality for men is several times higher than for women. It also fluctuates considerably from age to age, being the highest in the age-groups from 18 to 40 or 15 to 45, that is in the age-groups whose proportions are somewhat higher in the city than in the country. In order that the rates of comparative criminality may be accurate they should be given for a standardized population, which is not done in many cases. Furthermore, although the above data about several countries show a great deal of similarity, nevertheless, even among them, there are several dissimilarities. In some countries, for instance in Sweden and Germany, the urban-rural criminality rates differ enormously. In other countries, only slightly. In some other countries it is hard to see any difference. This means, that the variability of rural-urban criminality even when we take such big universes as whole countries, is considerable. If we had taken smaller universes, for instance, separate cities and some separate rural districts, we would have seen that the variability of comparative criminality is incomparably greater. There are big cities much "purer" than small towns, villages, or rural districts. There are villages "purer" than big cities, or rural parts; there are rural parts much "purer" than villages, towns, or cities. When one microscopically studies the distribution of rates of offenders or crimes from county to county, from city to city, one cannot fail to see this conspicuous variability. This is important because, as it is known, the greater is the variability of an investigated statistical series, the less is the significance of their results. This is to be borne in mind. In brief, there are dozens of shortcomings of the data which vitiate their accuracy and their results. Granting these defects, shall we go so far as to deny even an approximate accuracy to the data? This may be done but there is no corroboration for such a radical denial. Unfortunately, we have no more valid data than the above. Furthermore, such a radical use of statistical results would scarcely be justifiable.

Indeed, stressing the considerable variability of the series studied, at the same time, we cannot fail to see that when large universes, in the form of whole countries, are taken the data exhibit a great deal of uniformity. If the meaning of this uniformity is interpreted properly—no more and no less than the meaning of any statistical averages with considerable variability—then they may give an approximate reflection of the reality. We see further, that the essential results of the data for many countries, and in the same countries for long periods of years, are consistent. Such consistency strongly suggests that the results are not quite incidental or fallacious.

The incomplete and defective registration of the offenses or arrests, in a

universe consisting of millions and millions of cases, are likely to counterbalance one another and for this reason eliminate some of the possible fallacies. The consideration about *better police service in the cities*, which leads to more intensive arresting and registration of the offenses and offenders than in the country, is a mere hypothesis which has not been proved and which is questionable. A crime performed in the rural parts is always an event. It is somewhat more difficult to be hidden and to remain unknown than a crime performed in the city. The same may be true about the arrest of the offenders: we do not have exact figures of the per cents of crimes committed in the city and the country whose perpetrators remain unknown. However, logically we may suppose that such proportions of unapprehended criminals are not higher in the country than in the city. Any criminal knows that it is much easier to hide in the city than in the country; and the headquarters of criminals are usually located in the urban communities. For these reasons this argument is not convincing. Even granting that it is accurate, it is counterbalanced by its opposite side: if the cities have better police protection against criminals than the rural parts, then these parts are more defenseless against crime; in such a condition they should show a greater criminality if the rural "criminal propensities" are as great as in the city. Therefore, at the virtue of their supposed equal or greater potential criminality, the rural districts should yield a greater or at least an equal, number of offenders or offenses. This, however, is not the case.

Thus the argument of a greater number of arrests in cities due to better protection against criminals has its opposite side which counterbalances its significance. The same practically may be said of almost all similar considerations, through which many investigators try to annihilate completely the validity of the rural-urban data. More important than these arguments are the *urban-rural differences in sex and age-compositions of their population.* However, the above rates of the comparative criminality may scarcely be explained through these factors. We saw that many countries give the comparative data for criminality separately for each sex. And the data show that the results do not change through such a standardization of the sex of the population in the city and the country. The city residing males and, particularly, females, taken separately, still give higher rates for criminality. Besides, the cities do not contain, as a general rule, a greater proportion of the more criminal male sex in their total population than the countries. On the contrary as, a general rule, with exceptions, the cities have a higher per cent of females in their population.[56] For this reason alone, if the urban

[56] See the data in the chapter on Migrations.

criminality were not higher than the rural, the urban rates should have been lower because the criminality of the females is much lower than that of the males. The data do not show this. Therefore, the sex-composition of the urban population cannot account for the higher rate of urban criminality (according to the residence of the criminals or to the place of perpetration).

More important yet is the difference in the age-composition of the urban and rural population. As is known, the age-groups 15 to 45 or between 18 and 35 are the most "criminal"; they have, relative to numbers, a higher number of offenders than other, younger or older, age-groups. As the proportion of these age-groups are greater in the city than in the country, this difference in the age-composition of the both classes of the population may be responsible for the higher wholesale criminality of the urban population (according to the number of offenses performed in the city and the country or according to the place of residence of the offenders). If this is so, then the higher criminality of the urban population is purely fictitious, being only the result of the difference in age-composition. Is such a supposition valid? It seems that it has some significance and is to be borne in mind. However, is it quite sufficient for an explanation of the difference in the rates of urban-rural criminality? A definite answer to this problem is prevented by a lack of data concerning the age-composition among the urban and rural offenders. For this reason the answer is only tentative. Although some of the higher wholesale urban criminality is due to a higher proportion of the above "most criminal" age-groups in the city than in the country, nevertheless, it is impossible to explain the whole difference through this factor only. After having standardized the city-country population according to the ages of the offenders, several countries, as Sweden, Germany, England, the United States of America, Russia, France, or Denmark, where the wholesale urban criminality strongly exceeds the rural, would probably show that the city criminality remains still higher than the rural. The reason is that the urban-rural quotas of criminality (according to the residence of the criminals or the place of perpetration but not the birthplace of the criminals) differ so conspicuously that standardization of the populations according to ages can scarcely obliterate the entire difference. Further, in many of the above figures, some standardization of the age-groups is already made. And yet, the difference remains. The data for Germany are computed not per 100,000 of the population of all age classes, but per 100,000 at the ages 14 years and over. That is, the computation omits exactly the younger ages, whose criminality is low, and which are more prevalent in the country. The same is true of many other countries which compute the rates of criminality per 100,000 actively engaged

in occupational pursuits, who are, at least, of the ages 10 years and more. This reason is still more valid in regard to the quotas of criminals computed on an occupational basis. Such a computation practically eliminates the differences in age-composition of the urban and rural populations discussed. In spite of this, as we have seen, the difference in favor of a lower criminality of the agricultural occupation in the majority of the countries remains. These considerations are sufficient to show why the difference in age-composition of the rural-urban population cannot account for the whole difference in the urban-rural quotas of criminality. This statement is still more valid because the sex-composition of the urban population by tending to decrease the urban criminality somewhat compensates for the greater rates of cities due to the age-composition of their population.

Thus, making all the necessary allowances, we seem to be forced to admit that in the majority of the countries, on the whole, *the wholesale criminality of the city population (according to the residence of the offenders and the place of perpetration of crime) remains somewhat higher than in the country or among the agricultural population.* The conclusion is only tentative, and yet, the only one possible under the circumstances.

Interpretation. If the above conclusion be true, what factors may be responsible for such a higher criminality in the city (according to the residence or the place of perpetration) or lower criminality in the rural and agricultural populations, on the one hand, and the other, for several qualitative differences in the criminality of both classes of populations studied?

Let us glance cursorily at the problem. Earlier criminologists gave a great deal of credit to the influence on crime of *economic conditions.* Although in regard to crimes against persons, economic conditions seem to exert no tangible influence,[57] in regard to crimes against property, their influence seems to be tangible, though not high. But even granting that such a correlation is close, economic factors in the form of poverty and wealth do not explain the differences in the urban-rural rates of criminality. In the first place, as a rule, the average income of the city population is not lower than that of the rural population. The same is true in regard to the standard of living. The owners or laborers in a rural population are not in a more advantageous position, in this respect, than the owners or laborers in the city population (industry, transport, commerce, etc.).

[57] Recent studies of the correlation between crime and business cycles has shown that in the United States of America and England the coefficient of correlation fluctuates somewhere between 0.4 and 0.25 (for various periods) for crimes against property. For crimes against persons the coefficient is quite insignificant: from 0.05 to 0.12. See the data, the coefficients, and the literature in Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 559 ff.

For this reason, *the economic factors cannot account for the lower criminality of the rural population especially in crimes against property.* Only, perhaps, for such countries, as Italy and Austria, where the economic position of the farm-laborer has been particularly low, economic factors might help to understand why, in these countries, this part of the agricultural population has had a rate for crimes against property not lower than that of the laborers in industry. All other phenomena, and among them particularly the extremely low rate of crimes against property on the part of the farm-owners, whose incomes are certainly below those of the owners in industry and commerce and whose criminality, almost in all countries, is below those of the owners in those big occupational divisions, seem to be unaccountable through the factors of poverty and wealth. If poverty really is a factor facilitating crimes against property, then the city population, as a whole, should have a lower rate of these crimes than the country population, as a whole, because the average income per capita is rather greater in the city than in the country. (See Chapter III.) For the same reason the owners in industry, commerce, and transport should have a lower rate of crimes against property than the owners of farm, show, in their bulk, are but small farmers and peasants and whose average income is much below that of the owners in industry, commerce and transport. Facts contradict the expectation. Therefore the economic factor is helpless in explaining the difference discussed (either because its influence is not as great as is supposed or because it is counterbalanced by the interference of other factors).

The same is to be said regarding *the factor of education or literacy.* Many of the rationalists formerly ascribed a great moralizing rôle to "education" and a criminalizing rôle to illiteracy. If the situation were really such, then we ought to expect that the city population would give a lower rate for criminality than the country population because the per cent of illiterates and "uneducated" is nearly always higher within the rural population. Yet, the data show that the expectation is not sustained by the facts. The more illiterate rural and agricultural population gives a lower rate for criminality than the more literate urban population. This means that, either the influences of literacy and education as factors are overestimated (which is somewhat proved now), or their influence is counterbalanced by other, more powerful, factors. Anyhow, the educational factor cannot help at all in understanding why, in many countries, criminality is greater in the cities than in the country.

The factors of sex and age distribution were already discussed. They also cannot account for the differences.

Possibly the hypotheses of *urban-rural selection* may give some

help. Some authors contend that cities attract particularly from the country those elements who, according to their native endowment, are potential criminals and in a less degree those who are innately upright. Several of studies show that some of the country migrants become city criminals. But, in the first place, no one has shown, as yet, that they become criminals because they were born with a "criminal" proclivity and that the proportion of such "inborn" criminals is greater among the migrants from the country than the proportion of "inborn honest" people. Both presumptions remain, at the best, mere guesses, are contradicted by many data, and should be dismissed.

Let us turn to some specific traits of the cities through which they differ from the country. Some of them may give a much better explanation of the "mystery." In the first place, we know that the character of the *family and the home* has quite a tangible correlation with criminality. As a rule, disorganized and unstable families (divorced, with one parent dead, parents lacking in harmony, and broken homes) yield a higher per cent of offenders than stable families with strong social bonds and traditions.[58] Just in this respect, as we may see from the chapter on the Rural-Urban Family, is the urban family less stable and less strongly bound by social ties than the rural family. The number of divorces and broken homes, as a symptom of instability of the family, is much higher in the city than in the country. Further, the per cent of *illegitimate* children is again greater in the city. This somehow signifies a lesser sanctity and purity of the family institution in the city. Moreover, the very time of being together (family association) of the members of the family in the city is much shorter than in the country. In brief, these and other similar characteristics of the urban family, given in the chapter mentioned, show it more disorganized, less stable, and more broken than the rural family. Shall we wonder, therefore, that the city-born, reared in such families, or the country-born, who migrate early to the city and find themselves "familyless" and "homeless," are robbed of a family moral guidance. As a result, they often "morally stumble" and enter the careers of offenders. This consideration alone is sufficient to explain why many of such migrants become offenders (without any inborn criminal proclivity) and why city populations should have a greater rate for criminality. Furthermore, the proportion of the single and divorced in the city is higher than in the country. They generally yield a higher rate of crimes than the married. This also tends to raise the city criminality. Such is one of the factors. Naturally others are operating.

[58] See the data in Sutherland, E., *Criminology*, Ch. VII; Gillin, J., *Criminology and Penology*, Ch. XI.

A second important factor is a *greater psycho-social heterogeneity of the city population.* This was shown in the preceding chapters. We know, and E. Durkheim has shown conspicuously, that a greater heterogeneity of a population, particularly a heterogeneity in religious and moral opinions and mores related to them, means a weaker inculcation of non-criminal habits and a diminution of social pressure on individual conduct. A diminished pressure means a weakening of the stimuli which restrain the individual from crime and offense. In a socially and morally homogeneous group, there are few oppositions to established rules of conduct. All the members and their offspring are educated and rigidly drilled in the same forms of conduct; they approve and disapprove the same things. In case of a violation of the law or mores they all react unanimously against a violator, and the violator is confronted with a terrific negative reaction by the whole community. In brief, while in such a group the moral unanimity exerts, in various ways, an enormous pressure on every would-be violator of its rules, in the morally and socially heterogeneous urban populations, there is very little of this unanimity and therefore the moral and social pressure of the population is weakened, dispersed, scattered, and atomized. Indeed, while part of the population, for instance radicals, anarchists, part of the working people and intellectuals, hail enthusiastically such and such deeds, other parts of the population (conservatives, rich classes, and part of intellectuals) slander it. "Private property is sacred," says one group; "it is stolen from the masses," says another. "The family is the greatest cultural institution," says one group; "It is legalized prostitution," says another. The same is true about religion, government, moral values, this or that law, reform, action, fashion, art, novel, and so on. Glance at the attitudes of radical and conservative magazines in regard to almost anything. You will find that what is approved by one is disapproved by another. Under such circumstances, it is impossible either to drill a moral habit into the urbanites with the same rigidity as is done in a morally homogeneous group, or to exert on would-be criminals the same enormous pressure which is exerted in a more homogeneous rural community.[59] Almost every

[59] There is a great deal of truth in Durkheim's theory that the existence of a great moral unanimity in primitive societies is the cause of the severe punishment of the offenders in those societies. By analyzing the law-codes of many societies at their earlier and later stages, Durkheim found that the proportions of the laws whose violation is followed by punishment tends to decrease, and the proportion of the laws without punishment tends to increase in the law-codes as one passes from the societies and stages with lower to higher division of labor and social differentiation. Increase of division of labor and social differentiation is a rough measure of the increase of social heterogeneity. In the light of this theory, a softening of the repression of crime, especially at the present moment, is not only, and perhaps not so much, the result of our increased humanitarianism, as much as the result of the enormous social heterogeneity of present-day urban society.

violator in the city does not stand alone against the unanimous disapproval of the whole city population. He always has a small or a large group of his sympathizers, admirers, and backers. The pressure exerted by one part of the population is counterbalanced by another. As a result, an urbanite stands amidst two or more currents of moral pressure often having opposite directions. For this reason, each of these streams of pressure is less efficient in keeping would-be criminals from offenses than in the case where the group is unanimous in its moral approval or disapproval. Shall we wonder, therefore, that the greater urban socio-moral heterogeneity is one of the most important factors in the urban criminality discussed. By hundreds of ways it leads to it. It hinders the inculcation of strong moral habits into the young urban population and makes these habits very unstable. It lowers the sacredness of rules of conduct because they are assailed and criticized by other factions. An urbanite growing up amidst such criticisms, at the best, can view them as but conventional rules which, according to the circumstances, are to be followed or broken. The same feeling of sacredness and horror about their violation cannot be and are not possessed by an urbanite to the same extent. It weakens or mutually annuls the power of moral disapproval and even repression of the criminal by a part of the community.[60] This weakening means an elimination of one of the most serious checks to offenses. These remarks are sufficient to understand the importance of the factor discussed.[61] *Other conditions being equal, the greater is the socio-moral heterogeneity of the urban population compared with the rural, the greater would be the differences in criminality of these classes of the population.*[62] It is interesting to

[60] See about this point Durkheims, *De la division de travail social;* Sorokin, *Crime and Punishment* (Russian).

[61] Many criminologists wonder why the criminality of the United States is so high. Many of them try to explain it through the old-fashioned factors of economic conditions, education, or something similar. It is evident that these factors cannot account for it because economically and educationally the United States of America are in the most favorable conditions. The mystery of a high criminality in this country, in its essentials, is due practically to the same factors which are discussed above and which really exist in this country. First, we know that the American family is relatively unstable and the divorce-rate is exceptionally high; second, its population generally is highly heterogeneous in racial, national, religious, moral, customary, political, and other respects with a great variety of mores and customs; this heterogeneity is particularly great in the big cities where social, psychological, and moral differences of various parts of the population are so great that a visitor from another planet might take them for different species of animals; third, the shifting and mobility of the population, is also exceedingly great. These and other factors discussed in the text, are the main factors which are really responsible for the high criminality of this country. Unless they are taken into consideration, it is doubtful whether other remedies offered by various anti-crime commissions may give any serious results.

[62] The above correlation between criminality and socio-moral heterogeneity of a group is to be regarded as quite tangible and corroborated in space as well as in time. Pre- and revolutionary times are marked by a great socio-moral heterogeneity of the population. The same times are marked by an extraordinary high criminality performed

note, that just in the field of the crimes against person, where there exists a greater unanimity of the moral opinions of the urban population, the differences between the urban and rural criminality are much less than in the crimes against property, where the moral opinions of the city population (capitalists and laboring class, defenders and assailers of the institution of private property, socialists, communists, etc.) seem to be particularly heterogeneous and opposite. This detail is in complete agreement with the hypotheses discussed. Such is the second important factor of a higher criminality of the city compared with the country.

The third factor, connected with the one just discussed, *is a greater-horizontal and vertical-mobility of the city population compared with the rural.* The very fact of a correlation between the mobility and criminality seems to be established satisfactorily. Usually the periods of great mobility in the history of a society are followed by a demoralization. This is particularly true in regard to the periods of great revolutions and upheavals. On the other hand, some special studies show that, within the same city, families of approximately similar economic and occupational status, but different in regard to their duration of time as residents within a given ward or district, yield different quotas of juvenile delinquents; the families with a shorter period of residence in a given place, being more mobile, yield greater quotas of juvenile delinquents than the less shifting or nomadic families. We saw, also, that vagabonds, hoboes, and day-laborers, without definite occupations and who permanently shift from place to place, give, almost in all countries, the highest rates of offenders. In short, the correlation mentioned seems to be really existing.[63]

We also know certainly that the horizontal as well as vertical mobility in the urban population is much greater than in the rural. (See the proofs of this in Chapter II.)

In a mobile society (urban), the members, being only "temporary dwellers" in a box (given social position) and permanently butterflying from position to position with their different standards and morals, cannot be inculcated with rigid and definite habits, and the

by one faction in regard to another. Periods of an extraordinary increase of moral and religious heterogeneity of a population, like the periods of Renaissance and Reformation, are marked by a conspicuous demoralization also. Transition from primitive moral homogeneity to a moral heterogeneity, in societies with division of labor, is followed again by a weakening of moral pressure and the increase of offenses. See the data and details of this theory in the quoted works of Durkheim and Sorokin. See also Richard, G., "Les crises sociales et les conditions de la criminalité," *L'année sociologique,* 1899; Sorokin, P., *The Sociology of Revolution,* Part I.

[63] See Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility,* pp. 526 ff., 533 ff. *The Sociology of Revolution,* Part I; Sutherland, E., *op. cit.,* p. 131; Brasol, B., *Elements of Criminology;* H. Hart's coefficient of correlation between migration and homicide rates per states for 1915–1917 in the United States is +554 ±096. Hart, H., *op. cit.,* p. 55. See other data and references in these studies.

habits themselves cannot have the same degree of stability as those inculcated in a less mobile (rural) society: hence, were the greater moral instability of the members of a mobile society and the higher level of criminality (in the cities).[64]

Such seems to be the next factor which partly accounts for the greater urban criminality as shown by the above data.[65]

In connection with this greater heterogeneity and mobility of the urban population stands a further characteristic of the urban environment which may also facilitate, to some extent, moral laxity, at least in several fields of conduct. The city psychical atmosphere is sophisticated and much more filled with a sceptical and "very conditional," sometimes even cynical intellectualisms, than the rural environment. Because the people in a rural environment are less heterogeneous and less mobile, they, since their childhood, are imbued with a few predominant convictions and valuations of what is good and what is bad, what is permitted and what is not. They are not (or are in a less degree) amidst various and mutually critical countercurrents of various mental, religious, moral, and social theories, beliefs, moral evaluations, and mores. As a result, the things they are taught and made to believe become rigid habits, strong rules, and not easily undermined by scepticism and criticism. They assume the character of unmistakable truths and have a real sacredness.[66] Such rules of conduct are harder to be transgressed or broken. The urbanites, meanwhile, are in quite a different situation. They are amidst the most different, opposite, and mutually critical, theories, opinions, beliefs, and ideologies which assail one another and mutually show the defects and shortcomings of each. Under such circumstances it is hard to have a feeling of a sacredness in regard to any rule, value, institution, or party. They lose this fascination. They cannot be viewed as absolute truths. Once no longer viewed as sacred, they become something very conditional, mere matters of convenience and comfort. Being such, they naturally are more easily broken when they become inconvenient, than the rules which

[64] Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, p. 526.

[65] Validity of the hypothesis that a great heterogeneity and mobility of the population facilitates criminality is supported by many detailed data; for instance, from this standpoint it is quite comprehensible why seaport cities (see above the data for England) give the highest rate of criminality; why in the United States of America in the past the criminality was flourishing in many "boom" towns with their heterogeneous and incessantly "flowing" populations attracted by gold or other "baits" from everywhere.

[66] "Right and wrong were eternal verities with him, which could not be changed and must not be tampered with; right was right, and wrong was wrong; thus it had always been, and thus it must remain as long as the world should stand." This psychology of one of the farmers described by O. E. Rölvaag, is typical, *The Giants in the Earth*, p. 140. See a brilliant development of this in Le Play's *Œuvres Complètes*, in all six volumes.

are felt as "sacred." Shall we wonder therefore that, especially in the fields of sex, property, and drinking, offenses against the social order and authorities, the city population shows somewhat higher criminality. Various fine intellectuals so successfully have shown the shortcomings of these rules of law and morals and so brilliantly criticized these practices that they have lost their prestige in the eyes of the bulk of the city population. The loss of this prestige of sacredness is a loss of one of the strongest "unseen" walls which protects the individual from crime. Intellectuals may gratify themselves: they have dissipated many "prejudices" in the eyes of the urbanites. One may wonder, however, whether they expected such objective results of their own "enlightening" activity, as those we are now discussing. Anyhow, it is probable that their critical activities lead to one of the factors which work in the direction mentioned. Excessive scepticism, cynicism, nihilism, and criticism, as well as forcible destruction of "prejudices" and "superstitions," seem to have always been breeders of demoralization and of criminality.[67]

In so far as such an activity goes on much more intensively within the cities and in so far as the city mentality (especially at the present time) is packed with criticism, scepticism, and cynicism, this factor is to be kept in mind also as one of the demoralizing forces particularly conspicuous in the city.

The next factor, inherent again to the city environment, is a *greater density of its population and, as a consequence a greater anonymity of social relations and a greater number of contacts of its members with one another.* Density of population itself is not necessarily a factor facilitating criminality. The same is to be said even of a greater number of contacts of members of a group with one another. But when density is great, and as a consequence, the anonymity of social relations and the number of contacts increases, and when these contacts are between heterogeneous (racially, socially, morally, intellectually, nationally, and so on) components of the population with different standards and "plastic habits" these factors lead to an increase of antagonistic relationships, to conflicts, to struggles, and, what is near, to an increase of offenses, mutual anti-social acts, and to criminality. The farmer on an open farm, sees, meets, and enters into contact with a comparatively few people. Even these few people are often very homogeneous socially to the farmer himself. For this reason, there is much less opportunity for hatreds, animosities, conflicts, and offenses than in the city where every individual is surrounded on all sides by a multitude of people

[67] This has been understood long ago and by many thinkers, like Plato, Marsiglio of Padua, Machiavelli, Pascal, De Maîstre, E. Burke, and more recently by Pareto, G. Sorel, Frazer and Sumner.

often quite *unknown and heterogeneous*. Through this heterogeneity, contacts often lead to conflicts and offenses, which result into this or that kind of a legally criminal action. Add to this the fact that, within the rural population, the majority of the people in contact are known and are friends, or often relatives, acquaintances, and neighbors. In the city the majority are "strangers" in regard to whom, psychologically, we seem to be offensive or aggressive more easily than in regard to "the like-minded," "our own people." Studies of K. Pearson, F. H. Giddings, E. Bogardus, P. Sorokin, and others have shown that we are more social to those who are "nearer to us" in social space, and who are more like-minded to ourselves. As the strangeness or heterogeneity increases, sociality, sympathy, and altruism decrease.[68] Since city dwellers are predominantly "strangers" to one another, it is natural to expect that they are less social or (more anti-social) toward one another than rural people. Under such circumstances a superabundance of contact, which is unavoidable in the city, leads to an increase of offenses.

For the above reasons it becomes comprehensible why many investigators have often found a positive correlation between density and criminality. In the quoted L. Levi's study (England) the coefficient of rank order correlation between these two variables was .85. In several other studies similar results have been secured, and the above figures on the comparative urban-rural criminality give abundant data backing up this correlation. If density, as such, is not necessarily a "crime-breeding factor," under the urban conditions, discussed, it is likely to become so. At least, it cannot be discounted in an explanation of why the urban rate of offenses is greater than the rural. So much for this point.

Side by side with the above factors inherent to cities, there are, of course, several others, and among them a series of factors which have appeared as a consequence of special urban conditions and, in this respect, are secondary; but since the time of their appearance, they have begun to play a "crime breeding" rôle and continue to contribute a great deal to city criminality. Such, for instance, are the *concentration in the city of houses of vice, gambling, saloons, and similar institutions*. They exist also in the country, but in a much less degree. In the city they are put on a business basis, institutionalized, and com-

[68] See Sorokin, P., "Emperimente zur Soziologie," *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, March, 1928; Giddings, F., *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, pp. 122 ff.; *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, pp. 164 ff. and Ch. XV; Bogardus, E., a series of papers on "Social Distance" in the *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 1925, 1926, 1927, and "Social Distance in the City," *Proceedings of the Amer. Sociol. Society*, Vol. XX, pp. 40–46; Spykman, N. J.; "A Social Philosophy of the City," *ibid.*, pp. 47–55. See also Simmel's suggestive paper in *Die Grosstadt; Vortrage und Aufsätze zur Stadteausstellung;* Spengler, O., *Untergang des Abendlandes*, pp. 101–131; Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociol. Theories*, pp. 726–728; *Social Mobility*, pp. 516 ff.

mercialized. Naturally, they contribute a great deal to city criminality. The same is to be said of the multitude and heterogeneity of the population which, like a thick and vast forest, gives a *much better opportunity for the hiding of the offenders than in the country.* It is much more difficult for an offender or a stranger to hide in the country: every man is known there and every stranger is noticed at once. In the city, the situation is quite different. In spite of a greater police force and similar agencies, an offender has more chances there of not being caught than in the country. For this reason, the *headquarters of the habitual criminals, and criminal gangs* are rarely situated in the rural parts but almost always in the city. In this way, the city breeds not only its own criminals, but usually attracts some offenders from the country. The city becomes their residence and often the scene of performance of crimes for the migrants. This results in an increase of the urban rates in the statistics of crime. Add to these *the extraordinary monotony of living in the cities for a considerable part of the lower classes.* Day in and day out they have the drudgery of factory work, or of many forms of manual and clerical work. This drudgery makes some adventure, excitement, or romance urgent and, in this way, often leads to criminal actions. Consider also the influences of the yellow press and of some forms of recreation such as movies, dancing halls, and similar agencies.

All these being taken into consideration, one has scarcely a reason to doubt the results as shown by the above statistical data. More than that. If the cities did not have a series of anti-crime agencies and forces, which are absent or more scarce in the country (better police and protective agencies, more churches, religious, educational and intellectual institutions, greater accessibility of sound recreational institutions, more teaching, preaching, moralizing, better service by various social workers, better care of poverty-stricken people and so on) then, owing to the above crime-breeding factors in the city, its criminality would have been incomparably higher than that of the country. The influence of these "counter-crime" agencies peculiar to the cities seems to counterbalance, to some extent, the effects of urban criminalizing conditions. Nevertheless, moralizing agencies cannot everywhere and always counterbalance the effects of the demoralizing factors. Hence, the discussed higher rate of criminality of the cities compared with the country.

Now turn to the *qualitative side* of the predominant rural and urban forms of crime. The differences, in this respect, are easily comprehensible in the light of the differences in the occupations and the respective environments. That *cattle-stealing* predominates in the rural and agricultural group, is a mere result of the fact that in the city there is almost no opportunity to perform such crimes (especially

now when even horses are becoming prehistoric rarities in cities) while in the country the opportunity is much greater for this crime. The same is true to a considerable extent of *arson and various offenses connected with land possession, use, distribution, and exploitation.* As to *infanticide* which predominates over abortion in the country, while in the city the situation is rather reversed, this is easily accountable from the standpoint of environmental differences: a lack of legal or illegal medical advice or help in the rural parts makes abortion, or particularly contraceptive means, much less accessible for country girls or women. The easier "outlets" are much more accessible in the city. As a result, the city "sinners" give an incomparably higher rate for abortions or avoid them through contraceptive means. The country sinners, not having this opportunity, are often driven to child-exposure or infanticide.[69] However, as the above figures show, the total rate of crime against the life of infants (infanticide, abortion, and exposure) is, as a rule, much lower for the rural women compared with the urban. The difference would be still greater in favor of the rural females if the accessibility of contraceptive means were equal in the two populations. It, however, has been very unequal. Taking this and the fact that, even in regard to infanticide, not all countries show rates for the rural higher than for the urban, one has to conclude that, in the field of sex offenses of this type, the rural females (according to residence) exhibit more "purity" and "cleanliness" than the urban females.

As to *homicide*, we saw that, as a rule, its rate for the rural population is not greater than for the urban. Only that it occupies a comparatively higher place in the totality of rural criminality than in the totality of urban crimes; on the whole, there is not much difference between the homicide rates of the rural and the urban populations. Such a similarity of the rates is, however, due not to similar but rather to different combinations of factors in the city and the country. A study of the details of how and why homicides are performed in the country shows, first, that a *greater proportion of rural homicides happen during various holidays and feasts when the population is somewhat intoxicated* and members of various rural communities begin to quarrel and fight. Such fights often result in homicidal "accidents." Further, when rural homicides are performed by individuals they appear as a *result of various animosities and grudges and only rarely have pecuniary motives or are connected with robbery, etc.* This "collective" and "non-pecuniary" character of homicides in the rural population strikingly separates this phenomenon from urban homicides. These, as a rule, are either a direct result of some pecuniary motive (performed in order to steal, to rob, or to appropriate wealth)

[69] See the details in Gernet, M., *Infanticide* (Russian).

or are its indirect results such as when robbers, burglars, cracksmen, or "hold-up" men are driven to it in order to escape or to carry the money away safely. Such a pecuniary character of urban homicides naturally leads to a businesslike organization for its perpetration and yields to an institutionalization of professional murderers. Such is the most important difference in the character of homicides in the rural and urban populations.

Finally, *in the technique of crime perpetration* there is a general difference between rural and urban criminality. The techniques of the rural crimes are marked by less planning, scheming, cunning, slyness, and are more direct, impulsive, and naïve than those of the urban population. We saw above that such crimes as fraud, forgery, embezzlement, and others which require a great deal of slyness and cunning, are universally much lower in the country than in the city. Taking into consideration that offenses performed by the specialized repeaters ("Ph. D.'s of crime") occupy a much larger place in city criminality than in the rural; that the urban environment generally develops more slyness and cunning ability; and that it gives a much greater opportunity for the offenses of fraud, embezzlement, forgery, and others of a similar nature, the discussed difference is quite comprehensible from this standpoint.[70]

The predominance of *crimes against property* in the city population is also comprehensible from the environmental standpoint. The cities are the abodes of concentrated wealth. There is incomparably greater opportunity and temptation for such crimes than in the country, where as a rule there are few banks, luxurious shops, palaces, mansions, jewels, concentrated money or other economically precious things. Besides, the "prepotent reflexes" or habits of property and restraint from its violation are likely to be much stronger within the country population than within the urban. The rural population has, as a rule, an incomparably higher per cent of owners and much lower per cent of "homeless, landless, propertyless proletariat" than the cities. (See Chapter III.) The rural people are, in a less degree, subjected to the influence of various socialist, communist, and similar ideologies which directly and indirectly assail, criticize, and undermine the habits of respect to one's own and other men's property. Further, such occupations as commerce, are predominantly urban occupations. Commerce in its very nature, represents a com-

[70] Although the above characterization of the qualitative side of urban and rural criminality is similar in many respects to that given by numerous criminologists (Tarde, Ferri, Corre, and others), nevertheless, we do not see any valid reason to conclude from this that rural forms of criminality correspond to a state of "savagery" and that rural man is nearer to the primitive men, while the urban forms of criminality exhibit "more advanced and more cultural traits" and that the urban man is nearer to the civilized creature.

plex manipulation with economically valuable things and gives a superabundance of opportunities for offenses against property. These reasons are sufficient to explain the difference discussed.

All the above shows that it is unnecessary to postulate a special inherent difference of morality in the urban and the rural populations. If urban criminality is higher and has some qualitative differences compared with the rural, these are due, not to the fact that the city man is inherently more bad or unmoral or corrupted, but simply to the fact that he lives in an environment which has some specific characteristics working in that direction. When rural people are put in such an environment, like many rural migrants, they show many of the same characteristics as the city born and reared. In other words, the lower criminality of the rural people or the higher criminality of the urbanites is not so much a matter of inherent corruption of the latter and inherent virtue of the former, but a result of the circumstances amidst which these rural and urban groups are born and reared. While stressing this, it is necessary, at the same time, to stress that the urban environment has several "crime-breeding" characteristics which are disquieting and menacing. The principal of them are mentioned above. If we are going to fight crime, in some way we must either change these characteristics or reinforce the agencies which may counterbalance the criminological effects of these urban factors. This is not an indictment of city people, or of the urban environment, as a whole, but of specific components of the environment, as discussed above.

In the above discussion regarding the high rate of criminality in the cities, we understand the rates according to either the residence of the criminals or the place of the perpetration, and not according to the place of birth of the offenders. In so far as the rates of criminality of the urban and rural populations, according to the places of birth of the offenders, are concerned, we can only say that, on the basis of some of the above data, the difference in the rates on this basis seems to be lower than on the basis of the residence or place of crime perpetration. We are not certain whether this difference exists everywhere. The scarcity of the data do not permit any definite conclusions about this. On the other hand, there are still fewer reasons to think that, according to the place of birth of the offenders, the rate of the rural parts is higher than that of the urban population. Such an assumption is not based on any date even remotely satisfactory.

Further, the above data have shown that a part of the migrants from the country to the city become criminals and offenders in the city. It would be interesting to find out as to whether this part gives a greater or equal or smaller per cent among all urban criminals than the proportion of the rural migrants makes of the city population

(standardized by age-groups). Unfortunately the data are lacking. For this reason the problem remains open.

Finally, how shall we explain the fact that a part of the rural migrants to the city become criminals? Is it due to the fact that these migrants already inherently were would-be criminals and would become such if they remained in the country? Or shall we think that the city environment is somewhat responsible for their "criminalization"? This question also cannot be answered certainly. However, it seems to be reasonable to ascribe a greater importance to city environment in such a criminalization of the migrants, and the prostitutionalization of the country girls. As yet, we do not possess any evidence that these migrants were destined by heredity to become criminals or prostitutes. All such attempts have not yielded anything valid. On the other hand, it is rather comprehensible that a part of such migrants, who happened to be unluckily situated in the city or were relatively weaker in the integrity of their personality, would succumb in the criminalizing environment of the city, the same as city influences make criminals out of the city born. From this standpoint it is very likely that if all had remained in the country, a part of them would have scarcely become delinquents or prostitutes. But these conjectures are only guesses. They may and may not be true. It is up to future studies to solve the problem.

General Summary. 1. In spite of the lack in the country of many anti-criminal agencies, and moralizing and socializing institutions which exist in the city, on the whole, rural or agricultural criminality, according to the residence of the offenders or the place of perpetration, is somewhat lower than that of the urban population, as a whole, or those of the majority of the large occupational classes with the exception of the professional and official groups. 2. This means, that from the moral and social standpoint, the rural population or agricultural class can compete successfully with the urban population. Socially it is sound and morally it is a law-abiding class. 3. Various classes of the city population show an enormous difference in criminality. 4. These general results do not prevent the existence of great variability in comparative rates of criminality of separate rural and urban districts. 5. There is no valid reason to think that morally, the urban population is better than the rural population. 6. The somewhat greater urban criminality is due to a series of specific urban conditions. Among them especially important parts are played by the greater instability of the city family, the greater heterogeneity and mobility of the city population, the greater number of contacts of the city dwellers, and by other secondary factors which have been the satellites of the city agglomerations.

CHAPTER XVII

THE RÔLE OF THE CITY AND THE COUNTRY IN INNOVATION, DISRUPTION, AND PRESERVATION OF THE NATIONAL CULTURE.

Fundamental Principles. If we take the whole culture of a given society or nation from the standpoint of the city and the country, it may be divided into two principal parts: *the first part is composed out of cultural phenomena* (instruments and technique of production, types of dwellings, roads, transportation, forms and fashions of clothing, kinds of food and meals, various customs, language, mores, manners, ceremonies, forms of arts, songs, music, poetry, dances, forms of beliefs, convictions, social and political institutions, juridical and moral rules, marriage and family, in brief, all the material and mental culture) *which are common to the city and the country;* the second part is composed out of phenomena which *are specific either for the city or the country* and which do not spread much from the city to the country or vice versa. These specific elements originate and die in one or the other of these areas. The first part of the cultural phenomena which is common to the city and the country may be styled as *the national culture* of a given society in the sense that it is common to the whole society, to its urban and its rural parts.

If at two given moments separated, say by thirty-five years, we make an imaginary cross-section of this national part of the culture both in the city and the country we probably would find the following difference in its rural and urban sections: the rural national culture would be composed in the second period, in a great proportion, out of some of the components which appeared and existed in the city culture of the first period; while urban culture, at any given moment, would contain a greater proportion of "modern" cultural phenomena which, as yet, had not become a possession of the rural parts and only later on (providing they are destined to be the components of the national culture) would spread over the rural part of the country and become components of the total national culture. This means that in the dynamics of cultural phenomena, whether they are good or bad, there always exists a powerful stream flowing from the city to the country. For diffusion over the country some time is necessary; for this reason, there exists a cultural lag of the country in regard to the city. It is probable that a somewhat similar stream also exists from

the country to the city (something originates in the country and, later on, spreads over the urban part). Correspondingly, there is also a lag of the city-culture in regard to that of the rural parts. But this "from the country to the city" cultural stream seems to be considerably weaker than the opposite one from the city to the country. Correspondingly, the lag of country culture in regard to that of the city seems to be much more conspicuous than the lag of the opposite character. This explains the above proposition of the presence in rural culture of a greater proportion of the "older" components of national culture and in the urban, the "modern elements" of national culture. In addition, each "culture" would contain elements which never enter national culture but are "specific."

The same proposition, put in a little different form, says that *the cities are, in a greater degree, the centers of the invention of new or modification of the old cultural phenomena than the country.* A more intensive stream of inventions in the cities results in a quicker rate of cultural change there than in the rural parts; and, consequently, in the lag of the country behind the city. A rough corroboration of this is given by the number of prominent men produced or residing in the city and the country as analyzed before: we have seen that the proportion of the prominent men born in the city, in relation to a definite number of population, is greater than in the country. As "prominence" means practically some notable contribution to culture, some discovery or invention, the greater fertility of the city in the production of prominent men means its greater inventiveness in comparison with the country.[1]

Such appear as the important differences between rural and urban characteristics of national culture of a given society at a given time, regardless to the concrete forms of that given national culture.

This generalization is a deduction from the facts that social interaction in the city is more complex, extensive, intensive, and diversified; that the city population is more heterogeneous biologically, socially, and psychologically; that social mobility in the city is again more intensive; and that its upper and middle classes are highly selected groups.[2] As a result of these "variables," changes and modifications in cultural phenomena of the city proceed at a much quicker

[1] As has been shown above, this does not contradict at all the fact that the inventiveness and intelligence of the agricultural classes is in no way lower than that of the bulk of the urban population (its labor and clerical strata) because the greater inventiveness of the city is almost entirely due to a relatively small group (its upper and middle classes).

[2] This statement concerning the selection of the upper urban classes is intended to mean two things: it is selected from the lower classes and the rural classes; and social stratification and vertical mobility are greater in urban societies. These two do not necessarily mean "the best are leaving the country in a greater proportion." See the chapters on Migration.

rate than in the country; in the process of the quick stream of interaction of the most heterogeneous and mobile urban dwellers, existing material and psycho-social cultural values are incessantly modified and changed until they lose their character and are replaced by others very different and new. In the country, with its less extensive, less complex, and less diversified system of interaction; with its more homogeneous population, its lower mobility and with its geniuses incessantly attracted to the city,[3] "the mill" grinds much slower and less intensively and "the flour of cultural values" is ground and changed at a much less rate than in the "mills of urban interaction." Hence the above phenomena of the lagging in the country; and of its culture woven in a greater proportion out of the older elements of national culture.

The same reasons account for the greater inventiveness of the city. Every invention represents a combination of two or more ideas in the mind of an inventor. Since urban individuals are placed amidst a more complex, wide, diversified, and manysided stream of interaction, and are in contact with different individuals with different ideas, the chances for such a lucky combination of existing ideas into a new one are naturally greater in the city than in the country. The very complexity of city life and its fast change, again facilitates and stimulates inventiveness because complexity and changeability do not permit the population to keep its adaptation to such an environment without continuous new changes in behavior. The mode of behavior which fits previous conditions is unfit for the new: hence the necessity of ever new and newer modifications, alterations, and creations of new "responses," actions, and cultural values. The greater educational facilities of the city in comparison with the country (research, educational, political, and other) lead to the same results.

Finally, besides these environmental circumstances, the *selectivity of the urban upper classes must be considered.* It is generally believed that the outstanding country youth migrate to the city. A great many do, but as yet we do not know whether this is proportionately greater than the migrations of other "inferior" elements. As it will be shown in the chapters about migration it is improbable that the proportion of the country-born talented among the rural migrants to the city is greater than the proportion of other—non-talented—persons. Granting this, we must understand that, while the city takes these talented from the country, it does not give the city-born talented to the country. The result is a greater concentration of talented in the urban upper classes. The city upper classes drain the lower urban classes of their inborn talented; they also drain the migrants from the country of their talented; and they do not give to the coun-

[3] But not necessarily disproportionate to the lower elements who are also "selected."

try almost any of the city-born talented. These talented persons are concentrated in the urban upper classes, and by the nature of greater intensitiveness of urban life, are incited to produce new inventions. If they fail, down they go. This more rapid concentration of the talented in the upper classes in cities, and the more rapid removal of "waste" material, would explain some of the greater inventiveness in the two societies, regardless of the relative distribution of native abilities. Further, under the modern division of labor, many, if not most, of the talented who contribute to agriculture, and were born in the country, live in cities.[4] Such was largely true in other urban societies.[5] So much for an explanation of a more rapid change in, and the greater inventiveness of, the city.

The above means that, in the dynamics of cultural change, the city plays predominantly the rôle of an *innovator* while the country plays that of a *preserver* of existing national culture. As any radical innovation means a destruction of the existing value and its replacement by a new one, the innovating rôle of the city means also that it is a *disruptor* of the continuity of existing national culture, while the rural part is a factor in *prolongation, preservation, and the maintenance of the continuity of an existing national culture.* The former, in its "whirlwind" of intensive and manifold interaction, tends incessantly to reshape any cultural value and, in this sense, to melt into something new, good or bad, the existing "national physiognomy and national individuality of a given culture." The country tends to conserve and to preserve it. The soul of the city is the "modern," "fashion," and "the newest sensation"; the soul of the country is "tradition" and "customs of our forefathers."

Urban society, which has neither memory, nor ancestors, is ever glad to hear some new thing; but rural society has a long memory, and is so fully aware of grandfatherly usages that it can hardly forbear to respect them. The countryman's natural impulse is to do, for his good or ill, as his grandfather did, because (direct) knowledge of his grandfather's ways fills a large part of his mind. [6]

Such is the essence of this cultural difference and the basic factors in it.

A series of facts seems to confirm inductively this deductive proposition. In the chapter dealing with religious attitudes and beliefs,

[4] See Sorokin, P., Zimmerman, C., *et al.*, "Farmer Leaders," *Social Forces*, September, 1928, pp. 33 ff.

[5] Nisard, M., *Les Agronomes Latins*, Paris, 1877; Heitland, W. E., *Agricola*, 1921; and Diehl, Ch., *Byzance*, Paris, 1919. This problem is discussed all through these works, especially *Agricola*.

[6] Irvin, Helen D., *The Making of Rural Europe*, p. 169. Compare Le Play, F., *Œuvres complètes, passim*, in all six volumes.

arts, political attitudes, and others, it will be shown that exactly the above differences exist. What is true of the beliefs, is practically true of almost any other element of culture. If one wishes to know the old folksongs, fairy tales or legends, of his country, he cannot go for this purpose to a dweller of a big city; he must go to the remote and isolated rural parts. As a matter of fact, collections of such old cultural phenomena by the scholars in Russia, Germany, Scandinavia, America, and other countries have been made in the rural districts. The same is valid in regard to the technique of production. At any given moment, the old types of instruments or machinery of production are to be looked for, not in the city, but in the rural parts remote from the big cities. Sometimes the rural districts exhibit differences in the technique of production lagging by decades from the modern technique of a big city. If we wish to know the styles and fashions of dress of the older types, it is useless to look for them in the clothes worn by the people in a big city. Almost in all cities of Europe, America, Australia, Asia, and Africa clothes are essentially the same, internationally similar. Now make a trip throughout rural Europe. Passing from one region to another you will see a great difference in the clothes worn by the peasants of Normandie, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, White and Great Russia, and so on. The same, to a lesser degree, applies to the United States.

Modern home equipment (heating systems, running water, furniture, decorations, even the types of house architecture) are found not in the remotest agricultural parts, but in the cities. Old national ceremonies and customs of marriage, of funerals, of births, of holidays, and so on, continue to exist in isolated rural parts often decades after they were obliterated in the city population. Consider the forms of dancing, once prevalent in the American colonies. Where may one find traces of them to-day but in the "square dances," Virginia reels, and dancing games of the rural sections of the former colonies and states settled by these former colonists? Older national political and social institutions again often exist in the country many years, and decades, and even centuries after they were replaced in the city. The same is true of language, ideals, tastes, forms of arts, beliefs, and other components of the culture. Many intellectual streams, which to-day are dominating in the city, are unknown at all to the country people. Some of them, after some years or decades, will spread among the rural population and compose an element of its culture, even after they have ceased to exist in the city. Take even such movements as birth control, or newer systems of education, or divorce, or "secular and companionate marriage," or "Christian Science," or falling birth- and mortality-rates, or "theory of evolution," or "jazz," or "bobbing" or diffusion of automobiles and radios or some modern songs.

Tracing the origin, diffusion, and movement of the curves of these phenomena, one may see clearly how they appear in the city and spread there and, only after some time, they begin to spread over the rural parts, among farmers and peasants.

Although the proposition discussed has some exceptions, and since there is also an opposite stream of "innovation from the country to the city" (which, however, in the majority of the cases represents a renaissance in the city of old national values which existed before in the city and have been subsequently forgotten but preserved in the country and taken in a modified form again by the city), nevertheless, as a general rule, the proposition seems to be sound and is corroborated by quite a sufficient series of well-established facts. And it means also that, the stronger is the interaction between the city and the country, the less is to be the above difference in their respective cultural rôles, and *vice versa*. Improvements in means of transportation and communication, and increases of mutual migration between the city and the country, naturally tend to decrease the difference, to make the lag shorter and less conspicuous, and to obliterate the differences in the innovating and the preserving rôles of the urban and rural aggregates. From this standpoint, it is comprehensible that the difference discussed is much greater between the city and the rural parts in Russia than in America; and that in America it tends to decrease with an introduction of cars, radios, telephones, telegraphs, newspapers, magazines, and so on. The proposition discussed is a key for the understanding of the basic differences between the rural and urban culture of any given society at any given time. In subsequent analysis of special classes of cultural phenomena, it will be corroborated sufficiently well to make it certain. We shall begin with the rural-urban attitudes of Nationalism and Internationalism.

The National and International Elements of the Rural-Urban Culture and Attitudes. The above rôle of the country, particularly of the agricultural class, as a preserver of national culture, stands in close connection with the attitudes of nationalism and internationalism and patriotism. With a considerable degree of probability it seems possible to contend that the agricultural classes have a more developed attitude of nationalism, in the sense of a love of their own country or region, than the bulk of urban population. To put the same idea in a somewhat different form we may say that the city culture contains a greater portion of elements foreign to the national culture of a given country, than the culture of rural parts. The city is more "international" in its character, the country is more national; correspondingly the city is a factor in internationalization, cosmopolitanization, and denationalization to a greater degree than the country, which, on the contrary, is a factor of nationalization to a greater de-

gree than the city. Of course the city as well as the country performs, to some extent, either of these functions; but relatively the city performs inter-nationalization stronger than the country, and *vice versa.*

If the proposition possesses any validity, how may we explain the difference? It is due to the same factors which differentiate the city and the country—(a) greater heterogeneity of the city population and the cultural equipment of its members; (b) its greater mobility; (c) the more extended zone of the urban system of interaction with more different and heterogeneous peoples and complexes; and (d) the greater intensiveness and velocity of the interaction processes in the city. Since the city population is composed in a greater degree out of individuals with different religions, traditions, languages, mores, and attitudes; and since the city is in a more intensive contact with more numerous foreign countries; these explain why city culture is more international than the country culture. This heterogeneity also makes it impossible for the city to have a unanimity in all those cultural respects; it makes the *relativity* of their own cultural values clear for many urban individuals; it forces them to recognize the value of different cultural traits; all these result in a sense of relativity of the value of national culture traits and hinders faith in their exclusive superiority and infallibility. The intensive contact of city people with different peoples and individuals, within and outside of the city, leads to similar results: it facilitates an infiltration of foreign cultural traits into a given national culture and, through this, modifies and internationalizes it; it makes the population see and recognize that foreign cultural traits are sometimes as good as their own, sometimes even better; through these the exclusive belief in the superiority of a national culture is again weakened and the enthusiastic nationalist spirit is curbed. The much more intensive (territorial and vertical) mobility of the urbanites facilitates a similar result: since they move from place to place, and from country to country, they naturally become, in a degree, "infected" with various cultural traits of those foreign regions and countries, and lose some of their own cultural traits. And, as a result, they "import" into national culture the elements of foreign culture.

These almost self-evident considerations are sufficient to understand why the urban culture of any country is more "internationalistic" than the rural culture; why the city is, in a greater degree, a "melting pot" in which are thrown together cultural fragments taken from the most different peoples and countries; and why, finally, the people themselves in the cities, in regard to their national cultural values, are less "nationalistic" than the rural people. Rural classes are more homogeneous; contain a less number of foreigners and newcomers from regions with different cultural traits; farmers and peas-

ants interact with foreign countries and peoples in a much more limited extent than city people; their mobility is again much less than that of the urbanites; and the farmers often die in the place where they were born, rarely going out of the limits of their county or province. The bulk of their culture complex is what they received from their fathers and forefathers, that is, the national culture of the country. Infiltration of foreign and heterogeneous elements into it is incomparably less. The development of the sense of the relativity of their national culture has fewer chances for spreading. The social change of culture is also much slower, and permits the crystalization and existence for a longer time of the inherited cultural values. This facilitates the development of beliefs about the superiority and lack of infallibility of their national cultural values. It facilitates the development of an enthusiastic spirit of nationalism, not in the military sense, but in the outlined sense of belief in, and love of, their cultural values.

The same factors explain why rural classes have a greater development of patriotism in the sense a particular attachment and love for their own region or to their own country. *The places of birth and living for life become for them a part of their own personality, inseparable and inalienable from it.* All their life is interwoven with these "native" places and their elements.[7] Everything that happens to the region or the country bears a vital interest (beneficial or disastrous) to them because they are, so to speak, "chained" to the place by thousands of ties which they cannot break and, in this way, move to some other country. Interests of rural peoples and interest of their country or region are inseparably interwoven. This exceeding attachment to their own place is so great that often it hinders the peasants from keeping in mind the interests of the whole country if it is a large one with several regions. For these reasons it is natural to expect an attitude of deep attachment and love for the area or country—an attitude of patriotism. The slogan "My country," under such circumstances, has a real and profound meaning; it touches the deepest and the tenderest strings in the soul of such classes.

Quite different is the situation with the city people. A considerable part of them have come from foreign countries where they were born and reared. "My Country," for these, either does not have any particular meaning or has, at least, a "double meaning." It cannot recall great enthusiasm at the virtue of this duplicity. A considerable part of the city population are "globe-trotters": part of their time is spent in one, part in another, and part in a third country;

[7] See an excellent development of this by M. Lee in her *The Economic History of China*, p. 50.

at the virtue of this globe-trotting they are real internationalists, men without any particular attachment to any country. "My Country!" is, for them, an empty call, or "a stupid nationalist prejudice." Another part of the city people (native born) leave or plan to leave their country and go, for various reasons, to other countries. Finally, the bulk of the city population is generally more mobile and migratory. Under such circumstances "the country" is not saturated with their own and their forefathers' lives; their interests are not inseparably interwoven with the area of their habitat: if some misfortune befalls the area, they may easily shift to other areas or countries; they do not "invest" much of their personality in the place of their habitation; the most tender and significant events of their lives are not associated with a given place or area; and therefore the place, region, or country is disassociated from their personalities. Any area or country for them is only a kind of a hotel or temporary residence and not a home in which their forefathers lived and in which they are to live for life. Therefore the urban attitude in regard to the country is not the devotional love and attachment to a "Home, Sweet Home" but that of a traveler to an hotel. If the hotel is comfortable, he is willing to stay, at least temporarily; if it is not, he moves on. Emotional patriotism tends to be more and more replaced by "*Ubi bene ibi patria.*"

Such in a somewhat schematical and overdrawn form, is this difference and its factors. It exhibits itself in hundreds of facts. The analysis of political attitudes of the farmers (see the ch. Political Attitudes) shows that even in such countries as the United States, Switzerland, and some others, farmers are more opposed to the League of Nations than urban voters. The history of many wars, beginning with those of Ancient Rome, testify that farmer-soldiers have been particularly fiery in engagements with the enemy when its army has begun to menace their own region or province. Again various international movements, which tend to efface or obliterate patriotism and nationalism (Socialism, Communism, Revolutionary Syndicalism, Pacifism) have had the least success among the agricultural classes. Study the history of international organizations of various social classes, which, directly or indirectly, try to sacrifice "the national interests" in favor of the international organization of the whole class. While the city proletariat long ago has been united into international class organizations (the First, the Second, and the Third Internationals, International Labor Unions and so on) with slogans, "Proletarians of all countries unite yourselves," "Proletarians do not have any national country" and with direct or indirect intentions of disregarding national interests; while the urban entrepreneurs for a long time have united into various international unions,

(Corporations, Trusts, Banks, International business enterprizes, various Rotary and similar associations); the farmer-peasant class, up to the present moment, has not created anything similar to these international unions. Even now, when we see some attempts to create a "Green International," the attempts are still in their initial stage; and even at this stage, the programs stress explicitly nationalistic and patriotic motives,[8] are free from "internationalistic pacifism" and differ enormously, in this respect, from the programs of the proletarian and capitalistic international unions. No less significant is the curve of growth of various anti-nationalistic, anti-patriotic, pacifistic and similar movements: it rises hand in hand with the growth of cities. Again, various ultra-patriotic and nationalistic movements, whether it is the Ku-Klux Klan, Facismo, "Black Hundred," or the "Sacred National Union," in difference from "internationalistic organizations," generally find a lively response on the part of farmers and peasants. Turn to the immense field of cultural phenomena discussed in the preceding paragraph. A tendency to stick to "native" religions, languages, mores, customs, beliefs, forms of art, and other forms of national culture; and an intentional or unintentional resistance to the infiltration of elements of foreign culture and to replacement of the national by the latter, are also forms of nationalism and patriotism. In this respect, the rural classes are much more "immune" to foreign and international influences, and stick to their "native" culture much more stubbornly than the city.

These and numerous similar facts seem to well warrant the proposition. Finally, we shall take a series of phenomena which, on a big historical scale and especially clearly, manifest the urban-rural differences outlined in this chapter. Besides they show something important from the standpoint of continuity of a national culture, decay, and regeneration of a given nation.

The Rôle of the Agricultural Class in the Longevity of a National Culture. As in the preceding paragraphs, by national culture-complex is meant "a unique combination of many social and cultural characteristics which, in their totality, compose 'a socio-cultural face' of a society or give to it its social individuality." [9] In this sense we

[8] The Secretary of the International Agrarian Bureau, Dr. Charles Mečiř talking of International Unions of Peasants and Farmers puts the matter as follows: "International Union? There is the difficulty. Does not the very idea of internationalism contradict with the deepest sentiments of the peasants—their nationalism and individualism? We will never succeed to make peasants enter directly into any international organization. They have too deep a national sentiment, and we ourselves also,—to make it possible." Only as a Union of the National Peasant Unions (for mutual information and coördination)—no more and no less—is Agrarian Internationalism possible. This shows clearly the point discussed. Mečiř, Ch., *Le Bureau International Agraire in Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire*, 1926, IV, p. 27.

[9] Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, p. 536.

may talk and indeed, are talking, of the Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Chinese, Hindu, Russian, English, French, and American culture-complexes. A unique combination of various cultural elements (language, religion and beliefs, forms of art and literature, political and social organization, family and marriage, mores and customs, not to mention forms of economic organization) compose such a national culture-complex. As long as, in its essential parts, the combination continues to exist, and in all its changes, preserves its continuity and its sameness, national culture continues to exist, in spite of a change in some of its elements including even a loss of political independence. As soon as the unique combination disintegrates and loses its essential character, we say the national culture-complex of a society has decayed and has been put out from the scene of history into museums. When this happens, the history of a corresponding society as a historical unit is finished regardless of the survival of some elements of its national culture. This is exactly what we mean when we talk of the decay of Ancient Greece or Ancient Rome.

When one asks what are the factors in the long existence or decay of a given national culture-complex, the rôle of the agricultural classes and the above attitudes of nationalism and patriotism seem to play some part in these phenomena. If the preceding propositions are valid we should expect that, other conditions being equal, the longevity of a national culture-complex of predominantly agricultural societies, is somewhat greater and more capable of survival amidst various historical trials than those of predominantly urban societies. More than that. Even loss of political independence and the conquest of an agricultural society by another is capable of destroying its national culture-complex less successfully than that of an urban society. The rural societies have more chances of preserving the integrity of their national culture-complexes under foreign political subjugation and of continuing their history and, when a chance is given, of regaining their political independence than highly urbanized societies.

Whether this proposition is pleasant or unpleasant, it is a mere deduction from the previous propositions and from the basic conditions of the city and the country. Since agricultural classes are more secluded from foreign and international cultural influences; since their "net" of interaction is limited and rarely goes beyond the limited area; since they are less mobile; since, culturally, their members are more homogeneous; since the processes of social change are going on there more slowly than in the cities; since their culture is more national and their attitudes of nationalism and patriotism are stronger; because of these, they preserve the native forms of a culture-complex more efficiently amidst all forces which try to disrupt

them. In difference from the city, which is open to all those disrupting forces, and which at the virtue of its density, internationalism, mobility, heterogeneity, and so on, is liable to be ruled, influenced, and changed much more easily by a peaceful or a military invasion of foreign culture, the country, through its isolation and conditions mentioned, is much more protected from these disrupting forces, even when it is politically conquered.

Such in brief is an explanation of the proposition. Is it supported by historical induction? The answer is, yes! Take, on the one hand, the decay of such brilliant societies and their culture, as Ancient Greece and Rome. We know that this decay proceeded side by side with a growth of urbanization. Growth of the cities led more and more to the infiltration of foreign, particularly Eastern, cultural elements into the native culture (religion, beliefs, mores, manners, forms of art, and what not) of these countries. The cities became the hotbeds of these foreign cultural influences which, step by step, modified, obliterated and disintegrated more and more the unity of the Greek or Roman national culture-complexes. A reduction in relative numbers of the agricultural native classes, which even earlier were small, meant that the countries did not have a strong "agricultural reserve" in which the national culture should be stored and preserved. Under such conditions the blows of several invasions, and the conquests of the largest cities by foreigners, was sufficient to put an end to the continuity of these culture-complexes, and through that, to the history of these societies. It is certain, of course, that many elements of their national culture continued to exist later; they spread among many other civilized peoples and barbarians; nevertheless, these elements were only separate parts of the dismembered bodies of Greek and Roman national culture, and, as such, they could not and did not function as a continuity of the disrupted unique Greek or Roman culture-complexes. This is one side of the story. Turn now to another side.

Take in the first place China or various Hindu societies. We certainly know these countries have their own "national culture-complexes" very dissimilar from those of many other countries and very peculiar in many respects. We know also that their culture-complexes have existed for a long time, which is necessary to compute by thousands of years. We know also that these countries have had, during their long history, innumerable numbers of invasions and many times were subjugated and ruled by foreign rulers for centuries. One wave of conquerors after another swept over the countries, took the political power, and ruled, and, of course, tried to modify the native culture-complexes according to those of the conquerors. The very dynasties of these rural countries often have

been composed, in a considerable part, of foreign invaders. India is even now ruled by the British. And yet, in spite of all these vicissitudes, and invasions, and conquests, and other blows, their national culture-complexes still exist; these societies still continue their history; they are still on its scene; and it seems evident, that step by step, they are regaining their political independence and regenerating their culture.

If we ask ourselves, how and why this has been possible; and how and why Greece and Rome decayed, the plausible hypothesis is: China and India throughout their history have been, and even still are, predominantly agricultural countries with an insignificant urbanization which even now is very modest; while Rome and Greece, during the last few centuries of their history, were highly urbanized countries with an insignificant proportion of the native agricultural population, and even this population was living either in or in proximity to nearby cities. China and India, with their enormous agricultural populations, have had an "immense reservoir" wherein the national culture has been stored and which have been inaccessible to the influences of the foreign culture and the foreign conquerors. With all their measures, they have been able only to glide on the surface of this immense agricultural ocean, to make the population pay their duties and taxes, but never have been able to penetrate into the depth of its culture and to modify it. "Enormous empires and waves of the conquerors have passed by only on the surface of the Hindu culture, never being able to penetrate into its inner parts." [10] Isolation from foreign culture; weak or even negligible interaction with the outside heterogeneous world; an absence of many strangers amidst the agricultural classes; insignificant immobility which hindered them from contamination by foreign cultural influences; these and similar factors have permitted the cultures of these countries to exist for thousands of years, and to survive amidst some of the most crucial trials of history. Having preserved their national culture, through this they preserved their historical unity or their own history; when political conditions have been changed, the existence of their national culture have served as a basis for their political integration and for regaining their political independence. Such is the other side of the story discussed. Turn now from Asia to Europe. Ask yourselves, how it has been possible that, in spite of the conquest and domination of the Romans over Celtic Britain they did not affect, almost at all, the culture of Celtic Britain? The answer is that "Rome was outside the village system (of the Celtic Britain) altogether . . .

[10] Bouglé, C., "Remarques sur les régime des castes," *L'Année sociologique*, p. 55, 1900; see also Shirokogaroff, S. M., *Social Organization of the Manchus*, Royal Asiatic Society, extra Volume 3, Shanghai, 1924, for similar conclusions concerning China.

that it left the village communities of Celtic Britain like England would leave the village communities in India, untouched in their inner life." [11] Ask yourselves again, how it has been possible that in spite of the conquest and domination of the Tartars over Russia for centuries, the history of Russia was not ended; the Russian national culture-complex was not obliterated; and that after a few centuries the country regained its political independence from the Tartars? Ask why and how it was possible that conquest and domination during several centuries of the Turks over the Serbians, Bulgarians, and Greeks did not put an end to the history of these countries; did not efface, in spite of the most vigorous efforts of the Sultans, their language, religion, beliefs, traditions, mores, and cultures; and did not prevent their political regeneration, in spite of the centuries of domination? Ask the same question concerning the Czechs, who were under foreign domination for centuries, and who, in spite of the very high character of Teutonic culture, preserved their own culture and regained their political independence? Ask the same question concerning the Poles, the Finns, the Latvians or the Irish? Finally, go to Karpatian Russia, and look at a relatively small group of the Karpato-Russians, who for centuries were isolated from Russia and were ruled and dominated by Hungarians and Germans and Poles and Jews; and yet rigidly preserved a culture as it was several centuries ago. How again has this been possible? The secret of this miracle is indicated: it is that all those peoples have been predominantly agricultural. As in the case of China and India, being in their bulk peasants and farmers, they preserved and could preserve their national culture and through it their unity; and when political circumstances changed the existence of their national culture permitted them to establish or to restore their political unity. In the light of the above interpretation, it is possible to say that a loss of political independence for an agricultural society does not necessarily mean the end of its history or culture or even the impossibility of regaining its political autonomy. The opposite conclusion is rather more valid. Meanwhile, the loss of political independence of a highly urbanized society, as in the case of Rome and Greece, is a real danger for the continuity of its culture complex, the prolongation of its history, and for the possibility of restoring its political independence.

A more detailed analysis of the behavior of urban and rural classes under the conditions of political domination by foreign conquerors only reinforces the above analysis. Dr. A. van Genner has made such an analysis [12] and has come to the identical conclusions. He shows

[11] Gomme, G. L., *The Village Community*, p. 292.

[12] See a detailed analysis of the problem with a similar conclusion in Genner, van A., "Class rurale, noblesse et nationalité," *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, 1921, No. 2.

that when a society or country is conquered, the conquerors, their army and agents and followers, plant themselves in the central cities of the conquered society. By governing the cities, and through them the country, they exert their influence upon the city people, and the city culture. The country largely remains free from this influence with the exception of a few fiscal duties to be fulfilled and a few agents scattered around—too few to exert any serious influence on the rural people. Further, whether they like or not, the city group (the native nobility, merchants, and members of the commercial classes, artisans and "professionals") must be in contact with the invaders, and must comply with their desires because, on the contrary, they could not pursue successfully their business or occupation or keep and receive their privileges. This, step by step, leads them more and more to lose their previous national cultural traits, and more and more they become imbued with the traits of the dominating invaders; soon they begin to aspire sincerely for them, in order to be more prominent or successful. In this way the gulf between the foreign conquerors and the city groups becomes more and more obliterated and the previous culture is more and more effaced. And, as a result, sometimes in one, sometimes in a few generations, considerable proportions of the native urban nobility, native commercial men, and native professionals forget, at least in part, many cultural traits of their own country; are assimilated by the conquerors and become just a mere aristocracy of, and instruments for, the foreign conquerors and their cultural traits. Among the aristocracy, nobility, and officials of pre-war Germany, Austria, Russia, and Great Britain there were many families of Polish, Czech, Latvian, Irish, Georgian, and other extraction. In spite of their origin from those subjugated countries, they were to such an extent "Germanized," "Russianized," "Austrianized" or "Englandized" that they faithfully served the régimes of the conquerors of their countries, lost their "native" cultural traits, and served for the purpose of "Germanization," "Russification," "Austrianization," or "Britishizing" of their "native" countries no less enthusiastically than real Germans, Austrians, English, or Russians. [13] In this way, the national culture and the national movement itself and aspirations for restoring the political independence are being weakened in urban people.[14]

Isolation of the rural classes from the conquerors; the possibility

[13] See some interesting details in Genner's paper quoted.

[14] A similar situation may be observed in contemporary Russia. While a considerable proportion of the urban intelligentsia and previous aristocratic and commercial classes in Russia have been forced to coöperate with the Communist government (in a considerable part composed out of the non-Russians); and while the urban culture has been considerably "communized" by the government, the rural culture has remained almost untouched by it.

for them to manage their business without begging particular benevolences of the invaders; and a series of other conditions mentioned, permits them to stay out of any intensive influence of their culture, out of the direct effects of their denationalizing measures, and out of the circle of foreign agents, parasites, and flatterers. This explains why the rural classes are able to preserve national culture for a longer time; why they do not lose their native cultural traits as quickly as urbanites; why the memory and consciousness of their national and cultural differences from the invaders is not easily effaced; why their nationalism and desires for independence do not die in their breasts as rapidly as among a considerable number of urban groups; and finally, why favorable conditions being given, this preserved spark of national culture flares up into great national movements for cultural and political autonomy. The cities in such cases generally participate; but the spark which started the conflagration was by the country; and preservation of national culture, without which the political national movement itself is hardly possible, again is not so much a product of the city as of the country. This series of phenomena, being important in itself, at the same time, conspicuously supports the validity of generalizations discussed in this chapter.[15]

As it follows from the text, the differences discussed are not due to some inherent qualities of the urban and the rural populations, but to the basic environmental and social conditions of the city and the country. Parallel with an improvement in the means of communication, transportation, and interaction; with an increase of urban-rural mobility; with a diminution of rural isolation and seclusion, the differences should be more and more weakened. But as long as in these, and similar respects, rural-urban differences continue, the differences in the attitudes discussed and in the peculiarities of the rural-urban culture mentioned are likely to remain.

[15] When the fact of the predominant agricultural character of many of those countries is reckoned with and the above propositions are taken into consideration, perhaps it is comprehensible why Europe is marked by such intensive nationalistic movements and jealousies; why it is not easy to unite dozens of different nationalities in one political body; why the very "standardization" of culture of these nations is exceedingly difficult. Even in the United States, as some studies show, Americanization of immigrants who, in the form of clustering colonies settled as farmers, is much slower and more difficult than that of the immigrant who settled in the cities. This above principle also explains the provincialism of the "South" in the United States of America. No one topic receives greater discussion in North Carolina, than North Carolina itself. The same applies to other southern states.

CHAPTER XVIII

RURAL-URBAN RELIGIOUS CULTURE, BELIEFS, AND CONVICTIONS

Introductory Remarks. When one carefully reads volumes and papers devoted to a characterization of the religious life, attitudes, beliefs, and superstitions of farmers and peasants and to a comparison of them with those of the urban population, he is practically lost in a sea of the most divergent, often contradictory, always numerous, and somewhat unclear statements. Some assure us that farmers are more religious than urban people; some assert the opposite. Some ascribe a conspicuous mysticism, magical superstitions, paganism, animism, spiritualism, fatalism, dogmatism, and emotional religiosity to the agricultural class. Other writers stress, on the contrary, a realistic and practical character to the religious beliefs of peasants and farmers, and a lack of any mysticism, dogmatism, paganism, and so on. The puzzle of these divergent opinions is still more increased by the lack of any definition of such somewhat vague and manifolded terms as religion, mysticism, and so on.[1] In connection with this vagueness the very statements, such as "more and less religious," "more and less irreligious," "more and less mystical," and so on, become very indefinite, too. The attempts to set forth uniform differences in the character and contents of the beliefs and attitudes of the classes studied have not been very plausible. In the first place, beliefs, as such, are relatively too flexible to offer very permanent differences in their "rural" and "urban" characteristics. Further, their character in each given group of a population, is shaped strongly by various currents of religious and social thought and usually represents, at any given moment, an accumulation, mixture, and stratification (sometimes quite incongruous), of many different "periods" and "currents." Thus, no one can very successfully dissociate the mixture of religious attitudes and say "this is typically rural" and "that is typically urban."

Furthermore, a series of well-known facts shows that, in regard to the principal characteristics of religious beliefs, there has been scarcely

[1] See for instance Thomas and Znaniecki, *op. cit.* Vol. 1, pp. 207–232, 238, 287 and *passim;* Williams, J. M., *op., cit.,* chaps. xv, xvi; L'Houet, *op. cit.,* pp. 171 ff.; Sims, N. L. *op. cit.,* ch. xiv; Darling, M. L., *The Punjab Peasant,* ch. ix, London, 1925; Carli, F., *L'equilibrio delle nazione secondo la demographia applicata,* pp. 206–211, Bologna, 1919; Thompson, J. G., *op. cit.,* ch. xxi.; Wiese, L., *Das Dorf,* ch. vi.

any conspicuous difference between the agricultural and the urban populations. Christianity, Hinduism, Confucianism, Mohammedanism, Judaism, Buddhism, Tao-ism, and other world religions, have been shared by urban as well as by rural populations of the corresponding countries. There is no evidence that any of these religions have been predominantly urban or rural. The rites, theology, dogmas, and ideologies of these religious systems, in their essentials, have been the same in both classes of the population, with the exception, perhaps, of the urban intellectuals who usually have polished them much more than the bulk of the urban and rural peoples. The same may be said of "animism," "fetishism," "totemism," "monotheism," "polytheism," and other general traits of beliefs. It is hard to prove also that the religion of the rural population is more "emotional," or "fatalistic," or "superstitious," or even "mystical" than that of the urban population. In the past, for instance in Greece, the unemotional and epic "religion of Apollo" (in the terminology of Friedrich Nietzsche) and the emotional religion of Dionysus or Bacchus existed both within the rural and the urban populations. Epicurean and Stoic forms of religious attitudes were developed in Rome among both classes of the population. Medieval emotional religious epidemics—(be they epidemics of witchcraft or such as that of the dancing of Vit, or that of the Crusades), or various mystical religions and beliefs (whether of the type of Giacomo of Flora, Thomas à Kempis, St. Francis of Assisi, Master Eckart, and "the spirituals," or of the type of the Pierre de Bruys, Tanhelm, Catharists, Waldenses, Poor Brethren of Lyons, Patarini, or that of the type of the Spanish Mystics, St. Ignatius Loyola, Louis de Granada, Francisco de Osuna, St. Teresa, St. John of Cross, and others),[2] cannot be regarded as either predominantly urban or rural, according to the origin and rearing of their initiators, or according to the composition of the followers. The same seems to be true of the contemporary emotional and less emotional religions, revivals, and religious epidemics: their representatives and followers are found in the city and the country. As yet, we do not have any evidence which would show that there is a particular correlation of the emotional type of religious sect and rurality or urbanity.[3] In a similar way, it seems to be difficult to contend that rural people are for instance "more religious" than urban people (or

[2] See about these and similar mystical movements of the Middle Ages and earlier times in Angus, S., *The Mystery Religions and Christianity;* Peers, E. Alison, *Studies of the Spanish Mystics;* Guignebert, Charles, *Christianity,* pp. 275 ff.; Karsavin, L., *Studies of Religious Life in Italy of XIIth and XIIIth Centuries* (Russ.).

[3] One-sided ascription of a greater emotionality to rural religion, made by N. L. Sims, F. M. Davenport, partly W. Burr and Gill and Pinchot, is well counterbalanced by a series of facts collected by J. G. Thompson. See Sims, N. L., *op. cit.,* pp. 328–331; Davenport, F. M., *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals,* pp. 79 ff.; Thompson, J. G., *op. cit.,* pp. 516–524.

vice versa). Such statements are always somewhat vitiated by an ambiguity of the term "more and less religious." Suppose that rural people at the present moment are nearer to "fundamentalism" than to "modernism" or adhere to Christianity more than the urban population. Granting that such a fact is proved, for this reason alone we are not entitled to claim that they are more religious, because the deviation of urban people from "fundamentalism" or "Christianity" may only mean that they have shifted to other forms of religion than "fundamentalism" or "Christianity." This, objectively, would mean only a difference in religious beliefs and attitudes and not "more or less religious."

Thus we have to recognize that in regard to "the content-characteristics" of religious beliefs and attitudes, as yet, we do not have any valid evidence to claim the existence of uniform differences between the city and the country.

Does this mean that no relatively uniform differences are to be found in the religious culture of the two classes of population or between the agricultural and the non-agricultural groups? It does not. Some differences seem to have existed, but they must be looked for in a field other than that of the content-character of the religions. Let us try to formulate the principal types of these differences.

First Proposition. Since the beginning of a clear differentiation of the city from the country, each given urban population, compared with its corresponding hinterland, has contained a higher per cent of people affiliated with other than "the native" religion of the society, while the rural population has had a higher proportion of the people affiliated with "the native religion" of the area studied.

For the United States of America "the native religion" was the Protestant in its various denominations, because the first European settlers belonged to that type of Christianity. Hence, rural America is predominantly Protestant, while urban America has a considerably higher proportion of followers of other religions: Roman Catholics, Jews, Greek-Orthodox, not to mention Confucianism, Buddhism, Jainism, Mohammedanism, and other non-Christain religions.[4] The followers of these religions are concentrated predominantly in cities.

The following abbreviated table depicts the situation for the United States of America, 1916. Taking as 100, the total number of members of all religious denominations in each specified class of community,

[4] If in some states, like Louisiana, there is a considerable proportion of Roman Catholics in rural parts, the reason is that for such a state "the native" religion was, in considerable degree, Roman Catholic. Exceptions of this type only prove the rule.

we have the following religious composition of the cities and of communities below 25,000.

		N. Y. City	*Cities of 300,000 and More*	*100,000 to 300,000*	*50,000 to 100,000*	*Outside of Cities of 25,000 and Above*
	All denominations	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Among them:					
I. "Non-native" Religions	Roman Catholics	73.6	66.1	51.4	52.3	25.7
	Greek Orthodox	1.1	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.1
	Jewish	4.5	2.7	1.8	1.5	0.1
II. "Native Religions"	Baptists:					
	Northern	2.2	2.6	3.4	3.1	2.9
	Southern		0.3	2.6	1.8	9.4
	National		1.8	4.7	3.6	9.3
	Disciples of Christ		0.6	2.0	2.3	3.8
	Methodist-					
	Episcopal	2.4	4.2	6.0	6.5	10.8
	Southern		0.3	2.7	1.9	7.1 [5]
	Lutherans		2.1	0.8	1.1	2.0

The "foreign" religions are concentrated in the cities; and the "native" religions in the country. Further, while from 62 to 92 per cent of all members of various Baptist denominations, from 77 to 90 per cent of all the Methodists, from 60 to 86 per cent of all Lutherans, 83.1 per cent of all the Disciples of Christ, 64.3 of all members of the Congregational Church, 75.1 per cent of all the Evangelical Christians, are in the rural (below 25,000) communities; only 43.5 per cent of all the Roman Catholics, 15.8 per cent of all the members of the Eastern-Greek-Orthodox Church, and 9.3 per cent of all the members of the Jewish religion, are in those communities. The greater part of these latter religions are in the cities of 25,000 and more.[6] This shows the difference discussed clearly.

In *England and Wales* the "native" religion is the Established Church of England, plus some other Protestant denominations, while the Jewish and the Roman Catholic religions are "foreign." The proposition discussed is corroborated by the data of the distribution of these religions as shown by the statistics of the manner of solemnization of marriages. In each 1,000 marriages, in 1919, there were solemnized, according to the rites of the Established Church of Eng-

[5] *Department of Commerce,* Bureau of Census, *Religious Bodies,* 1916, Vol. I, pp. 121–122.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 121.

land, in London 565, in England and Wales 597; according to Roman Catholic rites, correspondingly 55 and 52; according to the Jewish rites correspondingly 26.5 and 5.0. Further, "Church of England marriages are relatively more frequent in the English rural counties." [7]

In *Poland* the "native" religion is Roman Catholic. According to the above proposition, we must expect more Roman Catholics in the rural parts of Poland. We must allow of course for those areas in Poland as a state which are neither Polish nor Roman Catholic ethnically and culturally. The expectation seems to be well warranted by the facts. While in the total population of the city of Warsaw only 63.8 per cent are Roman Catholic, in the whole Warsaw department the per cent is 85.4. Corresponding data for the city of Lodz and the department of Lodz are 53 and 77 per cents; for the city of Wilno, it is 59 and the province of Wilno 79.4.[8] In Berlin, Germany, per 1,000 persons, the number of Protestants in 1910 was 815.5, and in the Brandenburg Province 937.3; the numbers of Roman Catholics were correspondingly 117 and 53; the number of Jews 43.5 and 3.1; the number of persons of other religions 23.7 and 6.2.[9] In Sweden the per cent of the people affiliated with "the dissident" religions (other than the Swedish Church), namely, Roman Catholic, Jewish, and others was in 1920, 0.2 in rural parts, 0.7 in urban, and 1.1 per cent in Stockholm.[10]

Now turn to *India*. Take, for instance, the provinces of Madras and Bombay where the Hindu religion has been the native and the Christian religion is a relatively recent "non-native" religion. In the province of Madras the per cent of all professing the Hindu religion was for 1921, 88.64, but in the city of Madras the per cent was 81.1; the corresponding per cent for the province of Bombay was 76.58 and for the city of Bombay was 71.1. On the other hand, the per cent of the Christians in the specified provinces and their central cities was as follows: Bengal 0.31, Central City 3.3; Madras 3.22, Central City 8.3; and Bombay 1.37, Central City 5.9.[11]

In *Finland* the number of persons, per 1,000 population, of the non-native religion was in 1925 in the cities: Roman Catholics 1.1, Mohammedans 0.2, Israelites 3.8, and freethinkers 18.5; the rural districts contained such a small number of Roman Catholics, Mohammedans, and Israelites that the rate of 0.0 was applied whereas only 6.1 out of every 1,000 were freethinkers.[12]

[7] *Eighty-second Annual Report of the Registrar-General*, 1919, pp. xxvi-xxviii.
[8] *Annuaire Statistique Polonaise*, 1924, pp. 12–15.
[9] *Statist. Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1926, p. 5.
[10] *Statistisk Årsbok for Sverige*, 1926, p. 11.
[11] Computed from *Statistical Abstract for British India*, London, 1925, pp. 10–11, 14–15.
[12] *Annuaire Statistique de Finlande*, 1927, pp. 46 ff.

These data, which may be multiplied many times, support the proposition discussed and clarify its meaning. Generally, in a country or an area (with the exception of such areas which have been a "hodge-podge" of various religions), the rural population gives a higher per cent affiliated with the native types of religion than does the urban population. On the basis of this principle, one knowing "the native religion" of an area may predict the rural-urban difference. In many areas of Russia, the per cent of the people affiliated with the Greek Orthodox Church, and in Italy, Poland, and Ireland those affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church should be and is higher in the rural parts than in the urban. A few exceptions exist, but these are predominantly in the areas which, for a long time, have been places of mixture of several religions without a marked predominance of any. Before interpreting the circumstances responsible for this general situation, let us turn to a second proposition, somewhat connected with the first.

Second Proposition. A second general difference in religious culture-beliefs and attitudes of the city and the country population at any given moment is that the rapidity of change of beliefs and attitudes of the rural and urban classes vary. As shown for all types of culture, the totality of the urban and rural beliefs may be divided into two parts: *the beliefs which are common for the city and the country, and the beliefs which are specific only for the city or for the country population.* The first common category of beliefs may be styled as *national religious culture.* The second—*specific urban or specific rural.* These specific beliefs appear, develop, and die within the city or the country only, and do not spread much beyond their urban or rural areas. The subsequent proposition concerns only the national religious culture. The differences between the specific-urban and rural-beliefs are outlined in propositions three through five. In so far as such differences exist, they mean that the country, although it follows the city in religious beliefs, follows it *selectively and not blindly.* It does not take everything from the city with equal ease. Some of the religious novelties of the city are accepted at once by the country and diffuse there successfully; others, on the contrary, do not spread noticeably and widely over the country.

After this necessary explanation, we may formulate the second proposition as follows: As a rule, in the national religious beliefs, the change originates in the city and spreads to the country population only later. As a result, there almost always is a lag in the change of the religious beliefs of the rural population compared with the urban. While the attitudes and beliefs of the urban population have already deviated from the previously prevalent attitudes and beliefs, those are still vital or exist unchanged within the rural population.

Hence, a discrepancy between the attitudes and beliefs of the city and the country population exists, to some extent, at any given moment. In periods of "religious upheavals" the discrepancy is great; in periods of a relative immobility of religion it is slight and inconspicuous. If there are cases when the change originates within the rural population and later on spreads to the urban, the result is similar: an existence of a rural-urban discrepancy. Such is the second "formal" and relatively general and constant difference. Here are some representative facts to illustrate and corroborate the proposition.

We know that Christianity originated in the city and spread at the beginning within the lower classes of the city population. Later on, especially after the edict of Constantine the Great, it began to be accepted by the upper aristocratic and intellectual classes of the urban population of the Roman Empire. The class which resisted it most bitterly, which was last turned to Christianity, and which kept the old forms of the Roman religion longest, was the class of peasantry in the Empire. Speaking roughly, there was a lag of about one or two centuries between the conversion to Christianity of the urban and the rural population of the Roman Empire. This is one sample of the discrepancy discussed above.

The most stubborn resistance (to Christianity) comes from the country people, *the pagani*, through their attachment to highly specialized minor local deities and to ancient customs intrenched by superstition. Their uncouthness renders the evangelization of them a somewhat dangerous matter. The word *paganus* means a dweller in the country, *pagus*. It has now been demonstrated that the hostility of the peasantry to Christianity gave the meaning of "pagan" to *paganus*. This seems to date from the first half of the fourth century and it gradually becomes general in the second half. [13]

A similar phenomenon has happened many times. For instance, in the replacement of the Roman Catholic Orthodox religion by the ideologies and attitudes of "Epicureanism" during the period of the Renaissance in the cities and rural parts of Italy; in the diffusion of various forms of Protestantism in urban and rural parts of the corresponding countries; in the diffusion of the "atheistic and enlightened" attitudes of the Philosophy of the 18th century in France; in these and many similar processes the country religious attitudes lagged behind those of the city people and resulted in the existence of more or less discrepancies of the type outlined above. Something similar seems to have taken place in the origin and diffusion of Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and several other religious currents.

[13] Guignebert, Charles, *Christianity, Past and Present*, chaps. i–viii, pp. 175–176; De Labriole, P., *The History and Literature of Christianity*, pp. 1–3, 467 ff.

Finally, a series of well tested facts indicates a similar phenomenon in the present. First of all, take the case of Soviet Russia, with the atheistic propaganda of its government. The substitution of atheism and communistic materialism for Christianity originated in the Russian cities, has spread more in the cities, and only later on, after a lag of several years and with much less success, has it reached the peasants of Russia. Among many facts which testify to this, a recent investigation of the religious attitudes of the soldiers of the Leningrad regiments shows it especially clearly. The principal results of the study are, first, the highest per cent of the followers of the native Greek-Orthodox religion among the soldiers was the group of the peasant-soldiers (at least 60 per cent declared themselves as "believers" at the moment of entering the army). In the process of living in the Leningrad army and being subjected to atheistic propaganda, 32 per cent were carried away from their "Greek-Orthodoxy." [14]

In 1926–1927, 200 American newspapers, under the guidance of a special committee, made a religious poll throughout the United States, principally in the cities. A total of 125,000 answers to the questions were received. The results show the following percentages of believers in the principal dogmas of Christian Religion among all who replied, among the population of the sixteen largest cities and, finally, among the population of the City of New York.[15]

Percentages of "Yes" Votes

	Total	*Sixteen Chief Cities*	*N. Y. City*
Belief in God	91	89	73
" " Immortality	88	86	64
" " Prayer	88	84	63
Divinity of Jesus	85	82	61
Inspiration of Bible	85	81	57
Members of church	77	73	51
Church attendant	76	72	50
Children in religious school	72	69	53
Religion is a necessary element	87	86	74

The data show that the beliefs in these principal dogmas of Christianity are most undermined in the largest city, next in the sixteen chief cities, and, finally, in smaller cities mixed with the country districts. The less industrialized southern region gave the highest per cent of believers in comparison with other—more urbanized—regions. If the poll had separated the rural population from the urban, the difference probably would have been still greater. The present seems

[14] See *Antireligiosnik*, January, 1928 (Russ.).
[15] *Literary Digest*, January 15, 1927, pp. 30–31.

a period of deep transformation, if not of decay, of Christianity. The figures testify that the city leads in the process of this transformation, and as a result we see the discrepancy discussed above.

Statistics of several other countries indicate a similar phenomenon. In *Finland*, in 1925, per 1,000 of population the number of persons not affiliated with any of the existing religions was in the cities 18.5, in the rural parts 6.1 per cent.[16] In *Prussia* (1910) per 10,000 of population there were atheists, people without religion, and free-thinkers not affiliated with any religion, in Berlin 9.37, and in its suburban province of Brandenburg 8.31, while in the majority of other provinces of Prussia the quota was below 1. It was somewhat higher in the highly urbanized and industrialized provinces of Sachsen (2.88), Hessen-Nassau (2.59), and Rheinprovinz (5.24). But even in those provinces, it was far below the figure for Berlin and its neighboring area.[17] Thus here also the cities seem to lead in the present process of "dechristianizing" the population. For England and Wales we do not have direct figures of a similar type but as a substitute the statistics of the manner of solemnization of marriage with and without religious ceremony may serve to some extent. Marriage without any religious ceremonial is a rather strong evidence of the disattachment of the corresponding individuals from an affiliation with any established religion or of "free thinking." In each 1,000 marriages solemnized in 1919, the number of marriages without any religious ceremonial was for London 317, and for all England and Wales 231. In the rural areas the proportions of such marriages were lower than in the predominantly urban counties. Besides, the proportion of such "civil marriages" has been systematically increasing from 42 per 1,000 marriages in 1870 to 317 in 1919.[18]

The corresponding data for other countries are not available at present, but a series of very convincing facts seems to indicate that the discrepancy discussed and the lead of the cities in "dechristianizing" the population and in the increase of atheism or "irreligiosity" or more accurately the "emancipation from the existing religions" is reasonably certain for the majority of the Western countries.

The principal of these facts are as follows: With the progress of urbanization, the per cent of atheists or of people who declare themselves "irreligious," has been systematically increasing. There are all reasons to think that these people are predominantly among the

[16] *Annuaire Stat. de Finlande*, 1927, p. 46.
[17] *Statist. Jahrbuch für den Preussischen Staat, 1914*, p. 18.
[18] *Eighty-second Annual Report of the Registrar-General*, 1919, pp. xxv–xxviii.
It is interesting to note that up to 1897 the proportion of such marriages was lower in London than in the whole country. Since that year the situation has reversed and the discrepancy has been growing.

city populations.[19] Add to this the well-known fact that such classes of city population as the professionals, students, intellegentsia, on the one hand, and on the other the proletarians, give at the present moment a particularly high per cent of "atheists" or "people free from any historical religion." [20] Add to this the fact that various "atheistic organizations" exist and prosper in the cities. Further, various popular writers, with their sceptical and mocking attitudes in regard to historical religions and Christianity (H. G. Wells, G. B. Shaw, H. L. Mencken, Upton Sinclair, Sinclair Lewis, and so on), are again urban dwellers and from the city and through the city spread these attitudes throughout the country. Take into consideration, further, many ministers of various "Christian denominations" who in their sermons and ideologies, in spite of their professions of Christianity, have very little, if anything, from Christianity as it existed historically, and practically deny its fundamental dogmas. These are 99 per cent urban. Note such facts as advertisements of the necessity for attending churches as carrried in newspapers by the United Council of the Churches; or the building of hotels in which a small portion is given to the church and where the hotel business has to pay the church expenses (a fact evidently contradictory to the expulsion of the merchants and traders from the temple by Christ and to the essence of every religion—a mixture of the "sacred" and the "profane"); [21] these and similar facts scarcely leave any doubt as to the leading rôle of the cities in "the dechristianizing of the beliefs" at the present moment. The country is "lagging." As a result, there exists a discrepancy, as outlined in the second proposition. These facts are sufficient to make the proposition comprehensible. The figures given above indicate that the city population has a higher per cent of unbelievers in the fundamental dogmas of Christianity than the country population. The data stand in contradiction to the results of the Census of Religious Bodies in the United States, as they are interpreted by some of the writers. The principal argument in favor of the higher religiosity of the city population is the per cent of church membership in the population of the cities 25,000 and over compared with that of the popu-

[19] See the *Annuaire International de Statistique*, 1916, pp. 152–157; 1920, pp. 94–95; Statistik Arbok för Norge, 1924, p. 20; *Year Book of the Union of S. Africa*, 1910–1924, p. 132.

[20] Dr. J. H. Leuba's study has shown that among American college students and professors from 40 to 60 per cent do not believe in God and Immortality. See Leuba, J. H., *The Belief in God and Immortality*, pp. 202–203, 212–216, 250–253 and chaps. vii–x; Sorokin, P., *Sistema Soziologii*, Vol. II, pp. 200 ff.; *Social Mobility*, pp. 402–413; a series of volumes: *Auslese und Anpassung der Arbeiterschaft*, published in the *Schriften der Vereins für Sozialpolitik;* Hermes, Gertrud, *Die Geistige Gestalt des Marxistischen Arbeiters.*

[21] See Durkheim, *E., Elementary Forms of Religious Life, passim.*

lation outside of above cities. Let us examine the data. They are as follows (1916):

PER CENT OF CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE POPULATION OF THE CITIES OF 25,000 AND OVER, AND IN THE REMAINING (OUTSIDE OF THESE CITIES) [22]

	Cities 25,000 and Over (All)	*100,000 and Over*	*100,000 to 300,000*	*50,000 to 100,000*	*25,000 to 50,000*	*Outside of the Cities 25,000 and Over*
Per cent of population of specified communities in the total population of the U. S.	32.7	17.2	6.0	4.9	4.6	67.3
Per cent of members of all churches in the specified communities to the total number of all members	36.5	18.3	6.6	6.0	5.6	63.5
Per cent of Sunday School scholars of each specified community in the total number of Sunday School scholars	25.7	10.6	5.1	4.9	5.1	74.3
Per cent of the value of church property of specified communities in the total value of all church property of the country	49.2	27.1	7.9	7.0	7.1	50.8

The figures show that the per cent of church membership in the cities is somewhat higher than that of the city population in the total population, while the per cent of the church membership outside of the cities is lower. May we say on this basis that the city population had higher church membership and religiosity? Such a conclusion would be fallacious: First, because mere membership is not a criteria of religiosity: we know that in the cities church membership is often a mere matter of a "social affair," maintaining of social relationships with desirable people or a mere refined "business-transaction." In the second place, the figures do not permit the claim of a higher church membership in cities because the per cent of Sunday School attendance and scholars (a form of church affiliation often more real and efficient than mere formal membership) is much higher in the country. If this is taken into consideration, then the country church affiliation is rather higher than that of the city. In the third place, even the figures of real adult membership, as such, do not entitle the claim. The point of importance is that the enrollment of members is quite different in various denominations. "The Roman-Catholic and Eastern Churches (note the churches which are predominantly

[22] *Religious Bodies*, Vol. I, p. 119.

urban), orthodox or independent, consider as members all persons, including infants, who have been baptized according to the rites of the church. The Baptist Church (and several other Protestant denominations which are predominantly rural) consider as members only those who, having formally applied for membership at an age when mature decision is possible, are then baptized and enrolled as members." [23] Thus, in the denominations which are predominantly urban, membership includes all the children and infants, while in the denominations which, like the Baptist, are predominantly rural, membership includes formally only adults and excludes children, though they may follow the religion of the adults and may be factually affiliated with the church no less than the children of the predominantly urban religions such as the Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, or Jewish. This mere fact of a different computation of membership by various, and particularly by the predominantly rural and predominantly urban denominations, is one of the causes of the seemingly higher church membership in the cities. If a corresponding correction is made, that is in both cases only the adults are included as members or children are included in both cases, then this excess of the city membership is likely to disappear. The Census says that it did not make any correction, but put the number of the members of each denomination on the basis of "its own report of members." [24] That the correction would annul the city excess may be judged from the following figures which show the per cent of the members of various denominations above and below 13 years of age. In predominantly urban denominations the per cent of members above 13 years of age is: Roman Catholic 72.6 to 75 (according to variety); Eastern-Orthodox Church 78 to 90; Jewish 83; in the predominantly rural churches the per cent of members aged 13 years and over is: Baptist denominations 98 to 100; Unitarians 100; Methodist 99.8; and Scandinavian 96 to 98.[25] Thus the denominations which are predominantly rural compute almost 100 per cent of the members at the age of 13 years and above and do not include children below 13 years. The denominations which are predominantly urban include a considerable per cent of the children. If these "nominal members" are excluded from the number of their members and the comparison is made on an equal basis for the denominations which are predominantly rural and urban, the above slight excess of the city membership would melt and disappear. It certainly disappears, if, further, the sex composition of the urban-rural population and the proportions of each sex in the church be considered. We know that the proportion of females is higher in the cities than in the country. Membership of the females in the church is also higher than for males. Member-

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 28. [24] *Ibid.*, p. 28. [25] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–37.

ship of all denominations in 1916 was composed of 43.9 per cent of males and 56.1 per cent of females.[26] This again tends to raise the rate of the city fictitiously. These considerations are sufficient to claim that *the data of the Religious Census do not show any excess of church membership in cities over that of rural districts.* When properly analyzed and interpreted, they show the opposite. When Sunday School pupils are included this conclusion becomes quite certain.

The results of other—local and fragmentary—surveys also give rather contradictory results—in some counties the rural rate is above [for instance, Boone county (Missouri), eight counties in Pennsylvania, Boone county, Indiana, and one township in Iowa], in some below the rate of church membership for the whole country. For this reason they do not permit a conclusion in favor of the excess of membership in the cities. In several such surveys, the criteria of membership have been very loose; moreover, the authors have not taken into consideration the above fact of the great difference in determining membership by the churches predominantly urban and predominantly rural. This is particularly important because of the excess of children in rural communities compared with the urban. In the computation of the total population, the children are included; in the computation of the church membership they are excluded. This leads, so to speak, to a double underestimation of rural church membership and to a double overestimation of the urban church membership. For these reasons it is impossible to accept as proved the contention of almost all texts in Rural Sociology that an excess of urban church membership is definitely proved. Only in regard to the wealth, it is certain that the urban churches are richer (see the above figures) and have a much higher share of the church property than the rural. But wealth is something quite different from church affiliation, attendance, or religiosity, as was authoritatively asserted by Jesus Christ himself.

Some investigators, especially religious workers, indicate as an evidence of the increase of religiosity in the contemporary population, an increase of the per cent of the total population of the United States in church membership. For 1890, the per cent was 34.9, for 1906, 40.9, for 1916, 41.1.[27] These figures, upon closer examination, in no way justify such a conclusion. The percentages for each of the above years are computed on a different basis. The per cents given for the years 1906 and 1916 are practically the same, in spite of the fact that in the computation of the members of the Roman Catholic Church for 1906 the actual number was cut down 15 per cent by the census while in 1916 such was not done. This difference in the computation is sufficient to make a surplus of 0.2 per cent for 1916 quite

[26] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 40–41. [27] *Census of Religious Bodies*, Vol. I, pp. 24–30.

fictitious. Take into consideration, further, a falling birth-rate, and as a result, a relative decrease of the younger age-groups in the total population of the United States. Since this population, from the standpoint of its age composition, has been becoming "older"; and since the younger age-groups are not admitted into the membership of many religions, then this very fact automatically tends to increase the per cent of the church membership in the total population. (In the same way that it tends to increase "the life expectation" of the population in statistical tables.) Note further that between 1906 and 1916 "the gain" in membership was much less than in the period from 1890 to 1906. These and similar considerations show that these figures may not be used as an evidence of an increase of religiosity or even church membership within the present population of the United States.

For these reasons we are entitled to think that the data of neither the Religious Census nor of local surveys contradict the conclusions and data which tend to show that the cities at the present moment are more "dechristianized" in regard to the fundamental dogmas and characteristics of the Christian religion than the rural population. The cities lead, in this respect, and the country is still somewhat behind.

Further proofs that this theory of greater church membership in cities is wrong are furnished by the study of Fry in Vermont. He found in Windsor county that the Protestant population had increased 11 per cent in the 33 years prior to 1920 and the Protestant church population 14 per cent. But the closer analysis showed that the *village population had increased faster than church membership and the open country population had declined more rapidly than church membership.* That is, open country population declined 30 per cent and church membership only 27 per cent. In the villages, population grew 34 per cent and church membership only 29 per cent.[28] Further, the contributions per individual member, without allowing for the fact that more of the members of each family were church members in the open country, and that the families in the open country were probably larger, were *relatively greater in the open country, compared with the village churches,* at the end of the period.[29] The same study also shows that the correlation between church attendance and density is positive up to 40–50 to the square mile, after which it becomes negative. This latter study is based upon 32 typical rural counties scattered over the United States.

Further data from the Studies of the Institute of Social and Religious Research [30] are given by Fry in the above-mentioned volume.

[28] See Fry, C. L., *Diagnosing the Rural Church,* p. 201.
[29] *Ibid.,* p. 205.
[30] Edited by E. de S. Brunner.

A 1920 study in Hardin county, Ohio, showed the following proportions of church members among the classes of the gainfully employed in Forest, Ohio: Unskilled 32 per cent; Skilled and semi-skilled 45; Business and professional 58; Farmers 65. Fry summarizes his study, in this respect, as follows: "This seems to prove that the interest of the people in the church is far more uniform throughout the rural areas of the church than has generally been believed."

Another study by the same Institute gives data as to the average per capita contributions in open country, village, town, and city churches. The village and town churches (still rural in nature) showed increases over the open-country churches, but the city (eight urban churches) showed less per capita contributions than the town.[31] Still another study shows that this decline in per capita contributions per church member with urbanization begins with the change from villages to towns.[32] This latter study also shows church membership increasing faster than population in these rural counties.[33] Opposite results are given for a larger study but this is attributed by the authors to the lack of churches in open-country areas.[34]

Interpretation of the First and the Second Propositions. Greater homogeneity and lower mobility of the rural aggregates (see Ch. III) are sufficient to explain the difference outlined in the two propositions regarding religious behavior. Since the population of rural communities is more homogeneous, this means also that there is a less variety of religions, and the young are imbued with the religious ideas and attitudes traditional for the specific community to a greater extent than the young of the cities. The greater variety of religions in cities furnishes a greater chance for shifting from one religion to another, and particularly from a traditional to a new one. Further, since urban populations in a greater proportion are composed out of more numerous and various immigrants, who often have religious different from that of the country of immigration, leads to the same result: to lower proportions affiliated with the "native" religion in cities compared with the same proportions in the rural parts. Add to this, the factor of a greater urban mobility. It naturally facilitates a greater and faster rhythm of change of the social processes in the city (including religious attitudes and ideas) than in the less mobile rural population. At the virtue of greater urban mobility, the system of interaction of the city man is wider, contacts are more numerous, more heterogeneous, and bring an urbanite into contact with very

[31] See Belknap, H. O., *The Church and the Changing Frontier*, p. 139.
[32] See Brunner, E. de S. and Mary V., *Irrigation and Religion*, p. 52.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 45.
[34] See Morse, H. N., and Brunner, E. de S., *The Town and Country Church in the United States*, Doran, 1923, pp. 42, 85 and elsewhere.

different religious ideas and beliefs. This leads to a less stability of the native forms of religion, calls forth a quicker change of ideas and attitudes, and facilitates new combinations of religious ideas and the creation of new forms of religion. All this results in a faster velocity of the process of religious change in the city and leads to a lagging of the rural parts. These factors, without involving others, are quite sufficient for a satisfactory explanation of the differences discussed.

Further proofs of this may be given from the St. Louis and Springfield (Mass.) surveys by the Institute of Social and Religious Research. First, it was found that Protestants living in Roman Catholic districts attend church less and, in strong Protestant districts, more than the average.[35] Second, the causes of failure of the city churches were most often found to be the mobility of the population.[36] Such failures leave the population open to new religions ideologies and to proselyting by non-native churches. Third, the migration to the cities (territorial mobility) was associated with dis-religionizing of the population in that native-born white population grew faster than Protestant church membership.[37] These are samples of the types of evidence furnished in these careful studies.

Third Proposition. The preceding two propositions describe, so to speak, the urban-rural differences in the distribution of religion, regardless of its nature. This and the following propositions attempt to indicate some differences in the characteristics of the religious beliefs and attitudes of the classes of the population under study. It is understood that, in this field, an investigator is practically "in a sea" of "delicate" and "elusive" differences, and any conclusions have many exceptions. At the best, we are making a very approximate attempt to give some typical characteristics which are not entirely fictitious.

Whatever may be the concrete forms of religious beliefs, attitudes, and ceremonies of the city and the country populations, including even cases where they are identical in essence (for instance Christianity of the same denomination, with similar dogmas, attitudes and beliefs and rites), nevertheless, there always seem to exist differences "in coloring" of these attitudes, beliefs, and ceremonies in the populations studied. The agricultural "colors" them in a way considerably different from the city population. The nature of the occupation, the occupational environment, and the general environment of the city and the country stamp the religious beliefs and practices with different stigmata and "color." Concrete forms of this difference are numerous and various and are impossible of description in general

[35] Douglass, H. Paul, *The Springfield Church Survey*, pp. 274 ff.
[36] Douglass, H. Paul, *The St. Louis Church Survey*, Chaps. III and IV.
[37] See *The Springfield Survey*, p. 94, and *The St. Louis Survey*, p. 207.

formulas. However, in each given case, they may be detected and put within the general formula of the third proposition. Here are a few examples from the present time. The time of the harvest and its completion is the time which, in the life of the agricultural class has an enormous importance. Hence, whether in the form of a "Thanksgiving" day, or in some other, it is always marked in the religion and ceremonies of the agricultural population.

"It is a day of worship in celebration of harvest." "Easter is another holy day of similar origin. The renewal of plant life and the germination of seeds that gave rise to it led to appropriate religious rites." [38]

Generally "the beginning and the end of the harvest, storing and threshing the crops, grinding the grain, milking the cow, taking eggs from the hen, shearing the sheep, collecting honey and wax, spinning, weaving, the sowing, the cutting of lumber and collecting of firewood, the building of the house, the preparation and eating of the food—all the acts involving a consumption of natural products were or are still accompanied by religious ceremonies, thanksgivings, blessings, and expiatory actions." [39]

This, with corresponding variations, may be said of agricultural populations of many countries. There is no agricultural work which was not followed by corresponding rites, ceremonies, sacrifices, and other religious performances.[40] In the year-round activity of the city population, many of these periods (seeding, harvest, etc.) and activities do not exist. For this reason, the corresponding celebrations and religious festivals either do not take place or, if they exist, are only "survivals" from the agricultural period. As such they have a considerably different meaning than that given to them by the agricultural population.

Take further the character of representation of various Saints by the city and the country population. St. George is a saint for the urban and the rural population. But while for the city population in Russia, he is only a Christian martyr, for the peasant population he is "a protector of the horses and cattle." For this reason on St. George's day they bring the horses and cattle to the church and make the priest perform special services and asperse the animals with holy water. Similar differences are to be found in the representation of St. Nicholas by urban and peasant classes. In the picturing of him by the peasants, his image is "colored" in such a way that St. Nicho-

[38] Sims, N. L., *op. cit.*, p. 326.

[39] Thomas and Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 221.

[40] *The Sacred Books of the East* are full of the Rites, Hymns, and Ceremonies relating to agriculture. See for instance the following volumes of these books: III, pp. 371–374; XXIX, p. 98; XXX, pp. 113–114; XCII, p. 486; VII, 191 ff.; XCIV, pp. 431–432, and *passim*.

las is conspicuously "peasantized." A similar "coloration" is given to the peasants' representation of "God," "St. Mary," "Paradise," "Hell," and so on. It does not consist, as some state, in that the religious beliefs of the agricultural class are more superstitious than those of the city (in this respect there is no valid evidence), but in that the beliefs are "colored" with the traits and characteristics taken from the agricultural environment and the agricultural life-activity. These are different from those of the city and of city life.

As has been said, the forms of this "coloration" are different in various countries and at various periods. But in every country and at any period there exists a considerable difference in the formal "coloration" of the same religious beliefs, rites, and ideas by the city and the country population of the same "cultural area." The religions are formally "the same," but, in fact, the colorations are noticeably different.

More than that. With a reasonable degree of certainty it is possible to claim that the religious beliefs, rites, images, and dogmas originated by the ancient or relatively modern agricultural classes are "agricultural" in their very nature and, as such, are different from those of the city population. Agricultural gods or spirits, have been, in essence, personified agricultural plants and animals. The life-history of these gods and complicated spirits reflect the important processes of vegetation and other phenomena connected with cultivation. Rites of such agricultural religions, in their bulk, are ceremonies which mark, reflect, and pertain to stages of agricultural work (plowing, sowing, harvesting, threshing, and so on). As a sample of this, one may see the history of the origin, forms, and variations of the "Spirits of Corn and of the Wild," the ceremonies connected with such beliefs and the deification of the Spirits of Corn among various (ancient and modern) agricultural peoples. J. G. Frazer's classical study has shown, first, that the principal deities of agricultural peoples have been nothing but a "personification of cultivated plants," particularly corn. "The vine-god Dionysius and the corn-goddess Persephone, with her mother and duplicate Demeter among the Greeks; Osiris and Isis of ancient Egypt; Tammuz of Babylon; Adonis of Syria and other countries; and Attis of the Phrygians, were nothing but Corn-Gods. The spirits of the Corn-mother and the Corn-maiden in Northern Europe, in all their rich variety, are but the same corn-gods." In brief, the *spirits and images of gods created by agricultural peoples, ancient and relatively modern, are nothing but personification of corn, the vine, and other plants or animals important in agriculture.* Second, the characteristics of these gods *are again nothing but a somewhat fanciful reflection of the characteristics of the plants and animals they represent.* The life-histories of the gods,

their birth, growth, death, dismemberment, and resurrection is a bizarre symbolization of the change of the seasons, the rhythm of the yearly decay and revival of life (particularly of vegetable life), and the rhythm of the seasonal agricultural activities. Finally, thousands of rites of these agricultural peoples (so rich in their variety and so numerous) show quite conspicuously the agricultural character and coloration of the religious beliefs and rites created and spread among the agricultural peoples. As illustrations we cite the rites of "eating the god" in the form of a sacramental eating of new corn or of other agricultural plants or animals; that of a sacramental sacrifice of the first fruit or corn to the gods; the rites of killing the corn-spirit or divine animal; the rites of propitiation of vermin and enemies of crops; even of the sacrifice of human beings for the crops; the rites of "crying the neck" and "cutting the neck" at harvest, in the past and in the present; the rites of the Yule Boar; and of Plough Monday.

"These beliefs and rites still practised by the peasantry at opposite ends of Europe, no doubt date from an extremely early age in the history of agriculture. They are probably far older than Christianity, older even than highly developed forms of Greek religion." And in spite of this, in modified forms they still are alive "in the cottages of the peasantry, to come forth on sunshine holidays and parade, with a simple but expressive pageantry, among a gazing crowd of rustics at the very moment of the year when their help is most wanted by the husbandman." As such they are more long-living than many developed and refined forms of beliefs and rites created by urban populations.

"Thus it happens that, while the fine flower of the religious consciousness in myth, ritual, and art is fleeting and evanescent, its simpler forms are comparatively stable and permanent. It may be that the elaborate theologies, the solemn rites, the stately temples (created by urban civilizations) which now attract the reverence or the wonder of mankind, are destined themselves to pass away like 'all Olympus' faded hierarchy,' and that (agricultural) simple folk will still cherish the simple faiths of their nameless and dateless forefathers, when the muezzin shall have ceased to call the faithful to prayer from the minarets of St. Sophia, and when the worshippers shall gather no more in the long-drawn aisles of Nôtre Dame and under the dome of St. Peter's." [41]

[41] Frazer, J. G., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Vol. II, p. 335; see all the details, forms, variations, and developments of the statements made in this text throughout two volumes of this work and in Frazer's *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*. These volumes give rich material in support of the proposition discussed. See also Martinengo, Cesaresco, E., *The Place of Animals in Human Thought, passim;* Gubernatis, Angelo de, *La mythologie, des plantes*, 2 vols, *Mythologie zoölogique*, Smith, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 137 ff.; Porteaus, A., *Forest Folklore;* Bergen, Fanny D., *Animal and Plant Lore*, 1899, *passim;* Bergen, F. D., *Current Superstitions;* Roberts, Hilda, "Louisiana Superstitions," *Journal*

However it may be in the future, one thing is quite certain, namely: the religions created by the agricultural peoples have been "agricultural" in their very nature; and as long as the differences between the agricultural and the city population and environment remain, there exists and shall exist some different "coloration" of religious beliefs, ideas, rites, and other components of religious consciousness. If the city accepts the religious beliefs created by the rural people, it modifies them according to its "nature" ; if the rural people are converted to the religious system created by the city, they "change" and "color" it in their own "agricultural" manner. Only when the very differences between the city and the country disappear only then do the differences in "coloration" have a chance to cease existence.

Fourth Proposition. The next general difference between the total sum of religious representations and beliefs of urban and rural populations seems to be this: the rural religious ideas and images are more conspicuously marked by traits of "indeterminism" and nature (versus man-made culture) occupies a more conspicuous place in them than in the urban religious representations and beliefs; man and man-made culture occupy a greater place in urban religion, and the ideas themselves, especially at the present time, tend to be stamped more by the traits of "mechanisticism," "materialism," and "determinism." [42]

This difference is but a reflection of the differences in the whole environment and activities of rural and urban populations. As we have seen, the urban environment is much more "man-made" and the rural environment remains predominantly "God-made." Further, urban environment, especially the contemporary occupational environment of the bulk of the city population, is "a machine-environment"—"inorganic" (iron, steel, and stone), "mechanistic" and "material" *par excellence*. The operation and revolutions of machinery are computed up to fractions of a second or millimeter; they may be foreseen; its movements are strictly mechanistic: there is no animation, no fancy, no "will," even no spontaneous life, shown in the motions. The occupational work of the bulk of the city population, especially of factory workers, consists in a mere transformation, with machinery, of one "material substance" into another material. An urbanite is surrounded on all sides by "culture" but not by "nature."

of Amer. Folklore, pp. 144–209, 1927; Randolph Vance, "Folk Beliefs in the Ozark Mountains," *Ibid*, pp. 78–94, 1927; In these and other numerous studies of the folk-beliefs and superstitions—mostly of agricultural peoples—the characteristics discussed are quite conspicuous and clear. See also all volumes of *The Sacred Books of the East*, and the spirits and gods of the Earth, of Husbandry, of protectors of agriculture, given in the Zoroastrian, Hindu, Chinese, Buddhist, and other religions.

[42] Determinism is used here in the sense of antithesis to "free will."

The total environmental complex and occupational activity of the agricultural population is different. Nature surrounds an open farm or a rural village on all sides. Its phenomena (temperature, sun, winds, storms, rivers, lakes, animals, plants, and so on) are felt all the time and directly by farmers and peasants. These phenomena are out of man's control. They often are not predictable. The objects of farmers' and peasants' occupational activity are plants and animals, not dead and mechanistic, but alive and organic. The instruments of their work (horses, oxen, and other animals) are living organisms. The nature, the instruments, and the results of the work are much less "determined" and much less foreseen and computed in advance than the operations of machinery and the results of machinery work. In brief, while the urban environment and occupational activities are predominantly mechanistic, man-made, materialistic, and deterministic, rural environment and occupational activity have been, up to the present time, predominantly natural, organic, vitalistic, and undetermined by personal efforts. Such a fundamental difference must be reflected, to some extent, in the realm of rural and urban religious mentality. And indeed it is. Concrete forms of the difference are various and manifolded, according to the country and the period. But in each country and at each period, in this or that form, the difference has been existing and may be detected.

A. *Nature's Part in Rural and Urban Religious Representations.* In the preceding proposition, we have seen that in the religions created and spread among the agricultural peoples "machinery" and "culture" occupies very little, if any, room. Plants, animals, and their personifications and symbolizations, are the centers about and around which is woven a fanciful lace of religious magic, images, and rites, fairy tales, myths, and legends. Even now among peasantry and farmers, although not so conspicuously as in the past, the sacred and deified objects of reverence are again not engines, machinery, and rarely mechanical objects but, as a rule, this or that tree, stream, plant, animal, rain, wind, sun, or other "natural" objects. In the contemporary urban populations, the cases of a deification of similar objects and generally "natural objects" are exceedingly rare. And nature plays little part in the totality of the religious and magical beliefs of city people. For a considerable part of its population, particularly intellectuals and the proletariat, images of machinery and mechanisms, in the first place, and "man-made" objects of culture (pictures, statues, books, and objects of museums), in the second, tend to become the objects of half-magical reverence, deification, and adoration. "Weather-lore," or "nature-lore" are rural creations; "culture-lore" the urban product. This seems to be true not only in regard to religious mentality but in regard to poetry, songs, stories,

fairy tales, and other intellectual products of urban and rural society.[43]

B. As to mechanisticism, materialism, and determinism on the one hand, and organicism and animation on the other, the difference depicted above manifests itself in many and various forms. For the bulk of the rural population "natural objects are always animated, often conscious and even reasonable. . . . The animated and conscious thing seems to be a category of peasant logic and conceptual life in the same sense that the mere 'thing' or 'substance' is a category of scientific reasoning." [44] Whether in the form of the animation of nature and things or in the form of beliefs in an existence of various animated objects behind material things, the religious and "philosophical" ideologies of agricultural classes have lacked systems and conceptions of any rigid determinism, mechanisticism, and materialism. This is partly witnessed even by the fact that various systems of more or less rigid determinism, mechanisticism, and materialism have appeared in cities and at the stages of considerable urbanization in countries of the past as well as of the present. In the sources of thought of ancient Rural Societies, such as ancient India, Persia, Egypt, or China, it is hard to find any serious traces of these "urban" religious or philosophical systems and ideologies. Sources such as the fifty volumes of "The Sacred Books of the East" give various "animated" ideologies, be they Solypsism, Transcendental Idealism, Spiritism, Pantheism, Monotheism or Polytheism, Fetishism, Animism, Totemism, and what not, but they contain little if anything from "Determinism," "Materialism," "Mechanisticism," or even "Agnosticism." On the other hand, with the progress of urbanization in Greece, we see the appearance of the materialistic and deterministic philosophies of Democritus and Leucippus; the atheistic and mechanistic ideologies of thinkers like Lucian or Anaxagoras; or the materialistic and deterministic conceptions of Epicureanism and some of the sophists. In a similar way, only at the stage of high urban development in Rome, was the appearance and spread principally within urban population, of the materialistic and mechanistic conceptions of Lucretius or the Roman edition of Epicureanism, and mechanisticism. The disurbanization of the Roman Empire, after the third century A. D., put an end to these ideologies and called forth a diffusion of spiritualistic beliefs. They dominated until the thirteenth

[43] See *What Farm Women Think About Farm Life*, pp. 9, 10, 13 and *passim; The Farm Woman Answers the Questions*, pp. 10–11; *The Advantages of Farm Life*, p. 23, and *passim*.

[44] Thomas and Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, 208–209. Compare Williams, J. M. *op. cit.*, chap. v; L'Houet, A., pp. 90 ff.; Meissner, P., *Der Bauer in der Englischen Literature*, pp. 33, 54, 60, 69, 95, 149, 161–165 and *passim;* See also Bolte, Johannes, *Der Bauer im deutschen Liede;* Martinengo-Cesaresco, E., *Essays in the Study of Folk Songs; The Place of Animals in Human Thought;* Porteous, A., *op., cit.;* the works of Galpin, Bergen, Roberts, Randolph, Frazer, Gubernatis quoted.

century. By that time urbanization of Europe had made an enormous progress. Since that time we see again the reappearance and growth of various materialistic, mechanistic, deterministic, atheistic, and Epicurean ideologies. They were prominent at the time of the Renaissance and later. In the seventeenth century they assume the forms of the "Social Physics"—quite mechanistic and deterministic and to a considerable degree materialistic. Urbanized Europe began to move in that direction. The eighteenth and subsequent centuries exhibit the parallel growth of cities and this type of "beliefs" and philosophies more and more. They are set forth and fostered in the cities and are spread from them to the country people. At the present moment, under various forms and names—"scientific concepts," "materialism," "mechanisticism," "agnosticism," "atheism," "determinism," cheap "behaviorism," and so on, the process has gone so far that it is thought to be "unscientific" to admit "the animation" of nature, "indeterminism," "the existence of animated agents behind the phenomena," or "vitalism." Many scientists, literati, and members of the city proletariat, deny any "soul," or "anima" or "vital force" or "psychism" even in human beings themselves. They try to interpret man as a mere "complex of matter" or "entirely determined machinery" similar to any other machinery only a little more complex. In predominantly agricultural stages everything and the whole inanimate nature have been "animated," and the material substance itself has been "spiritualized" and "humanized." In the predominantly urban stages, the soul, the man, and the psychical experience itself have been "materialized" and "mechanized," and depicted as a mere variation of a mechanism and of material machinery.

Such is the contrast and such is the correlation of the change in religious beliefs and philosophies with ruralization and urbanization. The simplification of this correlation, given in the above pages, does not make the conclusion fallacious. The same contrast may be observed at the present time. In spite of the contamination of the rural population by these urban mechanistic concepts, the rural peoples still participate in them to a much less degree than the urban; and the traditional "spiritualistic, animistic, and indeterministic" beliefs are still preserved in a much more vigorous form than in the city. The hotbeds of materialism, agnosticism, mechanisticism, atheism, and determinism, are still the cities. Of course, the more the difference between the city and the country is obliterated, and the more the rural parts are urbanized, the less and less conspicuous the above difference will be.

Fifth Proposition. The next more or less constant and general difference in religious beliefs and convictions of the classes studied is

the greater rigidity and firmness in rural religious beliefs and greater amounts of scepticism and sophistication in the beliefs and convictions of urban peoples.

In its ideal typology, the beliefs of the farmer-peasant class, accepted as taught from tradition, are held, so to speak, without questioning, analysis, doubts, or sophistication. Since the individual is born and reared in a homogeneous religious atmosphere, where he is taught only one religion; and where he is out of contact with the influence of many opposite and mutually criticizing religious ideas and dogmas, he accepts the ideas as natural and valid. From day to day, and year to year he follows traditional rites and ideas and rarely has an opportunity to question their validity. He does not have any particular stimulus to examine, analyze, or to doubt his religion. In other words, he is reared in a domain of but one religion which is traditional for his community. As a result, he is firm in his beliefs. He is convinced of their righteousness. For this reason sometimes he is intolerant of other religions. In the city, the religious situation is considerably different. Cities are the centers of interaction of several, and often different, religions. The city man rarely may avoid this fact and the silent or open struggle and rivalry of various religious and philosophical systems. This rivalry leads to a mutual criticism; and the mutual criticism leads to a weakening of the sacredness and infallibility of each of the fighting religions. As a result, the city man is inculcated with the ideas of not one but of several religions; he is robbed of the infallible sacredness of his professed religion; he is shown its shortcomings by the rivals; he has an opportunity to see and, at the same time, to learn the positive traits of other beliefs; he often hears or reads the most radical criticism of all religious ideas; he witnesses the most sophisticated discussions of various theological dogmas; all this stimulates his doubts of the infallibility of his traditional religion. It calls forth his own thinking about religious ideas, and leads to analytical criticism. Under such circumstances, it becomes difficult to believe "naïvely" the complete righteousness of one set of ideas; religious relativism and syncretism become rather inevitable; criticism, scepticism, sophistication, and sometimes "freedom from any religion" have greater chances of development. Instead of the rural monopolistic, unsophisticated, and naïve, but quite firm, religious convictions, soft, critical, rationalized, syncretic, often mutually tolerant, and highly sophisticated ideologies begin to blossom in the city.

Thus the conditions of greater mobility and heterogeneity facilitate urban development of religious syncretism, criticism, relativity, scepticism, sophistication, and weakness of beliefs. The greater homogeneity and immobility of rural environment facilitates com-

paratively greater firmness, rigidity, powerful convictions, and the "naïve" character of the religious beliefs.[45]

The outlined difference is of course relative; the presentation somewhat overemphasizes the significance of the correlation; the difference varies according to the degree of contrast in the conditions of city-country homogeneity and mobility; nevertheless in its essential traits, the proposition indicates something corresponding to the reality. In the first place, the figures given in support of the first proposition indicate that the traditional, unsophisticated, and unsceptical forms of religion are more spread among rural than among urban populations. Those in support of the second proposition testify that atheistic and free-thinking ideologies are more spread among urban than among the rural population. Further, a rough historical induction seems to support this fifth theory. We need only to recall the wave of sophistication (sophists, like Gorgias and the Socratics), which appeared at the time of the great urbanization (fifth and fourth centuries), in Greece. A similar parallelism happened in Rome. During the earlier stages of Roman history none of the later rapidly multiplying currents of sceptical thought was heard of. At the end of the Republican period they appeared and grew rapidly. They disappeared, beginning with the third century and disurbanization, in the dogmas and beliefs of Christianity. Only after the end of the thirteenth century, when the urbanization of Europe developed again, did these currents of "liberalism and enlightenment" appear again. At the present moment the difference discussed is rather evident, as shown in the second and first propositions.

One of the chief criticisms and "enlightened scientific suggestions" of many of the rural sociologists and religious leaders of today is that the rural church is decaying because it is not "keeping step" with the progressive changes in urban churches and religions. But this is a matter of evaluation, into which the authors do not care to commit themselves. If the theories of this chapter are correct, the real menace to historical Christianity, once an urban (Roman) development, is this same urbanization of society. The "small" churches, "underpaid" ministers, "inadequate" organization of rural religious life is, from the standpoint of preservation of this historical Christianity, the greatest bulwark. Those who maintain otherwise, do so at the cost of leaving the world of science and entering the sphere of evaluation. Thus many urbanized rural sociologists conceive urban religions as "better." But that is a matter of, perhaps ill-founded, opinion.

[45] See a substantiation of these effects of mobility in Sorokin's *Social Mobility*, Ch. XXI.

The above five propositions seem to exhaust the principal constant and relatively certain differences in religions and religious ideologies between the agricultural and the bulk of the city population. A series of writers has tried to show numerous other differences, some of which were mentioned briefly at the beginning of this chapter. But they are too speculative, contradictory, and the statements are too poorly backed by proofs for us to accept them as even tentatively valid generalizations. Not wishing to enter the perilous sea of pure and unbridled speculation, we prefer to limit the enumeration of religious differences to the characteristics given. This limited number of relatively more valid generalizations have been statistically and historically verified and logically accounted for. In a science we may go no further.

CHAPTER XIX

POLITICAL CULTURE, ATTITUDES, AND BEHAVIOR OF RURAL GROUPS

Rural-Urban Participation in Voting. A study of a few phases of political activity of rural groups should give some insight into the prevailing mind and character of farmers and peasants and the changes which come through urbanization. Obviously, it is impossible to study all phases of this problem. We shall proceed and raise one problem at a time and try to establish some theories as to relative rural and urban differences. The first problem is to find if there be a correlation between urbanization and the percentages of the electors voting. Thompson has already discussed this problem, and after stating that there is much evidence on either side, finally leans to the conclusion that urbanization increases political activity. He is not specific as to the number voting.[1]

There are numerous theoretical reasons why rural populations should vote less and a few for the urban. Women are less free in rural families, and in days of universal suffrage, this would tend to hold down percentages voting in rural districts. Further, some person generally has to stay about the farm and watch the place. This duty may often be left to the women. In cities, both may leave the home much more easily. The distance is shorter and the number of children and cares of home life are less binding. Bad roads, distance, seasonal labor, unfavorable weather—all these tend to keep down rural voting. On the other hand, especially in America, the urban populations are often constituted of foreign born, where theoretically the women are less used to political activity. But this is cancelled somewhat by the fact that many of them are not eligible to vote—that is not electors. The same applies to migratory populations which are found in cities. However, fewer of these are registered voters. Other factors might be suggested. Stability in country districts is conductive to voting. This helps to overcome the natural handicaps of voting in rural districts. The rural dweller always knows where the polling place is to be found and generally knows the candidate personally. In cities one often does not know the polling place. Either it is moved or he has moved in the time prevailing since the last election. That requires reregistration, in many electoral districts. If the voter has moved he has to become acquainted with

[1] See Thompson, J. G., *Urbanization*, 1927, Chap. 14.

many new candidates and party bosses and the like. All this movement and mobility so taxes the attention of the individual that he cannot keep up with everything. Further, why should he care who is elected? Often he does not intend to stay in this ward or this part of the city or even this city, so it makes little difference to him. We may conclude that excessive mobility in city life is a factor tending to compensate for the greater natural handicaps of voting in the country.

Another factor is the fact that voting is a means of contact in the country. In cities contacts are often avoided but in many rural districts they are often sought. This leads many rural groups to vote more just as a matter of meeting friends and more social life.

Another is that, as a rule, more people in the rural districts are direct taxpayers so they are vitally interested in the elections. The differences in the distribution of property and the indirect means used for collecting many of the taxes in cities is a factor which makes voting less necessary for the urban individual.

Offsetting factors must also be considered. It is to be realized that popular voting is not used in all countries and only recently in others. Such new habits begin in cities and spread to rural districts. We should not expect rural people to take up these new habits as rapidly as city dwellers.

The final conclusion is that the gross amount of political activity is the product of a number of natural and social factors. Since these factors fluctuate extensively in both rural and urban districts, we find fluctuations of political activity correspondingly. The facts are that there appears no correlation between political activity and urbanization and the theories of Thompson and others to the contrary are of doubtful validity.

Thompson bases his conclusions as to the correlation between urbanization and interest in political activity primarily upon references to historical trends and the increase in voting. That is, increasing urbanization and increasing proportions voting are somewhat coincidental. But this does not establish a causal relationship. Urbanization and increased voting may both be partial results of increased communication. For the sake of fairness, we cannot give great validity to those types of proof. He says, "The extent of political activity manifested by the rural and by the urban population, respectively, at any given time or period in a given country, is a matter of more uncertainty." . . .[2] Later he gives statements to show greater percentages voting in the urban districts of Great Britain. But in London and the Metropolitan boroughs, however, the proportions were lowest of all. Very little difference was found

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 330.

for France in the election of 1919.[3] The same statement is applied to Germany. In Italy, the rural populations voted more in the election of 1919. In Spain, the contrary was true. On the basis of the results and data cited in this work, the conclusion that urbanization is associated with increased voting, may not be drawn.

Let us go further and study the results of actual elections in a few countries. In the general elections of *Belgium* for 1921, the proportion not voting varied from 7.5 per cent in communes of 1,000 to 12.6 in communes of 300,000 or more.[4] This shows less voting in the urban districts, in spite of the fact that uncontested seats were all in districts under 20,000 and 91 per cent in districts under 3,000. Results for *Sweden*, in the elections to general councils and electoral colleges between 1922 and 1927,[5] establish the opposite conclusion, and for both sexes. However, the differences were small. In the votes for local officials, the results show slight differences between the rural districts and the small cities. In 1926, the rural districts voted more frequently than the smaller cities. However, for both sexes and all years, the largest cities (seven largest of the kingdom) showed greater proportions voting.

Denmark[6] shows few rural urban differences, and these were primarily between rural districts and small cities. As in England, the large city populations vote less than those in smaller cities. This is opposite the results for Sweden. For *Norway*, in the elections for local officials of 1910, 1913, 1916, 1919, 1922, and 1925 the urban populations voted relatively more than the rural populations. The same was true for both sexes.[7] For *Bulgaria*, the opposite has been true since 1908. Before 1908, the urban populations had the highest proportions of voters per 100 electors, but since 1908 the opposite has been true.[8]

In *France* for the general elections of 1909, 78 per cent voted in the Department of Seine and 77 per cent in the whole republic. Rural and urban differences were negligible, the same as 1919, as far as proportions of the electors voting are concerned.[9]

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 332.

[4] See Belgium, *Annuaire Statistique*, 1924–1925, p. 72. The same correlation was true for the local elections in 1911, except that the difference was less. Communes less than 5,000 had 5.25 per cent absent and more than 5,000, 5.47 per cent. See *Annuaire Statistique*, 1914, p. 197.

[5] For the data on Sweden see *Statistisk Arsbok*, 1927, Tables 267–269.

[6] *Danmark Statistisk Arbok*, 1927.

[7] See *Statistisk Aarbok Norge*, 1925, pp. 178–180.

[8] See *Annuaire Statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie*, 1923–1924, p. c47.

[9] See *Annuaire Statistique de France*, 1909, Vol. 29, p. 431. According to the data of F. E. Le Chartier in elections since 1876 to 1910 the per cent of those who among the voters did not vote fluctuated from 31.38 to 18.61. The more and less urban departments do not show any certain and uniform differences. Le Chartier, F. E., *La France et son Parlement*, pp. 1013–1014.

In the general elections for the Reichsrath of 1911, 92.6 per cent of the electors of *Lower Austria* voted compared with 93.3 per cent in *Upper Austria*. The same relative differences existed in the elections of 1907. These provinces were similar in racial or national background (more than 95 per cent Germans) and religious composition (Catholic). However, the large city of Vienna, at the time more than two millions, was in Lower Austria, whereas Upper Austria had no city above seventy thousand. The results were favorable to the more rural province.[10]

In *Italy* there is no apparent relation between the proportion of the population urban or rural and the percentages voting.[11] Some rural provinces voted most and, on the other hand, some urban provinces. It does not give justification for any conclusions concerning constant relationships.

In *Germany* conditions vary according to the election. In the election of May, 1924, 76 per cent of the electorate voted in Berlin and 77.4 in the whole country. The same ratios held for the elections of December of that year. In March, 1925, 75.4 per cent voted in Berlin and only 68.9 per cent in the whole country. The same was true for April, 1925, elections.[12]

For *Switzerland*, data are given for the votes on measures decided by popular referendum since 1872. During this time 89 measures were voted on. The results in per cents of the registered voters voting [13] show 63.3 per cent of the registered voters voting in the 6 rural cantons, and only 46.6 per cent in the 14 urban cantons. All cantons with compulsory voting are eliminated. The rural cantons are Uri, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Glaris, and the two Appenzells.

It is useless to go further and present more data. These results show that the *correlation between urbanization and increase of the proportion of the electors voting is not valid.* Different countries show opposite results at the same time. Some countries give opposite results at different times, as Bulgaria. Others, such as France and Italy, show no effect. In some countries the larger cities voted more than the smaller cities and in other countries the results are just opposite. We must conclude that what relationship exists between urbanization and voting is purely temporary and characteristic of the individual countries.

Rural-Urban Conditions and Ticket Splitting. For a second theory, let us *examine what relation exists between urbanization or ruralization*

[10] See Austria, *Statistisches Handbuch*, 1911, Vol. 30, p. 408.

[11] See *Annuario Statistico Italiano*, 1925, p. 108, and Coletti, F., *La Popolazione rurale in Italia*, 1925, p. 35. Careful rank order relationships were worked out, but the table is omitted.

[12] *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsches Reich*, 1923–1924, pp. 388 ff.

[13] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1924, p. 361.

and ticket splitting. By ticket splitting is meant that voters choose part of one ticket and part of another. At the same time information as to contested elections will be presented, because ticket splitting and heated election contests are of a similar nature. Both indicate that the voters have a hard time in making up their minds. For ticket splitting and irregular voting in the United States, the elaborate study of A. C. Millspaugh gives some urban districts and the whole states separately. The data are for the presidential election of 1916. The method used is to compare the whole state with the most urban county. The following table gives detailed information.[14]

URBAN AND RURAL TICKET SPLITTING IN THE ELECTIONS OF 1916

State	*Urban Area*	*Urban Per Cent*	*Whole State Per Cent*
Illinois *	Cook county	1.9	0.5
Rhode Island ‡	Providence	34.6	32.0
Michigan *	Wayne county	6.9	3.6
Minnesota *	Hennepin county	22.0	21.2
California †	San Francisco	30.1	16.1
Maryland †	Baltimore	8.7	4.8
Missouri *	St. Louis	0.2	1.6
New York *	Kings county	7.5	1.5
New York *	New York county	0.05	1.5
Pennsylvania †	Philadelphia	1.1	1.9
Utah *	Salt Lake City	2.7	4.0
Washington †	King county	16.8	11.8
Wisconsin †	Milwaukee county	18.2	10.6
Ohio *	Cuyahoga county	4.9	1.5
Ohio *	Hamilton county	2.2	1.5
Ohio *	Lucas county	7.3	1.5
Massachusetts *	Suffolk county	0.4	2.4
New York ‡	Kings county	12.5	1.5

* President and Governor.
† President and Senator.
‡ Actual percentage of split tickets.

This table would seem to show that on the average there *is more ticket splitting in the urban districts and more straight party voting in the rural districts.*

Political offices filled without contest are also an indication of changes and splits within the political mind. In the elections for councils in Belgium in 1921, 70 per cent of uncontested places were in communes under 1,000, 21 per cent in communes 2,000 to 3,000, and the other 9 per cent in communes from 3,000 to 20,000. All the seats in communes above 20,000 were contested.[15] In the same country for the elections of 1911, communes under 5,000 had 18,132

[14] See Millspaugh, A. C., "Irregular Voting in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1918, Vol. 33, pp. 230–254.
[15] Belgium, *Annuaire Statistique*, 1924–1925, p. 72.

candidates for 11,054 communal councils compared with 3,390 for 1,624 positions in communes above 5,000.[16] In this same election, the candidates who won without question or with an absolute majority were primarily all in the smaller communities.

These figures with others concerning votes which are presented later in this chapter, suggest that *there is a valid correlation between urbanization or the size of the community and ticket splitting and the indecisiveness of the vote.* Why should or should not this be true? Is it a sign of greater intelligence or "progress"? [17] We think that it has nothing to do with the spirit of progress or regress and is the result of quite different factors. Greater mobility of city life has established pathways for changes and made these changes easier. Communication is more easy in cities, consequently the presenting of issues to city populations is easier. Many city populations have less to lose by changes in political parties and the mixing of parties. City political positions offer tempting economic rewards which make them much more desirable. Gangs often control city politics for the reaping of rewards out of the use of public moneys. Cities are more varied. There is less homogeneity, consequently more interests and issues. There are many opposed and mutually critical cross-currents of thought and ideas which in many cases facilitate indecisiveness and hesitations. There are so many great phenomena in cities that politics and political officials lose much of their sacredness. Consequently, there is no one recognized natural leadership in cities as in many rural districts. Urban interests demand so much of men that it is next to impossible for a man to be leader in more than one interest. In rural districts the wealthy men are often leaders in churches and politics. An example is the Mormon society in Utah. In urban life that is not true. The wealthiest men in New York do not run for the position as mayor, etc.

These reasons as well as others are responsible for more contested elections and split tickets in cities. But this makes it evident that such is not necessarily a sign of progress or intelligence. It is a sure sign of indecision and varied interests, caused by greater mobility and heterogeneity of urban population, by more intensive cross-currents of different streams of ideas and increased competition. Rural societies are much more stable and homogeneous.

Agricultural Classes and Socialism, Communism, Radicalism. For a third theory, let us examine the correlation between urbanization or ruralization and the support of Radical or Socialist parties. Are rural groups conservative or radical? Which classes in cities are radical? Concerning which measures are farmers radical?

[16] Belgium, *Annuaire Statistique*, 1914, p. 197.

[17] See Block, Maurice, *Dictionnaire de la politique*, Tome 2, article on "Villes et Campagnes," for such a statement.

Stuart Rice made a study of the votes of the State of Washington for the years between 1914 and 1920.[18] He found a correlation of −.37 between the vote for the Farmer-Labor party, 1920, and the proportions of farmers in the total population by counties. The correlation between the value of farm property per farm for the same year and the vote for the Farmer-Labor party was −.55. On the other hand, the correlation between the vote for the Farmer-Labor party, 1920, and the vote for the eight hour day law, 1914, (a direct interest of the laboring classes in cities) was +.80. This study suggests that farmers are not radical, and that the chief radical groups in a society are the city laboring classes. It further suggests that rural radicalism is more spread among the poorer sections of the country.[19] Rice secured, further, a positive correlation between the average size of the mortgage debts by states and political insurgency. However, correlations by such large units do not necessarily establish a relationship between only two variables.[20] Rice's general conclusions in these and other studies are that farmers are primarily conservative, and that the laboring groups in cities support the radical parties more.[21]

Ogburn and Peterson made a study of rural and urban voting in the Oregon referendums for the years 1910–1914. The total votes on 26 measures classed as radical were grouped and gave the following results. The rural favored these measures with *42* out of every hundred votes, and the city groups *46*. But, 37 of the votes of the upper classes in cities favored the measures, 42 of the middle classes, and 52 of the laboring classes, out of every hundred. Thus the rural were more conservative than the laboring groups and less than the upper groups of cities. The rural votes were identical with the city middle classes.[22]

A study has been made of the correlation between ruralization or urbanization and the proportions of the vote by counties cast for the radical parties by a seminar in rural sociology for Minnesota. The term "radical" parties was used here to mean all other than the regular parties—Democratic and Republican. The main party securing votes other than these two conservatives was the Farmer-Labor. The correlations as given in the following table is based on

[18] Rice, Stuart A., "The Referendum in Washington," *Proceedings of the National Conference for Social Work*, 1923, pp. 508–510.

[19] The same author in another study found no correlation between political unrest and farm tenancy. But farm tenancy is by no means an indication of poorer farmers. As a matter of fact, in most of the states of the United States, farm tenancy is found most high in the wealthier sections. See *Farmers and Workers in American Politics*, Col. Univ. Studies in History and Political Science, Vol. 133, 1924, p. 53.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

[21] See, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups," *Political Science Quarterly 1925*, pp. 60 ff., and the recent book by the same author.

[22] Ogburn, William, and Peterson, Delvin, "Political Thought of Social Classes," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 30, 1916, pp. 300 ff.

all radical votes cast for governor of Minnesota in the general elections between 1916 and 1926. It gives, first, the proportions of radical vote in the whole state; second, the proportions in the three urban counties containing Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth; third, in the remainder of the state; fourth, the correlation (Pearsonian from grouped data) between the proportions of the population living on farms 1920 and these percentages of the votes radical by counties; and fifth, the men who made the computations.[23]

Year	*Percentage of Votes Cast for Radical Parties in:*			*Correlation with Proportions of Population on farms, 1920*	*Computations by*
	The State	*Three Urban Counties*	*Remainder of State*		
1916	13.2	13.6	13.0	−.235	E. H. Lott and C. A. Anderson
1918	34.2	35.3	39.7	−.295	William Gordon
1920	36.5	35.1	37.2	.123	R.W. Hopperstad
1922	11.7	12.3	11.3	.081	O. W. Behrens
1924	45.4	42.3	47.1	.163	O. D. Duncan and I. A. Hammer
1926	38.0	37.1	38.5	−.001	E. C. Paustian

This table must be considered in the light of the fact that this was a period of agitation in the Northwest. The Non-Partisan League entered the state about 1916, and by 1920 its national offices were established in the Twin Cities. This League was a definite agrarian movement with "planks" formulated to catch the mind of the farmer. Following 1920 came the post-war agricultural depression, which was accompanied by hard times in the state, and the failures of several hundreds of rural banks each year in the region. Several counties in the trade area of the Twin Cities did not have a single solvent bank during part of this period. Thus there were all reasons to expect a definite agrarian movement, attended by wide differences in voting in the rural and urban districts. This is said in spite of the fact that the merchants and business men in the small towns and the Twin Cities also suffered severely. But the farmers themselves, through foreclosures, drastic declines in prices, bank failures, and the encroachment of several pests, notably the wheat rust and Canadian thistle, suffered first and most severely. In spite of this, the rural and urban differences were negligible. The first two votes show negligible differences in the proportions of the three urban counties and the remainder of the state. The correlation coefficients for those years showed negative relationships between radicalism and farm population (the coefficients are larger than three

[23] A study not yet published.

standard errors for these years). In 1920 and 1924 there were slight positive relationships, but these disappeared by 1926. The positive relationships in these two periods were biased by the personalities of the candidates.

In addition to these data for the United States, we have numerous statements made by students that "Communism is a phenomena of urban proletarianism."[24]

Radicalism in Europe. The best example of radicalism in Europe at the present time is the Russian Soviet-Communist-party. According to the party census of 1927, it was composed 55.7 per cent of workers, 19.0 per cent of peasants, 22.6 per cent of office workers, and 2.7 per cent of others. The members and candidates of the Central Executive Soviet of the first, second, third, and fourth sessions were similarly divided. Workers comprised 39.9 per cent; agricultural laborers, 3.7 per cent; peasants, 21.3 per cent; handicraftsmen, 0.1 per cent; office workers, 32.8 per cent; and unspecified, 2.2 per cent. The population of Soviet Russia was from 82.1 to 85 per cent rural (living in villages less than 2,000) in 1926. A better index of the rurality of the country is given in the analysis of the composition of the army conscripts for the year 1927. Workers comprised 12.1 per cent, peasants, 83.1 per cent and others, 4.8 per cent. Thus the Soviet party consisted of 19.1 per cent peasants, the Central Executive Committee 21.3 per cent, and the army 83.1. Other information concerning the composition of the local organs of Soviet power gives the same general results. In the rural soviets of 1927, only 12.9 per cent of the members were official members of the communist party or Young Communist League. In the town soviets, 52 per cent were members of these organs. The others were classed as non-party by the *soviet authorities.* Other years show greater differences.[25]

The same correlation appears for *Germany* in studies concerning the support and composition of the socialist or Sozialdemokraten party. Its chief support and votes in 1898 and 1903 show a positive correlation between urbanism and socialist sympathy. The only communities which gave no support to the party were in electoral districts under 30,000 while the one giving more than 75 per cent support was in the 100 to 125 thousand group. The others ranged in between showing an increase in urbanism with an increase in support.[26]

[24] Watkins, Gordon S., "Revolutionary Communism in the United States," *American Political Science Review,* 1920, Vol. 14, pp. 14 ff.

[25] *Ten Years of Soviet Power in Figures* (in English). Official Publication of the Central Statistical Board of Soviet Russia, pp. 14, 15, 17, 21, 35, and 74. There are valid reasons to think that the per cent of peasants in the communist party is exaggerated; in fact it is still lower.

[26] See Braun, Adolf, "Die Reichstagwahlen von 1898 und 1903," *Archiv für Sozialgesetzgebung und Statistik,* 1903, Vol. 18, pp. 538 ff., especially 552 and 553. The correlation is very marked.

R. Blank reached practically the same conclusion as Braun concerning the composition of the socialist party.[27] He found that in 1898 the city of Berlin gave 59.5 per cent of its votes to this party compared with 27.2 per cent for the whole kingdom. In 1903 the proportions were 66.8 per cent in Berlin compared with 31.7 for the whole kingdom. In the two elections of 1924, the major part of the votes was divided between a Nationalist (Deutschnationale Volkspartei), and central (Zentrum), and a Socialist (Sozialdemokratische) party.

The data seem to indicate that the city is the seat of the socialist and communist parties, whereas the country is the place of the nationalist and conservative parties. However, it must be said that the upper classes in cities are also strong supporters of the conservative parties. The same conclusions apply to the vote for Von Hindenburg, conservative nationalist, April 26, 1925.[28]

In *Norway* the elections to the Storthings of 1924 show that while the rural districts furnished 65.8 per cent of the total vote, they only furnished 53.5 per cent for the Socialist party and 55.6 per cent for the Communist party. They also furnished 51.2 per cent of the conservative vote, but 81.3 per cent of the left branch of the Conservative party. One would have to know Norway politics to fully understand all the parties, but we may be sure that the correlation between urbanization and support of the radical parties remains valid.[29]

The data for *Sweden* in the general elections of 1927 show that the rural districts furnished 65 per cent of all votes, 55 per cent of the Communist, and 61 per cent of the Socialist, but 100 per cent for the relatively conservative Agrarian party. They also furnished more of the liberal dry party than of the total vote. The socialist vote increased with urbanization and the communist vote was found mainly in large cities.[30]

For *Denmark* information concerning distribution of the vote for all national elections between 1910 and 1926 show the same distribution.[31]

The vote of the 20th national assembly in *Bulgaria* for the year 1922 is given for rural and urban districts in some of the provinces.[32] These show much greater communist support in the urban districts.

These data are sufficient for us to draw the conclusion that radical-

[27] Blank, R., "Die Sozial Zusammensetzung der sozialdemokratischen Wahlerschaft Deutschlands," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 20, 1905, folge 2, pp. 507 ff.

[28] See *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsches Reich*, 1927, p. 498; and 1924–1925, pp. 388 ff.

[29] *Statistisk Aarbok Norge*, 1925, Table 116. The elections of 1921 bear out the above conclusions based on the elections of 1924.

[30] *Sweden Statistisk Arsbok*, 1927, Table 268.

[31] Denmark, *Statistisk Aarbok*, 1927.

[32] *Annuaire Statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie*, 1923–1924, p. c49.

ism and communism have a positive correlation with urbanization. The communist party which is the extreme "left" of the radical parties has a high correlation with size of urban districts. It is primarily found in the larger cities.[33] The correlation is also supported by the per cent of farmers and peasants or their sons among the leaders of the contemporary radical and urban labor movement. Among those leaders in America only 14.9 per cent are farmer-peasant sons, while the proportion of farm population in 1880 was no less than 40 or 50 per cent of the whole occupational population in the United States. And according to the occupation of the leaders themselves only 0.7 per cent are farmers.[34] A similar conclusion is given by the occupational composition of the members of various parties in Parliaments. For instance, in England in the House of Commons in the nineteenth century, according to the data of Demolins, only 26 per cent of all members from agricultural occupations belonged to "the left" wing of the House (liberal and radicals), the remaining 74 per cent being on "the right" (conservative) side. The per cents of "the left" among the members of the House were: among manufacturers, 65 per cent; merchants and bankers, 72 per cent; professions, 85 per cent; clergy, army, navy, and officials, 51 per cent.[35]

Finally the character of almost all contemporary farmer and peasant parties and Agrarian-International unions is free from socialist and communist tendencies. All these parties stress their adherence to the institution of private property, their anti-communist and anti-socialist character, their animosity toward an undue expansion of governmental interference in economic matters (with the exception of such interference whose purpose is to correct governmental policy in measures unfair to the agricultural classes).[36]

We are against overdeveloped governmental organization, bureaucracy, and its worst aberration—communism. The state has shown itself incapable to organize and direct the whole economic life. Only private iniative and motive of profit as well as free competition are the most powerful factors of production and real creators of contentment and welfare. The objective of our political efforts is to ennoble those forces, and to put them at the service of the whole

[33] Michels, Robert, *Political Parties* (Trans. by Ellen and Cedar Paul), p. 196, gives data concerning the composition of the socialist party in Italy before the last war. For Switzerland see Rappard, W. E., "Democracy vs. Demagogy," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1923, Vol. 38, pp. 290–306 and 360–387.

[34] See Sorokin, P., "Leaders of Labor and Radical Movements," *Amer. Journ. of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 395, 399; 1927.

[35] Demolins, E., *Anglo-Saxon Superiority*, p. 206.

[36] See an authoritative characterization of the programs, objectives, means, and history of development of agrarian parties of various European countries by their leaders in the *Bulletin of the International Agrarian Bureau* published in Prague, for the years 1924–1928.

society. . . . Respect for the Community and the State are not supreme values in themselves like a house is not a supreme value in itself. They are servants and helpers of their members. In so far as they are necessary, a free individual must adapt himself to them. In so far, respect for the Community, and for the interests of the whole society are supreme duties of every citizen. [37]

This declaration of the peasant party of Switzerland is typical for almost all farmer-peasant parties on the point discussed.

These data are sufficient to show that agricultural classes are more immune to socialism, communism, and radicalism generally than urban populations, particularly the urban laboring classes.

The Nature of Agrarian Radicalism and Revolutionism. The above, however, does not mean that agricultural classes are entirely free from radicalism or never participate in revolutions and social disorders. Histories of various countries show that in Ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, China, Medieval Europe, or Russia, in the past and in relatively modern times, there have been a number of revolutions and disorders in which peasants and the agricultural people had an active participation, sometimes even playing the principal rôle. Peasants' revolutions in the last few centuries of the Roman Empire; peasant revolts of 1381 and 1450 in England; a series of peasants' risings between 1437 and 1440 in Sweden; 1340 and 1441 in Denmark; 1418 and 1437 in Bohemia; 1432, 1525, and subsequent years in Germany; 1322 and 1328 in the Low Countries; 1395 and 1479 in Spain; the French Jacquery; active participation of the peasantry in the Russian Anarchy of the seventeenth century; their predominant rôle in the Rasin and Pougatschov movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; a series of revolts and disturbances of the peasants in various countries during the nineteenth century; and some participation of the peasantry in the recent Russian Revolutions: these may serve as examples of peasant revolts and revolutions.[38] Such revolutions have not only happened, but some have been exceedingly bloody, and the most conspicuous cruelty, destructive impulses, pitilessness, and other satellites of any bloody revolution, have been exhibited by the peasants as well as by their opponents. Side by side with revolutions there have been many forms of social unrest and radical movements in which the agricultural classes have actively participated.

If such is the situation, does it follow that in regard to revolutionism, radicalism, and anarchy, there is practically no difference be-

[37] *Ibid.*, 1927, p. 130.

[38] See a brief summary of the medieval peasant revolutions in Boissonade, P., *Life and Work in Mediæval Europe*, pp. 316–331. See also, Sorokin, P., *Sociology of Revolution*,

tween the agricultural and urban, particularly the labor classes? Does this warrant the practical conclusion that in regard to support of social order and social stability the urban and rural classes are in the same position? Such a conclusion would be somewhat hasty and misleading.

1. There seems to exist some *quantitative difference* in revolutionism and anarchism of the urban-labor classes and the agricultural classes. In a tentative way, the statement may be made that the occurrences of revolutions, disorders, and revolts seem to have been more rare among peasants and farmers than among urban people, particularly the urban proletariat. It is hard to supply exact statistics of such a quantitative difference, but nevertheless, investigators of the histories of revolutions and social disturbances generally reach such a conclusion after studying the field carefully. First, while in the cities, such disorders as strikes, and big demonstrations followed by battles with the police, damages to property and similar phenomena happen almost every year, sometimes several times in one year, the agricultural regions very rarely have this kind of social unrest. Further, a study of comparative criminality (see the chapter about criminality) shows that individual or collective crimes against social order and government are much more numerous and common in the cities than in the country. Third, it is rather certain that urban centers, not the rural, are the "hotbeds" of the incessant production and diffusion of various radical and revolutionary theories. This circulation of radical ideologies, and correspondingly, the circulation of streams of social unrest, goes on incessantly in urban centers. Fourth, the occurrences of revolution in the country are more rare: while there is seldom an important peasants' revolt which is not preceded or followed by revolution in the cities, there are many revolutions in cities which find no response, at least, in any tangible degree, by revolution in the rural parts of the country. It is sufficient to mention that in the nineteenth century, the revolutions of 1830, 1848, or even of 1871 (in France) were practically only urban revolutions without any serious participation and support by the agricultural parts of France and other European countries. The history of long-existing agricultural societies, as in China, records some large peasant revolts; but these are few in number and have happened in interims of time computed by hundreds of years. The same may be said of the history of several other agricultural countries.

This "quantitatively" less unrest and revolutionism of the agrarian classes compared with the urban population is supported also by the fact that histories of various countries begin to record the occurrences of revolutions only after a stage of a considerable urbanization has

been reached by the corresponding country. In other words, the curve of revolution appears and grows somewhat parallel with the growth of the cities. What Dr. Pöhlman, one of the best authorities on ancient radicalism, has said of the early Roman period seems to be typical of many other countries.

It is remarkable, that in the early period of Rome, when quite conservative farmers strongly sticking to their land dominated at the forum, there are no traces of any class-struggle, or any sharp class-conflicts, or any attack at the social and political order.

They appeared only later when urbanization made a notable progress.[39] The same seems to be true of the history of the Greek States, as is witnessed by Hesiod's *Work and Days*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Iliad*, and other sources. The pre-urban agricultural period of the various patriarchal Greek societies was not marked at all by any great social unrest and revolution or the spirit of revolt.[40] In a similar way in the *Texts of Confucianism*, Confucius stresses many times that in the early, pre-urban stages of Chinese history "the people lived in peace and harmony, and there was no ill-will between superiors and inferiors." [41]

Again, in the history of Europe, the first great wave of urban and rural bloody and Communist (in the cities) revolutions (Salonica, 1542–1552; Rome, 1347; Bologna, 1376; Genoa, 1339; Vienna, 1355–1370; Florence, 1342 and 1371; Ypres and Bruges, 1323, 1328, 1359–1367; Ghent, 1338–1345; Liége, 1330, 1343; Louvain, 1340; Brussels, 1359, 1366, 1368; Cologne, 1390; Strassburg, 1346–1380; Regensberg, Paris, 1356–1358; and in many other cities of European countries and some rural parts) coincides with the period when urbanization of Europe reached a conspicuous proportion. Urbanization had already become noticeable by the twelfth century. Since that century the annals of history begin to record revolutions more and more often. By the fifteenth century urbanization had made an enormous progress: Paris had about 300,000 inhabitants; Prague, 100,000; London, 35,000; Barcelona, 70,000; Venice, 190,000; Florence, 100,000, and so on.

"Capitalism above and pauperism below were the two disturbers of social equilibrium." "The second half of the fourteenth, and to a less extent the first half of the fifteenth were marked by constant risings, usually (among the peasants) without either any program,

[39] Pöhlman, R., *History of Antique Communism and Socialism*, Russian translation, pp. 546–548, St. Petersburg, 1912; See also Frank, T., *An Economic History of Rome*, pp. 120–125, Baltimore, 1927.

[40] See Halliday, W. R., *The Growth of the City States*, pp. 74 ff.; Glover, T. R., *Democracy in the Ancient World*, Chap. 1, N. Y., 1927.

[41] The Hsîao King, Chap. I, in *The Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. III, pp. 466–467.

unity, or direction, mere anarchical and bloody manifestation of the suffering and hatred of the people." Among the urban proletariat the objective of the revolutions was "a desire to conquest political power, dictatorship of proletariat, class domination," and an extermination of all bourgeoisie and capitalists.[42]

After that time the phenomena of revolutions have been going on throughout the history of Europe, with some irregular "ups" and "downs."

Finally, turn to the programs, tactics, and methods of political activity of the contemporary farmer-peasant parties and unions in Europe as well as in America. In contrast to many radical parties of the labor class, which do not reject revolutionary methods in their politics, farmer-peasant parties stress in their programs negative attitudes to revolutionary methods and in their activity show this in fact. "Our politics shall never become that of force;" such is the motto of almost all those parties.[43]

These and similar facts seem to warrant the conclusion that there is some causal connection between urban conditions and social unrest and revolutions, and that, all in all, the agricultural classes are indeed somewhat less revolutionary than the mass of the urban population, especially the class of the urban proletariat.

2. Side by side with this quantitative difference, there seems to exist some qualitative differences in the causes, character, and results of urban and rural radicalism and revolutionism. First, the majority of revolts and uprisings of the agricultural classes have been marked by a purely elemental, programless, objectiveless character. Neither a certain intentional organization, a certain unity, nor a certain program or conscientious direction have been present in them. They burst like thunderstorms, being called forth by a superabundance of suffering, the impossibility of bearing the existing conditions, and in spite of the great patience of the peasant class. Urban revolts, on the contrary, in more numerous cases show some conscientious organization, unity, program, direction, and leadership. In this sense they are less elementary and more "artificial" outbursts of passions, dissatisfactions, and desires of the urban classes, factions, and groups.

Second, only the persons quite uninformed about the history of socialism, communism, and other attacks on private property, think that a Communist Revolution burst out for the first time in Russia, in 1917. As a matter of fact, communist and socialist revolutions are very old. They are recorded in the Egyptian papyri approximately

[42] Boissonade, P., *op. cit.*, pp. 279–331.

[43] See the quoted *Bulletin of International Agrarian Bureau.* 1927, p. 130, and all copies for 1924–1928.

two thousand years before our era.[44] It seems typical for the majority of urban revolutions and the aspirations of the labor classes that urban revolutions, as a rule, are marked to a greater or a less degree by socialist and communist tendencies. The revolutions of the peasants only rarely and very inconspicuously have these characteristics. Even in those cases where rural movements embrace socialist and communist tendencies they do so only in the initial stage of the revolution and in so far as a redistribution of land and farm-property is concerned. As soon as this objective is achieved, the socialist tendencies disappear, the land is turned into juridical or factual private property and the peasant class turns against socialism and communism if they are still promoted by the urban revolutionary classes. In other words, while urban revolutions and revolutionary aspirations, as a rule, bear socialist and communist tendencies, peasant and farmer revolutions either do not show them at all, or they are present only in the first stage of the revolution. Practically these means are used only to satisfy a thirst for land. When the land is taken from the landlords, the rural classes aspire to hold it either in individual or quasi-collective (Mir) tenure, having nothing in common with socialism and communism.

3. *Some of the farmer-peasant revolts and radical movements have been directed against the city and its classes, sometimes the upper and sometimes the lower classes.* The encroachment by the church, the nobility, or the city bourgeoisie upon the land or land-rights of the agricultural cultivators followed by oppressive natural or money taxes and duties put on the peasants by these urban landlords; or, as in the Middle Ages, the exploitation of the cultivators by the cities and an extraordinary control by urban authorities of the economic affairs of the cultivators in the form of requisition of agricultural produce, its registration, regulation of production, marketing, consumption, and oppressive and numerous taxes; [45] or again, when in order to pacify the menacing city proletariat, the cities attempt to feed and provide this loss with necessities (free from charge) at the cost of the agricultural classes whose produce and labor directly or indirectly have been

[44] Erman, A., *The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians.* "The Admonitions of a Prophet," "The Complaint of Khekheperre-sonbu," and "The Prophecy of Neferrohu," pp. 92–116, describes some of the ancient communist revolutions in Egypt. See also Sorokin, P., *Sociology of Revolution;* Pöhlman, R., *Geschichte d. Antiken Kommunismus und Socialismus;* for ancient China, Chang, Chen-huan, *The Economic Principles of Confucius,* Vol. II, pp. 497 ff., N. Y., 1921.

[45] For the Middle Ages see Afanasieff, *The Conditions of Food Trade* (Russian, 1892); Araskranianz, "Die Franizösische Getreidehandelspolitik bis zum Jahre 1789," *Schmollers Staats, und Sozialwiss. Forschungen,* Bd. 4, 1882. For Ancient Egypt and Rome and Greece, see Rostovtzeff, M., *State and Personality in Economic Life of the Ptolemaic Egypt* (Russian); *Economic History of Roman Empire,* Sorokin, P., "Impoverishment and Governmental Control," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXXII, pp. 206–215.

stolen, by the city, as in Rome (*frumentariæ leges*); [46] or in the Middle Ages, or in contemporary Russia, where during the years of the Revolution the cities have been half-parasitically existing at the cost of a robbed and exploited peasantry; or in protectionism, custom-duties and taxes on industrial and agricultural produce at the cost of the agricultural classes (as in America at present); these and similar forms of exploitation and oppression of peasants and farmers by the cities, when it reaches extraordinary forms makes the life of the cultivators unbearable and exhausts their patience, generally calls forth revolts, unrest, and radicalism directed against the city and its classes.

4. *The main cause of farmer-peasant revolts and radical movements has always centered around land—its possession and redistribution—a cause which has played very little rôle in the causation of urban revolutions.* Farmers and peasants find land necessary to their well-being. Where extensive small ownership is to be found, radicalism is not favored, unless mortgages are high. The farmer or peasant favors radicalism not of the sort which puts the state into business but which brings about a redistribution of land on a private property basis. In spite of the numerous attempts of the Marxian "Scientific Socialists" to win support of the rural classes, they have seldom been successful. Where the small farmer existed, Marxianism did not thrive. The Socialist Congress at Breslau in 1895 made radical revisions in the socialist program to attract peasant support. State crop insurance, and state ownership of mortgages were promised the rural classes, but with little avail. On the contrary, peasants have supported the conservative, and nationalist parties in the states of Europe since the last war.[47]

This phenomenon of the organization of agrarian interests and political movements about land and its possession is not new. It has gone on as far as history records the ups and downs of the rural classes. Peasant societies, their forms of social organization, their social classes, and their very life are generally built around the institution of land. We should not be surprised to find that modern agrarian movements are built around this same type of property.[48]

[46] See Heitland, *Agricola;* Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*

[47] See Benjamin G. G., "German and French Socialists and the Agrarian Movement," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 34, 1926, pp. 349–376; Comp., Hodža, Milan, "Address," in *Bulletin of the Czechoslovak Akademy of Agriculture*, Vol. IV, p. 441.

[48] For a general historical analysis of the movements among peasants see Sée, H., *Histoire du Régime Agraire en Europe*, La Chavanne, *Histoire des classes agricoles en France;* Brants, *Histoire des classes rurales aux Pays Bas;* Seé, H., *Les Classes rurales en France aux moyen âge;* Boissonade, *Life and Work in Mediæval Europe;* Heitland, *Agricola;* Frank, Tenney, *An Economic History of Rome;* and Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire.* For rural and urban comparisons in political alliances and affiliations, see Jagow, Kurt, and Heere, Paul, *Politisches Handwörterbuch*, Vol. I, Agrarpolitik, pp. 17–21; and Block, M., *Dictionnaire de la Politique*, Tome I, 1873, article on "Agriculture" by Lavergne and Tome II, article on "Villes et Campagnes" by Block, M.

This same influence of land in agrarian movements has also been true for the United States of America. We need not go into details. But the first important social movement based upon land was the attempt to establish the manorial system of England here. The trading classes of England wished a native population in this country, so they could develop trade such as in India. Wealthy Englishmen, and sons of former landowners in England secured large grants and attempted to set up the land system which had almost disappeared in England. It failed in New England, primarily due to the roughness and infertility of the soil. In the South, poor men came as indentured servants, bound for a period for their passage money. But many deserted without serving their time. They went to the frontier for land. Others followed as soon as their service was up. Still others came and went directly to the frontier. When they arrived, they often found the lands already taken up by land speculators. Some of these were Europeans, but many others were noted colonials—Washington, Franklin, Gallatin, Patrick Henry, James Wilson, and others. A debtor class grew up in the west. They were trying their best to keep off the Indian with one arm and to clear the soil and make crops to pay the mortgages with the other. As a result, these small farmers in the west were nearly always opposed to the policies of the primarily urban seaboard and the east. Following, came the movement for a federal government to replace the confederation. The federal constitution meant a rise in value of money, due to redemption of the paper money, and higher taxes due to payment of the war debt. Farmers who had gone into debt at low money values would now have to pay back at high money values. A bushel of wheat did not mean as much as it did when these debts were contracted. The federal constitution was "put over" on the small farmers of the frontier, in most cases by disfranchising them.[49]

This rural-urban difference, as shown in the Frontier versus the East has existed through the entire history of America. At times the struggle appears to be over railroads, or lakes-to-sea waterways and other things. Behind it all is a mortgaged and debt-owing farmer class who wish to keep the dollar where it was at time of incurring the debt or to get out of debt otherwise. Undue changes in the economic system make it harder to pay off these mortgages and results in some form of revolt ideology. The formation of the constitutions of Kentucky, Oklahoma, and other states was associated with this struggle over lands. Oklahoma provided that corporations could

[49] See Beard, C. A., *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States;* Libby, O. G., "The Geographic Distribution of the Vote of the 13 States of the Federal Constitution, 1787–1788," *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin,* Vol. I, 1897; and Mead, Nelson, P., "The Land System of the Connecticut Towns," *Political Science Quarterly,* 1906, Vol. 21, pp. 59–73.

only hold or trade in farm lands under very exceptional circumstances. The "Granger" and "Populist" movements (1873–1896) were similar episodes, in which debt-owning farmers were opposed to the steady deflation in commodity prices and inflation of currency prices after the Civil War. The value of the dollar was rising and more bushels of wheat had to be sold to repay these dollars than could have been purchased with the same dollars at time of borrowing. The agrarian (McNary-Haugen) movement of the present time, is similar in nature. *Radicalism among farmers is an attempt to maintain the wide distribution of private property. Radicalism among wage earners and the city classes is generally either of the type seeking to concentrate the ownership of property in the hands of the state or to do away with the institution of private property.* This is a fundamental difference, which should be kept in mind at all times in thinking of agrarian versus urban radicalism.[50]

Not only in the United States but in Mexico and other countries on this continent is such a statement true. The recent peasant movement in Mexico was an attempt to regain peasant lands and to restore the former economic position of the rural classes.[51] Such are the principal differences in the nature of revolutionism, radicalism, and conservatism between the urban and the rural classes.[52] These differences are outlined somewhat schematically and do not exclude some deviations. Nevertheless, they correspond in a considerable degree to the reality. The preceding shows that the rural class is relatively less revolutionary and constitutes a more solid foundation of social order, stability, and private property, than the bulk of the city population.

Interpretation. This section has developed the idea that radicalism and communism as generally known increase with urbanization and that rural radicalism is of a different sort. Where small farms are distributed, there is relatively little rural radicalism unless increasing mortgages, deflation of currencies, or other economic and juridical changes, attack and question this distribution of land. Why should these theories be true?

Radicalism and communism as generally known are attacks upon private property. One group wishes to concentrate its ownership in

[50] See Buck, S. J., *The Granger Movement,* and *The Agrarian Crusade;* Kile, O. M., *The Farm Bureau Movement;* Barnhart, "Rainfall and the Populist Party in Nebraska," *American Political Science Review,* 1925, Vol. 19, pp. 527 ff.; Beard, C. A., "The Constitution of Oklahoma," *Political Science Quarterly,* 1909, Vol. 24, pp. 95 ff.; Coulter, E. Merton, "Early Frontier Democracy in the First Kentucky Constitution," *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 39, 1924, pp. 665 ff.; Hansen, A. H., "Effect of Price Fluctuations on Agriculture," *Journal of Political Economy,* 1925, Vol. 33, pp. 196 ff.

[51] See Phipps, Helen, "The Agrarian Phase of the Mexican Revolution," *Political Science Quarterly,* 1924, pp. 1 ff.

[52] Comp. Riehl, W. H., *op. cit.,* Vol. 2, Chap. III; Wiese, L., *Das Dorf,* p. 61.

the state and the other wishes to do away with the institution. The agricultural class, as we have seen, *is a proprietorial class par excellence.* Hence, its opposition to socialism, communism, and elimination of private property is quite natural. Each of the principal types of rural societies is proprietorial. One is comprised mainly of the small owner farmer as is to be seen in many countries of Europe and America today. Accompanying this type of farm tenure is the tenant class, which is using tenancy primarily as a means of climbing the agricultural ladder to farm ownership. Even the tenant class have the property rights about the farm for the period of the lease, at least one year. In England, Prof. A. W. Ashby tells us, the tenants are more stable than American farm owners. However, there are many forms of this tenancy even in America. An illustration is the cropper class in the South and the hired laborer in the North and West. In the main, such agricultural societies are organized with one ideal of success, the achieving of farm ownership. A second type is the community ownership of property, or perpetual leasehold upon property. The classical illustration of this is the Russian Mir. Here the Mir or village, which is the outgrowth of the family and clan, own or rent the land in common. The land belongs to the rural community and its members have all the rights of property and its redistribution from time to time among the members of the community. The one exception is that they cannot sell the land. The village communal responsibility goes no further except to see that it is distributed according to some fixed plan such as the number of mouths in the family. Each peasant does his own labor and gets his own results after paying his taxes or rental. This principle nearly always applies to the cultivated land, and oftentimes to the grazing land. While the grazing land may be kept in common, yet it is distributed among the families according to the number of cattle rights they have over it. In all essential respects this system results in private energy and initiative in exploitation. By private is meant the efforts of the recognized family unit. In other words, the term "communism" as applied to the village community, is a misnomer.

The third principal type is the perpetual family leasehold, as developed under the manorial system and as seems to be developing in England today. A. W. Ashby, one of the outstanding agricultural economists of England, had the following to say concerning the land problem in England, in a personal conversation with the authors (summer of 1928). "The average tenure of tenants (within one generation) in England and Wales averages more than 16 years, even when allowances be made for premature deaths. Further, many families have been on the same farms for 50, 75, and even 100 years or more. Under the British Agricultural Holdings Acts, about the only cause

for removal of a tenant is poor farming and then only after reimbursement for his investment in the property such as in ditching, manuring, and improvements. This perpetual family tenure has been developing since about 1825 (after the last series of inclosure movements) and has been technically recognized by the Series of Agricultural Holdings Acts since 1875. Further, there are definite indications that the proportions of operator-owners are increasing. Finally, during the agricultural acts of the emergency of the last war, more owners were called to court for poor farming than tenants, because the owners more often were so well fixed that they did not have to be so careful in their farming operations."

Under this perpetual family leasehold system, the land belongs to the lord or the state in a similar manner as the state really owns the land in the United States today. The occupier, called the owner, pays taxes for each acre. If the taxes are unpaid, ownership is forfeited and the land is sold for the taxes. Under the manorial system, the same system prevailed, except that the feudal lord rather than the state received the taxes or feudal dues. The villeins of the Middle Ages had perpetual rights to their lands, and with the payment of certain taxes, the right to succession. While certain writers have made much of the communistic phases of the manor, yet in essential respects it was not much more communistic than the legal personality—the corporation or chartered town of today. The ranks of individualism were open at all times. Individuals of merit were always climbing ahead of the rest and acquiring a higher status through individual initiative. In all essential respects the manorial village was individualistic, not socialistic. The same applies in all essential details to the civilized tribes with any development of agriculture.[53]

This analysis of agricultural systems, faulty and inadequate though it is, seems to indicate that the nature of farm life requires much individual energy, initiative, and responsibility. This landed basis of rural life, connected with the isolation of the individual and family, explains both the radicalism and lack of radicalism of the farmer. He is opposed to socialism and communism as a rule, but he soon becomes radical when the institution of landed property is assailed or if his land or land rights are taken from him. One cannot possibly understand farm life, unless he sees its relation to land. Land does not change hands at a rapid rate. As a result rural classes are more or

[53] For the manorial system see Vinogradoff, P., *The Growth of the Manor*, chapter on Ownership and Husbandry, especially pp. 325, 326. Vinogradoff has given one of the most reliable interpretations of the development of the manor. For the agricultural tribes, see especially the earlier chapters in this same book and Seebohm, F., *The Village Community*. The works of Henri Sée have occasional passages which are very enlightening concerning both the manor and tribal organizations. His work *Histoire du Régime Agraire aux Europe au 18 et 19 Siècles* gives an analysis of the Russian Mir.

less stable, and rural radicalism is not as frequent as that of cities. Societies, such as the Byzantine Empire for instance, have attempted definite policies of protecting the small farmer in his land holding. Much of the stability of the eastern half of the Roman Empire, which lasted 1,000 years after the fall in the West, has been attributed to this policy.[54]

The same proprietorial character of the rural classes partly accounts for *its less revolutionism.* A series of other factors contribute to the same result. For the actual outburst of a revolution, it is necessary that the wave of disturbances come simultaneously in many places and involve a multitude of people. Scattered as they are over a vast territory, the low density and isolation of the farmer-peasant population is a considerable obstacle for that. Many farmers and peasants may suffer and be dissatisfied; they even may try to resist the authorities; but as these actions are not co-ordinated and organized and do not happen in one place and at one time, they are easily quieted or suppressed. The enormous density of the city population and better communication, on the contrary, makes a simultaneous outburst of big masses of revolt much easier and even permits its artificial organization, as we see clearly at the present moment. Greater contrast in economic and social standards of living in the cities is again a factor in revolutionism. When all are poor one does not feel his poverty as acutely as when side by side there are millionaires and paupers. The same is true of the amount of privileges and disfranchisements and of almost any cultural value. One of the basic differences between the city and the country is exactly the fact that the city shows much more numerous and sharper contrasts or inequalities than the country. For this reason, a proletarian in the city feels his poverty much stronger than a farmer of the same standard of living; the proletarian poverty is stressed by millionaire luxury. Hence, he is more dissatisfied and is ready to revolt more willingly than a farmer. This concentration of enormous inequalities in the city has been an important factor in city revolutionism. *Concentration and localization in the cities of almost all centers of political control and governing also facilitate the outburst and success of urban revolutions.* There the task of the revolutionaries is concrete and simple—to seize these centers (fortresses, governmental buildings, arsenals, telephones, telegraphs, power stations, banks, etc.); as soon as they are taken, three-quarters of the revolution is done. In the country, a seizure of such centers is impossible because they are absent. If the peasants try to move to the city in order to do this, some time is lost, and this gives the government a possibility of preparing for defence and suppression of the attack.

[54] See Diehl, Ch., *Byzance,* Chap. 6, Book III.

There are many similar conditions which facilitate the same result. But side by side with the concrete conditions, there is some general factor which, together with the proprietorial character of rural classes, seems to have contributed greatly to urban revolutions. Up to recent times, at least for the bulk of the city population, the city environment, as such, has been much less natural and has given much less opportunity for the satisfaction of basic human needs and fundamental impulses than the rural environment. For a clarification of this idea, let us consider the situation of the urban proletariat, its work, its occupational environment, and the essentials of its mode of living. This group works in a closed factory or shop, which has been, especially in the past, often unhygienic, ugly, unesthetical, and unattractive to eyes, or ears, or to the organs of smell or other perceptors. They are surrounded by the kingdom of dead machinery, steel, iron, coal, and oil. Enormous noises, clangs, grinds, knocks, raps, clatters, and taps of machinery and tools fill their ears. Dirt, summer heat, and winter cold assail them. Such has been and still is their occupational environment to a considerable degree. The work itself is also tiresome, monotonous, mechanical, half automatic. It furnishes little, if any creative or interesting outlet for them. It goes on monotonously day in and day out, for months, and years. And such work is continued for eight, ten, or twelve hours every day. After it, they go to their "homes," which, as a rule, are one or more rooms or an apartment in the worst part of the city. Often it is stripped of any comfort and convenience. This has and does compose the bulk of their manner of living and the essential environment of their existence. Where and when during the thousands and thousands of years of man's history, have man's essential impulses been trained to be adapted to such an environment and manner of living? Have not the environment and manner of living of 99 per cent of human beings during the thousands of years of preceding history during which man's fundamental impulses—reflexes, instincts, habits, responses—have been shaped, been quite different and opposite? Are they fit and adapted to the above city environment? Can such a city environment and manner of living satisfy these fundamental impulses and habits developed in quite a different situation and adapted to quite a different environment? The answer is no. Neither the impulses for creative activity; nor for orientation, curiosity, and novelty; nor the lust for variety and adventure; nor the physiological needs for fresh air; nor the needs for healthy activity in which the whole body participates but not one organ; nor the physiological and psychological necessity for being in touch with nature; nor to enjoy with eyes the greenishness of the meadows, the beauties of the forest, the clear rivers, the waves of golden wheat in the fields; nor

to hear the birds singing, the thunderstorm, or the mysterious calm of an evening amidst nature; these and thousands of similar phenomena have been taken from the urban man. All these and hundreds of "prepotent drives" have not been able to find satisfaction in the above urban conditions. "Culture" and its values have remained inaccessible to the proletarians in some of its best and richest forms. Shall we wonder that being put into such a "bed of nails," this stratum of the city has felt itself dissatisfied, has been "feverishly turning over and over in this bed of nails" and has tried again and again to find some outcome of this "unnatural" environment in the form of disorders, riots, and revolutions? Shall we wonder that the revolutions began to break out with the beginning of urbanization? Man has not been adapted, during thousands and thousands of years of his history, to such an environment and to such a living; and since he has not been adapted he could not and cannot quietly "sleep" in such a "bed." In spite of the enormous improvement of the conditions of the urban labor classes in these respects, the city still has a great deal of these elements of "unnaturality" and through that stimulates dissatisfaction and disorders.[55]

The farmer-peasant environment, on the contrary, has been much more "natural" and much more identical with that to which man has been trained by thousands of years of preceding history. The basic impulses of man, as they have been shaped by the past, are to be satisfied much easier in the environment and by the occupational activity of the farmer. There is neither a lack of nature, nor the killing monotony of work, not extreme specialization, nor one-sidedness. His standard of living may be as low as that of proletarian; his house or lodging may be bad; and yet the whole character of his structure of living is quite different and healthier and more natural. He is a "whole man" in difference from a city workingman turned into "a mere finger of a social body" by modern conditions. The "bed" on which history has put him to sleep has had less nails in it than that of the proletarian.[56] This general condition has been responsible, in no small degree, for a less revolutionism of the rural class.

Such in brief are some of the principal factors which explain the difference in radicalism, rural and urban.

[55] See several valuable considerations of this type in Patrick, G. J. W., *The Psychology of Social Reconstruction;* Freeman, R. A., *Social Decay and Regeneration, passim;* Sorokin, P., *Sociology of Revolution,* Chap. XVII; Veblen, T., *The Instinct of Workmanship;* Blaha, A., *Sociologie sedlaka a delnika,* Chap. V.

[56] This is supported by the answers of farm people to the question: "Are you satisfied with farm life?"; 88 per cent of the men, 89 per cent of the women, and 87 per cent of the boys and girls who had tasted town life answered positively. Kumlien, W. F., *op. cit.,* p. 10. See also *Attitudes and Problems of Farm Youth,* pp. 17 ff., 49; *What Farm Women Think About Farm Life; The Advantages of Farm Life;* "Cossacks on the French Farms," in *Vosrojdenie,* No. 1163, 1928; King, F. H., *Farmers of Forty Centuries,* p. 110.

Types of Political Measures Favored by Rural Classes. A number of studies has been made of the various types of political measures favored by the rural classes. The state of Ohio voted a new constitution in 1912. An analysis was made of those measures favored by the rural and urban classes. Let us examine them in detail in order to grasp any peculiar tendencies of the political mind of the farmer.[57]

Amendments to Ohio Constitution Defeated by Rural Vote but Securing a Majority of the Urban Vote

Number	*Name*
2.	Abolition of capital punishment.
22.	Contempt proceedings and injunction.
24.	Omitting the word "white" from the constitution of 1851.
25.	Use of voting machines.
29.	To extend the state bond limit to 50 million dollars for inter-county wagon roads.
30.	Eligibility of women to certain offices.
38.	Out of door advertising.

Others were carried by the urban districts in spite of the fact that rural districts opposed them.

Amendments to the Ohio Constitution Carried by Urban Districts in Spite of Opposition from the Rural Districts

Number	*Name*
3.	Depositions by the state and comment on failure to testify in criminal cases.
4.	Suits against the state.
5.	Initiative and referendum.
8.	Limiting veto power of governor.
9.	Permitting mechanics' and builders' liens.
11.	Workmen's compensation.
18.	Eight-hour day on public works.
19.	Change in judicial system.
17.	Abolishing prison contract labor.
20.	Judge of common pleas for each county.
21.	Abolition of justices of peace in certain cities.
27.	Organization of boards of education.
28.	Creating offices of superintendent of public instruction.
31.	Abolishing boards of public works.
32.	Taxation of state and public bonds including interest and income from production of minerals.
39.	Methods of submitting amendments.
40.	Municipal home rule.
41.	Schedule of amendments.

Amendments to the Ohio Constitution Carried by the Rural Districts Without Help of the Urban Districts

Number	*Name*
1.	Reform in the civil jury system.
5.	Damage for wrongful death.
7.	Investigation by each house of the general assembly.
10.	Welfare of employees.
12.	Conservation of natural resources.

[57] See Cushman, Robert E., "Voting Organic Laws," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1913, Vol. 28, 1913.

Number	*Name*
14.	Removal of officials.
15.	Regulating expert testimony in criminal trials.
16.	Registering and warranting land titles.
18.	Limiting power of the general assembly in extra sessions.
26.	Primary elections.
30.	Regulating insurance.
34.	Double liability of stockholders and inspection of private banks.
35.	Regulating state printing.
37.	Civil service.
42.	License to traffic in intoxicating liquors.

The first two groups were opposed by the rural districts and favored by the urban districts and the last was favored by the rural districts. What do these tell us concerning the mind of the farmer? It is obvious that many of the measures were of local or technical significance so that they really tell nothing. On the other hand, we find farmers favoring capital punishment, and keeping race relations as established, and opposed to increases of taxation, changes in law-making to bring about popular rule (22, 4, 5, 8) and the eligibility of women to certain offices. They were also opposed to many items of special interest to the workmen, such as the eight-hour day on public work, abolishing prison contract labor, workmen's compensation, etc. Yet they favored reform of the civil jury system, property damages for criminal acts, regulation of banks and corporations and several other measures which they thought would promote honesty in politics. Women suffrage secured about the same vote in each. Before we discuss these further, let us give information from some more studies.

L. B. Shippee made a study of direct legislation in the state of Washington and gave the following rural and urban differences in voting. The country districts favored prohibition, but opposed the eight-hour day and teachers' pensions. City districts voted the opposite on each of these. Concerning the abolishment of private labor employment agencies, there seems to have been some difference of opinion. However, all the cities opposed private labor agencies except Spokane, second in size. It carried in the state by 52.85 per cent. This is slight evidence that the bill was not as strongly favored in rural districts.[58]

Ogburn and Peterson made a study of the political thought of social classes in the state of Oregon based on the popular vote on 103 measures submitted to the referendum between 1910 and 1914.[59] The vote of Portland was considered as urban and that of 20 counties possessing no town of 3,000 or more population in 1910, as rural. The urban vote was divided into three groups, upper, middle, and

[58] See Shippee, L. B., "Direct Legislation in Washington," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 30, 1915, pp. 235–253.

[59] Ogburn, William, and Peterson, Delvin, "Political Thought of Social Classes," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 30, 1916, pp. 300 ff.

lower classes, based upon the majority of occupations in certain wards. They give the average difference between the social classes based upon the number of voters out of each hundred voting opposite for all 103 and for 26 so-called progressive measures of general interest. That is, if 30 votes out of every hundred among the upper classes favored the 26 measures and 50 among the lower classes, the average difference would be 20.

What conclusions may be drawn from the facts? Could one call farmers individualistic on the basis of these? It is hard to say. The great variations of opinion and class feeling are in cities. The difference between the upper and middle classes and the laboring populations in cities is much greater than the rural-urban difference. At the same time, rural groups differ more from the lower classes in cities than from the middle or upper. However, the rural vote did not differ as much from any city class as the differences within the city. These conclusions may be based upon the votes for all measures or only upon those for the 26 radical ones. Out of every 100 votes, 37 of the upper classes favored the progressive measures, 42 of the middle, 52 of the laboring, 46 of all the city and 42 of the rural. The actual votes in favor of 16 of the more important measures are given below:

Popular Vote in Favor of 16 Measures for the Social Classes of Oregon

Measures	*1910–1914*		*Social Classes in City* *		
	Rural	*City*	*Upper*	*Middle*	*Lower*
Women suffrage	46	32	21	46	29
State railroad construction	39	44	33	38	52
Increase of salary of a judge	13	23	39	34	17
Employers' Liability	60	68	48	53	85
Public Utilities regulation by state	61	64	69	69	65
Eight-hour day on public works	53	67	49	61	80
Prohibiting private employment of city convicts	62	74	76	75	73
Single tax	24	35	23	35	41
Abolition of death penalty	39	42	30	31	45
Sterilization of criminal or insane	43	42	55	55	27
Workmen's compensation	70	73	84	81	61
Universal eight-hour day	25	30	10	14	43
Eight-hour day for women	40	46	26	31	57
Prohibition	61	50	46	65	31
1914 abolition of death penalty	47	51	41	47	53
Single tax heavily graduated–1914 vote	31	33	18	26	39

* Portland.

Rural districts favored women suffrage because it was tied up with the prohibition question. They were not in favor of the state going into the business of railroad construction. Very few voted to increase

the salary of a public official. They feel that employers should be liable for accidents to employees, but not as strongly as the employed classes in cities. They were relatively opposed to the eight-hour day and to state regulation of public utilities. They favored prohibiting private employment of city convicts but not so strongly as any city class. The single tax was opposed both times much more so than in cities. They favored the death penalty, relative to city classes. Sterilization of criminals was opposed and prohibition was favored.

Another study of some significance to this chapter is that by Stuart A Rice concerning referendum votes in the state of Washington, 1914–1920.[60] Based upon the use of rank correlations by counties, he secured the following results:

Variables Correlated	*Rank Coefficient of Correlation*
Vote for prohibition in 1914 and vote for the Farmer-Labor party candidate for governor	−.28
Prohibition 1914 and proportion of farmers to total population	.33
School medical inspection, 1922 (anti-vaccination) and vote for Farmer-Labor party candidate for governor	.38
School medical inspection 1922 and proportion of farmers to total population	−.30
School medical inspection 1922 and value of farm property per farm	−.43
Vote for "30–10" school act * 1922 and vote Farmer-Labor party, 1920	.68
Vote for "30–10" school act * 1922 and proportion of farmers to total population, 1920	−.25
Vote for "30–10" school act * 1922 and value farm property per farm, 1920	−.59
Vote for Farmer-Labor party 1920 and vote for the eight-hour day law, 1914	.80
Vote for Farmer-Labor party 1920 and proportion of farmers to total population, 1920	−.37
Vote for Farmer-Labor party 1920 and value of farm property per farm, 1920	−.55

* This bill was to provide for public schools three-fourths from the state treasury and one-fourth locally. It would have placed more of the costs upon city populations and have been an advantage to farmers.

The unpublished study of rural and urban voting made in a seminar conducted by the authors at the University of Minnesota in 1927–1928, gives some comparisons of votes on some important questions. The correlation coefficients were between favorable votes on the measure and the proportion of population on farms.[61]

1. 1916, Am. 2: Relating to investment and loaning of school funds on improved farm lands within the state: −.136.

[60] Rice, S. A., "The Referendum in Washington," *Proceedings of the National Conference for Social Work*, 1923, pp. 508–510.

[61] The results were computed by E. H. Lott, C. A. Anderson, William Gordon, R. W. Hopperstad, O. W. Behrens, O. D. Duncan, I. A. Hammer, and E. C. Paustion.

2. 1916, Am. 7: A provision for direct legislation through the initiative and referendum: —.185.

3. 1918, Am. Prohibition: —.070.

4. 1920, Am. 16: Trunk highway system, requiring an issuance of bonds and an automobile tax to pay these off: —.634.

5. 1920, Affecting the assessments of railroad real property: Sect. 2226, G. S. of Minn. 1913: +.372.

6. 1922, Sec. 10, Art. 9, Rural Credits Act: +.995.

7. 1922: Taxation of iron and other ores for the general benefit of the state: +.701.

8. 1924, Sec. 5, Art. 9: Sale tax on oil and gas for motor vehicles for support of trunk highways: —.471.

9. 1924, Am. 17: States Grain Elevator: —.149.

10. 1924: Reforestation program, by state: —.553.

11. 1926: Reforestation by state: —.135.

12. 1926: Authorizing the legislature to prescribe and limit the liability of stockholders in corporations: —.848.

These above results are biased by a number of factors, other than the direct issue of town-country allegiances. One is that not voting for an amendment, when the voter casts his ballot, counts as a negative vote. Another is that this was a period in which the agricultural depression struck the state. This is to be seen in the opposition to the trunk highway system in 1920 (most farmers in Minnesota own automobiles and the tax would fall on each of them; further, the agricultural crisis was in full effect by the time of the elections in the fall of 1920); the attempts to put more taxation upon the railroads in 1920, and on the mine companies in 1922; and the opposition to the gas tax amendment in 1924. These and other special features reduce many of the town-country differences to a minimum. One of these special features was the slight opposition to prohibition in the rural districts compared with the relative standing of the three cities. In this nationality and religious differences annul the town-country differences in a similar manner as already shown in another study, that they made the birth-rates of Switzerland appear higher in the cities. A further factor which might have affected the vote on prohibition was the fact that it was taken during the time when the war was at its height.[62]

A few other studies have been made in the United States, but these

[62] An interesting sidelight of this study is the vote on the reforestation measures in 1924 and 1926. There were certain changes in the measure between 1924 and 1926, which may partially explain the more favorable reception in 1926. But the interesting thing is that the rural districts were less favorable in both votes. This may be explained primarily by the fact that rural voters being nearer to nature, cannot see the necessity of attempts to artificially maintain a natural environment. Further, the matter of increased taxes, or a fear of such, was a factor.

suffice for illustration.[63] What conclusions are suggested by these studies? 1. Farmers are opposed to many class measures favored by the laboring classes. Illustrations are eight-hour day laws and the prohibition of private employment of criminals. 2. Farmers vote relatively more on the basis of moral idealism. Illustrations are prohibition [64] and the Ohio measure for the welfare of employees. 3. Farmers are relatively opposed to any measures which alter their rights to land or in any way endanger their possession of lands. Such as by increasing taxes or centralizing the control of tax rights. Illustrations are their opposition to single taxes, their favoring the warranting of land titles, and the attempts to reduce or pass the burden of taxes to others in Minnesota after 1920. 4. Farmers are hard and are generally opposed to measures which seem to partake of "mollycoddling" or softening of the social system. Illustrations are their opposition to abolishment of death penalties and opposition to pensions for teachers. The rural classes take care of themselves in old age and they expect others to do the same. 5. They favor paternal societies rather than popular or mob rule. The illustrations are the votes in opposition to initiative and referendum. 6. They are conservative in regard to property rights. They opposed the school taxation reforms in Washington, even when it would have accrued to their advantage. They wish private property for themselves and are willing that others should have it in order that they might also. But in case of a conflict with measures affecting their land rights, as after 1920 in Minnesota, the safety of their own land prevails over the other attitude.

Rural and Urban Political Attitudes in Switzerland. This little country has been experimenting for some time with the popular referendum. The votes on various measures in the rural and urban cantons enable us to make some comparisons similar to those just made for the United States. At the same time the student must remember that there are many factors affecting political attitudes besides rural and urban correlations, hence conclusions must be drawn carefully. Parts of Switzerland are German, others French and Italian. Further, some parts are Catholic and other Protestant. As just pointed out, these national and religious correlations may obscure the rural and urban correlations.

The first statement concerning the temper of the Swiss as shown by their votes is that the radicals and socialists are in the cities and

[63] See Rice's study, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1925, pp. 60 ff.; *Farmers and Workers in American Politics*, *op. cit.*; and the recent book by the same author.

[64] The lack of a correlation with the Prohibition Vote in Minnesota is assumed to be an exception, for the reasons given before.

urban districts. The conservatives and the stable elements are to be found in the rural districts.[65]

The second characterization deals with internationalism. On May 16, 1920, a vote was taken concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations. On the average the rural districts were more opposed to the League of Nations than the urban. The rural classes were more nationalistic, and the urban more internationalistic.[66]

The next vote is that concerning state regulation of labor practices. On October 31, 1920, a vote was taken concerning state regulation of hours of labor in the transportation enterprises.[67] The results in the rural and urban cantons show that the rural classes were relatively more opposed to state regulation of hours of labor. Another vote, January 30, 1921, concerning the suppression of military justice, is somewhat similar to the votes on repealing capital punishment in the United States.[68] The vote in urban and rural cantons gives the conclusion that rural populations were relatively more opposed to the suppression of military justice in the army. All the rural cantons had higher per cents of the inscribed electors opposed to the suppression than the average of the total vote except Basel-Land, and this canton had a higher proportion opposed than Basel-Stadt. Another vote concerns the submission of custom-house questions to popular referendum. Switzerland has a system where certain measures must be submitted to referendum, others may be if the initiative petitions are signed, and others are settled by the national assembly. This measure is an attempt to extend popular rule similar to the provision in the Ohio constitution of 1912 which added the initiative and referendum to the representative form of government. It is to be remembered that the rural voters in Ohio opposed the initiative and referendum features of the 1912 constitution. The vote by urban and rural cantons in Switzerland for April 15, 1923,[69] shows that rural populations in Switzerland are relatively more opposed to the extension of popular rule. The referendum of December 6, 1925, dealing with constitutional provisions for state insurance for aged persons, orphans, and invalids,[70] shows results similar in essential respects to the votes in the United States providing for pensions

[65] See Bonjour, F., *Rural Democracy in Operation*, appendix 215–219; also Rappard, E., "Democracy vs. Demagogy," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1923, Vol. 38, pp. 290–306 and 360–387.

[66] In a similar manner, peasants took the nationalistic attitude on the vote of December 1926, "sur l'approvisionnement du Pays en céreales." See *Jahrbuch*, 1926, and 1920, p. 345.

[67] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1920, p. 346.

[68] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1921, p. 334.

[69] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1923, p. 366.

[70] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1925, p. 288.

for teachers. It provides for state aid and support of dependent persons. It is not completely a charity bill but means that these persons may depend on the state in old age rather than upon their savings. The rural cantons opposed this measure. Only one had an average vote in its favor greater than the average of all Switzerland. All urban cantons given favored the measure more than the average of the country as a whole. This vote is quite characteristic of the attitude of farmers concerning state aid. They prefer to take care of themselves and let other persons do the same. The strength of family organization in rural life is probably a factor in this same phenomenon. In 1922 this same country voted upon a compulsory levy on capital, in order to absorb some of the war debts and to aid in financing the state. This movement was defeated by the rural districts and the bourgeois in opposition to the socialists and communists.[71]

Interpretation. With the previous discussion in mind, it is relatively easy to understand the attitudes of rural classes concerning many legislative measures which come up for their decision. Farmers are opposed to many measures fostered by the laboring classes, because their property holdings, their occupational and economic status, as a class, and the essential nature of their lives make them different. They oppose the laborers on measures which tend to abrogate property rights. Since the rural classes are entrepreneurs, they can see few objections to a long working day. Further, they do not understand the nervously debilitating nature of much of urban labor. Farmers have strong family units. As a rule, they accumulate some real property. The cost of living is cheap. For these reasons and others they are able to take care of themselves in old age. As a result they object to pensions for old age, etc. Further, pensions mean higher taxes and farmers pay direct taxes. Other classes, especially the laboring classes in cities, pay primarily indirect taxes, where they pay any. Farmers can see their tax money go out.

The moral idealism of farm political attitudes arises out of the religious and family organization of rural life. It is not only in America that farmers vote "dry." The Swedish "dry" party, as already shown, gets most of its support in rural districts. This same matter has been analyzed more fully in the chapter on moral and criminal behavior, so no further elaboration need be given here.

The farmer vote on military justice, abolition of the death penalty, and concerning initiative and referendum, is a result of many factors: greater rigidity of farmer-peasant moral convictions, greater unanimity in the ideas of what is good and what is bad, and other factors

[71] For the comparative vote on this matter see Rappard, E., "Democracy vs. Demagogy," *op. cit.*, and also *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1922.

discussed in the chapters dealing with the rural family, religion, and criminality. To these the influence of agricultural occupation is to be added.

The farmer deals with nature in a rude and relentless competition for a livelihood. When he fails to adjust himself to nature or to its laws, he sees the immediate and terrible results. The farmer sees suffering in his daily round. He helps the cows to calve and the animals about the place to bear young. He sees and feels the immediate retribution of nature when one of its laws are overstepped. If the animals stay out in the wintry night they freeze. In a similar manner, if he stays out he suffers. Urban populations do not see those things to the same extent as the rural. They deal with artificial and material things. Children are fewer, and more of those are born in hospitals and away from common observation. Urban people suffer less unless it is the psychical suffering of restless, overstimulated, and unsatisfied minds. They do not feel the force of nature, nor are they as willing to accommodate to the forces of nature in their dealing with each other. Their life is "softer." Hence, the above differences which manifest themselves in the field of criminality, religious attitudes, and many others analyzed in this book. As it is shown in another place in the book the mind and moral code of the rural classes is nearer to that of the Old—stern and just—than to the New Testament—soft, forgiving, and loving.

CHAPTER XX

AGRICULTURAL CLASSES AND POLITICAL RÉGIMES

Many writers, among whom one of the most recent is J. G. Thompson, assert that political liberties, freedom, and democracy have been predominantly the effects of urbanization; that correspondingly, city conditions facilitate a development of these and similar phenomena, and urban people have stronger attitudes of democracy, tolerance, political and social freedom than rural people.[1] For a corroboration of their contention these writers cite a series of historical facts which, in their opinion, support it.

It is not our intention to enter here into a detailed discussion of this complicated matter. All that we wish to show is that these, and similar claims, are not sufficiently proved, and, for this reason, remain mere opinions, and very often, are pretty indefinite in their meaning.

To begin with, the terms democracy, liberty, freedom, and even intolerance have so many and so different meanings, aspects, and connotations that in the multitude of synonyms they, as such, are meaningless. It is exceedingly difficult to establish any causal correlations between the vague and different phenomena covered by these terms and some other variables. Practically all the theories mentioned (as well as the opposite ones) remind an attentive reader of a complex system of dark and unknown caves in which the author incidentally throws a light on only a few casual spots, while the whole body of thousands of passages remains in darkness. Even these few spots under the weak and wandering light of the authors continually change their forms and character. It is impossible to build any valid body of a theory under such circumstances. In the second place, this historical evidence given in such cases represents nothing but a few fragmentary and quite incidental cases which do not prove anything. In the third place, the real meaning even of these cases is often quite wrongly interpreted. Let us substantiate these critical remarks. In order to avoid vague terms as much as possible, let us split democracy into a few better-defined elements, and make urban-rural confrontations in regard to these elements.

Monarchy and Republic. Rightly or wrongly (the latter is the more probable) many authors and politicians often regard the republican form of government as harmonious with, or a constituent

[1] See Thompson, J. G., *op. cit.*, chaps iii–xi.

element of, democracy. May we say that urbanization is definitely correlated with republican, and ruralization with monarchical, régimes, or that city people are more republican while the rural classes are more monarchical? The facts scarcely justify such a correlation. Among the monarchical countries at the present moment, we find, on the one hand, the most industrialized countries, such as England and Belgium; those considerably industrialized, such as Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark; and the least industrialized, such as Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Spain, Afghanistan, and many native states of India. On the other hand, among the republican countries we find also highly industrialized and urbanized countries such as the United States and Germany; those considerably industrialized, such as France and Austria; still less industrialized such as Russia, China, and many South American republics. This spatial confrontation does not show any correlation between the forms of government and ruralization or urbanization. The same conclusion is suggested by a confrontation of these phenomena historically.

Take, for instance, the history of Rome or Greece, or many of the Hindu states. If at the earliest period of Greek and Roman histories, their régimes were monarchical, later on, at periods still predominantly rural, Rome and many of the Greek states shifted to the republican form of government; and still later, when urbanization was further increasing, the republican régimes of Rome and of many Greek states were replaced by monarchical forms of government. In India, besides "the patriarchal democratic republics of the earliest periods" the development of the republic-empires was the most successful at an earlier—less urbanized than the later—more urbanized stages (B. C. 600–450; 350–300; and B. C. 150–350 A. D.). After this period republics in India almost disappeared, though urbanization in many states progressed.[2] Further, many European or Asiatic countries have maintained, throughout centuries, either monarchical or republican governments in spite of the fact that the curves of urbanization of these countries have fluctuated enormously during those centuries. Furthermore, in some of these countries there have been changes of political forms; from monarchy to republic and to monarchy again (for instance, in England in the seventeenth century, and in Spain in the nineteenth century), or from republic to monarchy and to republic again (in many Italian city states of the Middle Ages, and in France in the nineteenth century), within short periods of some twenty or thirty years, during which the amount of urbanization remained practically unchanged. These confrontations in time and in space show that these variables; forms of government,

[2] See Sarkar, B., *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindu*, Ch. VI.

on the one hand, and urbanization or ruralization on the other, move quite independently and do not show any tangible correlation. For this reason, we cannot claim that farmer-peasants are more monarchical or more republican than city people, or *vice versa*. As will be shown later on (see the chapters about Traditionalism, Nationalism, and Patriotism) the farmer-peasant class adheres somewhat longer than the city classes, as a whole, to the forms of government which have been historically prevalent in the country. If the régime preceding the change was republican, the rural groups would remain attached to the republic for a longer time than the city people; if the preceding régime was a monarchy, the class studied would remain attached to the monarchy for a longer time. This is all that it is possible to say validly. And this does not mean any particular inclination of farmer-peasants for either a monarchy or a republic. It means only that in this, as well as in other cultural changes, the country lags in comparison with the city. No more and no less.

Self-Government and Autocratic Government. In a similar way, we do not find a valid basis for the assumption that rural peoples are less capable of self-government, or elective government, or that they are more disposed to autocratic or hereditary forms of government than urban people. This is claimed by many. A test of the correlation in space and time, as the above, does not justify such an assumption. In the first place, the largest and the best analyzed sample of simple agricultural peoples (studied by Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg), shows that among the most primitive agricultural peoples only 3 per cent have social ranks of nobility; among somewhat higher agricultural peoples the per cent is 15; and among still higher agricultural societies it is 23. Thus the enormous majority of the pre-urban and pre-industrial agricultural peoples are free even from the presence of the social ranks of nobility, which is one of the prominent symptoms of autocracy and despotism. The same study shows further that among all cases of pre-urban agricultural peoples studied, 57 had hereditary governments, and 47 had personal (non-hereditary or elected) governments. In 34 cases the governments were "powerful," in 71 they were "influential"; in 15 "powerful only in war"; in 9 "powers in war and peace were distinct"; in 51 the councils were powerful; and in 22 the "governments were slight or nil." [3] This seems to show that the situation is very complex and does not give any basis for the claim that "pure" agricultural peoples are bent either to autocracy, or to hereditary, or to despotic and unlimited forms of government.

[3] See Hobhouse, L., Wheeler, G., and Ginsberg, M., *The Material and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, pp. 236 and *passim*.

When we turn to "historical" peoples, it is sufficient to point out that the most and (perhaps) purest forms of democracy in the histories of Rome or of several Greek states or other European and Asiatic peoples were not so much at the later (urban) but at the earlier (predominantly agricultural) stages of those peoples with their direct, self-governing class and folkmoots.[4] Many similar facts are true for self-governmental institutions of rural communities, such as the Russian Mir, or Chinese village, or the Hindu rural communities and guilds,[5] which often have survived, at least in local forms, through all the vicissitudes of political change, and under the very unlimited autocracies. Is it necessary to point out further that, at the present moment, self-governing democracies exist not only among highly urbanized countries such as England, but among much less urbanized countries such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Jugo-Slavia. More than that: the attentive study of the origin and development of democratic types of men and the really democratic ("particularist") society in Europe, so brilliantly made by F. Le Play and his school, shows, at least, that the cultivators of the particularist type have been responsible for the creation and spread of "democratic" (particularist) types in Scandinavia, Saxony, England, Europe, and throughout the world. These particularist men originated and were formed not in the cities but on individual lots of land, farms, and estates. These "particularist" cultivators created and later introduced self-control, self-government, and the contractual type of society in the cities; they promulgated it; they protected it from all attacks; and thus they created what is known today as real democracy. If there is a little prejudice in this theory, its essence is scarcely wrong.[6] After this penetrating analysis of the origin of democracy in Europe by the Le Play School, it is rather difficult to agree with the opinion criticized here. In an application to America it is sufficient to remember F. J. Turner's *Frontier in American History* to see, at least, that the contributions of the farmers to American democracy have been not a trifle, but something very fundamental.[7]

More than this: many forms of leadership of the cities in the movement for liberation and democracy meant, in addition, but the exten-

[4] See Frank, T., *op. cit.*, pp. 50 ff., 120 ff. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, Ch. III; Gomme, G. L., *Primitive Folkmoots*, pp. 20–69; *Village Community*, pp. 250–265.

[5] See Smith, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 226 ff.; Sarkar, B., *op. cit.*, pp. 51 ff., 59 ff., and 67 ff.

[6] See Tourville, H. de, *The Growth of Modern Nations*, N. Y., 1907; Demolins, E., *Anglo-Saxon Superiority*, London, 1898; see Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Ch. II.

[7] It is curious to note that many authors, including Thompson, in their fragmentary and superficial survey of the development of democracy in Europe, do not even mention the results obtained by this school. Charles A. Beard's "Culture and Agriculture" (*Saturday Review of Literature*, Vol. V, pp. 272–273) suffers from a similar one-sidedness.

sion and promotion of urban autocracy and despotism upon and at the cost of self-government and democracy in the rural communities. In India the growth of the cities and their empires robbed the rural communities of their liberty.[8] The Greek City-States fed their own democracy by the exploitation and autocratic governing of neighboring agricultural regions. They enslaved enormous masses of the populations. Similar was the story of the Roman urban democracy. Also in the Middle Ages "bourgeois city-states worked solely for the profit of their members, without any regard for the rights of neighboring and hostile communities. . . . They subjected the peasants of the surrounding districts to themselves," prevented their development, robbed them of freedom and imposed upon them a rigid, and quite autocratic, economic and political control.[9]

Such is the other side of the city movement for democracy and self-government. It has been rather common; and it means that if the cities have played a conspicuous part in the development of self-government and democratic institutions, their progress in this respect has often meant the promotion of an autocracy upon, and the destruction of autonomy and self-government in, the rural communities. This other side is often forgotten by the eulogizers of the "free air" of the cities; meanwhile it is scarcely less common and important than the "shining" side. "The city free air" often has meant "prison air" for the rural parts. The above brief indications are sufficient to claim that the whole theory discussed is unwarranted. Neither studies of farmer voting, nor historical evidence corroborates this (or the opposite) contention. All that it is possible to say in this respect is that owing to their scattering over a vast territory, and to the poorer means of communication which make fast and permanent organization of farmers and peasants into large social units exceedingly difficult, rural communities have been often less able to defend their rights and privileges from assailants and attackers (including the cities). The concentration of a multitude of urban people in a small territory, on the contrary, has permitted city populations to organize much easier, and in cases of emergency to gather together much more quickly. In this way they have incomparably better conditions for organized action, whether for promotion of their political interests or for their defense. For these reasons, in some cases the cities have been more successful than the scattered farmer-peasants, whether in the defense of their liberty or in its expansion at the cost of the king, feudal rulers, the Church, or the rural classes. This difference in conditions has been, often enough, a source of weakness for the agricultural classes in defense or the

[8] Sarkar, *op, cit.*, pp. 59 ff.

[9] Boissonnade, P., *op. cit.*, pp. 212 ff.

promotion of self-government and political rights.[10] But it has nothing to do with the predominance of "the spirit of democracy" in the cities and "the spirit of autocracy" in the rural communities.

Freedom, Political Liberties, and Tolerance. Again quoting Thompson, "Nothing is clearer than that slavery and serfdom have declined as cities have developed. For these two forms of human bondage are almost exclusively features of a rural economy." Such is the new correlation between ruralization and slavery, or urbanization and freedom claimed by the partisans of the cities.[11] In a similar manner they claim that the progress of political and religious liberty and tolerance is due principally to the cities; and correspondingly, "the urban elements are more 'liberal' than the rural elements; and though this circumstance may have its unfavorable as well as its favorable aspects, it, without doubt, contributes today, as it has contributed in the past, to promote freedom both with respect to the outward forms and activities of religion and with respect to the subtler and more intimate spheres of thought, of speech, and of publication, in the religious field. Without doubt, too, the urban environment exerts a similar influence today with reference to freedom of thought, of speech, and of the press in general." [12] Similar opinions are expressed by a great many writers and scholars. Are these contentions valid? Without doubt they contain a little truth, but even this little part is given a false meaning.

Let us test briefly to what extent it is true that slavery and serfdom are rural products and decline as the cities grow. For testing we shall take, in the first place, the largest sample of pre-urban agricultural peoples studied and see if they have in 100 per cent the institution of slavery or serfdom.[13] The facts show, first, that in two of the pre-urban agricultural stages more than 50 per cent of the pure agricultural peoples did not have slavery at all; second, that the per cent of agricultural peoples who have slavery among the highest agricultural people (among whom urbanization already exists to some degree) is higher but not lower than among those two lower, pre-urban, agricultural peoples; third, that slavery exists also among the hunters and pastoral peoples. These data suggest, first, that pure agricultural stages and slavery are not necessarily causally connected: since more than a half of pure agricultural peoples do not have

[10] A striking example of this weakness is demonstrated by contemporary Russian peasantry. Although it composes about 85 per cent of the population of Russia, and though the enormous majority bitterly opposed the Communist régime, it has not been able to overthrow the urban dictatorship up to the present time. This is due to the scattering over the vast territory, lack of means of communication, and the impossibility of simultaneous organized action.

[11] Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[13] See Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

slavery, we are entitled to think that the slavery institution is due probably not to agriculturism, but to some other concomitant factors present in the earlier stages of social evolution. This is corroborated by the fact that slavery is present among the pastoral and hunting peoples. Second, it is untrue that, as the cities appear and develop, slavery declines: since among the higher agricultural peoples, among whom the degree of urbanization is greater, the proportion of the peoples with slavery is greater, we cannot state that the curves of slavery and urbanization go on in opposite directions. Such are the results given by those data.

These conclusions are supported by the data of history. Study the histories of slavery in ancient Greece or Rome or China or several other countries. Roughly, such a study shows: at the earlier-agricultural-stages of Rome and Greece slavery was quite insignificant in quantitative proportions, and qualitatively was very mild and human; it grew quantitatively, and became incomparably more horrible qualitatively as urbanization of those countries proceeded. In Rome the climax of slavery was not at its agricultural stage, but at the end of the Republic, and in Greece during the fifth and fourth centuries B. C., the time of the greatest urbanization of those countries.[14] In a similar manner, the curve of slavery in the history of China does not show a constant decline with the growth of urbanization.[15] Similarly, the curve of development and decline of serfdom is much more complex than is depicted by the theory discussed. Neither in Russia, nor in the majority of the European countries, and in the United States was serfdom the most developed at the least urban stages; on the contrary it grew with the growth of cities (in Russia and America up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, in European countries up to the fourteenth century).

Only after those periods in Russia, the United States, and in other European countries was there a decline of serfdom. Such a movement suggests that the association of serfdom and ruralism is unwarranted; that, if after certain times, serfdom began to decline, the cause probably was not the growth of urbanization (which did not prevent the growth of serfdom in the preceding periods) but something else. These indications are sufficient to show the inadequacy of the hypothesis discussed. In the whole theory there is only one point which may be accepted, although even this point is misinterpreted, namely: owing to their scattering over a vast territory, their poor means of communication and lack of fortresses and arms, the rural

[14] See Meyer, E., *Die Sklaverie im Altertum;* Guiraud, P., *Études économique sur l'antiquité.*

[15] Chen Huan Chang, *op. cit.*, pp. 374 ff.; Lee, M. P. H., *The Economic History of China.*

classes have been often less capable than the city people of defending themselves from those who attempted to turn them into slaves or serfs. This, however, does not mean that rural classes have been more willing to accept slavery or serfdom than urban peoples or that the impulses for freedom among the rural have been weaker than among the urban. More than that; as a rule the urban classes were not enslaved to the rural classes; but, on the contrary, the rural were the victims of the urban in this respect. Viewed from this other side, the comparative rôles of the city and the country, and of rural and urban countries, in the origin and promotion of slavery are somewhat reversed. The city often has secured liberty and freedom for its population, but at the cost of the agricultural classes of their own country or of some foreign countries. When this is taken into consideration, the city scarcely has any valid reason to boast about its rôle in this matter.

As to the predominant *rôle of the cities in the establishment and promotion of religious and other liberties* (of speech, press, and so on) we may grant that they have been really more conspicuous in this respect than the country. Nevertheless, the real meaning of this is quite different than that which is ordinarily given by the theorists discussed. Figuratively, the problem is this: if one's shoes do not pinch one's feet, one does not talk much about his shoes pinching his feet and the necessity of "readjustment and liberation" of the feet from the pinching. If one's health is excellent one does not talk of health or try to procure good medical service or swallow various medicines. Now if, in a community, all the members have the same religion, the same mores, similar opinions, and moral rules, such a community does not need any declaration or any constitution to procure "liberty of religion, opinions, convictions" and what not. At the virtue of their homogeneity in all these respects, the members of the community, without any declaration, have naturally the freedom to believe and to think as they believe and think. Nothing is "pinching" their liberties, in this respect, and for this reason they do not need to talk of "freedom" and to secure some guarantees of these liberties. They already have such guarantees.

Quite different is the situation in a community with heterogeneous religious, political, moral, and social characteristics among its members. Owing to this heterogeneity, a community of beliefs, opinions, and convictions is lacking. Under such circumstances, there is an inevitable conflict of ideas, beliefs, and aspirations of the various members. If one part of them try to force the others to give up their ideas and to follow the ideas of the first part, this situation leads to a mutual or one-sided pinching or coercion and compulsion of one or more parts by others. Living together peacefully under such

circumstances is impossible unless there is some guarantee of "liberty" for every one to believe, or to think in his own way. Hence the necessity to talk of liberties, and to make compacts and agreements about tolerance and liberty. Hence the declarations, constitutions, and all this phraseology which has filled the annals of history since the appearance and growth of the cities.

We have seen that one of the fundamental differences between the city and the country is that the rural population is more homogeneous than the urban population. At the virtue of their homogeneity, rural peoples naturally have comparably greater similarity of beliefs, conviction, mores. Thus they may manifest or proclaim what they believe without hindrances and oppressions by other members of the rural community. This means that they "naturally" have much of the liberties discussed, and do not need either to talk much about them, to fight for their establishment, or to quarrel for such a guarantee. They are not "pinched." The city is the association of heterogeneous peoples. Hence, its members do not have naturally the liberty discussed. Conflicts in their ideas and beliefs are inevitable. And, as a matter of fact, such have taken place since the appearance of cities. Under such circumstances urbanites are doomed either to fight incessantly, one faction trying to impose its beliefs upon another, or to inculcate the attitudes of tolerance and to recognize the right of everyone to believe as he likes. Initial stages of urban history were full of such fights, which often undermined the welfare of the whole society, and made life miserable. After many trials, some mutual accommodation was achieved in the form of the recognition of some degree of mutual toleration and "liberty."

Such, in a schematical and somewhat simplified form, is the real meaning of the fact that the rôle of the cities in establishment and promotion of liberties has been more conspicuous than that of the country. This real interpretation does not mean at all that either the rural classes are more intolerant than the urban classes, or that the rural like liberty less than the urban, or that farmer-peasants did not know or appreciate, or did not have these liberties before they were generously obtained by the cities. *It shows only that, at the virtue of their greater homogeneity, the rural classes and peoples naturally have had the liberties which the cities, at the virtue of the great heterogeneity of their population, could have only after many conflicts and much misery following the attempts of one or more city groups to impose their beliefs and mores on others.* The rural people have had "liberty" naturally: the urban have had to establish it artificially and after many sacrifices. That is the chief difference. It shows that the ideologists of urbanity make a virtue out of what has been factually a matter of dire necessity. They ascribe liberties to the city while, as a matter of fact,

these same have been naturally enjoyed by rural peoples in no less degree than the cities.

The above means, also, that there is no valid reason to contend that rural peoples are more intolerant than urban peoples. No one has shown, as yet, that various religious persecutions have been started by agricultural but not urban classes; no one has demonstrated, also, that religious or other persecutions have been more severe and numerous in agricultural rather than industrial countries. On the contrary, the annals of China or India are not particularly rich with such persecutions. Neither are the agricultural stages of European societies (before the 14th century) rich with them compared with the later—more urbanized—stages. Development of the inquisitions and religious wars fall not at the pre-urban stages, but at the stages of a prominent urbanization (14th to 18th centuries). Finally, there is no evidence that, at the present moment, the agricultural classes or their parties show a greater degree of intolerance than the city classes and their parties. On the contrary, the statistics of religious crimes show that the agricultural class is less criminal in this respect than the urban population. In a similar manner the sharpness and bitterness of the struggle of various political factions seem to be greater in the city than in the country. A tendency to impose their convictions forcibly on unbelievers under the argument of terror and punishment is clearly manifested by various Communist factions in the city. This does not mean that the city is more intolerant; it means only that we do not have any basis to assume greater intolerance for the country. All that it is possible to claim is that the forms of intolerance in the city and in the country, at any given moment, are somewhat different.[16] For instance, the city may be much more liberal in regard to birth control, criticism of the Bible or attacks on private property; while the country may be much more liberal in regard to the assailment of various "freethinkers," "radicalism," in slandering various radical movements or in regard to the demands of the contemporary table etiquette. Such concrete differences exist; their forms may vary; but they do not mean what is generally claimed for them by the enthusiasts of the cities.

The above criticism of the pro-urban theories is not intended to decrease or minimize the rôle of the cities in all the above movements. It only tries to correct the inadequate underestimation of the real rôle of the rural population and absolve it from the "sins" of which it is not guilty.

[16] Comp. Lundquist, G. A., and Carver, T. N., *Principles of Rural Sociology*, pp. 153–154.

CHAPTER XXI

RURAL-URBAN ARTS AND ESTHETIC CULTURE

Common and Specific Elements of Rural-Urban Esthetic Culture. The general differences in other spheres of rural-urban culture outlined above, remain valid also in the field of rural-urban esthetic culture and attitudes. In brief they may be formulated in the form of the following propositions. *In the total sum of the esthetic or art culture* [1] *of a given country there is a part which is common to the city and to the country, and there is another part which is specific only for each of these areas of culture and correspondingly belongs only to the urban or the rural population.* In other words, side by side with the esthetic and corresponding attitudes common to the city and the country, there is a specific rural and a specific urban esthetic culture and corresponding attitudes. Let us substantiate this proposition. During the last quarter of a century there have been various fashionable extreme schools in painting, such as cubism, futurism, impressionism, and similar movements. These are already beginning to decline.[2] They appeared and spread almost entirely within the urban areas and are dying out without any diffusion, and even without being noticed, by rural populations. (Such a curve has been particularly clear in Russia.) It is also true for the United States. This is one example of specific urban esthetic phenomena. Take another and more prosaic case. The top-hat, full evening dress, and various court-uniforms and dresses, although they have been existing for decades, nevertheless have not spread over rural areas and practically remain the specific esthetic properties of the cities. In a similar manner, in poetry and music, in sculpture and architecture, and in literature and practical arts there always have been and are other phenomena which appear, spread, and die entirely within the cities, remaining unknown and unintelligible to the country and its population.[3] And *vice versa:* the country has had a series of esthetic phenomena which

[1] We take the term *art* in the broad sense outlined by L. Tolstoi. The usual meaning of the term *art* in the sense of what we see and hear in theaters, concerts, expositions, or read in poems, etc., "is only an insignificant part of the real art with which we transmit our inner experience to, or receive it from, others. The whole human existence is full of art-objects, beginning with lullabies, dances, mimic intonations, and ending with religious services and public ceremonies. All these are a real art also." Tolstoi, L., *Qu'est-ce que l'art*, p. 60, Paris, 1903.

[2] See Utitz, E., *Die Überwindung des Expressionismus.*

[3] Comp. Tolstoi, L., *op. cit.*, 85. "At present artistic productions of modern poets are as unintelligible to the common people as if they were written in Sanscrit language."

have not spread, in any noticeable degree, within the cities and their populations. There have been many agricultural folksongs and tales, legends and dances, forms of costumes and ornamentations, patterns of houses, furniture, and other architectural details, which have remained almost entirely within rural areas and, omitting a few specialists and museums, have not spread in the cities. Let the reader examine, for instance, the excellent volumes of Vavroušek, Bossert, and Karutz.[4] By a study of these collections he will see that, side by side with the forms, patterns, drawings, and types which have been taken by the peasants from the city, there are many samples which have been either entirely unknown to the city, or which represent such a fundamental modification of urban patterns and such "an apparently inexhaustible wealth of motifs and everchanging ornamentation" [5] that they are entitled to be called original rural creations, or specific peasant art. This "peasant art" of various European countries, in spite of differences in national culture and "in contradistinction to the various 'style' arts, is possessed of a remarkable consonant, or harmonious, spirit." [6]

Characteristics of the Rural Specific Art-Culture. The most conspicuous characteristics of the specific rural art are: first, its main topics and the whole "setting" are predominantly agricultural and center around the phenomena directly and indirectly connected with agricultural and rural conditions; second, it is more collective and impersonal or less marked by the individual peculiarities of its individual makers; third, it shows a less numerous variety of styles than city art; fourth, each of the rural styles is marked by an extraordinary "coherence," "harmoniousness" and artistic "typicality" which gives it a conspicuous originality; fifth, it is predominantly sincere and simple in its beauty; and sixth, it often is marked (in legends, tales, and songs), by attitudes of superiority of rural heroes, rural conditions, and rural phenomena in comparison with the urban.[7]

[4] B. Vavroušek, *Dědina*, an album of 516 photographs of peasant houses and their inner ornamentation of Czecho-Slovakia; H. Th. Bossert's *Peasant Art in Europe*, which contains 2,100 excellent color plates of peasant ornamentation and handicraft; Dr. Karutz's plates in the *Atlas der Völkerkunde;* Byhan-Haberlandt's studies in Bushan's *Ethnography.*

[5] Bossert, H. Th., *op. cit.*, p. ix.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. x.

[7] In the American setting, almost all that is said of rural art may be applied to the Negro art, particularly to the Negro songs. See Odum, H. W., and Johnson, G. B., *The Negro and His Songs; Negro Work-a-day Songs.* Besides the Negro folklore, the folklore of white rural America unquestionably exhibits all these characteristics. The same is still more true of Europe or Asia. See for America (and England): Gomme, A. B., *Traditional Games of England, Scotland and Ireland*, 2 vols. Newell, W. W., *Games and Songs of American Children;* Heck, J. O., "Folk Poetry and Folk Criticism," *Journal of American Folklore*, pp., 1–78, 1927; Eckstrom, P. K., and Smythe, M. W., *Minstrelsy of Maine;* Rickaby, F., *Ballads and Songs of the Shanty Boy;* Dobie, J. F., "Texas and Southwestern Lore," *Texas Folk-Lore Society*, vol. vi; Miller, G. M., *The*

It is a rather general fact that art expresses predominantly those feelings, ideas, images, emotions, wishes, desires, events, and situations which to some degree are experienced (felt, perceived, sensed, thought, and understood) by the artist. Correspondingly, it is natural to expect that "rural and agricultural" topics would predominate in the arts of rural people. Indeed, as for rural beliefs, rural arts are stamped with these rural characteristics. Let the reader look at the collections of rural ornamentations and handicrafts mentioned above. In spite of their immense variety in richness, a few and the same "topics" are systematically repeated in them. They are: patterns of trees, flowers, and plants; patterns of horses, cattle, and other domestic animals; patterns of birds and fish; and of peasant houses; these are the main topics of the rural environment and occupation. There is not a single ornamentation with a factory, or a machine, or other urban phenomena. (See Bossert's collection.) In the chapter about the Rural Religion and Beliefs, we found a similar phenomenon. Take the rural folksongs: their topics, images, and "contents" are again "rural": the sun, the moon, stars, rivers, brooks, streams, flowers, trees, nightingales, and other rural birds, horse, wolf, dog, and other animals;[8] change of weather and seasons, corn, grass, harvesting, ploughing, and similar phenomena. Human feelings: love and hatred, joy and sorrow, happiness and pains; human events: birth, marriage, death; these topics common to all men are expressed in those songs always in "rural settings," in the form of images and ideas and symbols taken predominantly from the rural environment and rural nature. The same is true in the field of national festivals. One of the most important public festivals in China has been the Spring Festival. V. Branford rightly says: "In this ceremony the Chinese Empire appeared as an agricultural patriarchate and matriarchate, wherein the Emperor in the peasant's

Dramatic Elements in the Popular Ballad, 1905; Hudson, A. P., "Ballads and Songs from Mississippi," *Journal of American Folklore*, 93–195, 1926; and the works of Bergen, Frazer, and others quoted above. For China, see Giles, H. A. (translation), *Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio*. For Oriental countries in the past see the *Sacred Books of the East*. For European countries the literature and materials are enormous. See the principal bibliography in the works of Newell, Miller, and Gomme. By studying these sources properly, one may see the validity of the statements in the text. A lack of space does not allow us to give necessary illustrations and evidences in the text. It is curious to note that the rural sociologists, up to the present time, have entirely neglected the whole problem of rural arts and have not mentioned either the sources or any theories in the field. It is hoped that from now on this inexcusable neglect will be eliminated.

[8] See Martinengo-Cesaresco, E., *The Place of Animals in Human Thought*. See Gubernatis' quoted works; Gaultier, P., *Reflet d'Histoire*, ch. "Le sentiment de la nature dans les beaux-arts." See also Bergen's, Newell's, Heck's and Frazer's volumes about the "Spirit of Corn," quoted. A lack of space does not permit us to give many facts and illustrations here. They may be secured by the reader from the sources indicated and many others. See also Odum and Johnson, *The Negro and His Songs*, pp. 57 ff.

yellow appropriated as the imperial color, drove the first furrow of the spring; while the Empress, again a typical peasant woman, planted the first row of soybeans. In a word, here was the sacrament of agriculture of a whole people." [9] In so far as peasant music is concerned, folk music is originated partly in connection with the processes of agricultural work, as K. Bücher has shown;[10] and partly in connection with various magical and religious rites which, as we have seen, are also marked with "rural coloring." The topics, the meaning, the performance, and even the rhythm of folk music is conspicuously stamped by ruralism and agriculturism which is easily detected by any careful investigator.[11]

As to the *impersonality and collectivity* of rural arts, this again is quite evident: almost all folklore is impersonal; it does not bear the names of the artists who created these esthetic values. As a matter of fact, folklore is the result of the creative abilities of many persons and, sometimes, many generations. The contributions of each individual are slowly added to those of others so that the song or tale, the ornament or tune has passed through the hands of hundreds of "makers." Besides, as all great investigators of the folk-arts unanimously say: "Popular poetry is the reflection of moments of strong collective emotion. The very heart of a people is laid bare in its sagas and songs." "The ballad (or folksong) maker only wields his power for as long as he is the true interpreter of the popular will. Laws may be imposed on the unwilling, but not songs." [12]

The less numerous variety of "styles" in rural arts and its extraordinary "coherence" and "harmoniousness" and, for this reason, originality, partly follows from the collective creation of rural esthetic values, partly from a strong selection among the values created by rural people. Rural people, in difference from urban, have not had special artists whose life-business has been that of a "professional poet," "composer," "play-writer," "dancer," or generally artists *ex professo* who secure their living through their artistic activity. As a rule, rural arts have developed "spontaneously" and "incidentally" in the minutes of agricultural work or leisure, as a free

[9] Branford, V., "A Note on Rural Sociology," *Sociological Review*, p. 107, 1927.

[10] One who is acquainted with peasant life even now may observe that most of the work done in *groups* is usually followed by collective singing. Odum and Johnson, *The Negro and His Song*, pp. 35, 246 ff.; *Negro Workday Songs*, ch. vii; Heck, *op. cit.*, pp. 14 ff.; Newell, W. W., *op. cit.* pp. 80 ff.; Gomme, Alice, *op. cit., passim;* and the series of harvest-fishing, imitation, and other games Vol. II, pp. 463 ff.

[11] The rhythm of the modern urban symphonies and music bears a clear mark of the rhythm of the machine, while the rhythm of the old and rural songs is the rhythm of either agricultural work or the non-mechanized human body and its movement—quite different from machine rhythm of the first type.

[12] Martinengo-Cesaresco, E., *Essays in the Study of Folk-Songs*, p. xiv; Odum and Johnson, *The Negro and His Songs*, pp. 2, 8, 14–16, 152, and *passim;* Miller, G. M., *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 46.

flow of feelings and experiences, but not as an intentional activity used as fundamental means of securing a living. As Goethe wrote: "The special value of what we call national songs and ballads is that their inspiration comes fresh from nature: they are never got up, they flow from a sure spring." For this reason "the unsophisticated man is more the master of direct, effective expression in few words than he who has received a regular literary education." The Brothers Grimm, like other great investigators of folk-poetry, say that "they had not found a single lie in folk-poetry." [13]

Similar opinions have been expressed by Montaigne and Walter Scott, by Dante, Molière, and Herder, to mention only a few names. If some of this folk-poetry, at the present moment, bears a mark of vulgarity, it is of a recent origin. Folk-poetry "comes to us, in its innocence and freshness, like the breath of a distant and inaccessible garden, tainted now and then by the odors of intervening city streets. But the vulgarity is modern, accidental; the pleasure and poetry are of the original essence," rightly says W. W. Newell.[14] Under such circumstances art-creation by rural people has been made, from time to time, in the way of a spontaneous manifestation of artistic tendencies and not through long training or apprenticeship in artistry or as a principal life-function as has been the case with the urban artists. Such spontaneity has led to two things: rural artists lack the technical skill which is the result of a long special drilling and practice. They create values of a definite kind "incidentally." Afterwards they may give some skilful variations along the line of this pattern, tune or form, but they do not become "equally skilful" in the creation or imitation of the most different patterns, forms, and "styles." An urban artist easily does this because he is well drilled in technique. He may reproduce or variate any style; but the rural artist is skilful only along his "spontaneously" created style and may be quite clumsy along different styles. At the virtue of this, the rural spontaneous artists are seldom as versatile and encyclopedic in their "styles" and technique as urban artists *ex professo*. The same "narrowness of the rural style" has been also facilitated by the fact that the rural area is much poorer in cross-currents of numerous and various styles than the city with its heterogeneous peoples and cross-currents of the most numerous styles, brought there from all parts of the world. These factors, plus the individualistic character of art creation in the cities explain why the rural variety of styles is less numerous.

A second result of this spontaneity and collectivity of the origin and development of rural arts has been that only *those creations have any chance for survival and diffusion* (*to be picked up by others and*

[13] Martinengo-Cesaresco, *ibid.*, pp. xiv–xv. [14] Newell, W. W., *op. cit.*, p. 11.

in the way of use to be polished, perfected and stereotyped), which were really valuable. That is, they dealt with important phases of existence, which appeal deeply to other rural people and for this reason were picked, used, and cultivated by them. Since a song, painting, tale, or ornamentation is created spontaneously by a peasant and not for "sale" or for pecuniary motives, (as a matter of fact rural people would not buy it), they express only a few things—the deep and important. They do not have any special "invested pecuniary interests" which, as in the city, may hinder a diffusion of esthetic values. Under rural conditions there is "quite fair competition" among the values created spontaneously for their own purposes. There is no pressure of money and other interests. Fair competition induces a strong and severe selection based entirely on the artistic value and innate appeal of the created art-object and on nothing else. Any other type of creation by a rural individual was and is doomed to die; since it does not appeal to the tastes of others and since there are no artificial promoters of arts, no financial interests involved, no artificial advertisements, and no professional critics.

The single existence of folk-songs may in general suffice to proclaim them the true artistic voice of some sentiment or feeling, common to the large bulk of the people whence they emanate. It is plain that the fittest only can survive—only such as are truly genuine to those who say or sing them. A herdsman or a tiller of the soil strings together a few verses embodying some simple thought which came into his head whilst he looked at the green fields or the blue skies. One or two friends get them by heart and possibly sing them at the fair in the next hamlet: if they hit, others catch them up, and so the song travels for miles and miles and may live out generations. If not, the effusion of our poetical cowherd or tiller dies away quite silently.[15]

As we see, this kind of criticism and selection is incomparably more severe, fair, and adequate than that of the very best critic, editor, and publisher. Only when a creation of a rural individual is really artistic; appeals to the taste of others; has so much value for them that they wish to learn it, enjoy it, use it, perfect it; only because it is "beautiful"; only for these reasons may it survive and be spread and "polished" by the hundreds who use it. This means that in such conditions only art-creations which are really valuable survive and live. And when, in addition, it has been used and "polished" by many others and sometimes by many generations (note that the motives of these others are non-pecuniary, also, spontaneous and artistic), shall we wonder that such creations are "extraordinarily coherent," "harmonious," original, and have the marks of "inner

[15] Martinengo-Cesaresco, *op. cit.*, p. 53. Compare Porteous, A. *op. cit.;* Odum and Johnson, *The Negro and His Songs*, p. 152, *passim.*

oneness," "wholeness," and "organic consistency." In each of such values are incarnated not the momentary fancies of urban artists, not an artificially created desire, and not a peculiarity of one individual but the deep and lifelong artistic tendencies—feeling, emotions, experiences, wishes—common to a multitude of people of several generations. All of them "put their hand and soul" into it; all of them felt it unanimously; and together they gave it its inner coherency, organic harmoniousness, and wholesomeness, in difference from the "hodge-podge" in which are thrown and "patched" together the fragments of the most different styles and values, as is the case with the multitude of the pseudo-art objects created by many urban "artists." [16]

The above explains also why rural art is always simple and sincere and significant, as has been stressed, by many, and among them by Montaigne and Goethe, Molière and Hugo, John Ruskin and Leo Tolstoi.[17] Since the artistic values of rural art have been created not for sale; since rural arts have expressed and dealt only with what has been deep and important to their creators; since, as a matter of fact, they have been closely connected with religion; since they have survived only after a rigid selection; and have been accepted and nursed and polished by many others in several generations; they naturally, because they concern very important matters, are sincere, are simple because they are the product of the multitude, which would not have accepted them if they had been incomprehensible, sophisticated, or individualized in taste; for those reasons they are really significant and valuable.

For instance, old folk love songs "have one quality in common: a sincerity which is not perhaps reached in the entire range of lettered amorous poetry." [18] "La passion parle là toute pure," said Molière about them. The same may be said of other forms of rural arts.

These considerations, shared practically by all the investigators of folk-arts, are so well expressed by L. M. Phillips in his analysis of modern and old-Egyptian, Greek, Gothic, and Renaissance arts, particularly painting and architecture, that it is worth while to make a long quotation from his work. What he says about the plusses and minusses of the Old and the Modern art may be applied, with slight variation, to the art of the country and of the city.

> The old limitations (in technique of painting and other arts) no longer in these days exist. The modern artist can paint anything. Not wild nature only and not all the daily incidents and moments of

[16] See many suggestive ideas in Tolstoi, L., *op. cit.*, ch. xi.

[17] See Tolstoi, L., *What is Art? passim*, and chaps v–xi; Ruskin, John, *The Two Paths*, pp. 59–74; *Lectures on Art*, pp. 142 ff.; the works of Martinengo-Cesaresco, Porteous, quoted; *The Sacred Books of the East*.

[18] Martinengo-Cesaresco, *Folk-Songs*, p. xxxix.

human life only, fugitive glimpses seen one minute and gone the next, yet caught with the extraordinary swift intellectual perception of modern sight—not these things only (many of which could not be painted by the old artists), can the artist of to-day paint, but atmospheric effects of shadows, and reflections, and mist-effects so aërial and evanescent that they seem scarcely palpable to sight itself. The change would seem all in favor of ourselves. Instead of being able to deal only with a very limited range of subjects, modern art can deal with, can realise, the universe. . . . But there is something to set against this. Our facility in representation, our miscellaneous and universal range of interests, threaten us with pitfalls from which Renaissance (and other less versatile art periods) was exempt. The man who can draw but little, and that little all from the same point of view, cannot widely err. The man who can draw anything from any point of view is liable to infinite error. There might be no great occasion to preach the need of selection and the evils of redundancy to an artist who could paint only a bunch of cyclamen, a praying saint, but how widely different does the case become when we have to do with artists who can paint rocks and dew, and the tangle of woods and street crowds, and all the motley panorama and topsy-turvydom of natural and human life all over the world. Coherence, significance and simplicity are the essential qualifications for all effective arts and art is effective only in so far as it possesses these qualities. . . . (In difference from the old Art), we have lost the old human centralization and the strict limitations in executive range of art which were such safeguards, which forced coherence, significance and simplicity on past generations. . . . These safeguards and restraints have vanished. Nothing any longer forces coherence, significance and simplicity upon us. If the reader would realise how grave a peril facility of execution, unguided and unrestrained, may become, he has but to glance around at the anarchy and confusion which have everywhere invaded the domain of art. Never were energy and activity in that domain so universal as at present, yet, never was the direction which all this energy and activity should take more obscure. One knows not whether to marvel most at the volume of the yearly output which this energy is responsible for, or at the number of spasmodic and contradictory impulses in which it fritters itself away. Voluble yet incoherent, eager, yet aimless, of such a kind is the activity which possesses modern art.[19]

With some exaggeration, somewhat similar opinions were expressed by L. Tolstoi. Having in view urban art as it is cultivated by the upper classes, he says that it is considerably degenerated from an art which served the important purposes of life into a mere source of pleasure; pleasure having become the only purpose of art of the urban upper classes, such an art lost its significance, sincerity, im-

[19] Phillips, Lisle M., *Art and Environment*, pp. 280–284.

portance, richness, and depth. Finally, having lost spontaneity, it lost sincerity, and became something absolutely "drilled," artificial, and distorted.[20]

When art was universal (before the sharp separation of the city upper classes) and only the religious art was appreciated, there were no pseudo-arts or if they by chance appeared they quickly disappeared, having been exposed by the whole nation. But as soon as there appeared differentiation of art into that of the aristocracy and that of the people (predominantly rural) and the art of aristocracy was turned into a mere means of pleasure, and such pleasure-giving art began to be remunerated, a crowd of people engaged themselves into this kind of activity and art assumed a new character and became a profession. And as soon as this happened, the principal and the most precious quality of art—its sincerity—was greatly weakened and doomed to disappear in such an art. Genuine art was replaced by its counterfeit. . . . Professional artist is forced to live on his art and this obliges him to invent incessantly new objects for his works. Look, for instance, what an enormous difference exists between the works produced by men like the Jewish prophets, the authors of the *Psalms*, Francis of Assisi, Fra Angelico, *Odyssey and Iliad*, folk songs and tales—by the men who not only were not paid for their creations but even did not care to attach their names to their achievement, on the one hand; on the other, the works produced by the court-poets and painters and musicians looking for honors and money! But still greater is the difference between the works of real artists and professional pseudo-artists who fill the world at the present moment, living on their "art," all these editors of magazines, journalists, art-managers, and so on. Such art-professionalism is the principal cause of a degeneration of art into art-counterfeit. . . . Another cause of it is development of professional critics, that is an institute of art evaluation, not by all the people (as it was in the past) and by simple and sincere men, but by the erudites, by men of a perverted intelligence, full with an enormous self-confidence. Critics are the fools who dispute the sages. They say that their function is to explain the art-objects. Explain and interpret! What is it in art that they have to explain? An artist, if he is a real artist, through his work transmits most successfully to other men the sentiments which he experienced. In such conditions what there remains or needs to be explained? [21]

Finally, each social group or nation has its own "bias" of superiority over others. The agricultural class is no exception to this rule. In many of its legends, songs, and tales, especially those composed at stages predominantly agricultural, there is a note of mockery, satire, sometimes of contempt, for urban peoples and often an attitude of superiority of the agricultural classes over the urban classes. Here

[20] Tolstoi, *ibid.*, p. 89, ch. viii.

[21] Tolstoi, L., *op. cit.*, pp. 142 ff.

is an example. In the epic tales of Russia, among many heroes who represent different classes, the most powerful and sympathetic and attractive is Ilja Mourometz, representative of the peasant class. Other heroes, representative of the aristocracy (Dobrynia Nikititch), of the clergy (Aliescha Popovitch), or the city merchants (Sadko), or even Kings and Princes cannot compete or rival the peasant hero, who before his prominence "thirty-three years sat by a stove in his peasant house." Another peasant hero, Mikula Selianinovitch, being challenged by the greatest wandering knight, Sviatogor, answered him by throwing a little bag on the earth and daring him to pick it up. When Sviatogor tried to do so, he sank in the earth up to his knees and on up to his head but could not raise the bag in "which was put the power of the earth and the cultivator." Similar manifestations of this attitude of superiority are found in many rural epics and tales and proverbs and songs of various peoples.[22] They vary in form but the attitude itself is rather common. The parables, universal truths and folklore of American farmers are filled with such group-egotistical incarnations. The politicians, in order to secure votes, try to identify themselves with this group egotism. It is successful in many towns and cities as well, because, after all, these are filled with homeless cultivators—the rural migrants.

"Ruralization" of Urban Phenomena in Rural Arts, and Vice Versa. The proposition discussed does not mean, however, that rural art does not deal at all with various urban or non-agricultural phenomena and people, or that purely urban art does not deal with rural phenomena. Both of them deal with those heterogeneous phenomena, but, as a rule, rural art "ruralizes" urban phenomena and sometimes changes them to such an extent that there remains very little from their real nature; and *vice versa*, purely urban art "urbanizes" rural phenomena and people to such an extent that there remains very little of their real nature.

Contrary to the assertion of W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, peasants read not only realistic literature in which rural life is depicted, but they also read and tell many stories about fantastic kings, princes, knights, warriors, and other urban personalities and events. In folklore these and similar personages occupy a very considerable place.[23] And the fantastic tales like "Bova-Prince" or "Princess Militrisa" and similar stories with events and environments and names having nothing with peasant or generally Russion conditions, have been the most common tales circulating among the Russian and other peasants. They have been quite popular among them,

[22] Among English-American folk love games, is the game: "There comes a Knight," the verse in it. "We're just as good as you are," is a sample of this kind of self-pride.

[23] *Vide* the works of Gomme, Frazer, Newell, Miller, Giles, Heck, and others quoted.

and are unknown to other classes. Peasant houses in Slavic countries, have not only religious ikons and other realistic pictures on the walls, but numbers of various cheap pictures of kings, generals, fantastic dragons, fantastic fighting monsters, or love scenes of perfect urban gentlemen and ladies, including pictures of Romeo and Juliette. All this is "romance" for the peasants. Even the fantastic "Life of the Saints" which has been one of the popular readings among the Russian peasantry shows the same phenomena. Rural ornamentations also have some urban scenes and figures. So it is scarcely correct to contend that peasant art does not deal with urban people or phenomena or that it is lacking in romanticism or fantasy. It deals with all those.

But, and here is the point, the kings, princes, knights, warriors, and other urban figures in rural art are entirely transformed into something which does not resemble real kings or princes or knights or merchants or real urban types. The same is true about various urban events and urban conditions as they are depicted in those peasant stories, tales, legends, and songs. The behavior, psychology, and the traits of these urban heroes are either "peasantized" or are made absolutely fantastic—something quite different not only from a peasant but from human beings generally.[24]

A similar "transformation" may be seen in pure urban art when its artist—who seldom comes into substantial contact with rural people—try to depict the rural people and rural life. A conspicuous example of that is given by the urban art of the time of Louis XIV when the urban or court art was practically entirely estranged from rural art. In the poetry and literature, in decorative art and painting, and even in music of that period, peasants and rural life and rural nature composed one of the most favorite topics. And yet, we know well what kind of "peasants" and "peasant life" was depicted. The peasant was transformed into a kind of Greek-Arcadian pastoral shepherd; peasant life into a happy pastoral idyll, peasant psychology, emotions, and morals into some incongruous mixture of that of Greek pastoral personages with highly intellectualized and sophisticated philosophers and court ladies and gentlemen. In brief, in all these peasant pastorals there was nothing from real peasantry or real peasant life.

In a greater or less degree this "ruralization" and "transformation" of urban phenomena by rural art, and corresponding "urbanization" and "transformation" of rural phenomena by urban art is a rather common phenomenon. The greater is the isolation of the country from the city and the less the collective creators of rural art

[24] See for instance Lanctot, G., "Contes Populaires Canadiens," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, pp. 371–450, 1926.

are familiar with the city or the urban artists with the country, the greater is the degree of this "transformation." [25]

Contributions of Rural Arts to the National Esthetic Culture. In that part of the art-phenomena which is the common property of the city and the country, and which may be styled as national, the rural variety of the national art is marked, first, by some lagging in comparison with the national art of the city; second, it is more "nationalistic" in the sense that it takes from the city not all novelties but predominantly those which agree with the traditional characteristics and "purity" of the national style of the country; in this sense it is more nationalistically selective; and, third, the most important urban art creations, although they represent some complication and perfection of the primitive patterns of art taken from the country, nevertheless, they are almost always composed and woven out of these rural patterns. In other words an enormous part of the really great art-achievements of urban artists are built out of, around, and on the basis of the kernel taken from rural art of that society. The urban artists perfect the rural art, and in this perfected form, with some lag, it is returned to the country, spread there and preserved by it in cases in which it dies out in the city. It is to be noted that these statements concern only that part of art-culture which is or will be national, that is, spread both in the city and the country. Purely urban art-culture, specific to the city, is not national, according to this definition, and as such does not concern us here.

Let us dwell a little over these statements. The leading rôle of the city and the fact that the country lags behind it in many fields of cultural phenomena have already been shown in the field of religious culture and culture in general. The same is true in the field of arts. Indeed, during the last few years, we have seen that such "arts-phenomena" as bobbing of the hair, jazz-music, and the Charleston, originated in the city and later on spread over the country. The same is generally true of fashions. Many fashions of costumes or clothing appear at the beginning in the city and only later spread over the country. Sometimes there is a lag of several months or years or decades according to circumstances. Consider further *architectural* styles. A study of the types of peasant houses in Czecho-Slovakia has shown that their architectural styles were, partly at least, taken from the cities and introduced in the country with some retardation. Models of the architectonic forms, "taken over by the peasants, were found in the Renaissance gables of the time about the

[25] See O'Henry's story "The Poet and the Peasant" in which he very shrewdly described this "urbanization" of peasant life by the city editors. The same may be said of many recent "farm-life stories," praised by the urban editors. An illustration is Fannie Hurst's recent work, *A President is Born*.

year 1600, in the galleries, loggias, and alcoves of the castles and townhalls of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in the voluted gables of the baroque period. . . . The models came into existence after the year 1600 and were taken over by the peasants about 50 years later." [26]

With corresponding variations the same may be said about all countries where the city-country differentiation is great. At the present moment, as we know, city institutions—governmental and private—in a systematic way have been busy with the construction of the best types of farmer-peasant houses and recommending and facilitating their spreading among the rural people. A similar urban leadership manifests itself in the field of poetry, literature, music, ornamentations, paintings, and other arts. A great many poetical pieces, poems, novels, fables, songs, created by urban artists are at the beginning "sponsored" by, and diffused in, cities; only later on are they spread over the country—through schools, newspapers, magazines, commercial agencies, and so on. They often are alive in the country when they have already died in the city. If some folk-poetry "seems rustic, it is only because the country retained what the city forgot." [27] The fact discussed is so general and evident that there is no need to supply further evidences.

Turn now to the "nationalistically selective" character of the national arts of the rural culture. As we know, not all cultural novelties and art created in the city are spread over the country. For instance, the most modern and extreme schools in painting, poetry (futurism, cubism, extreme symbolism, acmeism, and many other "isms") have not spread over the country—in Europe or America—at all. More than that: in Russia during the years of the Revolution the Soviet government tried to promote these forms of art by all means, and yet, it entirely failed as far as rural Russia was concerned. Many of the most modern poets recognized by the city, even such as Baudelaire, Verlain, Henri de Régnier or Proust in France; as Rilke in Germany; or as Briussov or many symbolists in Russia, have remained and seem to remain unknown in the rural parts of the various countries. The same may be said of many "modern" musical compositions. They live and die within the cities. Thousands of everyday art hobbies and fads, beginning with "tattooing" ladies' faces or other parts of their bodies with various butterflies and flowers, and ending with many extravagant fashions, songs, and dances, merely scratch the surface of arts-phenomena in the cities and do not go out to the country at all. This means that the country does not pick everything from urban arts, but only a part of them. In other words, the country art, in its following of the city, does not do

[26] Vavroušek, Boh. and Wirth, Z., *Dedina*, p. 4. [27] Newell, W., *op. cit.*, p. 7

so blindly, but "selectively." It sifts the city art creations, rejects one part of them and accepts another.

If we ask now what is the general principle of this selection; the answer is: the factors which decide it are many and numerous; but among them one of the most important factors is the agreement or disagreement, congenialty or utter heterogeneity, harmony or disharmony, of the city art novelty with the total character of the rural national culture. The art novelties which are congenial to it have more chances to be spread over the country and to become a component of the national culture. In order to be congenial to the rural national culture, they must be comprehensible, and as such, if they are really beautiful, they naturally are enjoyed by the rural people. Since they are enjoyed, they are accepted and have success. The art novelties which are quite strange to the rural national culture have less chances for acceptance. Since they are quite strange, they are incomprehensible; incomprehensibility puts an obstacle to the enjoyment, the understanding, and to the appeal to the heart or the mind of the people. If they are meaningless or "empty," they naturally cannot have any success among the rural people. Hence, "the nationalistically selective" character of rural art of a country. In the city with its "international" culture, many art forms, quite heterogeneous to the national culture, are comprehensible to the urban people on account of the internationalistic composition of the urban population and culture. In the country, the situation is different. Hence, the difference discussed. It means again and again that the country culture is more nationalistic in its character; has fewer elements of incongenial—foreign—culture; takes and preserves the national culture, in this case the art national culture, better than the city, where it is always more diluted by the mixture of foreign arts. So much for this point.

We see that the city leads in art and the country lags behind, although it does not follow the city art blindly but selectively; on the other hand, the *city art in its greatest and best achievements, needs and incorporates the country art in its original, and often pre-urban forms.* Such is the other side of the problem. Any art creation in order to be great, must be coherent, innerly harmonious, and to have all its parts and components organically united into one artistic whole. Those which lack this inner coherency and organic unity cannot be great and significant. A building which is composed out of a mixture of all styles is an ugly building. A symphony in which are thrown together fragments of the most different tunes and compositions taken from the most different sources, as it is done by contemporary jazz-makers, is doomed to be jazz but not symphony. A poet who would try to write a poem with a mixture of the styles of Goethe and Byron,

Burns and Hugo, Verlain and Poe, would have anything but poetry. And the same is true everywhere. In the above, we have seen that from any standpoint, country art, though less rich, is more coherent and "whole" and harmonious than city art. Hence, the necessity for great city artists to turn to rural art as a source of inspiration, as a school in coherency and harmony, as a precious, though primitive, jewel, to be polished and perfected by his genius. This does not mean that no artist may go on successfully without country art—the nationally coherent art *par excellence.* It means that, for a great many of the great artists of the city, the rural art has been indispensable for their achievement and that many of their best creations have been in the first place an elaboration and perfection of what they found in the rural art of their country. The city with its "disheveled," mixed, composite, and international "hodgepodge" culture could not give or supply them with innerly coherent motives, topics, patterns, tunes, forms, and styles. Hence their turning to country culture and their borrowing from it.

The facts which corroborate this statement are rather too numerous to be quoted here. A few examples are sufficient. Additional ones the reader may supply himself. Take *music.* There is a great deal of truth in Grieg's and Rimski-Korsakoff's statements that any masterpiece of music is an elaboration of the folksongs of a corresponding country. Everyone who is competent in this field knows that principal motifs and tunes of the best operas and symphonies of the greatest Russian composers, Glinka, Tschaikowski, Rimski-Korsakoff, Borodin, Mussorgski, and Cui, are the motifs and tunes taken from the old folksongs of rural Russia. In a similar way, many of the rhapsodies and symphonies of Brahms, Dvoařk, Liszt, Berlioz, Grieg and Gounod, are nothing but brilliant elaborations and arrangements of the motifs and tunes of Hungarian or German, or French or Italian or Scandinavian folksongs. The same is true to a considerable degree of several of the creations of Bach, Beethoven, Handel, Verdi, Saint-Saëns, and many others. So much about the motifs and tunes. The topics of the operas are very different, partly those which are universally human, partly heroic, partly urban, and partly rural. But it would not be far from the truth to say that, as yet, there is not a single opera which deals with modern urban life. The majority take as their topic either old folkpoems and tales (Wagner's operas, Aida, Ruslan and Ludmila, partly Mephistopheles, Faust, Samson and Dalila, and many others), or some great eternal problem carried on amidst the historical setting of the past (but not of the modern urban world), and with a considerable proportion of rural environment and elements (Carmen, Evgeny Onegin, and others).

A similar thing is seen in the field of *poetry and literature.* "The Folk-tale is the father of all fiction, and the Folk-song is the mother of all poetry." Every great writer is obliged to his national culture, and to the rural culture of his country, in the first place, through the language in which he writes. And many forms of the purest and the best national language-proverbs, expressions, idioms, and so on,—are preserved in a better form in the country than in the city. They have been learned by the writers from rural people, even by many urban writers who, as Pushkin, either had a rural nurse, or as many others, lived among rural people, or even deliberately and patiently studied these rural sources. Further, the topics of many great literary chef-d'œvres have been either folk tales, folk-epics, folk-legends, folksongs, or tales of the life, conditions, environment, and events of rural people and rural nature. If we turn to the "literary styles" of many of these chef-d'œvres, it is often nothing but a slightly polished style of the same folk literature.[28] If we take the greatest creations of literature, the impersonal literature of the predominantly rural stage certainly occupies the pick of the most precious jewels of the literary treasury of mankind. The Sacred Books of India and Mahabharata, Classics of the Chinese Literature, Gilgamesh of Assyria, the Bible of the Jews, Iliad and Odyssey, of Greece, Edda of Scandinavia, Tales of the King Arthur of the Anglo-Saxons, Kalevala of the Finns, the Niebelungenliede of the Teutons, epic poems of the Russian and Slavic peoples, the Arabian One Thousand and One Nights: these are samples of these jewels. It is true that some of them deal with topics which are at least partly urban. Nevertheless, we have seen that the art and literature of the rural classes does not avoid such topics. Further, these old jewels were certainly created at stages where urbanization was insignificant. If some of them were "published" and collected at a later period, their contents were created much earlier. For these reasons they are the products of the predominant rural stage. Likewise, the origin of the modern drama and plays goes very distinctly to the folk-plays[29] and many great modern plays, like those of Ibsen, Tolstoi, Björnson, and many others—are inseparable from, and deal with the rural setting. If in our imagination we suppose that the above and many contributions of rural art had not been made; that neither by the way, of language, nor topics, nor inspiration, nor style, nor personal contact of the writers with rural culture and people; nor images and symbols used; the writers had not received anything from rural art; how greatly the treasury of the literary values of mankind would

[28] See substantiation of this in Martinengo's work about folksongs, and Gubernatis' works on plant and animal mythologies.

[29] See Miller, G. M., *op. cit.*, pp. 47 ff.

have been impoverished and how little coherency and significance, originality and typicality would have remained in the literature of various countries!

What has been said of literature and music may be said of other forms of arts.

Painting. One of its principal varieties has been the pictures and drawings of landscapes, views of nature, animals and flowers, trees and fields. These are topics either entirely rural or, at least, having very little in common with the predominantly urban views and environment. And more than that—the great pictures of landscapes of the great artists are marked with the characteristics of their own rural country and rural people: they are, so to speak, scenes and the rural art of their country re-created by genius.[30] With some fluctuation, sometimes growing, sometimes weakening, this variety of painting has been going on throughout the history of painting. And as a rule not every painting of every kind of scenery, even of the most gorgeous views, has been a masterpiece. Almost always masterpieces have been only those pictures which reflected and concentrated "the spirit of the rural people and their mind." Further, the style of painting again is due in a large degree to the rural national style, elaborated some time before any urbanization took noticeable place. Many masters even now have made valuable contributions to the art of painting just through their modernization of the old primitive styles of the country. Many forms of to-day modernism in painting are but a return to the primitive styles of it. More than that. Several investigators of the history of architecture and painting maintain that one cannot grasp the central point of any great style—be it Egyptian, Greek, Gothic, or Renaissance art—in those arts without knowledge of the predominant characteristics of the people of the country and, first of all, rural peoples and their religion. One cannot understand the most common type of the Egyptian column, or the architecture of its temples, or the character of its literature and painting without considering the rural conditions of Egypt, the dominant rôle of the Nile in the prosperity of Egyptian agriculture and through it in the prosperity of all Egypt; these explain partly why the religious beliefs of the people of Egypt were stamped by these traits (deification of the Nile, rams, crocodiles, bulls, cowhawks, and other plants and animals) and why the art of Egypt—highly coherent and harmonious and original—assumed the forms which it really had. The Egyptian column is a "rude imitation of the lotus plant"; the central

[30] See the data in Gaultier, P., *Reflets d'Histoire*, part: Le sentiment de la nature dans les beaux-arts, Paris, 1909. J. Ruskin very acutely has shown also that many ornaments and art symbols have been made along the lines and patterns given by rural environment. See Ruskin, J., *Love's Meinie*, Lectures on Greek and English Birds.

topics of its hymns, poems, and literature are the Nile and flowers and animals:

> Blessed be the good God, the heaven-loving Nile, the Father of the Gods of the holy Nile dwelling on the waters, the plenty, wealth, and food of Egypt. . . . Shine forth, O Nile! giving life to his oxen by the pastures!

The lines of Egyptian architecture and drawings are marked by the same rigidity and traits by which were marked the conditions of its rural people and their beliefs.[31] In a similar way the national religion of the Greek was created, in all its essential traits, at the rural stage of their history. The character of these beliefs determined the forms of Greek sculpture and architecture. In essentials it was the "materialization" of the beliefs and myths and ideas of Homeric and even pre-Homeric agricultural and pastoral Greece. Phidias and Praxiteles were urban artists, but they materialized the creations of rural Greece. Without adding here other similar facts which are known to the reader himself, these considerations show that *the very best in art that has been created in the cities, whether by artists who have been of a rural origin and rearing and only lived in the cities, or by the artists of urban origin, has not been the achievement only of the city, but in a scarcely less degree, of the country also.* Directly and indirectly the rural art has given the kernel-pattern or the style to the great city masters who elaborated and developed it. Such a combination of the "potent but coherent" country art with the city great artists has been the indispensable condition for the creation of the greatest masterpieces of art. On the other hand, a complete estrangement of the city artists and the city art-culture from their rural sources, although they have yielded some works of real value, in the majority of the cases, they have given results of only a very relative value. More often the results have been bizzare, "faceless," "styleless," incoherent, and anarchical reflections of the heterogeneity and mechanical mixture of city cultural components. Finally, at the present time, we are witnessing especially clearly all the chaotical extremism and pathological peculiarism of city art in its extreme and pure urban forms, as a result of the loss of contact with "the mother rural art." At the best these extreme forms of art, properly styled as forms of decadence, can serve but a few individuals and in a few ways. But they seem to be doomed to die without blossoming, scarcely adding any long-living value to the treasury of art masterpieces. Many thoughtful art investigators have indicated the decadence of the modern super-urban art and the dangers of the overdeveloped industrialism to the development of art. If their

[31] See several suggestions and interpretations in Phillips, L. M., *op. cit.*, Chaps. I, II.

anxiety and pessimism are somewhat exaggerated, it is not entirely wrong.

Phidias, Michelangelo, and Dante—from these we may go down, step by step, among mighty men of every age, securely and certainly observant of diminished lustre in every appearance of restlessness and effort, until the last trace of inspiration vanishes in the tottering affectation or tortured insanities of modern time.[32]

This sentence may somewhat underestimate the art contribution of our industrial and super-urban culture, nevertheless, the disruption of city art from its rural sources certainly has not been followed by particularly great achievements of purely urbanized city artists and of city art generally.

Especially negative was the influence of the first periods of the development of the machine culture upon the development of arts in all forms. In the field of architecture and painting, it led to the appearance of ugly city buildings which, with their ugliness, smoke, coal, iron, dirt, and other products of industry, spoiled the natural beauty of the scenery, and suffocated other forms of previously existing art.

Every art feels the shock of this change: living becomes subordinate to working, and working (in difference from the rural stage where work was art and art was working) is no longer enriched by the whole personality. The new working class can, alas! neither produce art nor respond to it; the intricate folk-dances disappear; the folksongs lose both in fun and in depth; the manufactured furniture, rugs, curtains, and dress materials that take the place of the old products of handicraft lose all æsthetic value; by the middle of the nineteenth century the age of non-arts apparently began. "The coal that was brought to the surface to run the engines in the new factories resulted in the horrible débris of the pithead; carried by railways, it created the smokepall which shut out sunlight, reduced the aërial colors to foggy grey." The country sides and landscapes were debased. "Architecture totally collapsed." [33]

In brief, the effects were disastrous. It is comprehensible why persons, like Lamartine, John Ruskin, L. Tolstoi, and others so strongly deplored the influence of the machine culture on the arts. For that time, especially, their complaints were not without foundation.[34]

[32] Ruskin, John, Modern Manufacture and Design, in his *The Two Paths*, p. 59; see also pp. 70 ff.; *Lectures on Art*, pp. 142 ff.; Tolstoi's criticism of modern urban art, in spite of some one-sidedness, certainly points sharply at many weak and perverted traits. See his quoted work, *passim*.

[33] Mumford, L., "Art in the Machine Age," *The Saturday Review of Literature*, Vol. V, p. 102, 1928. In the countries, like Russia, where this age of mechanization of culture was late, the outlined effects of industrialization have been quite evident in the twentieth century.

[34] See a similar analysis for the United States in Sherwood Anderson's *Poor White*.

Later on, the machine culture of modern cities, especially in the United States, liberated itself from many of these sins. It has shown the ability to cleanse itself from the dirt, smoke, and ugliness of the previous period. Through the very development of machinery, it has created new possibilities of expansion and of diffusion of art and artistic values (through radios, motion pictures, the striking development of the engineering art, and the subjugation of the power of steam, electricity, and radio, to the needs of men and among them to the need of man for the beautiful). It has shown the ability to synthesize the styles of the previous periods into a new style. It has opened new and almost unlimited possibilities to the artists for an exercise of their genius. In brief, there is no reason to regard the influence of the machine culture on the development of arts pessimistically or hopelessly. Nevertheless, this does not warrant also a contemptuous attitude in regard to rural esthetic culture. Nor can it be used as evidence that the rural role in arts from now on, is finished. First of all, the modern Renaissance of the Machine-age Arts has not taken place without a very serious contribution from the rural esthetic culture. Even in the modern architecture, where the progress of the machine-age culture has probably been the greatest, the new and beautiful modern skyscrapers do not represent a creation of an entirely new style but rather a synthesis and modification of the styles of the previous periods—classical, and Gothic—predominantly. (Study the modern buildings, such as Marshall Field's Warehouse, the Los Angeles Public Library, the Shelton Hotel, the Woolworth Tower, the Town Hall in Stockholm, the Hill Auditorium at Ann Arbor, the railway station at Helsingfors, and so on.) The same is still more true of other forms of art. The modern Renaissance has been, in a considerable degree, a regeneration of the old styles and the adaptation of them to the new machine environment.[35] In the second place, even now there are still many symptoms which indicate some serious dangers in a pure machine-art-culture, when it is cut off from the rural art-culture. The mixture of all styles in the city, its heterogeneity, its topsy-turvydom, the great rôle played by pecuniary interests in its culture and the very character of the machine environment, these and other specific conditions of the urban world are still responsible for a series of the modern "art-phenomena" whose real value is rather questionable.

Jazz in music and dancing; cubism, futurism, and other "isms" in painting and sculpture; impressionism, symbolism, acmeism, the decadent school; obscenity, sexualism, psycho-analiticism in litera-

[35] Likewise the modern popular "Blues" in America, in essence, are but the Old Negro or the White mountain people's "Blues" only considerably spoiled and stripped of their original beauty. See Odum and Johnson, *Negro Workday Songs*, Chaps. II, III.

ture and on the stage; these and similar contributions of the arts of the machine-age city to esthetic culture are of a very questionable value. They certainly express—and very excellently—the modern restless, distorted, unbalanced, composite, incongruous, and rushing spirit of a considerable section of the city population. From this standpoint they are invaluable for the social psychologist or sociologist. They pictorially draw before one's eyes one of the important aspects of the city soul. But not everything which is valuable for a psychiatrist is necessarily beautiful or represents an esthetic value. Further, other, and somewhat better forms of modern art, in so far as they are purely urban, show excellent technique, but rather poverty of "inner content and harmony." Few of them are exceedingly powerful, especially in the art of music. But even they contain something from this spirit of disharmony, artificiality, madness, and anarchy partly at least typical of the city.[36] Others, like almost all the recent best sellers, arranged and nursed by various "book a month clubs" and purely urban literary associations are "empty" inwardly. After six months as best sellers, they are forgotten once and forever.

This leads to another danger of the purely urban culture on the development of the purely urban arts, namely, to the danger of standardization and commercialization of arts in the modern machine age culture.

In the above we indicated that the severest, most fair, and nonpecuniary selection was made by people in the past and in rural districts in sifting the best esthetic values from the pseudo-values. In a modern city such a selection is absent. The arts have become entirely commercialized. Pecuniary interests have become the vital condition of the very possibility of their creation and diffusion. Authors, publishers, managers, directors, producers of plays or symphonies, directors of movie corporations or editors of a literary magazine, these all get their living from art and all have art as their business. As in any business it requires from them a purely business attitude, that of profit and money return. Otherwise their business is ruined, and with its ruin the production of arts is ruined also. Under such circumstances, the principal criterion of the value of an artistic creation becomes the pecuniary criterion. If it is going to give a deficit, it is rejected, however fine it may be. If it is profitable, it is produced,

[36] Compare from this standpoint, for instance, the music of the old masters and some of the new ones, like Skriabin, Prokofieff, Stravinsky, C. Debussy, R. Straus. Again, the rhythm, combination of sounds, and tunes in the modern symphonies are stamped with the rhythm and sounds of steel and iron machines of the modern factory city. Compare from this standpoint, 1st movement and largo in Dvořak's symphony "From the New World." While the 1st movement is the music of the city and reflects the sounds of the train and machines, the "largo" is rustic (Negro spirituals, etc.). This contrast of the urban and rural America goes most distinctly throughout the whole symphony.

however rotten it may be, from a purely esthetic standpoint. Further, a large amount of advertisement and other powerful means of increasing the sale or money return are used. All this makes the very selection and competition of the artistic creations purely pecuniary, that is in no way selective from the standpoint of esthetic criteria. Such conditions may easily lead to the suffocation of a fine creation and to a diffusion of a poor one, if its backers have a financially strong organization for its advertisement. These factors do not always "put over" poor work or keep good work down. But they are important factors. Hence, the superabundance of pseudo-values at the esthetic market of the modern city, and the scarcity of really great creations. Connected with this commercialization of arts or pseudo-arts is another important urban factor in this field: various specialized groups who try to take complete control in determining what is valuable and what is not in arts-production, or what is to be sold and what is not. The organizations, such as the mentioned "book a month clubs" may serve as an example of such agencies. However competent may be the managers of such agencies, only God himself may be faultless in an estimation of the value of art-objects. Add to this that these "estimating and standardizing organizations" are again built around, for, and on the basis of, pecuniary interests. Consider, also, that their managers are rarely really persons above the average rank of a talented journalist. These and similar circumstances make many blunders inevitable in their selections, estimations, and recommendations. Correspondingly, their control often may hinder the appearance and diffusion of a real value, and may promote the diffusion of a pseudo-value in arts. Hence, the dangerous side of their activities on the development of art. When such organizations become too powerful, and the habit of swallowing books, musical records, or motion pictures "ready-made" by these agencies becomes too strong within the population, one may be sure that their negative effects will be far greater then their positive effects. Rural art has been free from such "an enlightened" and "deadly standardized" control. Rural art is and was selective in the best sense of this term. Hence it has not had these and many similar dangers of the degeneration of arts into pseudo-arts; and artistic creation into a pecuniary enterprise determined by profit and gain.

Without further mention of other bad symptoms in the purely urban esthetic culture, we may say that although there is no ground for pessimism, nevertheless, the time has not come yet, if it generally comes, when a disruption of city art from its primeval and vital sources in rural art can go on without a vital harm to the city art. This means that the contributions and the rôle of rural art have indeed, been great.

Interpretation. A few remarks are sufficient to explain the above differences. As has been mentioned, the principal factors responsible for the great perfection of the rural art are: *its spontaneous and collective character; its freedom from pecuniary debasement; its creation for purely artistic purposes (art for art's sake); and the severe and objective selection made by the whole people.* To these factors others are to be added. The nature of agricultural work and environment seems to have something which stimulates singing and spontaneous expression of artistic feelings, in the team or group agricultural work, or in the individual. Many times it has been observed that while the workers in the city factory or shop practically never sing in the process of working (the mere noise of the factory is sufficient to make any singing useless; the efficiency of the work is likely to be checked by it and so on) the singing of peasants, especially while working in teams, is rather a common phenomenon. Singing by the peasant and farmer while he does his work alone is also not a rare fact. In the conditions of agricultural work such singing or other forms of manifestation of artistic emotions does not hinder but helps the efficiency of the work; further, no one is bothered by it amidst nature; the farmer-peasant is his own boss; and the natural environment rather inspires and calls it forth. In the urban office, shop, or factory, singing of one of the workers would certainly hinder the other workers; the environment is rather monotonous and gray; the work is exacting. These and similar conditions probably play a significant part in the difference found. Besides, at least for the bulk of the urban population, and especially in the period of the beginning of the machine-age, the character of the city environment was not particularly inspiring.

What they do see in most great towns is the monotonous ugliness which surrounds their homes and their labor. Then again, it is a well-known fact that with the people loss of individuality means loss of the power of song (and artistry); and where there is density of population there is generally a uniformity as featureless as that of pebbles on the sea beach.[37]

The above is supported also by the rather universal phenomenon that agricultural peoples and primitive peoples, who live in the bosom of nature, generally like to sing, or to see, hear, and experience the arts in various forms. It is sufficient to mention the following case. The Chinese peasants, as it is known, are very poor. And yet, all the investigators of Chinese peasant life unanimously stress the fact that they go to a great expense in order to have in their village various theatricals, shows or other form of arts, beginning with re-

[37] Martinengo, *Folk Songs*, p. 89.

ligious art ceremonies and its objects (temples, statues, pictures) and ending with other forms of arts.

To theatrical holidays in Chinese villages every other mundane interest must give way. . . . Young farmers delight in the excitement of stage life.[38]

The same with still greater reasons may be said of the peasants and farmers of other countries. Nature seems to play some part in such a development of the artistic attitudes in rural people: while the character of the urban (machine-age) environment somewhat hinders it. These brief considerations are sufficient to make comprehensible at least a part of the discussed differences between rural and urban arts.[39]

[38] Smith, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 58–63.

[39] In the light of this and preceding chapters concerning the rural contributions to religion, beliefs, traditions, morality, social institutions, arts, human genius, and talent, and to culture generally, one can easily see the enormous one-sidedness of the statements which try to ascribe to the city almost all the honor of creation and promotion in arts, sciences, philosophical and moral systems, and in culture generally. To check our biases, we have attempted to let the facts tell the story as one may see.

CHAPTER XXII

FARMER-PEASANT ATTITUDES OF INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM

The Element of Coöperation Among Farmer-Peasants. It is almost a unanimous opinion among rural sociologists that the farmer (and partly peasant) class are conspicuously individualistic and less collectivistic than the urban population. "Extreme individualism is one of the outstanding attitudes of the farmer. His is the 'I' rather than the 'we' outlook," such is this opinion.[1] Whether or not such an opinion is due, at least partly, to the vagueness of the terms individualism and collectivism or to inadequate observation, without serious correction and fundamental limitation it cannot be accepted.

If by individualism is meant a disinclination to do any "teamwork" with others, or to be particularly egotistical, or to be unable to work in coöperation with others, or to neglect the interests of other men and groups, then a conspicuous individualism of the farmer-peasant class is a myth and nothing more. If farmer-peasants are individualistic in this sense, then how has it been possible that *various coöperative organizations* have been the most successfully developed among exactly this "individualistic" farmer-peasant class? It is sufficient to remind one of the excellent and powerful coöperative organizations of the farmers in Denmark, in Russia, where before the War the membership of the peasant coöperative organizations amounted to more than ten millions, in Japan, in the United States of America, and other countries. The table on page 512 gives a still better idea of this.

These figures of the number of the organizations, whose total membership is to be computed by tens of millions, seem to testify definitely against the hypothesis of individualism in the given meaning. Moreover, that almost in all countries, the proportion of the farmer-peasants organized into coöperative organizations much exceeds the proportion of this class in the total population. For instance in Japan they composed (1917) 89.4 per cent of all membership in all coöperative organizations; in Germany agricultural coöperative organizations in 1920 composed 81 per cent of all coöperative organizations of the country—much above the proportion of the agricultural class

[1] Sims, N. L., *op. cit.*, p. 226. Compare this attitude with the opposite bias of dozens of writers about the "Communism of the Peasant Village."

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF FARMER-PEASANTS COÖPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES

Country	*Year*	*Number of Organizations*
U. S. A.	1919	63,000
Russia	1916	38,267
Germany	1919	33,950
France	1916	30,305
Japan	1919	13,106
Czecho-Slovakia	1919	7,697
Italy	1919	8,334
Belgium	1911	5,325
Denmark	1913	7,434
Switzerland	1913	6,504
Sweden	1915	4,333
Norway	1915	2,996
England	1921	3,027
Ireland	1912	1,162
Canada	1919	4,997
Holland	1920	4,778
Austria	1913	3,401
Hungary	1913	2,263
Finland	1919	2,397
Rumania	1917	2,668
Jugo-Slavia	1919	1,873
Poland	1919	1,395
Bulgaria	1919	1,284
South Africa	1919	57
New Zealand	1921	537
India	1910	1,766
Argentina	1919	17
	Total	252,914 [2]

in the total population of Germany. Similar is the situation in other countries.[3] "Coöperation in Denmark is a rural movement. Until the beginning of this century it was, literally speaking, only the rural population who were members of the associations." [4]

This simple test is sufficient to show the mythical character of the statements about the particular individualism or egocentrism of farmers or peasants. Add to this that in spite of much greater difficulty (isolation, distance, etc.), labor unions among agricultural laborers have been fairly successful in the past and in the present.[5] In regard to peasants, its fallacious character is shown also by another fundamental category of facts, namely, that among pre-urban agricultural peoples the predominant form of holding property in land has been not the individual but community landownership; the same,

[2] Emelianoff, J. V., *Coöperative Organizations Among Farmers* (Russian), Prague, 1923.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 49–53 and *passim;* Zimmerman, C. C., and Black, J. D., *Minnesota Technical Bulletin* 45.

[4] Manniche, P., "The Rise of the Danish Peasantry," *The Sociological Review*, p. 218, 1917.

[5] See some data in Irvine, H. D., *The Making of Rural Europe*, Ch. X.

in a smaller degree, is true of the peasants of many countries in pre-urban stages of culture. The following table gives some idea of that:[6]

PER CENT OF THE SPECIFIED FORMS OF LANDOWNERSHIP AMONG THE SPECIFIED CATEGORIES OF THE SIMPLER AGRICULTURAL PEOPLES

	Ownership of Property					
	Communal	*Intermixed*	*Private*	*Chief*	*Nobles*	*Total*
Agricultural lower peoples	64	18	18	0	0	100
Agricultural higher peoples	54	21	13	8	4	100
Agricultural still higher peoples	29	24	10	27	10	100

The table shows that the "pure" agricultural stage is little conducive to an economic individualism in the sense discussed. Add to this the fact that community-land ownership, such as the Russian "Mir" and "Obschina," and various forms of collective organization continued to exist among the agricultural classes of many countries in the age of considerable urbanization.[7] These institutions do not agree at all with the hypothesis on inability of a farmer-peasant to do "team-work," or to "coöperate" or of their "egotistical" or "unsocial" character. Those who know to what extent, in the Russian "Mir" and agricultural village communities, the life of the peasant has been interwoven with the lives of other peasants, and how greatly the "Mir" and "Obschina" limited and suppressed even quite legitimate inclinations of each person, will at once discard the myth of farmer-peasant individualism in the above sense. Consider further many forms of mutual help among farmers and peasants in the form of work of a whole community for one peasant who for various reasons could not harvest his crop; or lending a horse or some machinery to a peasant who does not have it; or helping to build a house, a barn, and so on; such forms of "mutual aid" are very much developed among peasants[8] and farmers in many countries; they are given free from any charge; and they testify that coöperation and sociality is not lacking among the class studied. Sometimes one community works for another community as the Russian "Pomotchi." In America it may be said that every rural community has organized several forms of mutual aid. "Meat rings" are used to supply fresh

[6] Hobhouse, Wheller, Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

[7] See Kovalevsky, M., *Community Landownership, the Causes of Its Development and Decay* (Russian); Laveleye, E., *Les Communautés des Famille et de village.* See a good summary of the peasant's collectivism in Irvine, Helen D., *The Making of Rural Europe,* Ch. III; Le Play, F., *Les Ouvriers Européens,* Vols. II, III.

[8] See Kropotkin, P., *Mutual Aid, passim.*

meat in summer. "Thrashing rings" take care of the need for surplus help in the harvest. Forms of social life and recreation in rural communities are to a large extent collective; in towns they are generally individualistic, often not even including more than one member of the same family. We need give no further illustrations to show the inadequacy of this general assertion of greater individualism among farmers, when individualism is defined as above.

Add to this the fact that the criminality of the class studied is rather lower than that of the city population. This means that the farmer-peasant class in no way is more anti-social or egotistical than the urban population. Consider further that the family-life of the rural class is rather cleaner and family integrity is stronger than that of the bulk of the city population. This means again that the farmer-peasant curbs his individual fancies and sacrifices them in favor of family collectivity rather more than the bulk of the city population. Add to this the strong "neighborhood" organization of the class studied. "The sense of fellowship and the recognition of common interests are the strongest bonds that unite Danish farmers"—this may be said of peasantry and farmers generally. Consider further, that the whole history of the development of the peasant-farmer communities have been collectivistic par excellence.[9] It is necessary to be quite innocent of the history of the peasant-farmer class to make the assertions about their individualism. These considerations are quite sufficient for the contention that, in the given sense of the term individualism, the farmer-peasant class is rather *less individualistic and more collectivistic than the majority of the city classes.*

The Element of Impersonality Among Farmer-Peasants. Another connotation of the term individualism *is the presence of particular traits in a person which make him biased and dissimilar to other men.* When a person is "peculiar" and biased we often say he has an "individuality" or "individual and unique personality." The opposite case may be styled as an "impersonality." May we say that farmer-peasants are more individualistic in this sense of extravagance or bias than the members of urban classes? The answer to the question is rather negative. The works of F. Tönnies, E. Durkheim, G. Simmel, and other sociologists have shown that such an individualism is positively correlated with division of labor.[10] Sorokin and others have shown that it is also positively correlated with social mobility, with complexity of interaction and social contacts and

[9] Manniche, *op. cit.*, p. 37. See, for instance, about the Chinese village communities in Smith's work, quoted; about the Hindu rural organizations in the work of Sarkar, quoted; about the European peasantry in the work of Irvine, quoted.

[10] See Durkheim, E., *De la division de travail social;* Tönnies, F., *Gemeinshaft und Gesellschaft;* Simmel, G., *Ueber soziale Differenzierung.* See about these theories in Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 467 ff.

similar factors.[11] As the division of labor, mobility, and complexity of interaction is much more developed in the cities than in the rural aggregates, it follows that the individualism in the sense of extravagance and bias is to be found much more in the city than in the country. And as a matter of fact this seems to be true. In regard to mores, manners, beliefs, opinions, tastes, standards of living and other psycho-social and, as we have seen, even in bodily or racial characteristics, not the country but the city is the abode of heterogeneity. In the preceding chapters it has been shown that in all these respects the city individuals exhibit much greater dissimilarity with one another than the rural individuals. All kinds of "odd," "extravagant," biased, and "queer" persons are found not in the country but in the city. Everything in the city is intended to stun others by such extravagance, paradoxes, extremism, and novelty. Everybody tries to be "original." One sees the mad tendency to get into print by drinking a record number of cups of coffee; or eating the record amount of pancakes or sauerkraut; by swimming the record number of miles; by sitting the record number of hours on a pole; by taking a bath in champagne and by hundreds of similar forms. The very fact of a mad strife to get publicity and become "famous" and "popular", various marathon dances, writers' and poets' tendency to be "original," the very fact that to call a city person "a common type, nothing original" means an offense, the tendency to be "interesting" and "original," these and thousands of similar facts point at the trend to "individualistic extravagance" in the city.

This is the more certain since many authors have shown that almost all cultural creations of agricultural peoples and classes have been marked by "impersonality," "collectivity" and by a lack of even the names of those persons who have initiated the creation of a value. This is especially clearly stressed by A. L'Houet. In rural aggregates tradition is much stronger than in the cities. Tradition means the co-working of a whole group, including several generations, with one another. Separate individuals add only a little to the whole product of the work. As a result, the traditional cultural value is impersonal and, as a rule, it does not bear any individual name as its creator. In the cities, on the contrary, there is a mania for stamping every positive or negative creation with the name of its creator (author, scientist, manufacturer, statesman, artisan, poet, journalist, merchant, and so on) and, as a rule, everything is stamped by an individual name. Cultural values created by the farmer agricultural peoples and even now by the class of farmers and peasants have been, as a rule, "impersonal." Whether we take folklore, folk-

[11] Sorokin, P., *Social Mobility*, pp. 541 ff.; Draghicesco, D., *Du rôle de l'individu dans le déterminisme social.*

poetry, folk-medicine, folk-music, or the very foundations of agriculture, cattle breeding, weaving, building, food preparation, and other folkways invented many thousands of years ago, we rarely find the name of any individual responsible for these great values. They are nameless; they are impersonal; they are "common"; and are free from any extravagance, paradoxicality, and extremism, as a result of the collective work of hundreds of persons and many generations, who did not try to obtain a patent or to fix their names on the results of their achievement. This collective culture creation has not been as prevalent in the city of the past as well as in that of the present. This impersonality of peasants goes so far that, in the past and partly even now, officially and non-officially not individuals, but "family," or "household," is the unit among the peasant-farmer population. The urban people decidedly wish to stamp everything with their names and their individuality. In a less degree, the same difference continues to exist up to this time. L'Houet seems to be right in saying, that "Peasantry as a group has a definite individuality, but the psychological characteristic of each individual peasant is an impersonality." [12]

The growth of "personalistic individualism" or extravagantism seems to have been parallel with the growth of urban culture. For this reason, it is rather fallacious to ascribe such an individualism to the farmer-peasant class whereas, in fact, it is more conspicuous within urban classes. Of course, in this as in many other respects, the farmer-peasant class is not quite a homogeneous mass; for instance, this personalistic individualism is probably more developed among farmers on open farms than among peasants living in the community-land conditions of the Russian "Mir" or many Hindu villages. *Nevertheless, even for the "isolated" farmers, one cannot claim that their individualism, in this sense, is more developed than that of the city populations.*

The Element of Solidarity Among Farmer-Peasants. Another, slightly different, connotation given to the term of individualism is *the prevalence of antagonistic attitudes in an individual more than solidary attitudes.* Can we say that a farmer or a peasant is more individualistic in this sense than the members of urban classes? No, we do not have any valid reason for this and we have many reasons for the opposite opinion. F. Tönnies, and E. Durkheim, among others, have shown that there are two principal forms of solidarity and correspondingly, we may add, two principal forms of antagonism. First, there is solidarity based on the social similarity or the homogeneity of individuals or, as Professor Giddings styles it, on "like-

[12] L'Houet, *op. cit.*, p. 52; see pp. 29 ff. where the author excellently shows this by a careful analysis of well-proved data. See also Sumner, W. G., *Folkways, passim.*

mindedness." The second solidarity is based on the social heterogeneity of individuals, particularly on the social division of labor.[13] The first form of solidarity is more intimate, less formal, more active, and comes, so to speak, from the hearts of men. The second is "colder" and represents not so much active solidarity and vivid sympathy as a dependence of one not self-sufficient individual or group upon another. It ties together various members of a society with a great division of labor in which no member or no particular group is self-sufficient and needs the exchanges and contacts with others in order to satisfy primary necessities. The solidarity based on heterogeneity and the division of labor is more of a dependence than an active sympathy.

If these generalizations are accurate, then on the account of the greater division of labor and greater heterogeneity of individuals in the city, we must expect that, *in the city, the solidarity of dependence and necessity is more predominant, and in the country, the solidarity of active and sympathetic co-feeling, co-belief, co-experience, and co-understanding is more prevalent.* The dependent solidarity is colder, more formal, and represents a matter of necessity; the sympathetic solidarity is hearty, warm, impulsive, and emotional.

Later studies of the factors of inter-individual and inter-group sympathy and antagonism have stressed still more the importance of the factor of bio- and psycho-social similarity of individuals or the factor of "consciousness of kind" or "like-mindedness." [14] Without it, it is hard to have a solidarity relationship of a noticeable intensity. At the best, there may be only, either a neutral attitude or a "solidarity of necessity," but not that of a free impulse. In so far as this is true, differences in ties which unite the members of the city and the city groups and those of a rural community must be expected. The urban ties are ties of dependence, and assume the forms of contracts or bargains in which each party tries to gain at the cost of the other party; the rural ties are natural and hearty sympathy, in which the co-actors are often ready to sacrifice private interests in favor of the other party. Hence, the city is marked by a social solidarity of the type illustrated by slogans: "A poor peace is better than a good class war" and "Let us make a business profitable to both parties." The rural community is marked by the active solidarity discussed

[13] See Tönnies, F., *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,* 3rd edition, pp. 1–102 and *passim;* Durkheim, E., *De la division du travail social, 1893;* Giddings, F., *Scientific Study of Human Society,* pp. 122 ff.; *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* pp. 164 ff., Ch. XV; Richard, G., *La sociologie générale et les lois sociologique.*

[14] See literature in Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 726–728; *Social Mobility,* pp. 85–92; also Sorokin, P., "Experimente zur Soziologie," *Zeitschrift für Völker-Psychologie und Soziologie,* March, 1928; Bogardus, E., "Social Distance in the City," *Papers and Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting of American Sociological Society,* 1926.

above. The first, as soon as the contract is broken or found particularly inconvenient to one party, may be broken also and replaced by class antagonisms and war. The second, unless one party is strongly offended, may be more durable and strong. For these reasons the theory criticized is fallacious.

The Belief in Private Property among Farmer-Peasants. Only in one sense of the term individualism it is possible to contend, with some limitations, that the farmer-peasant class at urban stages is at least as individualistic as city people: namely, *in the sense that they stand for the institute of private or family* (but not state) *property, for personal responsibility of each individual or family* (but not of the state) *in managing his or its business*, and are opposed to *Socialism, Communism*, and other forms of the elimination of individual or family responsibility, independence, and self-reliance *in not a less degree than the city population generally and even more than the city laboring class.* This meaning of individualism has nothing to do with sociality, or egotism, or disregard of the interests of other men. In brief, it does not contain anything which could be regarded as antisocial or socially harmful. On the contrary, a developed sense of individual initiative and responsibility represents rather a social characteristic which is positive and beneficial. Even in a socialist "Utopia" these characteristics of responsibility would be valuable.

In this respect there is a tangible difference between the farmers and the peasants who live in villages and under conditions of community-landownership. It seems that farmer-owners have a greater sense of ownership and possess a more developed initiative and sense of personal responsibility, with the motives of risk and profit, than the peasants who live in the conditions of the "Mir." The farmers are fuller owners, more independent in their activity, and are not restrained by the limitations which are put on a peasant by his "community" and "Mir." The difference in the objective socio-economic conditions of these two classes of agricultural people calls forth the above difference. Nevertheless, even in regard to "Mir peasants" it is possible to contend that they, with some limitations, are more devoted to the institution of private property or its factual substitute and have a more developed attitude of personal or family responsibility and are more opposed to various forms of Socialism, Communism, and nationalization that the industrial labor class of the cities. Such an attitude is the result of the basic socio-economic conditions of the class of peasantry outlined above in Chapter II. We have seen first, that not only farmers, but peasants also, represent factually the most proprietorial and entrepreneurial class having the smallest per cent of the propertyless employees and workingmen. This remains true even when a peasant is not a full

owner of the land he cultivates because the socio-economic and juridical conditions of land-tenantry approach very much those of landownership. Second, we have seen that the farmer and peasant in difference from urban labor classes are their own bosses in managing their own affairs. As a boss, he bears responsibility for the success or failure of his enterprise. Third, while industrial workers work in big factories where there are gathered together thousands of men, each of them does only a little fraction of the whole work of making a definite product; all are very interdependent and have insignificant room to exercise their initiative and plans. Farmers and peasants work in small independent units; they are independent producers; and they can and must rely only on themselves and members of their families. For these reasons, the farmer-peasant is imbued incessantly with the sense of the value of private ownership and is urged incessantly to exercise his senses of individual responsibility, independence, and self-reliance. The socio-economic conditions of the city proletariat and of the class of private and public employees lack these incentives for particular sympathy with the institution of private property and the development of individual responsibility.[15] Such, in brief, are the conditions which explain the discussed generalization.

Do the facts corroborate it? The answer is Yes! A study of the political attitudes and criminality of farmers and peasants has already shown that their votes and behavior exhibit these traits clearly.

1. Farmer-peasants give notably lower rates for crimes against property than urban classes. This means that agricultural classes have stronger inhibitions against violation of ownership; and that the habits and convictions respecting the institution are inculcated into the agricultural population stronger than into the bulk of the urban people.

2. Farmer-peasants participate in Socialist-Communist parties and vote for Socialist-Communist parties in a much less proportion than almost any urban class, with the exception of the upper urban groups.

3. Farmer-peasants show a tendency to vote against any transferences of economic responsibility from the shoulders of individuals or groups to the state and the whole society.

4. Farmer-peasants manifest a tendency to vote against an expansion of the governmental interference at the cost of private control of economic life. There are a few exceptions in the field of the vital interests of this class, especially during economic crises and phases of the business cycle which operate unfairly against farmers. Then

[15] See many similar statements in Carver, Thomas N., *Principles of Political Economy*, pp. 215 ff.; *Principles of Rural Economics*, pp. 14 ff.

farmer-peasants often appeal to the state and demand certain class measures; but even in those cases, as soon as the "injustice" is eliminated, or as some time has elapsed they try to take the matter into their own hands and manage it themselves. They are not "angels," of course, but relative to many urban classes, they possess more individualism in this sense of the word.

5. Contemporary farmer-peasant political organizations, as a rule are opposed to Socialism and Socialistic measures and stand separate, from industrial labor organizations, in so far as these are stamped by Socialism and try to eliminate the institution of private property or to expand enormously governmental control of economic life.

6. Although history shows some cases of peasant movements which have been veiled to some extent by various half-Socialist and Communist colors, nevertheless, in comparison with those among the city labor classes, such movements are rare; and what is still more important, the farmer-peasant movements generally lose these "colors" as soon as the objective of the movement (nearly always a redistribution of land or reductions of debts and various feudal duties) has been achieved. The individualism, in the discussed sense, then manifests itself in the way in which it was manifested recently by the Russian peasants:

"When the peasants succeeded in getting the landlords' property into their own hands," disconsolately says Communist Commissary of Agriculture, Ossynsky, "they turned an absolutely deaf ear to socialism and resolutely refused to listen to any idea of communism." "The peasants, as a mass, do not admit socialism, and do not want to have anything but free grants of land," says another prominent Communist, Mescheriakov. The same is stated by Lenin several times.[16] A similar "story" has been repeated many times before.

7. Finally, in the past as well as the present, various Communist and Socialist experiments of some of the urban groups have been put down almost always under the direct or indirect pressure of the peasantry. Just as during recent years in Hungary and Bavaria, and at the present moment in Russia, Communism has been curbed by direct and indirect pressure of the peasants, in a similar way, the Communist tendencies of the Great French Revolution were bridled and replaced by the "lust for ownership" of the peasants; in a similar way peasant votes and the peasant army stopped the extremization

[16] See Ossynsky, "The Building Up of Socialism," *Russian Labor Review*, 1921, No. 3, p. 91; Mescheriakoff, *Agricultural Communes*, 1918, pp. 11–25 (Russian); see Lenin's "address" in *The Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets*, 1921, pp. 29–31 (Russian).

of the Revolution of 1848 in France, and suppressed the Commune of 1871 in the same country.

These and similar facts seem to support inductively the above deduction made from the basic socio-economic conditions of the farmer-peasant class. Only in this sense of the term individualism may farmer-peasants be styled as "individualistic"; they are partisans of private ownership, of individual or family initiative and responsibility, and of individual or family independence and self-reliance in the management of one's economic affairs. In this respect, the class studied is near to the propertied and entrepreneurial classes of the city. But this sort of individualism is not to be mixed with the previous three meanings of it. It does not signify either an egotism, an anti-sociality, an inability to work in coöperation and in teams, a disregard of the legitimate interests of his fellow-men, a prevalence of the antagonistic attitudes or a superdeveloped thirst for "personal individualism."

We have shown that the farmer-peasant class can successfully rival other classes in sociality, morality, co-operation, impersonality, collective effort, mutual aid, and similar things. In so far as the writers mix the lack of all these different things into one term, "individualism" and ascribe it to the farmer-peasant class, their contention is entirely unwarranted and must be rejected. So much for this point.

PART V

RURAL–URBAN MIGRATION

CHAPTER XXIII

TRENDS IN, AND FACTORS OF, RECENT MIGRATION

Introductory Remarks. The relationships of rural and urban communities, and also of the farmer-peasant and other social classes, are of great significance, because of their interrelations due to the exchange of population. In one sense of the word, there is no permanent or significant-permanent urban class. Societies may be spoken of roughly, as rural populations living on the farm or in a rural environment and migrated rural peoples living at present or having resided a generation or so in an urban environment. This statement is true if we examine cities for a short or for a long time. Cities are constantly growing, when they grow at all, at least partly at the expense of rural communities. Many cities which are not growing rapidly are having their ranks replaced by rural migrants. In every city, families are moving each year to smaller communities and are being replaced by families from these smaller communities. However, this migration back to the smaller communities is seldom as important as the migration to the larger as already indicated. But there are times in the history of a state or a nation, such as during a crisis, a famine, or at the falling of a society, in which the whole urban environment is deserted rapidly and the population becomes ruralized. Such instances have already been discussed earlier. Rome declined in the fifth and subsequent centuries A. D. from approximately a million in population to about 50,000. In a similar manner, the decline of the Roman Empire in the west meant the ruralization of the entire population. The same applies to the decline and fall of most of that series of city states which grew up around the Mediterranean Sea. Famines, crises, and other disasters in various countries have been followed by the same phenomenon of rapid ruralization.[1]

In this and succeeding chapters, we shall discuss urban-rural interchange of population, the mechanisms of interchange, the quantitative phases of interchange, and the qualitative or social effects of interchange. The problem involves an understanding of the reasons why some persons urbanize and others ruralize. What are the mechanisms which select populations for cities? Are the rates for urbanization increasing or decreasing? Are cities of the present compared with previous decades more dependent upon internal growth than migrations? What kind of persons migrate? How are they characterized

[1] See Boissonade, P., *Life and Work in Medieval Europe,* Ch. 1, for a discussion of the ruralization of the Roman Empire.

by sex, age, mental and moral propensities and physical or biological equipment? What happens to them when they urbanize? Do they become successful in cities? What ranks, upper, lower or middle, do they enter in cities? To what extent may rural-urban social differences be explained by this interchange of population? All these and many other questions should be answered before we understand this problem of migration and the larger problem of rural-urban relationships. It is obvious that all these cannot be answered definitely here. Further, those answered can only be handled tentatively. This is a subject which should demand the critical study of numerous competent investigators before any analysis approaching finality, if such a finality can ever be reached, may be made.

Comparative Rôles of Migration and Natural Increase in the Growth of the City Population. The last epoch of the rapid growth of the cities has continued from the late middle and early modern ages up until to-day. The number of cities with populations above 100,000 in Europe [2] was 23 in 1800, 146 in 1900, and 202 in 1920. A similar process has been taking place throughout the world; also in regard to smaller cities. The urban world has been expanding; the rural world has been decreasing and the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture has been decreasing while that engaged in urban occupations has been growing.[3] The question arises: what have been the sources of the increase of the urban population? Has it been due to the natural increase of the city population or to migrations from the country to the city? Or to both factors? If to both, what have been the important changes or recent trends in the relative significance of the excess of births over deaths and migrations in the growth or maintenance of the city population? The existing theories in the field are different and even opposite. The optimistic theory is represented by Weber and Kuczynski; the pessimistic one by George Hansen and partly by C. Gini. The essence of these theories is as follows: Weber and Kuczynski argue that the significance of migration in the growth of cities is declining. After quoting some data from various sources, Weber concludes as follows: "It (the increase in the rate of natural increase in cities) denotes the fact that cities are no longer mere consumers of population produced in the rural districts, but *will contribute their full share to the increase of the population.*" [4] The same authors argue further that the peak of migration to cities was reached generally by 1850. In support of this thesis, they give some data for various European countries,

[2] See Bunle, "Superficie et population des contrèes de la terre, vers 1920." *Bulletin de l'Inst. Intern. de Statistique*, Vol. XXI, 1927.

[3] See the data in Ch. XXVII of this book.

[4] Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 243. See all of Ch. 4: Kuczynski, R., *Der Zug nach der Stadt.*

some of which seem to bear out their conclusions. Weber and Kuczynski were writing at a time when city vital indices were at their best due to the migrations of young adults. These same adults had more chances for producing children, especially since death-rates of the cities had been lowered by hygiene and artificial control of population had not become a factor. Earlier writers, such as G. Hansen, on the contrary, based their catastrophic conclusions that cities would disappear, if not supported by rural migrants, upon the statistics for the time before health conditions were improved and when deaths generally exceeded births in most cities. These conditions led them to believe that cities maintain their population balance, or even grow, only at the cost of migration from rural parts. If this migration decreases, then the cities are doomed to decrease also. If there had been no migration the cities would have disappeared within a few generations. An excessive urbanization of a country leads to a decrease of its rural parts. Where these become small they cannot supply a sufficient number of migrants to the cities. The city biological balance is negative. Thus, sooner or later, excessive urbanization leads to a decrease of the whole population of the country and to its decay. The theory developed by G. Gini was not so extreme and pessimistic, but it also maintained the depressing rôle of urbanization on the natural increase of a population and the fact that it led to a decay of a nation.[5] Which of these opposite types of theories is more valid? Is it true, as Weber and Kuczynski claim, that the maintenance or growth of the city population is due more and more to the excess of births over deaths in the urban population than to the migration from rural parts, and that the natural increase of the city population, or the excess of births over deaths, becomes greater and greater as time goes on? Or, does more of the truth lie in G. Hansen's claim that the cities cannot keep the biological balance of their population and, if they do keep it and even grow, this is due only to an increase of migration? The subsequent data must answer these questions and are intended to show the trends in a relative importance of these two factors—migration and natural increase of the city population in the maintenance and growth of the cities for the last few decades. Now let us turn to the data.

The first line of evidence bearing on this subject could have come from a comparison of the standardized rural and urban vital indices as developed in a previous chapter. But on account of the impossibility of such a standardization, and the misleading rôle of crude vital indices, it is better to omit this line of evidence and to turn

[5] See Hansen, G., *Die Drei Bevölkerungsstufen;* Gini, C., *I fattori demografici dell' evoluzione delle nazioni.* See about these theories in Sorokin. *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 422 ff.; 245 ff.

directly to rural-urban rates of natural and migrational increase. Even in regard to these rates, it is necessary to stress that they depict a situation fictitiously more favorable to the cities. As already shown, there is, at least since 1900, a constant tendency for city populations to concentrate on the older and especially the active adult groups. This tends to increase fictitiously the crude birth-rate of the city population; and to diminish fictitiously its crude death-rate on account of a decrease of the proportions of children within the urban population.[6] This results in a fictitiously higher rate of natural increase of the city population. This is to be kept in mind in an interpretation of the subsequent data. If the rates of natural urban-rural increase of population were standardized, they would be somewhat more unfavorable to the city than is shown by the figures given.

The following table gives the rates for natural and actual increase for Sweden for the past 100 years and also the rate of urban migrants.

RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE, ACTUAL INCREASE, MIGRATION, AND URBANIZATION IN SWEDEN SINCE 1820[7]

Period	*Rate of Natural Increase Per 1,000* *		*Rate of Actual Increase Per 1,000*		*Rate Per 1,000 of Net Urban Migration* †	*Proportion of Population Urban* §
	Rural	*Urban*	*Rural*	*Urban*		
1821–30	12.56	‡3.02	11.15	9.90	12.92	9.75
1831–40	10.10	‡4.53	8.37	7.83	12.36	9.70
1841–50	11.59	‡0.56	9.92	14.72	13.16	10.00
1851–60	12.24	1.34	9.03	21.63	20.29	10.5
1861–70	11.86	6.78	5.68	21.27	14.49	11.5
1871–80	12.89	8.08	6.54	24.40	16.32	14.0
1881–90	12.29	11.33	.26	26.22	14.89	17.5
1891–00	11.05	9.70	3.75	20.66	10.96	20.5
1901–10	10.85	10.98	3.00	21.44	10.46	22.9
1911–15	9.14	8.77	0.13	25.49	16.72	26.3
1915–20	7.04	5.58	0.18	22.59	17.01	28.5
1921–25	7.82	5.31	1.53	12.91	7.60	30.4
1926	5.95	3.28	‡1.49	14.40	11.12	31.0

* Difference between the crude birth- and death-rates.
† Net migrants per 1,000 of the city population.
‡ Means higher death-rate.
§ These are approximate. They were attempts to secure the midpoints between the earlier figure and the later figure. For some later periods the percentages for the mid-year were taken.

If the exceptional conditions due to the War are omitted, there appears no important trend for the urban populations to become self-supporting in their ability to furnish the increase of population. The only important changes were the decreases in the death-rates in the last century and the offsetting decreases in the birth-rate in this century.

[6] Because death-rates for children are exceptionally high, as already shown in Ch. VIII
[7] *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige*, 1927, p. 46.

The same change is to be noted if we follow out the single city of Stockholm, which had about 50,000 population in 1721 and 440,000 in 1924.[8]

This city shows the cyclical reaction which has been evident in the so-called population-independence of cities. Stockholm actually increased 20.9 per 1,000 in 1924, which is a ratio of 19.6 net migrants per 1,000 residents. Deaths now equal births, and there is some natural increase of the city population, but migrants still furnish the greatest gains.

The same decline in the ability for cities to furnish the increase is noted in statistics for Denmark for the years since 1911.[9] The detailed figures are not given here.

Mortality statistics do not exist over a sufficient length of time for the United States in order to study these trends. However, conditions are somewhat different due to the rate of rapid urbanization and the minor rural-urban differences in this country. P. K. Whelpton has made some calculations on the rate of natural increase in the United States, based upon the ratio of children 0–4 years of age per 1,000 to the number of women 16–44 years of age. His data show a rate of 28.0 in 1800, 21.2 in 1830, 12.5 in 1860, 4.8 in 1890, and 4.0 in 1920. This shows a rapid decrease in the rate of natural increase associated with increasing urbanization and industrialization. This decrease is primarily in the urban districts as shown by his rural-urban computations for 1910. The author gives further proof of his thesis that urbanization had cut down the rate of actual increase of the population, even among the foreign-born immigrants. His final conclusion is, "had the United States remained a more agricultural nation, its population would have tended to grow in numbers more rapidly than has been the case. The larger natural increase under rural conditions would have been more than sufficient to offset any loss from the shutting off of city-attracted immigrants and their descendants." [10]

[8] The data are given in *Statistik Arsbok for Stockholms Stad*, 1914, p. 80, and since that time from *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige*, 1925, p. 41.

[9] See *Denmarks Statistik Aarbog*, 1926, p. 22.

[10] See Whelpton, P. K., "Industrial Development and Population Growth," *Social Forces*, March and June, 1928, Vol. 6, Nos. 3 and 4. Similar calculations in Hornell Hart's thesis, quoted, show the same for a shorter period. Likewise L. Dublin's and A. Lotka's computation led to the conclusions that "already in 1920, the native stock residing in the urban areas was scarcely replacing itself the country over." Dublin, L. I., "The Statistician and the Population Problem," *Journal Amer. Statist. Ass'n*, March, 1925, p. 9. J. M. Gillette's studies show the same for a shorter period. See his (Revised) *Rural Sociology*. Finally R. R. Kuczynski's recent study shows that at the present moment the population of the Western urbanized countries only barely replaces itself, and within one generation, if the present trend continues, will begin to decrease. Such a conclusion on the part of this author, who thirty years ago was especially optimistic in regard to the ability of the city population to keep its positive biological balance, is especially significant. See Kuczynski, R. R., *The Balance of Births and Deaths*, N. Y. 1928.

There is nothing in this careful study by Whelpton which would lead us to believe that the cities of the United States are showing any indication of greater ability in furnishing the increases in their populations. On the contrary, the reverse seems true. The following estimates by the United States Department of Agriculture show this growth at the expense of rural migrants for recent years.[11]

MOVEMENTS TO AND FROM FARMS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1922–1927 [12]

Year	*Persons Leaving Farms for Cities*	*Persons Arriving at Farms from Cities*	*Net Movement from Farms to Cities*
1922	2,000.000	880.000	1,120.000
1924	2,075.000	1,396.000	769.000
1925	1,900.000	1,066.000	834.000
1926	2,155.000	1,135.000	1,020.000
1927	1,978.000	1,374.000	604.000
1928	1,960.000	1,362.000	598.000

A careful study of the rates of average increase per thousand per year due to excess of migrations compared with rates of natural increase for some Swiss urban provinces since 1870, illustrate the same conclusion.[13] There was some variation between cities for all periods. Considerable depended upon whether or not the city itself was a growing one. On the average, however, there appeared no trend during this period of fifty years which would indicate that cities were becoming relatively more capable of furnishing the increases in their populations.

The similar careful study of Berlin shows the same cyclical movement for relations between city and rural populations as noted before, with some variations. Berlin had more births than deaths in the early part of the 19th century.[14] During the latter portion, the death-rate fell to less than the birth-rate. Following 1890, the birth-rate decreased rapidly and the death-rate seemed to stabilize itself as if it were near a minimum. Data since the War show that the rate of natural increase is negative. None are at hand for the migrations. With some exceptions, Berlin does not show any real trend for the city to become more capable of furnishing its increases in population.

[11] The study of Hornell Hart, *Selective Migration*, University of Iowa Studies, 53, 1921, p. 25, shows that the cities of Iowa depended more upon migration between 1900 and 1910 than between 1890 and 1900.

[12] Galpin, C. J., *Agricultural Situation*, April 1, 1929, p. 16. See also Whelpton, P. K., "Population of the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIV, p. 265, 1928.

[13] Made on the basis of tables given in *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1925, p. 38.

[14] A careful study was made of the data given in *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin*, 1914, pp. 101, 125, 214, and from *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1923, and 1926. For sake of brevity the figures are omitted here, although, at the expense of considerable labor, they were calculated from the gross data given in the references.

Even with a declining or a stable population, the interchange with the rural districts is more intense than ever before. A study of the ten most important German cities in 1924 gives the relative significance of the differences between the birth- and death-rates and migrations as factors in changes in the populations of these cities. It shows that the crude rates for migrations are several times higher than the crude rates for births and deaths. Further, these migration rates are much more flexible and elastic than the birth- and death-rates as shown by extreme variations as between such cities as Cologne and Hamburg. Birth- and death-rates, as viewed from year to year, are more or less stable. In six cities the actual gains through migration were of much greater significance than the natural increases. Three were losing population through migrations and only one was growing more rapidly due to the difference between births and deaths.[15] The declining significance of natural increase as a factor in city growth is especially noticed if all German cities be grouped by size and compared. The following table taken from the same study by Dr. Elfert shows the significance in 1913, 1919, and 1923. Of course, the War has been a factor; but this same war was a factor in rural life as well. Furthermore, since wars appear to be rather common factors in societies, we can only assign them as causes and not as mitigating or special circumstances which affect the validity of the correlation. Besides, 1923 was 5 years after the War and the population rates in most areas had recuperated themselves from the War. The cities are divided into class A (more than 200,000), class B (100,000 to 200,000), and class C (50,000 to 100,000).

Excess of Births Over Deaths per 1,000 of the Population of German Cities

Year	*Class A Cities*	*Class B Cities*	*Class C Cities*	*All Cities*
	(23)	(22)	(46)	(91)
1913	9.72	11.88	10.01	10.18
1919	2.37	3.58	1.75	2.51
1923	1.50	5.60	1.99	2.46

Even if mitigating circumstances be given some credit, since Germany was a loser nation in a long war, yet the decline in the rates of natural increase shows few signs that cities are becoming more capable of producing the future gains in their populations.

In Paris it is apparent that, on the whole, the natural increase rate is no higher at present compared with the migrational growth.[16] There was considerable variation from year to year and from period

[15] See Gustav Elfert, "Stand und Bewegung der Bevölkerung," *Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutsche Stadte*, 1927, Vol. 22, pp. 338 ff.

[16] See data given in *Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris*, 1921–1922, p. 26.

to period. (Some of these variations are to be explained by differences in recording the population of the city.)

What has just been said for these cities may also be said for London. The rate of natural increase had gone through the same cyclical movements during the past 50 years, so that it tends to become smaller at the present time.[17]

Summary Concerning Migration as a Factor in Urban Growth. The above data suggest the following conclusions. First, the theory of G. Hansen is inadequate for the urban population since, at least, the second half of the nineteenth century. Contrary to his statement, on the whole, the city population has been able to compensate for its deaths by births and, in this way, to keep its biological balance, although remaining stationary. Second, still less adequate is the contention of Weber and Kuczynski that the cities, in the maintenance and growth of their population, would depend more and more upon the natural increase of their population and less and less upon migration. The data given show that there is no such trend. On the contrary, since approximately the end of the nineteenth century, the rates of natural increase of the city population (excess of births over deaths) tend to decline and have declined so much that, at the present moment, the city population is only barely replacing itself. If we take into consideration that the above crude rates of natural increase of the city population would be considerably lower if they were standardized; and that the city birth-rate always includes the birth-rate of the rural migrants to the cities, whose fertility is usually higher than the pure urbanites of two or more generations; then we must conclude that the rates of natural increase of the cities would have been still lower had they been computed for only the pure urbanites of two or more generations. In this case it is very doubtful as to whether the pure urban population, at the present moment, is replacing itself. Third, the growth of the city population has been due principally to the migration of the rural population to the cities. Fourth, the rôle of this migration in the growth or maintenance of the city population compared with the rôle of the natural increase of the city population has not been decreasing but rather increasing. Fifth, if, in the future, the cities continue to grow, this will be possible only through a continuation of the migration from the rural parts or countries to the cities or urbanized countries. Sixth, if the rural parts decrease their natural increase to the level of the present urban rate of natural increase, then there will be no

[17] Graphs of the rates of births, deaths, and natural increase are given in all the volumes of *London Statistics*. They are not very reliable before 1880, especially for birth registration. Registration of births was not compulsory until 1871, and it is doubtful if the greater number were registered before 1880.

surplus source for an increase of the city population. In this case, either the growth of the cities will stop, or if migration from rural parts continues, it will lead to a depopulation of the rural parts which sooner or later will cause a decline of the city population. According to Dr. Kuczynski's study already the situation in European urbanized countries is as follows: "With a fertility and a mortality as they prevail at present the population of the larger countries, France and especially England and Germany, is doomed to die out" (p. 4). This is to be remembered by the enthusiastic partizans of a low birth-rate. Seventh, urbanization has been, and still is, a process, rather than a static state in a society. There is a constant interchange and moving of population from the country to the city, and in a less degree, from the city to the country, and from one city to another. This is true even of cities whose population is stagnant. We might really say that there is no significant permanent population which has been urban for many generations. Part of the urban population dies out within a few generations; it is being incessantly replaced by the migrants from the country; a part migrates from the city to the country; a third part moves from city to city until it dies out or shifts to the country; the remainder (those who have been urbanites for many generations) form a relatively very small part in the total population of a given city.

Factors of Migration from the Country to the City. Since cities have been growing principally at the cost of migration from the country, it is natural to inquire what are the factors which cause such a migration? In their concrete forms the factors are numerous and different. Some of them are local and peculiar to a given place and time. Others are more or less general and constant. Omitting the local and peculiar factors without discussion, the general factors are: *the demographic factor of a higher fertility of the rural population, a series of economic factors, and the progress of science and inventions.*

(1) Since the rate of natural increase of the rural population has been greater than the urban, this has made it possible for the rural population to yield a surplus of population which, incessantly, for various reasons indicated further, could leave the country. The fact that this surplus has gone to the cities has been determined by a series of economic and other factors. But the fact that such a surplus has been yielded by the rural population has been the result of its greater rate of natural increase and as such represents a factor of a demographic character.

(2) The economic factors of migration are numerous. The principal of them are as follows:

a. Many rural communities have developed land laws or customary methods of inheritance such that the estate remains intact in the

hands of the elder or younger son. This requires the others to move. In the process, many move to cities. Where such laws do not exist, various customs work to the same result.[18]

b. The economic processes of cities are different from those in rural districts. City populations manufacture products of elastic demand whereas, relatively, the products of the farm are inelastic. This means that rapid increases in production of farm products may not be absorbed as easily as the city products. This is true only in a relative sense. The basic farm crops have demands that are relatively fixed. Let us give an illustration for potatoes which applies as well, but possibly not as rigidly, to corn, wheat, meats, cotton, and most other farm products. The average production of potatoes for the United States varies from 2.1 to 3.7 bushels per capita. They are a crop which cannot be exported cheaply on account of bulk. An increase of one bushel in production per capita is generally accompanied by a drastic decrease in the price. The amount of variation depends upon which portion of the demand curve the increase is added. This shows the relative inelasticity of demand for this crop.[19] The principle is illustrated by the numerous curves of demand or the relationship between supply and price worked out by various economists.[20]

A. E. Taylor has stated the general principles in three laws applying to food consumption, which also apply in a relative sense to other farm products. These are as follows: [21]

1. The total consumption of foodstuffs, in terms of calories, in a normally prosperous nation is not expanded notably by an increase in the national income. The intake of the undernourished may be brought up to normal. Consumption does not expand in the direction of a greater intake in terms of calories, but shifts to foodstuffs re-

[18] See the works on Historical Jurisprudence by Paul Vinogradoff, for proof of this. See also Wehrwein, George S., "The Problem of Inheritance in American Land Tenure," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 9, April, 1927. This is no attempt to claim that primogeniture arose or has been prominent in rural districts. It merely claims that custom as well as some laws permit one child to retain the landed estate intact in some countries.

[19] Budd A. Holt, of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, has furnished these data concerning the relationships between production and the price of potatoes.

[20] See *Technical Bulletin* 10, University of Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station. For proof of these relative differences in elasticity of the agricultural crops see Peterson, George, *The Problem of the Agricultural Surplus in the United States*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Minnesota; Taylor, A. E., "Consumption, Merchandising, and Advertising of Foods," *Harvard Business Review*, April, 1924, Vol. 2; and numerous studies of demand curves.

[21] See the work of Taylor cited. Numerous studies of food consumption are cited in Minnesota Bul. 240. See especially *Lirsmedlsforbrukningen inom mindre bemadlade hushall under krisaren 1914–18*, K. Socialstryelsen, Stockholm, 1922. We might add also that an increase in the welfare of a country does not see food expenditures increase as rapidly as other expenditures. See Engel, E., "Die Lebenskosten," *Int. Inst. de Statistique*, 1895, and *Minnesota Experiment Station Bulletin* 246.

garded as more desirable. More meat and tidbits are ingested, and less cereal and potato.

2. In a period of hard times, in a country with diversified agriculture, restriction in income leads to a cheapening of the diet by substitution of lower-priced calories for higher-priced calories, rather than by reduction of the calory intake.

3. We may finally formulate a trade law to the effect that introduction of a new foodstuff or improvement of an existing foodstuff, with the population in a normal condition of prosperity, will not represent a caloric addendum to the diet, but will be a substitute.

c. Another characteristic economic difference is that, thanks to the increase of inventions, cities (of the present industrial society) manufacture new products to a much greater extent than those produced in rural districts. The development of these new products finds increasingly greater markets. We have only to mention the numerous new products for communication, compared with the relatively fewer new agricultural crops and products. This combination of greater elasticity of demand for city products and the new ones which constantly come on to the market, is a factor in differences in incomes, rural and urban. *As a result there is a tendency for populations to migrate from lower-income communities to the cities.* These new products develop more rapidly than the natural increase of city populations. W. F. Ogburn has expressed this factor of new inventions and new products in an exponential curve which is growing at an increasing rate.[22]

d. An important factor is that the improvements in technique in industry and the development of science add to the efficiency of agricultural production so that fewer farm families may grow increasing amounts of food and textile products. Since the demands for these are fairly inelastic, this pushes more and more workers into cities, and these, in turn, add to the circle by making industrial technique more efficient. In other words, due to the development of cities, at least at the present time, more farm machinery is developed and fewer workers are needed on the land.

The improvements in agricultural production have been shown from time to time. Let us quote the words of Carl C. Taylor in this connection.[23]

Not only does farm machinery lessen the irksomeness of farm labor, but it increases the productiveness of man power many fold by saving time and multiplying the directive power of the human element. In 1830 it took three hours and three minutes of human labor to produce

[22] See Ogburn, W. F., *Social Change,* for an analysis of this.

[23] Taylor, Carl C., *Rural Sociology,* pp. 68 and 69. Taylor secured his data from *U. S. D. A. Bur. of Stat. Bul.* No. 94, pp. 59–69 and from *Cyclopedia of American Agriculture,* Vol. 1, p. 209.

a bushel of wheat in the United States. In 1894, it required but ten minutes. Improvements have been made since that time and the human labor is to-day considerably less arduous than it was in 1830 when the cradle and flail were the chief tools. In 1855, it required four hours and 34 minutes to produce a bushel of corn. In 1894, it required 41 minutes. It took 35½ hours to produce, harvest, and bale a ton of hay in 1860. In 1894 it took but 11½ hours. In 1844, it took 13 and $_{10}^{4}$ minutes to produce a pound of seed cotton. In 1895, it took but 4 and $_{10}^{7}$ minutes.

This introduction of machinery into agriculture, bringing about greater production per acre and per worker, has continued since the time mentioned by Taylor. The "sled" is developing in the western portions of the cotton belt, so that one man can take care of 100 acres of cotton by himself. The "combine" harvester-thrasher is being used in the wheat belt so that much less labor is needed to produce a bushel of wheat in many areas. The machine corn harvesters, four-row cultivators, trucks, tractors, and other items of farm machinery have been and are important factors. By 1925 there were about 500,000 tractors on the 6,000,000 American farms. What has been said for America, applies in a similar manner to Europe, although not so drastically. These changes are placing part of the labor of agricultural production in cities. At one time practically all the agricultural labor was done on farms. Now the machinery is made in cities and that much of agricultural production carried on away from farms.

This improvement in technique and its effect on agricultural production are illustrated further by a study made by Bernard O. Weitz of yields of crops.[24] His findings show a steady improvement in the yield per acre for all crops studied. At the same time this improvement has been associated with the passing from a virgin soil to one worked on a permanent basis. It is the common belief that such change has been brought about by mining of the soil and a reduction in yields per acre, but the facts show different results. This change from a virgin to a permanent agriculture and, at the same time, to more efficient production, has been associated with a relatively, and at present, actually, declining farm population. The application of the machinery and the science developed in cities has enabled much of this improvement, which, in turn, enabled fewer farmers to feed more people and forced others and their children to find outlets for their life in cities. This correlation between time and yield per acre is true in spite of the fact that many of the crops are constantly being

[24] A carefully detailed study and bibliography are given in *U. S. D. A. Department Bulletin* No. 1458, December, 1926. It summarizes the crop yield statistics for America and Europe, as far as they are available, by regions and give some historical data.

pushed out on marginal land such as the dry farms of the wheat belt, where productivity is naturally low. This same is true for other countries. It is apparent that these same conclusions apply to European countries from data to be found in this study and elsewhere.[25]

Some of this increase in yield is no doubt due to increase in intensity of cultivation. But intensity of cultivation does not necessarily mean more man power per acre. Now, it more often means the application of more machine power per acre. Other crops, and the same crops in other countries, have gone through these same processes of increase per acre—to a greater extent than the increase of agricultural labor per acre. This is due to better varieties, scientific crop rotation, and other scientific discoveries which have been brought about by the general scientific development which has been the product of urban civilization. Between 1850 and 1899 the production of red clover in Belgium per cultivated hectare, increased from 19,119 to 27,662 kilograms. Potatoes increased from 7,284 kilograms to 18,001.[26] Of course some crops have decreased, due to changes in varieties and market demands for quality as well as the increase of animal and other pests. But on the average, we are justified in the statement that the progress of inventions has led to the development of agriculture so that the same number of farmers can feed a larger number of people in cities. This has undoubtedly been a factor in the rapid migrations of the children from the large farm families to cities rather than to other farms.[27]

e. Among other economic causes, especially for the growth of the European cities in the second half of the nineteenth century, a considerable rôle has been played by the opening of new and fertile lands in South America and Australia. The fertility of the new land, the low cost of foreign production and the developed means of transportation have made agriculture unprofitable in many parts of Europe with their less favorable conditions. Agriculturists in such parts of Europe could not compete with these cheap American agricultural products and had to give up agriculture and go to the cities. In

[25] See the data in the appendix of the quoted study by Weitz.

[26] See the table on p. 377, *Annuaire Statistique de la Belgigue*, 1914. Other yearbooks give similar data. See *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1924–1925, p. xix for references to German data on crop yields since 1878. For Austria-Hungary, see *Statistisches Handbuch* 1911, p. 87; p. 44 of the Résumé Retrospéctif " of the *Annuaire Statistique de la France* for 1909 gives average production for each year between 1815 and 1910 for most of the important crops of that country. See also, Sweden, *Statistisk Arsbok*, 1915, p. 83.

[27] This same point is made by Dr. William Ogle, in "The Alleged Depopulation of the Rural Districts," *Journal of the Royal Stat. Society*, June, 1899, Vol. 52, part 2, pp. 205 ff. The decline in rural population in a typical county (Huntingdonshire) was associated with the appearance and increase of a new class called *agricultural machinists* by the Census Officials.

other places in Europe, the peasants could compete only under an improvement of the technique of production. This improvement of the techinque of agricultural production, as has been shown above, has led to a reduction of human forces necessary for the agricultural production, to a surplus of human material in the country, and through that, to a migration of the surplus to the cities.

f. Add to these, the moving of many industries from the country to the city—a shift caused by many conditions; we see the concentration in the cities of many industries even dealing with the transformation of food (packing and canning industries); and the shift of the professionals to the cities caused by the greater opportunities which they have found in the cities. These basic economic conditions make it comprehensible why migration to the city from the country has been going on intensively for the past century.

(3) Finally, *the progress of science and inventions is to be mentioned as among the basic factors of migrations.* If there were no new inventions, the above economic factors alone would not have been as efficient as they have been. A series of most important inventions since the second half of the eighteenth century called forth the industrial revolution, and made possible the enormous mechanization of industry, and partly agriculture, as discussed above. The invention of the spinning jenny (1767–1768), of a special type of furnace (1766) for the transformation of iron ore, of the steam engine (1769), of the locomotive (1824) of electrical induction (1832), of the telegraph (1832) of the steamboat (1836), these and similar inventions made possible the industrial revolution itself. This latter called forth the above mechanization of industry, the creation of new and newer types of industry, the expansion of markets, the intensification of world-commerce and trade, and finally, the mechanization of agriculture itself. In this way they made possible the play of the economic factors described above and through those have caused the process of urban growth and urbanward migration.

Especially important was the "domestication" of steam power. Its utilization made necessary the creation of big factories with thousands of laborers. The impossibility of transmitting steam energy over wide distances facilitated such a concentration of hands in the factories and mills, and the concentration of the factories in the cities. In this way, hundreds of thousands of migrants have been attracted to the cities and have swelled the urban population by composing the largest strata of the city population in the form of skilled and unskilled laborers.[28] These basic factors make comprehensible

[28] See about this concentrating rôle of steam power in Krische, P., Die Soziale Schichtung, der Erwerbstätigen im Zeitalter der Dampf-maschene und der Elektrizität," in *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie u. Soziologie,* March, 1928. It is interesting to note

the necessity of the rural migration as discussed.[29] These previous factors embrace what are styled as "social" reasons for migration and urbanization, such as comforts and conveniences, nearness to schools and medical facilities, and other factors of a similar nature. In their totality they are but concrete forms or were results of the basic factors discussed above.[30]

that an increasing utilization of electrical energy which may be transmitted over long distances from power stations tends to a greater degree than the steam industry to work in the way of dispersion of mills, shops, and factories over vast areas. See a very suggestive consideration and data of this kind in the same paper.

[29] See some interesting details of this problem in Sombart, W., *Das Wirtschaftsleben in Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus*, Chapters 24–25; Shanahan, E. W., "Economic Factors in the Changing Distribution of Population between Urban Centres and Rural Areas," *The Economic Journal*, 1927, Vol. XXVII, pp. 395–403; Weber, A. F., *op. cit.*, Chapter III.

[30] For a discussion of these "social" reasons, see Taylor, C. C., *Rural Sociology*, p. 19; Sims, N. L., *Rural Sociology*, Chapter 5; Gillette, J. M., *Rural Sociology*, Rev. Ed. 1928, pp. 98 ff.; Hawthorne, H. B., *The Sociology of Rural Life*, pp. 151 ff.; Turner, V. B., *Causes and Conditions of Retirement of Farmers Living in Mt. Horeb, Wisconsin*, Washington, D. C., 1926; Ta Chen, "Chinese Migrations with Special Reference to Labor Conditions," *Bulletin of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics*, No. 340, 1923, p. 11; Wilson, E. A., Hofsommer, H. C., and Benton, Alva H., *Bulletin 214, North Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station*, "Rural Changes in North Dakota," 1928, p. 47; Hart, H. H., "Selective Migration as a Factor in Child Welfare," *University of Iowa Studies*, first series number 53, 1921, and Levasseur, E., *Histoire de la Population Française avant 1879*, Vol. 3, Chapters 8 and 9, especially the latter portions of Chapter 9.

CHAPTER XXIV

AGE AND SEX SELECTIVITY OF URBAN MIGRATIONS

Introduction. The next major problem which arises with the urbanward migration of a population is that of the selectivity or lack of selectivity by cities. What kinds of populations are selected by cities? How do they differ from the rural populations in age distribution, sex distribution, native ability, and inherited physical, mental, and moral characteristics (as far as these are determined by nature)? In this chapter, we shall attempt to summarize various data which deal with the age and sex selectivity of cities and to suggest some probable conclusions.

Age Selectivity of Cities and City Migration. It is generally assumed that persons migrate while young and in the active stages of life. Let us suggest a few propositions and then test them for their validity. First, the majority of migrations begin with early adulthood and take place during the years of greatest physical activity. The bulk of the females migrate a few years earlier than males. Second, this gives city populations a greater concentration of populations about the active and productive stages of life. Third, the process of migration itself, like army service in many countries, comes at a time when many would ordinarily settle down and make new homes for themselves. Fourth, the concentration of city populations about the productive stages of life gives them greater mobility due to the greater energy of the younger adults and to the higher average incomes which are partly accounted for by the differences in age distribution. In proof of these statements the following data are presented:

Ages of migrations to and from the United States and from rural to urban districts for the 20-year period 1890 to 1910 have been computed by Hornell Hart.[1] According to Dr. Hart's analysis, the following conclusions appear from his data:[2]

On this basis it appears that three-quarters of the foreign immigrants over ten years of age enter the United States at the ages 10–29, and that this proportion is fairly constant for the two decades and for urban and rural communities. Native white and negro migrants

[1] Hart, Hornell, "Selective Migration," *University of Iowa Studies*, 53, 1921, p. 32. This study does not bear out the earlier theory of Smith, H. L., that migrants to large cities are older. In fact they seem younger.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 33–34.

from the rural areas are even more concentrated in their age distribution. More than half of them migrate at the ages 20–29, and an additional fourth at the ages 10–19 (which probably means 15–19).

Migration to cities occurs at earlier ages than immigration or emigration to the United States as a whole. Over half of the migration to cities occurs at the ages 10–19. In medium-sized cities, this percentage decreased from about 55 to about 45 per cent between the decades. In large cities, however, it increased from about 55 to about 60 per cent. The large cities show a fairly marked emigration of natives in the age periods after 30. So pronounced is the concentration of cityward migrants in the age-group just preceding 20, that it is fairly accurate to say that such migration is a phenomenon of the adolescent period.

Other studies bear out the general results of Dr. Hart.[3] Whelpton found 50 per cent of the native white, rural-urban migrants between the ages of 15 and 30.[4] The existing data for other countries give similar results. In Russia among all migrants to the eighteen cities studied (April, 1927) the children at ages below 16 years composed only 7.7 per cent, and in July–September about 9 per cent.[5]

A study of the population of London, by the same methods as used by Hart, shows that the great excess of male population occurs at the ages 15 through 34. After that there is a loss in most groups, due to return to smaller towns and to rural districts as well as to migrations elsewhere. This same study shows that females migrate at younger ages, and are more concentrated. The reverse migrations of females commence five years earlier (age-group 30–34) the same as the earlier migrations of females to cities.[6] H. L. Smith, studied the migrations to London some years earlier and reached the same conclusions. Eighty per cent of the migrants studied by Smith left the rural districts between the ages of 15 and 25.[7] Further proofs for Switzerland are given in the following table. The population is divided into age-groups up to 15 years, 15–39, and above 39. If migrations take place in the middle adult and active period of life, we should expect each thousand of the population in urban life to have a greater proportion in the age-groups 15–39. This table shows such has been true for Switzerland as far as records exist (back to 1860).[8]

[3] See Zimmerman's studies of "Migrations," *American Journal of Sociology, loc. cit.*, and *Farm Economics*, October, 1928.

[4] See Whelpton, P. K., "Population of the U. S." 1925–1975, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 34, p. 265, Sept., 1928.

[5] *Statistical Review* (Russian), 1927, September, p. 81, November, p. 87.

[6] See Hill, A. B., *Internal Migrations, op. cit.*, pp. 33 ff.

[7] See Smith's studies in Booth, Chas., *Life and Labour of the People of London*, Vol. III, "Poverty," p. 139.

[8] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1923, p. 41.

NUMBER IN EACH THOUSAND POPULATION BETWEEN AGES 15–39

Year	*All Switzerland*	*25 Important Cities*	*Difference in Favor of Cities*
1860	413	499	86
1870	384	451	67
1880	383	455	72
1890	378	449	71
1900	406	475	69
1910	406	473	67
1920	408	461	53

This difference has been considerable at each census period since 1860. Its reduction in late years shows the decline in sharp rural-urban differences with urbanization of the countryside.

The data of Sweden for the 1920 census give us some idea of the time of migrations.[9] If a population does not migrate we should expect each increasing age-group to have a less number than the previous one, as some die in each group each year. This study shows a decline in the numbers of male population from 72 to 56 (thousands) in the urban age-group 10–15. Between 15 and 20, the migrations caused sufficient increase to offset the deaths and show a small gain. The big gain came in the age period 20–25, after which there was a loss. The only difference for females was that migrations were earlier and more intense. Females gained as many thousands between the ages 15–20 as males in the age periods 20–25. In the age periods 20–25, females gained more than males in any age period. The inverse of this situation is to be discovered if we examine the age-groupings of the rural districts.

Further information for Sweden shows that, for the emigrants into the country and immigrants out of the country since 1860, the largest age-groupings occur between the 15th and 40th years. Of 10,671 who left the country in 1924, 7,899 were between the ages of 15 and 40. If there had been an equal distribution in all age-groups between 0 and 70 years of age, only five-fourteenths of the 10,671 would have been in these age-groups, or 3,810. The proportion in these age-groups was about twice the expectancy. The same distribution applies to the 5,942 immigrants into Sweden.[10] The city of Stockholm by itself shows the same trend as the urban population.[11]

The fluctuations in the sexes by age-groups show the effects of migration on age composition in Denmark for the census of 1921.[12] It confirms the principal conclusions already drawn from previous

[9] See *Sweden Statistisk Aarsbok*, 1925, p. 10.

[10] *Sweden, Statistisk Aarsbok*, pp. 62–63, 1925.

[11] Age-groups for the population of Stockholm for the years 1820 to 1912–1913 are given in *Statistisk Arsbok for Stockholms Stad*, 1914, p. 91. The life survival tables are given on p. 111 of the same Arsbok.

[12] *Statistisk Aarbog Danmark*, 1926, Table 7.

studies. Urban migration is principally a phenomenon of early adulthood, and begins about 5 years earlier for females as compared with males.

The same phenomenon appears for Paris.[13] On the whole one may see that a tremendous increase of population in the active age of life has been brought about by migration and that this commences earlier for females as contrasted with males. Furthermore, it is more prevalent for the females. If it were not for this migration, a decline in the total number in each sex should be expected.

Some data for Italy which give the ages of the emigrants show that the majority are adults. In 1921, 84 out of every 100 who emigrated were above 15 years of age. In 1925, 87 out of every 100 were above 15. This same table shows that the majority of the foreign emigrants (long distances) were males.[14]

The study of foreign migration by the League of Nations gave the same results, in spite of the fact that migration from country to country is considerably different from that between rural areas and cities.[15]

Historical studies of the age distribution of the city versus the rural population bear out the previous results. Weber shows that the normal population not affected by migration and growing assumes the shape of a pyramid. The base of the pyramid broadens in cases in which the population is growing rapidly through natural means and where numerous children are constantly being added to the lower age-groups. In cases of migration the population pyramid assumes two shapes: (a) in the case of immigration, the age curve assumes the shape of a top on account of influx of population in the middle age groups; and, (b) in the case of emigration, the curve sinks in the middle through loss of population and the figure becomes spindle-shaped. The urban population may be said to assume the shape of a top, because it receives migrants, and the rural population that of the spindle. In proof of this thesis, Weber gives data for Hungary, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Bavaria, and the United States.[16] In an earlier section dealing with the age of migration, proof is given that the migrants are primarily of the adult stage. The statement is made that, "over one-half of the migrants are of the age 20–40,—in many cases 20–30." He claims that, in the groups before 16, males predominate, but between 16 and 30 females become of greater

[13] *Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris*, 1921–1922, p. 290.

[14] *Annuario Statistico Italiano*, 1922–1925, p. 29.

[15] International Labour Office, League of Nations, *Migration Movements*, 1920–1924, Geneva, 1926, pp. 20 ff.

[16] Weber, A. F., *The Growth of Cities*, pp. 300 ff. For previous centuries see the data in the works of John Graunt, William Petty, R. Price, J. Süssmilch and other "Political Arithmetitians" of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.

significance than males. These young migrants "wrest away from the city-born the real work of the city." The immigrants form a much higher proportion of the city populations gainfully employed than they do of any of the younger or unemployed classes.[17]

Levasseur reached the same conclusions in his earlier study. His conclusions are based primarily upon France, Germany and Italy in the 19th century. Immigration was found to take place generally in the years of adolescence or early adulthood—between 15 and 35. He found the same bell-shaped curve of the distribution of population in urban districts and the spindle-shaped in the rural districts. In all essential traits his analysis and that of Weber are similar. Weber gives Levasseur credit for the suggestion of many ideas in his own study and uses much of the data from the works of Levasseur in corroboration of his own thesis.[18]

In this respect, cities show less variability in age distribution than rural districts. This is the one exception to the general principle of greater variability of cities. But, at the same time, they show greater deviation from the normal age distribution than rural communities.

Causes of Age Selectivity in Migration. The chief causes of age selectivity in migration are that such a movement requires great energy, great adaptability, and adult judgment. A child or an old man cannot take care of himself and therefore cannot afford to leave either the parental home or the local community where he is guided, supported, and advised. If a small proportion of them leave they go together with the active adult members of the family. For the same reason a family, where the number of helpless children or of old members is great, moves to a new and remote place less often than a family with a small number of such helpless members. Only the adults who have accumulated the energy, are still in the adaptable stage, and are sufficiently mature to take care of themselves, leave the local community and seek a new opening for life. These reasons also explain why the females migrate at earlier ages than males. They mature earlier.

The Social Effects of Age Selectivity in Urbanization. The conclusions to be reached from these data are that the propositions put forth at the beginning concerning ages of migrants and the effect of migration upon the city population are valid. Young persons leave for cities at about the age of adolescence or soon after. The females leave some years earlier than the males, due no doubt to earlier maturity. They add to the disproportionate age distribution of city populations. This increases the economic productivity of city populations because

[17] *Op. cit.*, pp. 280 ff.

[18] Levasseur, E., *La Population Française*, Vol. 2, especially Chapter 15. See also Hansen, G., *op. cit.*, pp. 25 ff., for detailed data for the cities of 19th-century Germany.

adults have greater productivity than either the young or aged. Further, each adult has fewer young and aged to support. This distribution of age-groups accentuates a tendency for cities to have higher average incomes and a more conspicuous and greater consumption of economic goods per capita.[19]

By such computations it is easy to see that the basal productivity of an active population such as that of a city, concentrated around the ages of greatest productivity, is much higher than a rural district. According to the United States Census for 1920, 45.9 per cent of the rural population was less than 20 years of age compared with 35.8 per cent for the urban. This is an important factor in wealth, productivity, expenditures, mobility, and all the differences which are evident between cities and rural areas. For the same year, each thousand of persons 20–44 years of age in urban communities had only 645 children under 15 years of age to support compared with 1,204 for each thousand adults in the rural districts. A second additional factor is that this adult period is the age of greatest mobility. It is the period of the greatest ingestion of food and output of energy. Such a congregation of persons during this active stage of life, with few children to support, relatively few home and community ties to bind them, and with the intense stimulation of city life, increases its mobility and the tempo of movements very rapidly. Weber's conclusions concerning this topic are worth noting.[20]

As a result of the presence of a relatively large number of persons in the active period of life in urban populations, one would expect city life to be easier and more animated, the productive classes being large and having a smaller burden to bear in the support of the unproductive classes. One would also expect to find more energy and enterprise in cities, more radicalism, less conservatism, more vice, crime and impulsiveness generally. Birth-rates should be high in cities and death-rates low, on account of the age grouping.

Other sections of this book have shown that much of Weber's predictions are justified. However, it must be realized that age distribution is only one of numerous variables which affect these social phenomena mentioned. Consequently, it is possible to find city populations, which according to age distributions *should* have high birth-rates but on account of other factors do not really have such

[19] See Levin, N. P., "A Statistical Study of the Economic and Sociological Significance of the Population Age," *Quarterly Journal of the American Statistical Association*, March, 1928, p. 40. Some groups reach greatest productivity (laborers and athletes) before 30; others, business executives, life insurance agents, and the upper classes after 50. The average is about 40. See also Schwarz, O., "Das Soziale Schiksal in Seiner abnangigkeit von dem Alter," *Allgemeinen Statistisches Archives*, Vol. XIV, pp. 138–148, 1925.

[20] Weber, A. F., *op. cit.*, pp. 303–304.

high rates. The same variations may be found in regard to all social factors which, as a rule, are subject to multiple causation.

Sex Selectivity of Urban Migration. It is generally assumed that the migration to cities has meant the selection of a greater proportion of the females than the males, and that one of the major differences in composition of the two populations is the feminization of the city population. This section will examine this conclusion for its complete or partial validity and discuss the sociological reasons and results for such a selection.[21] For the *United States* as a whole it appears that proportionately there are more females in the urban districts. We must recognize that there were 104 males for each 100 females in the total population (1920). But for the farm population, 1920, there were 109.1 males per 100 females, 106.5 for the village (all under 2,500 not farm), and 100.3 for the urban (all above 2,500 not farm).[22]

However, this feminization of the population with urbanization is not general and true for every large city. Of the 144 cities which had populations more than 50,000 in the United States in 1920, 44 had, at least, a thousand more males than females and numerous others had slightly more. This means that these cities had attracted at least as many males as females, and some of them more males than females. Industrial cities, primarily employing males, are an illustration. But this greater proportion of males has to be examined further, because as already explained, there were more males than females in the total population of that census. The following lists some of the important cities in the United States which had considerably more males than females and gives the ratios of males per 1,000 females in each: Akron, Ohio, 1,389; Bridgeport, Conn., 1,055; Canton, Ohio, 1,183; Chester, Ohio, 1,192; Chicago, Ill., 1,029; Cleveland, Ohio, 1,078; Denver, Colo., 1,059; Detroit, Mich., 1,191; Duluth, Minn., 1,103; Flint, Mich., 1,293; Fort Worth, Texas, 1,124; Gary, Indiana, 1,350; San Francisco, Cal., 1,166; Seattle, Wash., 1,135; and Toledo, Ohio, 1,067.[23] Other large cities, such as

[21] We must discriminate carefully between long-distance—generally country to country—migration, and migration urbanward, which, on the whole, is a short-distance migration within the same country. There are conspicuous exceptions, as in the United States during the first years of this century. Long-distance migration is primarily male. See the proofs of this statement in International Labour Office, *Migration Movements*, 1920–1924, series O, No. 2, pp. 20, 31, and appendix; and Jerome, H., *Migration and Business Cycles*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Publication No 9, pp. 37 ff. Negro migration to towns and cities within the South sends a predominance of females to cities. See Woofter, T. G., Jr., *Negro Migration*, New York, 1920, Ch. IV and p. 149. See also *Farm Population of the U. S.*, 1920, Census Monographs No. VI, pp. 245 ff.; and Schott, Emmet J., *Negro Migration during the War*, Carnegie End. for Int. Peace, New York, 1920.

[22] *Farm Population in the United States*, 1920, p. 235; *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1922, p. 13.

[23] These were taken from p. 45, *Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1923, U. S. Bureau of Commerce. A number of smaller cities with a higher sex ratio were omitted.

Philadelphia, New York, St. Louis, Los Angeles, and others, had more females than males. These cities which had more males than females, range from the highest proportion of 1,389 at Akron, Ohio, to the lowest proportion of 1,029 at Chicago, Illinois. They include large cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland, as well as many small ones.

The same fluctuations among cities in spite of a general tendency for the urban districts as a whole to have relatively larger proportions of females, is to be found in Germany. In 1924, of the 91 cities over 50,000 in population 79 had more females than males and 12 the opposite. The cities with peculiar types of industrial development were those with more males. Of course some types of industries require females (*e. g.*, the textile industry), so the general theory that industrialized cities have most males and commercial cities have most females, is not true.[24] This same general type of variation was noted earlier by Levasseur. His study gives the number of males and females in the 24 most important European cities during the latter half of the 19th century. The data are not copied here, but they bear out the theory stated above.[25] Levasseur attributes these variations in sex to migration plus different occupational opportunities in the various cities. Paris and London had an excess of females at that time, according to this author, because there was a need for female domestics. St. Petersburg, on the other hand, uses male domestics. In 1871, St. Petersburg had only 77 females per 100 males. The discrepancy in Rome is attributed to the number of clergy.

In *Switzerland*, the feminization of the urban population is more general than the previous data for the United States and other countries showed. For the whole country, at the time of the 1920 census, there were 518 females in every 1,000 of the population. Of the 25 cities in the country, above 10,000 in population, only two had less than this ratio of females, and the average for the 25 cities was 544 for each thousand population.[26]

For the year 1924, *Sweden* had 988 females for each 1,000 males in the rural districts, and 1,154 females per 1,000 males in the urban districts. This same relative proportion of females in the urban districts was true for each department for that year. Stockholm had a ratio of 1,238.[27] Further analysis shows that the correlation between urbanization and the relative feminization of the population has been true for Sweden since 1800. Individual cities are not given,

[24] Elfert, Gustav, "Stand Und Bewegung der Bevolkerung," *op. cit.*, pp. 338 ff.
[25] Levasseur, *Histoire de la population Française avant 1879*, Vol. 2, p. 389.
[26] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1923, pp. 37–38.
[27] These data are taken or computed from *Statistisk Arsbok of Sweden*, 1925, pp. 5–6, and from *Statistisk Arsbok for Stockholms Stad*, 1914, p. 93.

other than Stockholm. The data are similar to those of the United States. We have reason to believe that there is considerable variation in the various cities depending upon the type.

In *Finland*, the ratio of females to males has been greater in the urban districts for the periods between 1810 and 1830, and for every census since 1850. In the census of 1800 and 1805 and those between 1835 and 1850, the rural female ratios were highest. However, in these earlier periods, this country had only a few very small cities. At no time after the total amount of urban population reached much above 100,000 has the sex ratio of females predominated in the country. For 1925, there were 1,194 females for each 1,000 males in urban districts and 992 in rural districts. This country is a conspicuous exception to the claim, discussed later, that the greater proportions of the female sex in cities is due to the use of machines in agriculture.[28]

The 1921 census of *Denmark* showed that the ratio of females to each 1,000 males was 1,201 in the capital, 1,122 in the provincial cities, and 977 in the rural districts.[29] *Poland* shows the same results for 1927. The urban ratio was 1,126 and the rural was 1,072.[30] Weber gives data for the United States for 1890, Germany 1890, England, Wales, Scotland, Sweden, Denmark, Hungary, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Serbia, France, Russia, Poland, New South Wales, and other countries (all for the latter half of the 19th century). All these statistics bear out the conclusion as to the relative feminization of the urban population.[31] Only Soviet Russia represents an exception to this rule. In 1926 there were 1,037 females per 1,000 males in urban, and 1,077 in rural districts. The majority of provinces had a prevalence of females in rural districts.[32] This exception, however, may be due to the disurbanization of Russia and to the destruction of its industries in the cities during the years of the Revolution.

Without citing further proof, it is evident that we may reach the conclusion that *there is a tendency, on the whole, for the urban populations to be more feminized than the rural.* However, this conclusion must be accompanied by the corollaries that variations among cities are great, that many cities exhibit just the opposite tendency, and that the same city may show different results from time to time according to the changes in forces which select the population. In this respect, feminization shows the phenomenon of greater variability in cities, already discussed as a city characteristic.

[28] See Finland, *Statistika Centralbyran*, 1927, Vol. 25, p. 7.
[29] *Statistisk Aarbog for Danmark*, 1926, pp. 10 and 11.
[30] *Annuaire Statistique de la République Polonaise*, 1927, p. 48.
[31] Weber, A. F., *op. cit.*, pp. 285–300.
[32] "Recensement de la Population du 17 Decembre 1926, Résumés abrégés, *Population de l'U. R. S. S.*, Table IV, p. 48, Moscow, 1927.

Is This Feminization of Urban Populations a Biological or a Selective Phenomenon? This raises the question as to whether this greater feminization is due to the greater number of females born in city populations, relative to rural populations, to a greater migration of females to cities, to a greater migration of males away from the cities, or finally, to a greater adaptability of females to urban life permitting them to survive in greater proportions. This question has been discussed by Weber; he reaches the following conclusions:[33]

> The excess of females in any population is usually ascribed, first, to the heavier mortality of male than of female infants, which within the first year usually effaces the superiority of male births. Then comes the great mortality of adult males due to the dangers of their occupations, as well as to vice, crime, and excesses of various kinds which shorten life. Now, all of these forces are accentuated in cities, producing a greater excess of females there than elsewhere, even without the influence of emigration, which increases the surplus of women in cities. In the cities also, the superiority of male births over female births is smaller than in the country.

Thus Weber attributes the excess of females in cities to all four factors. Let us examine the data given in these chapters as to evidences concerning this.

The data for London, showing the origin of the population of the 1911 census, shows a greater proportion of the females now residing in London were born in the city. The same applies to all other places of origin other than "foreign countries." The data which give the present place of residence of population born in London show that females, more than males, migrate for short distances away from cities. The statistics do not give the information concerning natives of London living in foreign countries. But Wales and the Channel Islands are the only places recorded where the migration of males from London is greater than the migration of females. The data suggest that migration of females from near-by places is in excess of males. Since this near-by migration is more important than long-distance migration (in which males predominate) the migration to cities adds to their feminization. Migration away also takes an excess of females, especially for the shorter distances. This reduces the gains of the cities in regard to females but it does not compensate for the greater feminization of migrations to cities or the greater significance of migration to cities (especially for growing cities).

In order to make a comprehensive analysis of the statement that cities produce (relatively) a greater number of females than rural

[33] Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 299 ff.

districts, let us present some statistics on the proportions of males per 1,000 females among the living born in rural districts and cities. Data for the *United States*[34] show 1,057 males per 1,000 females in the cities and 1,056 for the rural districts. As it stands, it shows a greater feminization of rural births but the difference is insignificant. The following states showed a greater feminization of urban births: Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming. Others showed greater feminization of rural births. These are: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, North Carolina, and New Hampshire showed no significant differences either way. San Francisco had relatively more male births than the rural districts of the state but less than the total of the whole state. The same statement applies to Chicago. Indianapolis, Louisville, Boston, Minneapolis, Buffalo, Portland, and Milwaukee had more males born relative to the states as a whole. Detroit, St. Paul, Omaha, Jersey City, Newark, New York, Cincinnati, and Philadelphia, had more females relative to the states as a whole. On the bases of these data for the United States for the year 1922, we are not able to support the conclusion that the greater feminization of urban districts is, on the whole, due to the relative excess of females born in urban districts or cities.

The reader must remember that all these confrontations of the sex ratios of living births are merely relatives. On the whole, in most countries of western society, there is a tendency for more males to be born than females. In the United States for 1922 there were 1,056 males born per 1,000 females, as shown in the previous data. Every state showed more males than females among the living births in both rural and urban districts. What we are discussing is the proportion of males, relative to females, in the rural and urban districts.

The next characteristic of sex ratios among the live births in the United States for 1922 is that the urban districts showed greater variation in sex proportions of live births than the rural districts. The range of the variation in the urban districts was 80 and in the rural districts, 70. The arithmetic average deviation of the urban districts was 14.8 and the rural districts, 12.2. Thus we still find the recurring character of greater variation in the urban districts.

If we compare Paris with all *France* for the years 1823, then 1830 and the decennial years until 1900, and finally 1906 (these were the years for which we have comparable information) it appears that

[34] From *Birth, Still Birth and Infant Mortality Statistics*, United States Dept. of Commerce, 1922, pp. 153 and 173.

for every year except 1906 the males in the births were relatively greater in all France. For 1906 the rates were approximately equal (1,040 for Paris and 1,038 for all France). But, as already indicated, each year the number of males per 1,000 females among the live births was greater in both Paris and all France. The range of variation for Paris was from 1,013 to 1,093 compared with a range from 1,038 to 1,062 for all France.[35]

A comparison of the masculinity of the live births for Stockholm and all *Sweden*, by ten-year averages, between the periods 1751 and 1910, shows that the rates have fluctuated for different decades (although every period showed more males than females born both in Stockholm and all Sweden). For the periods 1771–1780, 1841–1860, and 1881–1900—a total of 50 years, the average of Stockholm births show greater relative masculinity. The other 11 decades (110 years) show relatively greater feminization of Stockholm births. Here, again, the range and variation was greater in Stockholm (49 points compared with 15 for all Sweden).[36]

Switzerland shows that in the ratio of male to female (live births only) for the year 1925, the 25 cities had relatively greater feminization than the remainder of the country (1,039 for the cities and 1,047 for all Switzerland). The largest 10 cities showed greater feminization than the total of the 25 cities. But six of these largest 10 cities showed the reverse correlation, when they were taken separately. Further, Geneva, St. Galln, Winterhur, Lucerne, La Chaux-de-Fonds, and Bief-Bienne had a higher ratio of male births than the total of the country.[37]

A comparison for *Denmark* also shows many fluctuations and no steady relationships between urbanization and feminization of births. For the period 1911 1915, all cities showed greater feminization than rural districts, but the smaller cities exceeded the capital. Between 1916 and 1920, the greatest masculinization was in the capital city—Copenhagen. The fluctuations were more violent between 1920 and 1924. There was no correlation between urbanization and feminization of births.[38]

Belgium shows greater feminization in the urban provinces between 1861 and 1910 and 1913. In 1912 the reverse was true. (The statistics between 1861 and 1910 are by ten-year average periods which hides some of the fluctuations.) But, for every year or period of years, one or more of the urban provinces showed greater masculinity

[35] Computed from *Annuaire Stat. de la France*, 1909, p. 10, Résume Rétrospectif; and *Annuaire Stat. de la Ville de Paris*, 1922, pp. 26–27.

[36] *Statistisk Arsbok for Stockholms Stad, 1914*, p. 89, and *Statistisk Arsbok for Sverige*, 1925, p. 50.

[37] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1925, p. 9.

[38] *Statistisk Aarbog for Danmark*, 1926, p. XXXI.

than the kingdom as a whole. In 1912 all urban provinces showed greater masculinity. Further, the provinces which showed greater masculinity some years showed less other years.[39]

Berlin showed slightly greater masculinity than all *Germany* in 1922 and less in 1923. There was no relationship.[40]

Italy showed a slightly greater preponderance of female births in the urban in 1922 and slightly less in 1923. The urban varied most in this respect.[41]

Rural and Urban Survival Rates for Females. The next phase of biological factors which may affect the general feminization of the urban populations, and the masculinization of the rural, is the possibility of greater survival of urban females in relation to rural females. If the difference between the death-rates for the sexes in cities favors women more than in rural districts, this factor would tend to increase the sex differences in proportions within the populations. Such a difference could arise through several phenomena. City life may be more adapted to women than men; or, the change in types of life in the urbanization of a population may be less harmful to women. For instance, employment in the dangerous trades may increase the mortality of men; on the other hand, employment of women, which often is a substitute for marriage, or if married, for motherhood, may not be as dangerous in certain age-groups as childbearing. These and similar factors may give city females a greater survival rate in certain age-groups. Let us see the actual situation.

As indicated in a previous chapter, the mortality of urban females is less than that of rural females in certain countries. In England this was true for the age-groups 15–25 for the period 1891–1910; for the year 1914, the age-groups 20–30 had lower rates than the rural. For the years 1910–1912, the tables of survivals based upon 1,000 females at the age of 12, show more rural survivors at the age of 45 (875 urban and 877 rural). But the intervening periods show more urban survivals, the change coming in favor of the rural only after the age of 30. For males, the rural had greater percentage of survivals in each period. Germany has about the same rural and urban mortality for females. In Bavaria, the age-group 25–30 has the same mortality in both sexes.

These results of mortality and survival tables indicate that *differences in survival of urban females and males might be a factor in feminization of the urban population.* But this is not a significant factor for the simple reason that feminization of cities is just as important a phenomenon in other countries, the United States for

[39] *Belgium: Amnuaire Statistique*, 1914, p. 127.
[40] *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutsche Reich*, 1925.
[41] *Annuario statistico Italiano*, 1922–1925, p. 20.

example, where there are little or no urban differential mortality rates favoring the females. Also studies of migrants who have left rural districts show that this movement is greatly dominated by females.[42] Since this point is discussed in detail in the chapter devoted to the *Map of Migration*, we do not give any figures to prove it here.

Summary of Biological Factors in Masculinization or Feminization of Urban Populations. On the basis of data presented here and other not presented, the following conclusions may be offered. *There is no real and permanent correlation between urbanization and the greater feminization of the urban births.* The proportions of male in the living born in cities and rural districts fluctuate from time to time in the same countries, in the same cities, and in the same territories. Further, at any one time different relationships may be found in adjoining countries and in countries of the same degree of urbanity.[43] Whatever primary and real correlation exists between urbanization and the proportion of females in the population must be explained by the selective influences between cities and rural districts and between territories of immigration and emigration. At times the greater feminization of urban births adds to the feminine constituency of the urban population and at others it subtracts from it.

This raises the question as to why there should appear a greater feminization of urban births at times and the reverse conditions at other. This is one of the types of greater variation in urban communities. The same applies to variations between cities, some of them located near each other as Minneapolis and St. Paul; these cities showed opposite relationships in 1922. At the present moment it is impossible to answer the question certainly because the factors of sex determination are still uncertain.[44] In view of this uncertainty, some of our statements are only tentative hypotheses. *Nationality* is a factor in masculinity of births (race is the primary factor back of nationality). Cities vary more as to nationalities or races than rural districts. Consequently, according to the elementary principles of selection developed by R. Livi (see Chapter IV) countries with low masculinity coefficients should have many large cities with high masculinity coefficients. On the contrary, countries with high mas-

[42] The data on mortality by sex and age-groups are given in Chapter VIII. The statement may be made that no study of migration, which takes the total rural migrating population, finds an opposite conclusion.

[43] Differences in the mortality rates of women, which favor the urban females, are significant but not a primary factor in this phenomenon.

[44] All existing theories may be divided into two groups: environmental and biological (predetermined by heredity) theories of sex determination. The majority of the more valid theories stress that sex of children is biologically determined and is inherited somewhat like the Mendelian unit. See the theories and the data concerning sex determination in Gini, C., *Il sesso dal punto divisto statistico;* Goldschmidt, R., *The Mechanism and Physiology of Sex Determination*, pp. 251 ff.

culinity coefficients should have many large cities with lower coefficients. *The rate of infant mortality* and the proportions of all pregnancies ending in still-births are factors in masculinity (A. Tschuproff's theory). The proportions of masculinity among still-births is greater than among live births, and further, still-births of the earlier periods of uterogestation seem to have greater masculinity than those of the seventh, eighth, and ninth months. As a result, cities with relatively low indices for still-births, and infant deaths under one day of age, will have a tendency toward greater masculinization. Cities which have relatively greater still-birth rates, and rates for infant deaths under one day of age, will have a greater tendency toward femininity of live births. Now, since cities, on the whole, have greater still-birth rates than the rural districts, and this difference was greater in the past, and since these still-birth rates are accentuated by the attempts at abortion, which are primarily in the earlier periods of uterogestation, we have some slight reasons here to expect a greater feminization of urban births. There is a tendency for masculinity to decrease as fecundity wanes, and for it to be higher in the first births, and lower in subsequent births.[45] Cities with greater proportions of first births would expect to find higher masculinity rates than cities with greater proportions of births other than first births, and *vice versa*. The same applies to rural and urban comparisons. If the theory of a positive correlation between hybridization of races and masculinity of births is valid, cities may yield higher rates of males born than the country, because marriages between mates of different races have more chances in the city than in the country.[46]

There are numerous other factors which must be taken into consideration, such as the general tendency for a greater masculinity of births, chance fluctuations, wars, wealth, types of occupation, food, and other factors which are supposed to have some influence on the masculinity of births. We cannot go into all these factors here. It is worth while to indicate that the masculinity of rural or urban births is the combined result of a number of factors, some of which are enumerated above.[47]

Whatever may be the factors of sex-determination, there are many reasons to expect greater masculinity of urban births, and others which suggest greater femininity. According to the prevalence of still-births and attempted abortions, we should expect greater femininity in the cities. According to the small families, greater

[45] See Harris, A., *Proceedings of the Society of Experimental Biology and Medicine*, 1926, pp. 806 ff.

[46] See Pearl, Raymond, "On the Relation of Sex-Crossing," etc., *Biological Bulletin*, 1908.

[47] For proof of many of these theories, see *Birth, Still-Birth and Infant Mortality Statistics*, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1922, pp. 30–31.

hybridization of races, and other factors, we should expect the opposite. But the totality of the results of factors are minor in nature. We must explain the relatively greater feminization of urban populations, where it exists, largely, as the combined result of a number of selective factors operating through migrations.

Reasons for Feminization of Urban Populations Through Selection. All the reasons for this phenomenon and its variations cannot of course be given. One of the most important is undoubtedly division of labor. Cities oftentimes offer employment of the types more suited to women. The fact that employment is a factor in urban selection also explains why the correlation between urbanization and feminization is by no means constant. Certain types of cities, steel and coal towns for illustration, offer employment primarily to men.[48] It is in this type of community where the ratio of males to females is higher than for the rural communities. In many instances cities such as these have a much greater proportion of males than females. There are other towns which are built around industries offering employment to more females. This type of community shows the greatest concentration of women. However, there is a tendency to build up the two types of industry in the same community, where possible, because of the available labor supply.

A second factor in the feminization of cities is that *agriculture as it is carried on in family units offers very little outlet for women other than through family life.* Women who do not care for marriage, or women who do not get chances for marriage, find their best opportunities in cities.

Some other factors are *greater mass stimulation in the cities, more anonymity, greater variety of stimulation, the greater development of prostitution, less exposure, and more physical comforts,* and many others. These factors may appeal more to the innate characteristics of women than men. In addition, as already indicated, urban life may be more suited to females, as indicated by some differences in mortality.

A last reason *is the present method of inheritance of farm property.* It goes primarily to the males, although in some cases the male child must recompense the others. This means that females are forced, to a greater extent, to leave the home farms. Once uprooted and forced to move, it is inevitable that more of them should end by migrating to cities.

[48] See Chapter XV on the *Family* for an analysis of the types of occupations open primarily to men. Manufacturing, mining, transporting, and other occupations are primarily open to males. Hence, we see that a steel town such as Gary, Indiana, or specialized manufacturing towns such as Flint, Michigan (automobiles), and Akron, Ohio (rubber goods), may have greater proportions of males. Governmental headquarters, general types of cities, and others, with high proportions of clericals, domestic servants, and professionals should be expected to show the opposite.

Results of Feminization of Urban Population. One cannot be dogmatic and give hypotheses as if they were proved social laws. The following social results of the feminization of urban populations are to be taken as mere hypotheses and suggestions. A first characteristic is, omitting those industrialized cities where males often are to be found in relatively greater porportions than in rural districts, that the chances for marriage of the female sex are made less. In the whole population of the United States, each 100 females has 104 chances for marriage. In the rural population for 1920, each 100 females had 112 chances, in villages 100 chances, and in cities 98 chances. These are the sex proportions. If the analysis were limited to the population of marriageable ages, the differences would be greater. If we grant the assumptions of the economists, that scarcity makes for greater sacrifices in order to satisfy desires, these sex differences in town and country would be partial causes of the increase in prostitution and extra-marriage sex life with urbanization. Urban females, on the average, are forced to make greater sacrifices for sex life and sex companionship. This is a mere hypothesis but may have some validity. Coupled with greater anonymity, more secondary contacts, and more opportunities, it may explain the most of the great amount of prostitution of all kinds and sex life out of marriage which are to be found in cities.

The careful statistical study of marriage in the United States by W. F. Ogburn offers some proof of the above statements.[49] He found, based on the 1920 census data, that the sex ratio giving the greatest proportions married was as high as 115 or 120 men to 100 women. His conclusions were based on a partial correlation analysis of 170 cities with sex ratios ranging from 60 to 190. For these communities an increase of sex ratio of 10 meant an increase in 1 per cent married. He found further that as the number of men in proportion to women increases, the percentages married among the men decreases much less rapidly than the percentages married among the women increases. "In other words marriage among men is less affected by changes in the sex ratios than marriage among women. It is possible that this difference may be due in part to the economic dependence of women; biological differences can however operate as a cause."

This feminization of cities may also mean an increase in productive efficiency of society as a whole. Females working at machines may often do as much as a male, whereas in the employments native to agriculture, the superior strength and weight of the man may be a factor. The significance of increased productivity of economic goods has been discussed in an earlier chapter.

[49] Vol. 18, *Publications of American Sociological Society*, 1923, pp. 47 ff. See also Ogburn's chapters in *American Marriage and Family Relationships* by Groves and Ogburn, especially Chapters XIII and XIX and pp. 481 ff.

It is possible that the increase of females in cities may accentuate those same traits in an urban society which originally attracted the women there. Thus we see increasing opportunities for employment of women and more and more occupations opening to them. A corollary to this which may have some validity, is that sex differences in opportunities not only in employment but in social life, moral behavior, and minor or major vices tend to be more and more minimized with the increase of urbanization. Living alone, going to places without escort, smoking, drinking, standing up in street cars,—all these traits or privileges of men tend to be taken over more and more by women with the increase of urbanization.

Summary of Conclusions. Cities select the young adults, and the females more often than the extremely young and aged persons and the males. The females are selected at an age from about three to five years younger than the males. The causes of age selection are primarily physiological but also social—migration requires adults in their years of greatest energy and before they have accumulated families of their own or have taken up a definite occupation. The causes of sex selectivity are still more complex. Differences in the proportions of the female sex born in cities in relation to males and in the greater survival of females of certain age-groups in cities, are minor factors, if factors at all, in the feminization of cities. This congregation of young adults and more females in cities has much to do with the peculiar characteristics of city populations. It increases the per capita incomes, decreases the proportions of dependent persons per 100 wage-earners, adds to the mobility and life of the cities, reduces marriage, adds to the amount of vice and prostitution, and gives cities the appearance of greater vitality than they really possess. The phenomena of sex and age distribution also show the greater deviations from the norms and greater deviation in cities as before noted for other characteristics.

CHAPTER XXV

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF "SELECTIVE" SELECTION

Introduction. We have seen in the previous chapters that the city-ward migration was selective as far as sex and age-groups were concerned. Now let us examine the arguments for selective selection further, and, in the end, indicate some probable conclusions and interpretations. At various places throughout this book we have referred to such theories. First, we will give some of the most popular theories concerning the selection by urbanization, and then present a summary of the findings in our studies.

Popular Theories Concerning "Selective" Selection Through Urban Migrations. The ideas that cities select a certain physical type from the rural population is by no means new. In one shape or another they appear in practically every work of any significance in which migration or rural and urban relationships are discussed. At various places in this book reference has been made to numbers of the different variants of the theory. Its most popular version is that cities are selecting the better population, and, more and more, the dullards are segregating in rural districts. The Hansen-Ammon-Lapouge version of this theory, already discussed (see Chapter IV), was based upon differences in stature, pigmentation, and the shape of heads in rural and urban districts. In addition, some other "proofs" were used in the various works. Other groups have maintained this same theory of "selective" selection on account of differences in the rural-urban distribution of feeble-minded and subnormals. (This contention has already been discussed in Chapter XIII.) Still others have found differences in intelligence quotients, school achievements, origin of men of talent or genius, origin of exceptional children, size of average income or distribution of wealth, alleged participation in political movements for "liberty," "freedom," differences in standards of living, and what not. All of these and dozens of other "arguments" have been used to show the selectivity of urbanward migration. On the basis of these alleged proofs of the selectivity discussed, several interesting theories concerning the social functions of city and country in the life history and processes of a nation or a society have been constructed. We only

have to mention G. Hansen's theory or the latter one by Ellsworth Huntington.[1]

The essence of Hansen's theory (elaborated by Lapouge and Ammon) is that the two main classes in a society are the farmer-peasants and the proletariat. The middle classes in the cities are merely a transition stage in which groups remain while changing their social status from that of strong (biologically) peasants to the ranks of the wasted and talentless proletariat. Rural societies, lying dormant for ages, accumulate within their ranks the biological basis for many strong and talented leaders. This racial basis of civilization accumulates within the rural classes because of the high birth-rate and the lack of a differential fecundity between the upper and lower classes, which, in urban societies, continually wastes the best blood through the rising to, and disappearance in, the upper classes. But the time comes when the excess of population among the rural classes, accumulated because of the high birth-rate and low death-rate, must find an outlet—in this case to the cities. The nature of urban selection is that a greater proportion of the stronger and more vital of the rural populations migrate and enter, primarily, the middle classes of the cities. These city middle classes are not permanent but merely transition stages. The rapid social processes of the cities continually drain these middle classes, some to the proletariat and others, more talented, to the upper classes. These upper classes also continually disappear, through low fecundity and the failure of many children to inherit or acquire the abilities of their fathers. Thus the middle and upper classes continually waste the best of the rural blood, by destroying it or using up its talents and discarding it to the proletariat. An outstanding characteristic of the proletariat, according to Hansen, is a high birth-rate coupled with a high death-rate. They possess little talent or leadership ability. This process of draining off the strongest and best blood from the rural districts, at its point of great intensity, is, according to Hansen, the "flowering" or "blooming" stage in a society, after which it soon dies. Thus, the essence of Hansen's theory is that the "life cycle" of a society is conditioned and determined by the forces of biological selection working through urbanization. By this theory he attempted to explain the rise and fall of Rome and other earlier urban civilizations.

As we have already shown in Chapter IV, the proofs of this theory,

[1] See Hansen's theory in *Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen;* Lapouge, G. V., *Les sélections sociales,* and Ammon, Otto, *Die natürliche Auslese beim Menschen,* contain an elaboration and inductive verification of many of the most essential phases of Hansen's theory; Ripley, W. Z., *Races of Europe,* Ch. XX; Hankins, F. H., *The Racial Basis of Civilization,* Ch. 10; Weber, A. F., *op. cit.;* Sorokin, P., *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* pp. 234 ff.; Kuczynski, R., in *Der Zug nach der Stadt,* gives an elaborate criticism of Hansen and Ammon.

as later developed by Ammon and Lapouge, did not stand. The three principal proofs [color, shape of head, and physical measurements (stature) of migrants] that urbanization was "selective," have been challenged fairly successfully. Further Ammon himself showed that the rural migrants did not necessarily enter cities by way of the middle classes; his computations showed that most of them entered the lower or proletariat class at the start.

The failure of these proofs does not mean that there is not some validity to the theory. If its greater part is invalid, a part of it may be truthful—in so far as it treats of the differential fertility of the upper and lower classes in the city, and the highly selected character of the upper classes and their dying out.

The Urbanization Theory of Ellsworth Huntington. The other example of these theories which tie up the destinies of civilization with the processes of selection through urbanization is that of E. Huntington.[2] The essence of this theory follows:

The phenomenon of fluctuations of urbanization and ruralization go through all human history. Urbanization is a process of growth and flowering and ruralization is the attempt to survive during periods of decay. Examples of such urban civilizations which have appeared and disappeared or declined are Greece, Rome, and Mesopotamia. The recent decline in Russia is a similar example.

But this does not indicate that cities are the primary causes of civilization. As a matter of fact, cities are the results of human activity and intelligence. Cities are only the agents. After they are established, they become secondary causes.

One of the first results of this selectivity upon the rural communities is that they become decadent. Their decadence varies directly with the age of the communities—rural New England being more decayed than the Mississippi Valley states, and these states more so than the West and California. The leaders gradually leave the farm and the remainder are rustics without special ability. This accounts for the fact that peasants and farmers are consistently sacrificed at the altars of manufacturing and commerce.

The process of urban flowering and decay may be divided into three stages. The first is when the urban communities first become of importance and the relationships are still close to the previous rural environment. "In such a community education is highly honored and many of the brightest young men become teachers. The same is true of religion, science and philanthropy." Government officials are highly esteemed, and their occupation attracts persons of a relatively high type.

The second or "golden stage" is characterized by the fact that, "the older professions and the older type of high moral ideals are

[2] See especially *Pulse of Progress*, Chs. 3 and 4, New York, 1926. The similarity between Huntington's theories and earlier ones is obvious.

still vigorous, but when music, art, engineering and business also enjoy a healthy development. . . . Perhaps the United States, England, France, Germany and Japan are still in this stage. . . . but the extreme devotion of France and Japan to art, and the other three to engineering and business may be signs that the best days are past."

The third stage often seems so glorious that people are dazzled into thinking that it is the culmination of its predecessor. The material and esthetic aspects of civilization forge to the front. Great buildings, monumental bridges, huge business corporations, fine pictures and entrancing music dazzle the imagination, But the rural people are likely to have become dull, sodden and ultra-conservative. Intellectual pursuits, pure science, the discovery of abstract truth and the practice of pure and undefiled religion are forced to the wall by commercial journalism, applied engineering, applied science, and over-organized philanthropy. Education becomes perfunctory, religion loses its fervor, corruption in government becomes rife and the feverish pursuit of wealth makes men think that money and the power it brings are the chief ends of existence. . . .[3]

We may see from the above interpretation of Huntington's theory, that, in essential elements, it is similar to the previous theories popularized by Hansen, Ammon, Lapouge, and Gini. It differs from them in details of working and proof. The proof used by Huntington, is the migratoriness and location of leaders as listed in *Who's Who* by types as indicated in the above discussion. His proof that rural-urban migration is selective is based upon the fact that more leaders were born in the rural districts than live there. This "proof" will be discussed later.

The major characteristics of these theories, represented by those of George Hansen and Ellsworth Huntington just discussed, are: first, urbanization is the blooming part of the life cycle of nations and societies; second, urbanization and complex societies are possible only because of the accumulation and use of much talented human material; third, the primary source of origin of this talented human material is rural life and the farmer-peasant classes; fourth, urbanization begins primarily when there is accumulated an excess of talent among the rural classes; fifth, this excess of talent, by its genius in social organization and industrial technique, makes a complex society possible; sixth, the selective power of cities continually drains off more of the biologically capable than of the less fit; and seventh, this "selective" selection of cities is the "key" which unlocks the doors, first to urban greatness, and later (by differential fecundity)

[3] A somewhat similar theory was earlier developed by C. Gini, in his *I fattori demografici*, quoted. Many of Gini's conclusions are more cautious and more carefully backed by proofs.

to urban decline.[4] Let us now proceed to analyze this key-theory of the "selective" selection of urban migration.

Sorokin has shown, by a careful and comprehensive analysis, that the following main differences are to be found between the mass of society and the talented upper groups of aristocracy.[5]

1. The upper classes are taller, have greater weight, greater cranial capacity, greater handsomeness and, less serious and less numerous, anomalies and defects than the lower classes.
2. The higher social classes are stronger physically and also healthier, and have a greater vitality than the lower. The duration of life of the higher social strata is longer and their mortality is lower than that of the lower social layers. The health of the higher social classes is better than those of the lower.
3. Except in periods of decay, the upper classes are composed of persons of higher intelligence than the lower classes.

With these conclusions in mind, let us examine urban and rural populations carefully to find if such differences exist between them, or if there is any proof that the migrants are in possession of a greater amount of talent than the rural classes which remain in the country. As a beginning hypothesis, the following seems sound. *If the upper and talented classes in a society are marked from the lower classes, on the whole, by differences in physical equipment, vital capacity, longevity, cranial capacity and intelligence*, and if the processes of urbanization are continually selecting more of the talented and superior among the rural groups and moving them to cities, then it is evident that proofs of this would be found in the more competent physical equipment, vital capacity, and intelligence of the urban populations as contrasted with the rural and of the migrants as contrasted with the stay-at-homes. Such a conclusion seems logical, as long as the upper classes have some correlation with greater strength, innate ability, and so on. This does not deny the effects of environment, but merely uses the correlations between physical and vital characters to test the theories of selective selection.

Physical or Bodily Evidences of "Selective" Selection. The data have already been summarized in Chapter IV. After this careful examination of existing studies, the following conclusions were reached. They may be repeated here in summary:

1. There is no valid reason to think that stature, as such, plays an instrumental rôle in the urbanization or ruralization of a population. Differences in stature in rural and urban districts fluctuate from

[4] An almost identical theory to the above was carefully stated and documented by H. L. Smith, *Life and Labor in London*, Chs. II and III, Vol. 3.

[5] See the data and conclusions in *Social Mobility*, Chs. X–XIV.

country to country and city to city. The most likely hypothesis for an explanation of these fluctuations is that of R. Livi, concerning the greater variability of urban populations due to selection from large areas.

2. On the whole, the rural population is slightly heavier than the urban population. This, if it is evidence of greater innate ability, means that urbanization has been the opposite from the general contention that it selects the best physical specimens. But there are satisfactory explanations of this difference in environmental factors. Consequently, the most general conclusion that weight, in itself, is not a factor in urbanization or ruralization, seems likely.

3. There are no evidences in the studies of build that cities have selected a superior type.

4. There are no evidences from the studies of chest circumference that urban or rural districts have selected any special type. What differences do exist seem most suitably explained by environmental differences rather than by a "selective" urban selection. Further, there are slight evidences that the chest circumference of the rural population is, on the whole, if anything, greater than the urban. But this is merely a tentative hypothesis.

5. The studies of shape of the head, size of the head, cephalic indices, and cranial capacity give no evidence of an uniform selection by urban districts.

6. Similar conclusions apply to studies of pigmentation of the urban and rural classes, and the migrants from one to the other.

7. The same applies to age of pubescence and maturation. If differences exist, they are not uniform. Further, these differences are to be explained by other factors, than selection based upon pubescence and maturation, as such.

8. On the whole, there is no evidence in these numerous careful studies of bodily or physical characteristics, which seems to warrant the hypothesis of a dysgienic urban selection. The slight constant differences were generally in favor of the rural districts. The analysis made in this section, indicates that such are to be most likely explained by other factors than "selective" selection. Such would be environmental factors plus an "unselective" selection due to the wider area from which the city migrants are recruited.

Evidences of "Selective" Selection in Vital Statistics. The sections in Chapters V to XI devoted to the analysis of rural and urban health, morbidity, mortality, longevity, defects, incapacity, children's diseases and defects, and so on, furnish the basis for the following conclusions:

1. The comprehensive studies of recruits, drafted men, and armies, which, on the whole, are about as thoroughly representative of the total population, especially the males, as is possible for studies to be, indicate, all in all, the rural population is more fit from the standpoint of health, anomalies, and disqualifying physical defects, than the urban. If these are representative of superior innate ability, similar

to such "marks of genius" found in the upper classes, then the opposite theory of urban selection of the "dregs" of humanity to a relatively greater extent, seems possible. But this conclusion is not to be taken for granted because the effects of environment on these physical defects are not known.

2. The results of the physical examinations of school children are vague and contradicting. The standards and exactness of technique seem to fluctuate from study to study and from case to case within many of these studies. Subjectivity and the biases of the investigators affect many of the results. There are some evidences that some of these studies have been handled in an unscientific manner, and that some seem to have been made to prove the previous biases of the investigators. However, these critical remarks do not apply to all of these studies. But no general conclusions may be reached from a summary of such studies. Anyhow they do not prove a "selective" selection by the cities.

3. The study of predominant diseases in the city and the country indicate that, on the whole, the physiologically significant diseases prevail in the city. The country districts, in spite of inadequate health facilities and medical service, seem better off. The diseases in which they have the greatest rates, are of minor and insignificant character compared with the important degenerative diseases of the city. The majority of the so-called constitutional diseases predominate in the city. This, in itself, is a damaging piece of evidence against the prevalent theories that the "better are migrating to the city in proportionately greater numbers." If the differences were primarily in the endemic and infectious diseases the appeal to an environmental explanation would have some validity.

4. The expectancy of life is, on the whole, greater in rural communities. This bears out the previous conclusions, drawn from other series of data concerning the physical and vital ability of the rural and the farm population.

5. The total mortality of rural and agricultural populations is lower than that of the urban and industrial populations. In some countries this is evidenced in the "crude" death-rates. In others, and in practically all, the difference shows clearly in the "standardized" rates. This is rather clear confirmatory evidence of the greater vitality of the rural population, in spite of several centuries of the recent rather intensive city selection, since the Commercial Revolution of the 15th and 16th centuries. Some countries show that the crude rates, rural and urban, are approaching, due to a more rapid decline of the urban rates. Numbers of demographers, statisticians, and sociologists have pointed to this as some indication of a great improvement in urban vitality. But, in the preceding chapters it has been explained that this is due partly to an improvement of environmental conditions; but mainly to more rapid decline of urban birth-rate and in no way may be interpreted as evidence of "selective selection" by the city or "depletion of the rural population."

Under conditions of improvements in sanitation and medical care, it is to be expected that urban communities, the first to accept new inventions, would gain the benefit first. Since the decline in the birth-rate began earlier in the city, and has gone further than in the country—the crude death-rate of the cities had to decline faster than in the country. For these, and other reasons discussed in the previous chapters, we cannot interpret any relative gains in urban crude mortality rates (which are not happening in all countries) as evidences of urban "selective" selection.

6. The comparison of mortality rates by sex and age-groups, shows that in some countries females fare relatively better in cities, and in some cases the age-groups between 15 and 30, show greater vitality in cities. These, especially the age-group differences, have been used as arguments for "selective" selection by cities. This theory will be discussed a little later, when we take up the recent study of A. B. Hill, in England. For the present, it is sufficient to say that, first, all countries do not show these differences in mortality in favor of the cities (especially those for age-groups); this would be expected if it were evidences of a general sociological principle of urban selection of greater proportions of the more capable and biologically strong: second, this is only one of a number of evidences, and it must be weighed against much more convincing and numerous contrary evidences of the same thing (total mortality, prevalence of constitutional diseases, infant mortality rates, prevalence of defects and anomalies, etc.): and third, the higher urban mortality in the older age-groups does not bear out the theory even in the same countries (principally England) where the age-group differentials, 15 to 30, favor the city.

7. Infant mortality, and the still-birth rates have generally been accepted as rather convincing evidences of the innate vitality of a population. This is no denial of the influence of environment upon these rates. But there are important reasons, as already outlined, to believe that urban rates for these two important factors should be lower than the rural. On the contrary, the difference, if any, generally favors the rural. Thus the data concerning vitality do not give any evidence in favor of "selective" selection by the cities.

Mental and Moral Evidences of "Selective" Selection. The conclusions here will also be merely a summary of the previous discussion and data given in Chapters XII and XIII. Below is a categorical outline of the argument:

1. The psychological tests show a constant differential between the ratings or intelligence quotients of the rural class and the urban class, when these tests are divided on a territorial basis. This differential is constant in that few exceptions are found, but not constant in the sense of changes in the size of the differentials. Improved schools, such as, for instance, the consolidated rural schools, show less differentials. This may be due to selection or to improved environment

in the consolidated schools, or to both. This type of comparison is generally questionable because it ignores completely the environmental differences in the populations compared and is misleading because the urban high rating in three-quarters is due to an insignificant group of the urban upper classes, whose grades are spread over the whole urban population.

2. When these ratings on psychological tests are divided on an occupational basis, there is some evidence that the rural or agricultural class approach the mean of the city group and that the chief characteristic of the city is a greater variation in intelligence. But this evidence for psychological tests does not show this point as clearly as the other evidence on productivity of men of genius and leaders, to be discussed later.

3. Attempts to remove the influence of environment by selection of types of tests, or the changing of age-groups, show that some influence is due to environment, as registered in the tests. However, most psychologists who have made these numerous tests, believe that the rural-urban differential is a constant innate phenomenon, even after the differentials due to schools and other environmental phenomena are removed. In other words, most psychologists believe that the brighter have and are migrating to cities to a greater extent than the duller. But we have shown that these are tests of indirect rather than direct experience and that this favors urban populations because they are "specialists" so to speak, in indirect experience.

4. Numerous studies of school achievement in subjects show constant or easily explainable differentials in favor of the urban children. The studies of school achievement bear out, in essential details, the results of the psychological tests divided on a territorial basis as outlined in paragraph one, above. This leads to the rather interesting, but logical conclusion, that the intelligence testers, on the whole, have merely put the results of school achievement in other words or concepts, and have approached no nearer the measurement of innate or environmental factors in school success than the previous results of school achievement. That is, the intelligence tests merely agree with the results of school achievement and do not analyze these results any further into heredity or environment.

5. But the results of school achievement in various subjects show no differentials in one subject which are not to be found in other subjects, other than those explainable through different efficiencies in teaching of standardized subjects, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, and new or unstandardized subjects such as art, social sciences, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that the numerous theories as to the selection of "innate mental *types*" by cities show no records or proof in school achievement subject differentials.

6. The results of studies of school achievement, as measured by rapidity of circulation through schools, when urban and rural children compete in the same schools, or by the ability of the children of the agricultural class to graduate an equal or higher per cent of the

freshmen who enter the higher schools and colleges, finds the rural class are not as far behind the urban as we are led to expect from the previous studies of intelligence quotients and school subject achievement. Since this is one test of real achievement, and the results indicated do not bear out the results attained from the studies of the psychological tests, we are inclined to believe that the psychologists over-estimate the ability of the before-mentioned tests to measure *innate* qualities.

7. Studies of the social map of illiteracy, bear out the conclusions obtained from psychological tests and school achievement. Constant rural-urban differentials are found. But no further light on the influence of innate factors or environment is spread from these data.

8. Studies of the origin of children with high intelligence quotients, and men and women of genius appear to show constant rural-urban differentials, when these results are considered territorially and geographically rather than by social class.

9. But a further analysis of those studies, especially when divided by social class or origin, seems to show that much of these urban-rural differentials is to be explained by the following factors: (a) Children of the upper classes more often rise to fame than children of the lower; the inclusion of the upper classes with the common population in cities gives the cities, on the whole, an unusually high rating which is statistically invalid for this comparison; (b) The agricultural class have a considerably greater fertility in men and women of genius and fame than the working classes in cities; the comparison is as of a group which is "unselected" and normal with another group whose able representatives are practically all weeded out; (c) There is evidence that inclusion in the ranks of genius or fame is based primarily upon urban achievement; farmers furnish almost all of their own leaders as well as a larger share of the urban leaders than the common populations of the cities; such facts as these throw new light upon the alleged lack of ability of farm populations; (d) This further analysis of one of the indices of "real achievement" of the rural classes, casts still more doubt upon the alleged proofs of low rural native ability as gained from the psychological tests.

10. The study of attitudes, and other mental or psychical characteristics gives no proof of the validity of the general and popular impressions and beliefs that the agricultural and rural classes are incapable of thinking "rationally" or logically upon social questions of the day. Such beliefs have been used as proofs or arguments that "the brighter and clear thinking ruralites have migrated to cities." The chief results of the various chapters devoted to analysis of rural and urban differentials in attitudes lead us to make the following very sharp and drastic statements: (a) Clear and constant differences may be distinguished between some of the most prevalent attitudes of rural and urban populations in the fields of religion, home, family life, duties of children, sex relationships, religion, morals, and many other phases of life; (b) These differences are valid sociologically; (c)

They are inherent in the combination of environmental factors which differ in rural and urban life but not inherent in rural-urban human persons; (d) The acceptance of such attitudes and beliefs by rural populations seems as valid and logical as the acceptance of opposite beliefs in urban life; (e) Most of the attempts to confound the logic of ruralites as unsound neglect to recognize the difference in conditions, on the one hand, and the soundness of the rural attitudes for rural conditions, on the other. That is, the most common logical fallacy—as well as non-scientific practice—is to give an evaluative significance to certain types of urban logic and to hold up these types as standards by which to judge the ability of logical thinking by the rural population. This setting of standards by subjective means, and the use of evaluation without regard to the circumstances in hand, is one of the most damaging and unscientific practices in many branches of sociology generally, and of rural sociology, in particular. Its most common fallacy in rural sociology is to define *progress* and *well-being* in terms of urban conditions and results, and to judge rural life by these standards.

13. The study of moral conditions indicates that, on the whole, whether in the field of crime, prostitution, use of intoxicants, use of "dopes" and "stimulants," or other types of moral degeneration, rural classes are more moral. The use of this term "moral" here, is not in the "evaluative" sense described above, but as a term applying to certain types of behavior already rigidly defined by laws, court practices, and long prevailing customs. We do not know the relative significance of environment and innate characteristics as factors in these types of behavior, but if innate characteristics are a factor, they indicate that urbanization, to this extent, has not selected a total sample of the rural population more representative of the capable and fit than of the incapable and less fit.

11. The study of the distribution of mental disease shows a high correlation between most types, especially those classified under the term "insanity" and the increase of the urban nature of the community or of the urbanization of a country. There was some evidence that the total of all mental disease increased with urbanization, but this is not proved. There was some evidence that epilepsies and feeble-mindedness were the same in the city and country. They showed no real increase as far as the data at hand permit any conclusions. A prominent factor in this distribution of feeble-mindedness was the practice of "farming out" the feeble-minded of the cities to the rural districts. Further, the nature of these latter two types of diseases is so ill defined, and practices in definition varied so from study to study, that it was impossible to reach any sweeping conclusions. In addition, there is the difference in practice in city and country of putting these defectives in institutions, so that studies in the general population are incomparable by themselves, as well as studies of institutional population. Studies combining the two, and eliminating the differences due to farming out of children by the

cities, are either missing or insufficient in number to settle this question. But we do know that physiological degeneration, on the whole, is more prevalent in cities; that a prevalence of feeble-mindedness in the country is not proved; and that the mass of mental diseases increases rapidly with urbanization. However, we do not know the relative effects of environment and heredity in the prevalence of mental disease. But this study has made us inclined to say there is no evidence in the distribution of mental disease that would lead us to conclude that urban communities, and migration to them, have selected any better section of the farm population, on the whole, than that which remains on the farms and in rural communities.

12. What has just been said above for mental disease, applies with greater force to the distribution of suicide and the innate and environmental factors back of this form of behavior. Thus the totality of the data, in this field do not supply any valid basis for the contention of a "selective" selection by the cities.

Economic Evidences of "Selective" Selection. The established facts indicate that the accumulation of wealth, average incomes, and the consumption of material goods are higher in cities than in the rural districts. Interpretations of this ordinarily given by the economists have generally been as follows: first, a series of environmental circumstances account for the greater incomes, such as efficiencies of the machine or factory system, better or more efficient organization of urban business units, division of labor and the like; second, the promises of greater economic rewards attract the energetic and economically capable in search of these rewards; this selection of the energetic and economically capable is hygienic for cities and dysgienic for rural districts; and fourth, these urbanites, now more economically capable than the average, and in an environment with more economic advantages than the average, still further increase the economic advantages of the cities.[6]

While we have stated the case of the economic "selectivity" of cities as simply as possible; and in so doing have neglected many considerations and mitigating factors so that the case, as it stands, does not do full justice to the economists, at the same time, we must recognize the validity of the argument in its hypothetical conditions and providing the major premises are sound. If the major premise—namely, that men are primarily "homo economicus"—is sound, and if the economic advantages of the bulk of the city population are really better than those of the bulk of the farmers, then urbanization

[6] See the arguments for this type of selection in Taylor, H. C., *Agricultural Economics*, Ch. 12; Black, J. D., *Production Economics*, and Taylor, F. M., *Principles of Economics*. In no case do these three authors apply this type of argument directly to cities, but state it as valid generally.

is more selective of a certain *innate* type.[7] But the chief criticism of this whole argument is that other factors in human behavior are neglected. The outstanding economic theorists, which includes those referred to here and many others, recognize this fact. But many of a lesser caliber have carried these arguments out to their ultimate conclusions without giving credence to other than economic factors. These smaller economists have failed to recognize, first, *that agriculture presents values as a way of life, and other than economic rewards.* Its family advantages, its nearness to nature, its stability, its provision for old age, and many other factors, not to mention the failures of men in seeking to achieve their greatest economic advantages, affect the economic selectivity of cities. Further, we do not know the relative significance of environmental and innate factors in economic achievement. Thus, the premise itself, legitimate for an economist in his hypothetical economic world and with his hypothetical "economic man," is inadequate for a much more complex real world and a much more complex real man conditioned in his behavior by not only "money-motives" but by many other non-economic motives and by hundreds of factors untranslatable into money-value.

Further, as we have seen, a somewhat higher average standard of living or income in the city compared with the country is a result of the inclusion in the city population of its upper classes, whose incomes and standards are exceptionally high. If, however, we exclude this small group and take the bulk of the city population—its semi-skilled, unskilled, and partly even skilled and clerical groups, their money income does not differ much from that of rural classes, while in their standards of living, all in all, they have many disadvantages in comparison with the rural class. (See Chapter III.) This means that even from the standpoint of the above economic criteria of "selectivity," if the small urban upper classes sustain the argument of "selective" selectivity (which is true in this case), the bulk of the city population does not support it at all. Meanwhile this bulk, in no less degree, is composed out of rural migrants of one or more generations than the urban upper classes.

A second series of principles of economic selection by urbanization or ruralization has been outlined by Dr. Leon E. Truesdell, and others, and some factual data in its verification have been presented by Zimmerman.[8] The essence of this theory is the net law of rural-

[7] Providing, of course, that cities do not offer greater rewards to a poorer class who cannot manage their own businesses successfully.

[8] See Truesdell, Leon E., *Farm Population in the United States*, Census Monographs VI, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1926, pp. 13 ff.; and Zimmerman, C. C., "Migrations to Towns and Cities" (with Duncan, O. D., and Frey, Fred C.), *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, Sept., 1927, pp. 237 ff.; *Farm Economics*, October, 1928.

urban social selection: *the cities attract the extremes while the farms attract the mean strata in society.* The theory, as outlined by Dr. Truesdell, is as follows:

> The overflow from each new generation of the farm population, that part which under present conditions goes largely to cities, is quite different in type and character from the part that remains on the farms. It includes, first, a group who are merely restless and hungry for excitement. These are happier and more useful in the city; and the country can well spare them.
>
> Second, it includes a great army of those who were born to be followers rather than leaders—who work more efficiently and find greater happiness working under other men's direction, with a stated income not dependent on the exercise of their own judgment or enterprise. These are useful workers on farms, but their service to society is doubtless greater in the city, where they work under superior direction.
>
> Third, there is a group made up of young men who seek the city because they feel that it offers greater opportunities—bigger and more remunerative tasks to be done. This group is very small in numbers, but it includes a large proportion of the most enterprising and energetic of country-born youth, in particular those who have in them the spirit of initiative. These are the ones the country and the farms can least afford to spare. By their going they often leave the country communities without competent leaders. And yet, because the country offers but meager opportunities and meager rewards for leadership, as compared with the modern city, one would hesitate to hold them back.

The essence of this theory is that social and economic organization in the cities is such that a few brainy men, by directing the labor of large armies of less competent can increase not only their own incomes, but the incomes of the employees as well. The key point as to the relative selectivity of the upper or superior groups and the lower or inferior groups, is not settled. Nevertheless, this kind of an economic theory, could explain the fact that large fortunes, and greater wealth and incomes exist in cities, and at the same time, be compatible with the facts already given, that in many lines of evidence, some of which were chosen especially for their supposed representation of the innate biological characteristics, there appears little, if any, evidences of the dysgienic effects of urbanization. So we will close the discussion of these two economic arguments with the statement that *economic theories or facts do not necessarily prove any specific type of selection.* They leave room for both a normal and a dysgienic (either to rural or urban) selection.

A third type of economic arguments for selectivity or urbanization are those theories discussed in the latter half of the chapter devoted

to *The Map of Migration.* These arguments have been two in number —that migrants enter the lower classes and stay there in greater proportions, and that migrants enter the middle and upper classes and stay there in larger proportions. In the one case the data were used to prove selection of the lower elements from the farm and, in the other, the better elements. But we shall see that the rural migrants enter all classes, and no one knows which classes they enter in a greater proportion, and, finally, we have no reasons to believe that the fact of entering shows either a selective or an unselective character of urban migration. Thus it still appears that the economic arguments concerning urbanization leave room for a normal or an abnormal selectivity.

Analysis of Specific Studies of Migration. Before we reach any final conclusions as to the selectivity of migration by the cities, let us examine a few specific studies, made within the past few years, to see if they present any types of argument, logical analysis, or facts not covered by the previous discussion. The three studies discussed in detail are those of C. C. Zimmerman based upon Minnesota farmers, A. B. Hill for England, and Livio Livi for Italy. In each case, we shall present the method of study, a summary of the results, the conclusions reached, and a discussion of the general validity of the conclusions.[9]

Minnesota Studies of Migration.[10] This group of studies is based upon the origin and migrations of 694 Minnesota farm families, the parents of these families and their children. The data were gathered in 1924–1928, along with certain information as to family income and expenditures, which enable the analysis of migration to be qualitative as well as quantitative. To begin with, it was found that 85 per cent of the parents of these farmers and their wives were farmers. Only 15 per cent came from out of agriculture. Of all families, 77 per cent had both parents born on farms, 18.4 per cent had one parent born elsewhere, and the remainder both parents urban. That is, four out of five who entered the agricultural from other classes did so by marrying into it. Sex selection was a primary factor in securing agriculturists from other classes. Second, it was found that two-thirds of all children, 18 years of age or older, were still on

[9] The study of Carter Godwin Woodson in *A Century of Negro Migration*, Ch. VIII, "Migration of the Talented Tenth" is not discussed in detail here. Woodson does not prove his point; if anything, he proves a chance migration. His conclusions represent his beliefs more than any proved theories. Many other studies are also omitted from detailed discussion. The recent careful study by Dr. Wilson Gee of the University of Virginia arrived too late for inclusion here. Its principal details will be given in the "Source Books."

[10] See Zimmerman, C. C., "The Migrations," *op. cit.*, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vols. 32 and 33. (The last study was with the aid of O. D. Duncan and Fred C. Frey); *Farm Economics*, October, 1928 (with O. D. Duncan).

farms. The remainder had gone to towns and cities and entered urban occupations. Forty per cent were on home farms, 27 on other farms, and the remainder in towns and cities. More of the females had migrated to urban life than males.

For purposes of analysis, it was conditionally assumed that different sized economic groups represented, on the whole, different innate abilities; that these differences could be measured by arranging the income groups in units of $1,000 or more; that the proportions of children, 18 years of age or over, represented the number of chances in each hundred that any specific group of farmers had of furnishing the migrants of any specific type; and that failures to furnish the proportion of migrants to any one type of position or size of community in like proportions to the per cent of children over 18 years of age was evidence of "selective" or non-proportional selection (providing such differences were greater than 3 times the standard error of sampling). An illustration of the method is given by the following statements. The groups with incomes of less than $1,400 (the lowest) had 23.2 per cent of all children 18 years of age or over. Presumably, these were the least competent of all. These 23.2 per cent furnished 30.9 per cent of all migrants to cities, 40 per cent of all migrants to large cities, 18.7 per cent of all children who were then farmers, 39.0 of all children who were then employed as wage earners, and 14.4 per cent of all who had reached the salary and higher classes in cities. On the basis of these facts, and others, and the previous assumptions, the following conclusions were drawn.

1. Children of the successful farm families stay on the farms more often than children of the less successful (and least competent) farm families.
2. When children of the successful farm families do migrate to urban communities, they rose more rapidly into the upper (non-wage-earning) classes. This is confirmatory proof that they had more ability.
3. Large industrial centers were greater agencies for non-proportional selection than the towns and villages.

For final analysis, it was necessary to add in the 15 per cent of urban families, who had merged into agriculture. In this case, to estimate the country gain or loss of natural ability, all migrants to and from agriculture were ranked according to their position on the urban social ladder—laborers, clericals, business, or professionals—and a net balance for agriculture was struck, on the supposition that a loss of 40 unskilled laborers and a gain of 20 left a net balance in favor of agriculture if the other 20 positions were filled by recruits from the business, professional or higher classes in towns, and *vice*

versa. To give an illustration, 86 of the migrants from farms were then unskilled laborers, and 37 who had entered into the composition of these families had come from the homes of unskilled laborers. That meant a country loss of 49 of the ability of unskilled laborers. In a similar manner, the country had lost 38 in the professional class, which is the other end of the social ladder. The middle classes in the social ladder showed slight gains for the country. At least, the losses were not as large as in the extremes of the social ladder. On the basis of these figures, the net law of rural-urban social selection was suggested—*the cities attract the extremes and the farms attract the mean strata in society.*

The meaning of these conclusions is that the average types of persons tend to stay in agriculture, whereas, on the whole, the extremely competent and the extremely incompetent tend to go more to cities. In other words, it is a theory that the urban "pied piper" is drawing away the children from the lower and upper ranks of natural ability. The result would be that the cities would vary more in ability than the country populations but that the average would not be far different unless the extremely high abilities of the upper classes would more than overweigh the low abilities of the lower classes. Under the urban system of martial industrial organization, where the brains of a few closely supervise and control the abilities of the incompetent many, higher incomes and productive abilities might appear and be logical.

Criticisms of this theory and this study are as follows. It is based upon a few cases for a limited area and a limited time; further, the post-war financial crisis of agriculture in the western portions of the United States might have affected the results; the assumptions might one or all be invalid; and the measurements might have been taken so roughly as to really mean nothing. In extenuation it might be said that the study agrees with some of the economic theories (those already quoted from Dr. L. E. Truesdell); that it accounts for the extreme variation in urban characteristics, already established in the previous chapters; and that such a type of selection could logically be possible.

Hill's Study of Selective Migration in England.[11] This study, fostered by the Medical Research Council of England, and carried on since 1922, reaches the conclusion that "migrants represent the healthier members of the rural community, and that they retain their advantage in the urban environment in comparison with other urban residents." The details of this study are as follows:

The death-rate by age-groups is used as an index of the vitality

[11] Hill, A. B., *Internal Migration, etc.*, Special Report Series No. 95, Medical Research Council, 1925, London.

of the population. An earlier study by Thomas A. Welton, had shown a lower death-rate for phthisis of London females 15–25 and males 20–25, when compared with similar age and sex groups in an inner and outer belt of rural counties—the hinterland of the city. From this Welton concluded that the remnant who stayed in the rural districts were not only deprived of the stronger, but, in addition, received back those who came to London and later contracted a disease or broke down in the rural environment.[12] The present study attempts to build upon this study to find, first, if age and sex groups showed differences in death-rate in city and country, and second, to trace out a number of migrants and try and find if environmental differences could explain this difference. For practical reasons, the county of Essex was used for comparison with the city of London. This rural county, according to census statistics cited in the study, has been a feeder for London since the beginning of migrations to London. Twelve of the most rural districts of the county had alone lost 181,944 of their population by net migration, between 1831 and 1911 (p. 24). The migration has been primarily to London. Of those enumerated in other districts of England and Wales in 1861, but born in Essex (120,566) 59 per cent were enumerated in London. In 1901, of 229,466 enumerated in other districts, 44 per cent were found in London. (In the later periods, the movement to industrial suburbs was more important, because the proportions found in South-Eastern counties including London for the two censuses were about the same: 72 and 64 per cent [pp. 40 ff.]). This migration from Essex to London included more of the females (1,315 per 1,000 males in 1901). Consequently, any effect upon the death-rate of qualitative selection of the rural population, would be more quickly and decisively registered in the mortality of females (pp. 43 ff.).

These data show, without regard to conclusions drawn in the report, that in all decades there has been a tendency for the Essex male group 20–25 to approach the death-rates of the similar London group. However, in only one decade (1851–1860) did it go above the similar London rate (as 115 to 100), and since that time its relative size has declined as expressed in the decreasing series, 115, 97, 96, 95, 95. In a somewhat similar manner, the Essex age-groups 10–30 for the females approach nearer to the London rates, some of the smaller groups surpassing the London rates each decade. But the significance of this surpassing was greatest in 1851–1860, and declined each decade since. Further, the number of smaller groups surpassing the identical London rate decreased from 4 to 2, centering about the age-groups 15–25 in the last decade studied.[13] The decline

[12] See Welton, T. A., *Journal of the Institute of Actuaries*, 1872, Vol. 16.

[13] In 1911–1920 this declined to one group, 20–25 years.

in significance of the urban-rural ratios is shown by the decreasing series for the 15 20 age-group; 185, 161, 131, 124, 117 (p. 47). These relative changes came about because the rural age-sex-death-rates for this time declined faster than those in London. A somewhat similar analysis is presented for death-rates for phthisis; the age-ratio curves, sex differentials, and decreases (more rapid in the rural districts) were somewhat identical with the results from the previous treatment of the general death-rate.

A more detailed analysis is made of the death-rates in all these 10 rural districts subdivided by the intensity of migration away. They show some tendency for the districts with the greatest migration rates to have higher death-rates in the age-groups at which migrations take place. However, the differences are small, they fluctuate from time to time, and at various decades the situation is reversed. (This reverse situation in the decade 1871–1880 is explained by the author as due to the intensity of migration. That is, in his belief when migration is intense, there is less selectivity.)

In the latter section of the study, some data are presented on rural diets, which are inconclusive, and will be neglected in the discussion. Following, are some age-height-weight curves based upon a thousand children ages 5–14 in the schools of these rural districts. They show: (1) unimportant differences between the male children of the agricultural laborers and the children of the other rural workers (non-agricultural); (2) female children of other rural workers are heavier and taller than the agricultural workers; (3) children of the agricultural laborers, both male and female, are heavier and taller than children of the miners in the North and Midlands, in each age-group.

The second part of the study also includes some records of the migrations of 178 males and 204 females. These records are compared with the health records of those in the same families staying at homes. They were gathered from the local pastors and schoolmasters. This small group of population is standardized into life expectancy tables, one for each sex, and by comparison with the expectancy tables of London, and the aggregate of rural districts of England, the conclusion is reached that the migrants died considerably less than expectancy. On the basis of these above data, the conclusion is reached that, "As a rule it is the brighter and stronger (mentally if not physically as well) of the young men and women in the rural districts who tend to migrate; in the country villages there remains the weaker elements" (pp. 87, 90–91, and 123). But on the contrary, it is further found that the death-rates in agriculture prove "that it cannot be an occupation detrimental to the health of those employed in it;" that the highest death-rates among males

in the rural districts is more among the non-agricultural rural males; that agriculture keeps only the stronger males; that relatively small numbers of the migrants fall ill and return home to die; that housing and diet conditions are miserable in the country (diet was especially bad in families having children about 10 years of age, just before they commenced to contribute to the family income); and finally, that the young children in rural districts show no signs of malnutrition or lack of growth.

Critical Analysis of Hill's Study. It is the contention of the authors that this study of Hill's does not prove his case; if anything, it proves the contrary. This contention is based upon two separate lines of evidence: first, the conclusions are not in agreement with results of other studies of bodily, physical, and vital characteristics of rural and urban populations; and second, the evidence presented in the study are internally conflicting, subject to larger errors of sampling than credited by the author, and do not confirm the conclusions reached. The first of these contentions has already been discussed earlier in this book. Let us now turn to the second, and present the arguments.

Hill's conclusion that urbanization is "selective" is reached in spite of the fact that his own figures show that the health of the rural districts has improved, not declined, during the period of the most intense migration. As a matter of fact, the figures given here show that this improvement of rural health has been more rapid than the improvement of the health of the city of London, as indicated by the decline in the general death-rate as well as that for phthisis. Hill meets this obvious contradiction by assuming that the improvement in death-rates in the rural districts has been due to the decline in amount of migration, so that the valuable human stock, once carried off to the cities, now stays at home. "There is certainly a suggestion that at these age-groups some influence, apart from the general improved medical knowledge and application in the last 50 years' period, is tending to depress these rural rates and to raise those for London; in other words, there is some ground for the belief that the lessened volume of migration has reduced the levels of the mortality rates at these age-groups in the rural areas, and has increased similarly the rates for London; . . . " (p. 50). The question under discussion here, is whether or not this explanation is reasonable.

The assumptions and conditions necessary to make this proof valid seem to be as follows: (1) There are innate characteristics back of the resistance to disease especially the more constitutional (other than endemic and infectious) diseases. (2) This inner human stuff is carried by heredity from one generation to the next. (3) Once carried out of a community by migration, it can only be replaced by

reverse migration, or by a more rapid multiplication of the remaining few who possess this innate resistance.

Let us examine this conclusion in the light of the three beforementioned conditions. First, the improvements in health of the rural districts went on most rapidly in the decades before 1901–1910 (at which time migration lost its significance). They appeared already by 1861–1870, that is while the migration was at its peak. Of course, the author recognizes the significance of improvements in sanitary conditions. At the same time, his own figures and study of housing and sanitation, shows that such improvements have not yet greatly changed conditions in the rural districts. There was a tendency for death-rates to stabilize themselves after 1900, as if they were approaching a minimum. This rather suggests that, if migration were an important factor, more results in improvement in the relative rural health, would be witnessed after the decrease of migration. Second, it is doubtful if the period after the decline in migration were sufficient for heredity to replace the stock lost by migration. The author does not show that the better classes in the rural districts have more children than the lower classes. We have already shown in a previous chapter that the characteristic of rural society, in this respect, is less differential fecundity, not larger families, in the upper classes.

By the author's own logic (p. 56), the selective force was weakened in the period of high migration (1871–1880) so that there was really no lessening the force of migration much before 1900. It is too much to stretch the imagination into believing that the fertility of the upper classes in these rural districts could replace in 10 years, the valuable human material carried away in the net migration of 180,000 or more, through a hundred years—providing the picking of these 180,000 were selective. The significance of this remark is made greater, when we remember that net migration by no means expresses all the interchange of population between these districts. Selection could go on and would logically go on just as much in the compensated migration which is nearly always as significant, if not more so, than the net migration.

The third argument is that even with a decline in migration from this district to London, and even with the decline in rapid increase in cities, our earlier analysis indicates that the significance of migration in relation to natural increase, is not declining in the city population. The trend is toward a decline in the rate of natural increase in London. The author must show that the lessening of migration from Essex was not a transferral to some other district. In other words, relatively, London should have lowered its death-rates just as fast, because we have no reason to believe that it would select

population from Essex on one basis and from another district on another.

Other arguments are that the data on physical conditions of the children presented by the author, the parents of whom were this "poor stock" left in these districts during the intensive migration of the previous century, do not show relative indices of deterioration; that his own evidence does not show that the diseased migrants return home to die (which would be logical under such a type of urban-rural selection); and that the samples are too small in his construction of life tables of migrants to prove the point. Standard errors have no significance unless we are assured of a random sample.

These conclusions in conjunction with the previous discussion of the validity of such selection by urbanization lead us to the final suggestion that *this study does not prove a "selective" selection by cities.* At the same time we must say that the study was brilliant in its inception and the carefulness of its technique. It deserves the serious consideration given to it here.

Livio Livi's Study of Italian Migration.[14] The essentials of this interesting study are as follows: Contrary to the predominant opinion in Italy and in several other countries, that the emigration of Italians to other countries, principally to America, has a negative influence on the population of the Italian provinces of emigration. Livi gives a series of data which show that, in fact, such negative effects do not take place. He ranges all provinces of Italy according to the intensity of the transatlantic emigration and tries to find whether the provinces and regions with the most intensive emigration (for a series of decades) show a decreasing vitality of their population compared with the regions with insignificant transatlantic emigration. The substantial results of this confrontation are as follows: Comparing the respective data for the years from 1882 or in some cases from 1877 and 1901 with those for the years 1912–1914 he finds that *in the provinces of strong transatlantic emigration the birth-rate and fertility diminished less, the rate of illegitimate children decreased more, the death-rate from tuberculosis, syphilis, and some other congenital diseases decreased more, and the general death-rate diminished as much as in the provinces with an insignificant transatlantic emigration.* Only the reduction of infant mortality from congenital weakness has been about the same, or in some regions of emigration less, than in the regions with no or an insignificant emigration. This means that, contrary to common opinion, the provinces with a long

[14] "Emigrazione ed Eugenetica," *Atti del Primo Congresso Italiano di Eugenetica Sociale,* 1924. We acknowledge our indebtedness to Dr. Livio Livi for his kindness in sending a reprint of his paper and for several valuable bibliographical indications of studies concerning Italian rural problems.

and strong emigration do show a vitality and morality not worse than the provinces with no or an insignificant emigration.

Such unexpected results naturally are puzzling and require an explanation. Dr. Livi's explanation of this phenomenon is as follows: He does not admit that the emigration to other countries may be unselective. Together with the majority of the Italian investigators, he is inclined to think that the emigrants are a positively selected group—the most fertile, and superior in health and vitality. In spite of this, the fact that the regions and transatlantic emigration are not worse in vitality than the regions with no transatlantic emigration, is due to differences in the effects of emigration of Italians to foreign countries and the rural-urban migration in Italy itself. He shows, first, that the intensities of the transatlantic and inner rural-urban migrations are reverse: the provinces with a strong transatlantic migration are marked by an insignificant migration from rural parts to the cities and from the cities to the rural parts, and *vice versa*. He shows, second, that the transatlantic emigrants, who return back to their Italian provinces, are much better vitally (have a lower per cent of tuberculosis, etc.) than those who return from the city to the country. The long distance eliminates the possibility of returning to Italy for those emigrants who are sick and weak. They die in the country of immigration. Many cityward migrants in Italy who contract various diseases in the cities, on the contrary, return to their rural districts. The short distance from the city to their rural abode does not hinder such a return. Returning to the rural parts, they bring all the pernicious—vital and moral—effects of the city; and in this way facilitate the diffusion of syphilis, tuberculosis, vice, and other negative "cultures" within the rural communities. If the transatlantic emigration drains the population of such provinces of its best elements, it does not lead to the diffusion of morbidity in such provinces through the return of the biologically inferior and defective persons. Such persons die in the country of immigration. Those who return (56 per cent of all emigrants in 1909–1913 and 33 per cent for 1922–1924) are excellent human material, more superior than the population of respective provinces from which they emigrated. They are, so to speak, the best elements among the emigrants who were tested by the acid test of survival among all those who emigrated. In this way the transatlantic emigration compensates, to a considerable degree, for its negative effects. Livi does not say definitely whether the emigrants from the country to the cities of Italy are also a positively selected group. But he stresses, and gives some evidence that, among these cityward emigrants who return back to their rural parts, the proportion of the diseased and weak persons is very high. If urbanward emigration is unselective,

through this return of the diseased persons it leads to a decline in the vitality of the provinces where such an urbanward migration took place. Hence, the result that, contrary to the preceding assumption, the provinces of strong transatlantic migration are not worse in vitality than the provinces with an insignificant transatlantic but a strong rural-urban migration. Such is the essence of this valuable paper.

Critical Analysis of Livi's Study. In regard to it we may say that, in so far as it does not claim a positive selection of the migrants to the city, it does not contradict the theory developed in this work. Its contention that the returning urbanward migrants are inferior in health and bring back various diseases contracted in the city and diffuse them in the rural population has a great deal of truth, at least, in regard to some regions and some groups of the returning migrants. Its contention that the transatlantic emigrants are a positively selected group, is, however, unproved. It only relatively corroborates the fact that those who return among such migrants are not inferior vitally than the population of their local provinces. This, as Livi himself stresses, may be due not to the fact that all such emigrants were positively selected at the time of their departure to foreign countries, but to the fact that the weaklings among them have less chance to return to their native country and die in the country of immigration. The returning emigrants are, so to speak, sifted and positively selected, not at the time of their departure from their native country, but during many years of their sojourn in the country of immigration. This is quite a different thing than a positive selection at the time of emigration. More than that: the fact that the provinces of a strong transatlantic emigration are not worse than the provinces with no or insignificant emigration of this type does not contradict at all the hypothesis of "an unselective selection" of such emigrants. On the contrary, it is in perfect agreement with such an hypothesis and possibly explains the situation even better than the theory of Livi himself. His data concerning the vital superiority of the returning transatlantic emigrants are rather thin and based on a very limited number of cases. He himself indicates that the percent of the tuberculars among those transatlantic emigrants who return to Italy is from 40 to 50 times higher than among the emigrants at the time of departure from Italy (pp. 4–5). If this is so, it is very doubtful that a return of such emigrants can compensate for the negative effects of the whole "selective emigrations" from these provinces. It appears to us that the situation is much easier explained if we admit that the whole transatlantic emigration is not selective (other than the above sex and age selection). Then it becomes comprehensible why the vitality of the provinces of trans-

atlantic emigration is not worse than that in the provinces with no such emigration. The factor of a pernicious influence of the returning cityward emigrants may play some additional rôle in an explanation of the phenomenon found. Thus, all in all, this study rather reinforces the theory defended in this book.

General Conclusions Concerning the "Selectivity" of Migration. We have tried to cover systematically all reasonable proofs, evidences, and results of the "selectivity" of cities. Let us now give a resumé of the most probable results and conclusions.

1. *Urbanization and ruralization are selective as far as age is concerned.* Such selectivity on the basis of age as a factor has important sociological significance for those types of behavior known as "urban" or "rural."

2. *Urbanization or ruralization are selective, on the whole, as far as sex is concerned.* But this type of selection varies more than the previously mentioned age selectivity. This also has serious effects upon the contrasting types of behavior.

3. *There is no valid evidence that migration to the cities is selective in the sense that the cities attract in a much greater proportion of those from the country who are better physically, vitally, mentally, morally, or socially, and leave in the country, those who are poorer in all these respects.* There is also no evidence that the reverse is true. The most probable answer is that, all in all, the cityward emigration is "unselective" in these respects.

4. *In regard to innate characteristics of all types, the most probable explanation is that the urban and rural populations, on the whole, do not differ widely.* Relative to social differences, *i. e.*, in social structure and behavior, these innate differences, if they exist, are insignificant.

5. *The most probable causal and functional explanations of rural-urban differences in behavior are in terms of sex and age composition of the populations, greater heterogeneity in the city and substantial components of the urban-rural environment, discussed in this book* (Chapter II).

Thus, contrary to predominant opinion, we must stress that, on the whole, the city selection is *chance selection.* The probability of picking up the innately talented persons of the rural parts by the city are almost as great as the respective probability of picking up the dull or mediocre persons from the rural population (relative to their prevalence in the population). The totality of the above data do not permit any other conclusion, in spite of the popularity of the selective theories.

One of the practical results of the conclusion is that there is no valid basis for the admission that the development of cities generally drains, more and more, the best elements of the country population

and, sooner or later, leads to the complete biological depletion of the country population. In some particular localities such may happen. But, on the basis of the above data, it is improbable that such a phenomenon is a general law. It is true that the cities (through differential fertility and so on) waste their best elements by burning them intensively. After burning these elements (the upper classes and men of genius and talent) they must replace them by recruiting from the lower classes; in this way the city upper classes suck the city lower classes of their talented and their best fuel; this process may even go so far that the city exhausts its "best human fuel" and begins to suffer from it. And yet, such a fact would not necessarily mean that the best human fuel is also exhausted from the rural population. Cities may rise and fall, but as long as the rural hinterland remains, regardless of the destinies of the city, it can continue to have as much a proportion of the potentially talented persons as it had before the urbanization. This means that the progress or decay of the city and of urbanized countries, in so far as these are conditioned by an increase or decrease of the best human material, does not necessarily mean an increase or decrease of this best human material in the rural population or in rural countries. Since the cityward migration is unselective, the curves of an increase and decrease of such material in the populations of the city and the country may go on independently or have only very remote relationships to each other. Such is one of the conclusions given by the above data. In so far, the discussed theories of the rise and decay of society based on the correlations between men of talent in the rural hinterland, are to be corrected.

In the last chapter of this book, we shall try to show that over-urbanization may lead to a decay of a society. But the ways and the conditions of such a danger from over-urbanization have little to do with the "selection" of the cities and, through that, with the exhaustion of the best human material in the rural parts.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE MAP OF HORIZONTAL MIGRATION AND VERTICAL CIRCULATION OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRANTS

The Map of Horizontal Urban and Rural Migrations. Now that we have outlined the intensity of the cityward migration and its causes, and the types of men migrating, the next problem to be discussed is how this migration takes place. In this section we seek to draw the map of migrations in order to make this process clearer. We seek to show the distance of migrations, the causal factors in distance, other general principles of migration, and the direct relation of horizontal to vertical migrations. Full data for a comprehensive analysis of these features are lacking. At the same time, those few at hand may yield something of value. Let us turn now to a discussion of the actual theories and data.

Numerous writers have tried to formulate some laws or general principles according to which the rural-urban migration takes place. Such, for instance, is the alleged law of Henry Carey, that cities attract human beings "in direct ratio to the mass (size of the city population) and in inverse ratio to the distance" (of the migrants from the city).[1] Such is the principle, formulated by K. Bücher, that, the greater is the influx of the migrants to a given city, the greater is the exodus of the natives of the city to other places.[2]

Leaving these somewhat impressionistic "laws" without discussion, let us turn to the most elaborate attempt to give the map—or general principles—of urbanward and ruralward migration, that by E. G Ravenstein and his followers in 1885.

Based on careful studies for Great Britain, the Continent, and America, Ravenstein stated and later furnished considerable data in proof of the following laws of migration:[3]

Ravenstein's Laws of Migration:

1. The great body of migrants only proceed a short distance. Consequently urbanization causes a universal shifting or displacement of population which produces "currents of migration" setting in

[1] Carey, H. D., *Principles of Social Science*, Vol. III, pp. 466–468, 1867.

[2] Bücher, K., "Zur Statistik des inneren Wanderungen, etc.," *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Statistik*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 1–13, 1887.

[3] See E. G. Ravenstein, "On the Laws of Migration," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 48, 1885, 167–235; Vol. 52, 1889, pp. 241–305. Karl Bücher elaborated some of the same theories in the chapter on "Migrations" in his *Industrial Evolution*.

the direction of great centers of commerce and industry, which absorb the migrants.

2. The process of absorption proceeds as follows: The inhabitants of the country immediately surrounding a town of rapid growth, flock into it; the gaps thus left in the rural population are filled up by migrants from more remote districts, until the attractive force of the rapidly growing cities makes itself felt, step by step, in the most remote corners of the kingdom. Migrants enumerated in a certain urban center of absorption will consequently grow less with the distance proportionately to the native population which furnishes them.

3. The process of dispersion is inverse to that of absorption and exhibits similar features.

4. Each main current of migration produces a compensating countercurrent.

5. Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centers of commerce and industry.

6. The natives of the towns are less migratory than those of the rural parts of the country. (Migration here means the same as the term inter-community and territorial mobility used in Chapter IV. We have already shown that this principle is invalid.)

7. Females are more migratory than males except for great distances or abroad, where males predominate among the migrants.

In addition to these "laws," Ravenstein gives some secondary generalizations, mentioned further.

In order to make the second and third propositions clear, the following simple explanation is given. *A* is a ring around a city with an approximate average distance from the city boundaries of 20 miles. (See the illustration on page 586.) A need for laborers is felt within the city. Most of these are supplied with migrants from the ring *A*. Some of these new laborers represent persons who quit positions in *A* in order to better their wages in the city; others represent men living in *A*, who are temporarily out of work, for various reasons; and the third group represents youths and girls who have not yet entered gainful occupations, but who use this as a chance to enter employment.

These migrations from *A* leave a surplus of jobs at *A*, because the first group represented some of the gainfully employed in *A*. This creates a demand for more laborers at A, which demand is filled from two sources; certain persons residing within the city who are temporarily out of work, or who are seeking to better their positions or enter into gainful employment, proceed to *A* and fill a few of these positions. However, this migration from the city out to *A*, on the whole, is always smaller than the migrations into the city, and this excess represents the migrational increase in the city. The second source of supply for the additional laborers in *A* is from *B*, which is a



Simplified illustration of Ravenstein's principles of Urban Absorption and Dispersion of Populations. The city is the center. A, B, C and D are outlying areas which furnish the migrants. They proceed by short movements.

second ring around *A* in the same manner that *A* surrounds the city. These proceed from *B* to *A* in the same manner as the previous group proceeded from *A* to the city. However, those proceedings from *B* to *A* are not as numerous as the group from ring *A* to the city, because some of those from *A* to the city represented a natural excess of population. In a similar manner, the vacant positions in *B* are filled by migrants from *A* and from a third ring *C*. The same applies to the fourth ring, *D*. Further, many of the migrants from *A* to the city represented previous migrants from *B* to *A* and so on. Thus we see that the process of migration urbanward of a population is a series of short jumps, nearly counterbalanced by reverse jumps of persons from the inner rings back to the outer. Needless to say, these rings around a city are merely taken for illustration, because the movement is first into the near-by trading villages, then to larger and larger towns, until finally the city is reached. Further, the difference in the

means of communication makes a difference in the length of any one migration. And, finally, there are always individuals who step over two or three rings at a time. This "law" merely represents general tendencies. In later pages of this chapter, figures will be given to corroborate this theory of short-distance migration.

Let us first of all see what data Ravenstein gives in support of his laws, and then examine some other studies to find if there is supporting evidence. In his first paper, which was based on Great Britain alone, it appeared that the important cities such as London, Edinburgh, and Dublin were composed of migrants primarily from the nearer territories. The farther away one went, the less did the migrants filter into the population of the cities. The reverse was also true, that the population of these cities seldom migrated more than short distances away. In a later study, information for certain European countries and the United States is given. He shows how the population residing in Berlin about 1880 was composed of elements which grew proportionately less as the distance from the city became greater. In a similar manner, it shows the migrants from the city of Berlin and their location (providing they were still within Germany).[4] This study of Berlin shows the application of the distance principle fairly well. The increase of distance from Berlin was associated with decreasing proportions of the population living in Berlin or born in Berlin. The relative size of the migrations is indicated by 785,061 non-natives living in Berlin and 112,479 native Berliners living in other places of Germany. The population of Berlin at the time of the study, was 1,315,287. A further table for America shows the same to be true. Of all the population born in Virginia but no longer residing there (683,336), 41.74 per cent were in border states of Virginia, 39.35 per cent in the next group of states bordering on these, and the remaining 18.92 per cent in the other states of the Union.

Further Proof of Ravenstein's Theory of Long- and Short-Distance Migrations. The question may be raised as to the general validity of this theory of short-distance migration. The two following charts which give the location of the migrant population from Iowa in 1920, and that to New York for the same year, indicate that such seems to apply to the United States. Other American studies seem to confirm it also. See also figures for Stockholm and for Denmark.[5]

[4] Ravenstein, E. G., "The Laws of Migration," *Journal of the Royal Stat. Soc.*, 1889, p. 251. W. Ogle's study in the same journal, Table P, p. 214, on the population of Huntingdonshire, shows the same migrational map.

[5] *Statistisk Arsbok för Stockholms Stad*, 1914, pp. 69 and 79; *Statistisk Aarbog Danmark*, 1926, p. 12. The study by E. L. Kirkpatrick and H. W. Hawthorne in "Sources and Uses of Income among 300 Farm Families of Vinton, Jackson and Miegs Counties, Ohio, 1926," *Preliminary Report U. S. D. A. Bureau of Ag. E. C.*, May, 1928, pp.

The facts for Norway and Denmark show that the rural communes have 84 and 92 per cent of their residents born in these same communes. The majority of the migrants come from other rural communes or from near-by provincial cities. On the other hand, about a half of the populations of the cities were native-born to those cities. Migration to them from near-by rural communes was greater than the migration away, and this interchange was less for the districts farther away.



This chart was furnished by courtesy of Dr. C. J. Galpin, of the United States Department of Agriculture. It shows where all the persons born in the state of Iowa, and living elsewhere for the census of 1920, reside (if they live in the United States of America). It is easy to see that the majority were located in the surrounding states, with few exceptions. More tended to go west than east, because the western sections of the country were settled by numerous migrants who moved from Iowa. That is, one wave of migrants moved to Iowa and settled. Later some of these, including their children born in Iowa, moved farther and farther west, in search of free land and other economic advantages.

A study of the origin of population resident in London for the census of 1911 and the prevalence in the various divisions of the British Empire of the population born in London, by sexes gives an idea of the interrelationships between this large metropolitan city and other sections as far as population interchange is concerned.

16 ff., bears out the results further for the United States. See also Young, E. C., *op. cit.*, *Cornell Exp. Stat. Bul. 426*, pp. 27 ff., for data on the U. S. Young states the principle of attraction as follows: $M = k\frac{F}{D^2}$ where M is the movement of the population, F is the force of attraction, D is the distance, and k is a constant. Thus the force of attraction decreases with the square of the distance. See also Hoag, Emily F., "The National Influence of a Single Farm Community," *U. S. Dept. of Agr. Bul. No. 984*, 1921.

This enables us to draw the following conclusions. Females predominated in the migrants from London in all districts except the foreign countries. More males than females had migrated away but that was primarily due to the fact that males migrated to foreign countries and to longer distances much more than females. Females migrated away from the administrative county of London for short distances much more than males. The movement to the extra-London urban districts was, of course, a suburban movement. The primary characteristics of the map of migration given by Ravenstein seem to be borne out.[6]



This chart was furnished by courtesy of Dr. C. J. Galpin, of the United States Department of Agriculture. It shows the place of birth of all native white migrants living in New York at the time of the 1920 census. The near-by states furnished most, and the farthest states furnished least. The apparently small contributions from the large states in the west, was due to the fact that these states are thinly settled.

An earlier study of India finds the same type of migration for that country. To quote: "Migration, as a factor in the movement of population, cannot be considered of more than local importance. . . . The laborers, who form the bulk of the migrants, return to their native place on completion of their term contract . . . the amount of foreign immigration is insignificant . . . 90 per cent of the population was born in the district or state where it was living at the time

[6] Similar proof for Essex are given in Hill, A. B., *Internal Migration, op. cit.*, p. 43. See also an earlier development of the theory with proof, by Smith, H. Llewellyn, *Life and Labor in London*. Smith gives proof of the validity of these theories, except that he says the reverse migration is for shorter distances, consists more of family units, is made at later ages, and is often a result of retirement of aged from the cities. The results for London in 1911 are found in *London Statistics*, Vol. 33, p. 76, 1912–1913.

of the census, while 6 per cent more was born in the territory immediately contiguous to it.[7]

Recent studies for Russia give the essential details of migration in that country since the Revolution. Two studies of the territorial migration to and from the 12 biggest cities in Russia in 1927 show that the number of territorial migrations or shifts systematically decreases with increase of the distance of the movement. Per 100,000 population of the migrants' own districts on the average there were 133.7 and 152.6 migrations (in two studies); within the districts of the migrants per 100,000 population of the province, minus the population of migrants' own districts, there were only (respectively in two studies) 23.8 and 135.8 migrations within the limits of the province; that is, the migrations to other districts within the province were less than in the migrants' own districts; finally, per 100,000 of the state in which the migrants resided, minus the population of the migrants' own provinces—there were only 4.5 and 20.8 migrations (outside of the migrants' local provinces).[8]

These data, in a somewhat different form, indicate that the number of shifts decreases as the distance increases. However, this is true only for a certain number of population; it is not true in regard to the proportion of the short-distance and long-distance migrations in the total number of migrations to and from these cities. That is, the persons residing some distance from a city, go there less frequently than those near by; but, on the whole, for those who go, we have no reason to think that they show a greater or less proportion of short-distance migrations.

The same characteristic appears in the present migration into France as a result of the declining popula ion. In one corner the Italians are moving in, in another the Spaniards, and another the Belgians. The migrations seem to be local and by short waves, pushing farther and farther into the country.[9] The country of Finland showed, in 1925, that for every 1,000 urban residents, 404 were born in the parish of enumeration, 283 in another parish of the same department, 278 in another department, and 13 out of the country. The trends for the rural districts were similar except that the rural populations were less migratory than the urban.[10]

Further verification of this thesis is to be found in the statistics

[7] Taken from Baines, J. A., "Distribution and Movement of the Population in India," Vol. 56, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, March, 1893, p. 19. The same is true of later censuses of India. See *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. I, pp. 467–468, 497; *Statistical Abstract of British India*, p. 203, 1919–1920.

[8] See *Statistical Review* (Russian), 1927, September, p. 34, November, p. 89.

[9] See Émile, James, "L'Immigration Italienne," *Revue des Études Coöperatives*, October–December, 1927, Vol. 7, pp. 1–23.

[10] *Finland, Statistika Centralbyran*, 1927, V. 25, p. 90.

of origin of the population of Belgium for each census epoch between 1860 and 1910.[11] The majority were residing in the communes where they were born. The remainder were nearly all born in other communes of Belgium. Only a small percentage came from out of Belgium, and the proportions of these fell off with the distance of the country. The correlation is not absolute, but, in the main, it holds. The reverse of the same situation is presented in the passport verifications and registers of the populations. In 1913, 531,456 made arrangements to go to another commune of Belgium and 42,916 to foreign countries. In 1880 the ratios were 268,025 and 16,490.[12]

This theory applies with equal validity to the Netherlands. In 1920, 6,171 out of every 10,000 were born within the commune of residence, 2,127 in another commune of the same province, 1,426 in another province of the same kingdom, 30 in the colonies of the Netherlands, and 248 in foreign countries or unknown. This applies also to the distribution of the population of this same country for every census since 1869.[13]

Weber [14] has presented some tables from the work of H. Llewellyn Smith in Charles Booth's *Life and Labour of the People of London*, which shows that the migration from rural districts to London is in all essentials similar to the thesis just discussed from the works of Ravenstein. In the first ring, which averaged 23.8 miles around the city, 166 out of every thousand of the population of the city originated. The next, which averaged 52.5 miles around the city, was responsible for 121 of every thousand of the population. The other rings declined in significance as the distance increased. The proportion of migrants over 20 years of age for the first ring was 77.6 and for the sixth ring (237 miles away) was 84.1. He takes this as proof that the immigrants have moved by successive stages, and the stops in the meanwhile have accounted for the increased age of the long-distance migrants. There may be some validity to this idea, but, as such, the proof is not yet adequate. Further data are given for other countries and cities in Chapter II.

Exceptions to the Theory of Short-Distance Migration. Exceptions to this theory of migration may be found. Some of them were indicated by Ravenstein himself and others by N. A. Humphreys and Karl Bücher.[15] First, certain countries, such as these on the American

[11] *Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique*, 1914, pp. 62–63.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

[13] *Jaarclifers voor Nederland*, 1925–1926, p. 12.

[14] See Weber, *op. cit.*, Ch. 4; the works of Smith quoted in Weber are from Vol. 3, Chs. 2 and 3, of *Life and Labour of the People of London*. See von Mayr, G. Heft 32, *der Beitrage zur statistik des Königreiche Bayerns; Die Bayereische Bevölkerung nach der Geburtigkeit;* Bücher, K., *op. cit.* For Germany, see Bücher's *Industrial Evolution*.

[15] See *Journal of R. Stat. Society*, Vol. 52, pp. 249 ff., 302, 305. See the quoted work of Bücher.

hemisphere, become countries of immigration because they have free lands or wonderful opportunities. As a result, whatever migration which takes place out of the other countries is liable to be to these new lands. To give an illustration, of the native-born Belgians located in other countries for the general censuses of 1912, Canada had the highest ratio (other than those districts immediately surrounding Belgium), with 133 per 100,000 of the natives. Argentine Republic was next with a total of 94.3 per 100,000. The near-by country of Germany had only 20.7 per 100,000. Austria-Hungary had only 1.2, Denmark had 2.6.[16] We see that the theory does not always work. The same applies to urbanization. Second, cities of exceptional opportunity, such as for instance metropolitan cities or rapidly growing cities, sometimes draw large groups of population for long distances. Further, other cities such as ports and boundary-line cities, often attract from longer distances because they are the avenues of social circulation from country to country. The ports of New York and London are illustrations of this. Some of the Russian cities in the quoted studies also give such exceptions.

A third exception is that of the migrations of the upper classes and persons of exceptional talent. They have been shown to have greater mobility and territorial migration that the lower classes. They often make journeys of longer distances and to larger cities in the search for exceptional opportunities, whether in business, the arts, the sciences, or in political or social life.[17] The graph on page 593 of the migrations of the graduates of the Belleville Academy in an old New York rural community (Jefferson County), show the exceptional long distance of some of the migrants to the city of New York and elsewhere.

Side by side with these and similar exceptions of a normal order, there are exceptions caused by various extraordinary circumstances, such as wars, revolutions, mass-famines, and special laws regulating immigration, emigration, and migration generally. The interference of such extraordinary factors may cause a serious deviation of the migratory waves from the rule discussed. In no way may it pretend to be more than a very rough empirical regularity, far from being rigid or imperturbable. As such, however, it has some value and

[16] These data are from *Belge, Annuaire Statistique*, 1914, p. 169. The same may be shown for Norway, Sweden, or practically any European country participating in the great migrations to the new world. The exceptions noted in *Life and Labour in London*, have already been given.

[17] For a discussion of this greater migration of the élite, see Sorokin, P., "Leadership and Geographical Mobility," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. XII, No. 2; Sorokin, P., Zimmerman, C., *et al.*, "Farmer Leaders in the United States," *Social Forces*, Vol. VII, Sept., 1928, pp. 44–45; Sorokin *et al.*, "Leaders of Labor and Radical Movements," *American Journal of Sociology*, Sept., 1927; Livi, R., *Antropometria Militare*, Vol. I, pp. 50–51, Roma, 1896.



This graph was furnished by the courtesy of Dr. C. J. Galpin, of the United States Department of Agriculture. It is from E. F. Hoag, "The National Influence of a Single Farm Community," *U. S. D. A. Bulletin 984*. It deals with the present location of all students from a small academy at Belleville, Jefferson County, New York, providing those migrants still lived in the state of New York. It shows that the majority moved only a short distance, whether considered from the viewpoint of those who moved only within the county or in the entire state. It further illustrates, that the large cities have the power to attract migrants from long distances in exception to the rule as given above. Outside of the near-by counties, one large city had 34, another farther away had 55, and New York City, several hundreds of miles away, had about 40 (with suburbs).

describes one of the important and relatively general traits of the migratory movements of "normal" times.

Causes of Short-Distance Migration. We shall not attempt at this place to give the causes of migration, but merely the reasons why it is generally for short distances rather than long distances. The chief reason appears to be *that migration is an adjustment within large bodies of population*, and similar to adjustments within other large bodies, it proceeds by gradual movements. Second, *migrations*

are expensive. Consequently, each individual as a rule moves only to those places where he is somewhat sure that the better opportunities will remunerate him for the cost. Third, *the processes of the spread of knowledge make it more easy for near-by individuals to hear of new openings first.* Consequently, they filter in and fill the place. Fourth, *the possibilities of individual adaptation to new environments requires that these changes be gradual.* So the country youth moves first to the village, or small town, where the change is not as great as from the country to the city. After a year or so of adaptation, he is more likely to move on to larger and larger places as he becomes more and more adjusted to the new urban environment and becomes more and more sophisticated. There are many exceptions. There may be other causes for this short-distance migration. But, on the whole, these seem the major reasons.

The Law of Predominance of the Females Over Males in Short-distance Migrations, and Vice Versa. In the sense of a rough empirical regularity for "normal migrations" this "law" describes the situations very accurately. Ravenstein, as well as many other investigators, has shown that in short-distance migrations from the country to the city, the females predominate. In the preceding chapters of this work it has also been shown that the cityward migration is attracting females predominantly. In long-distance migrations, especially abroad, on the contrary, the males seem to predominate. For instance, while in the United States among the native whites of native parentage in 1920, there were 103.0 males for 100 females, and among the foreign-born immigrants there were 121.7 males for 100 females.[18] Concerning migrations from the continent of Europe overseas in 1924, the proportions of males by country ranged from 52.3 in Ireland to 72.3 in Italy. The average proportion of males for the year was 67.7 among the continental migrants from Europe overseas.[19] "Immigration to the United States has been preponderantly male in every year from 1820 1923 except the fiscal year of 1922, when the ratio of males fell to 48.4 per cent of the total immigration." "In most of the years since the Civil War, males have constituted from 60 to 70 per cent of the total migration." "In emigration, males constitute even a larger proportion than in immigration." [20]

However, the above rules show many exceptions even for normal times. For instance, in the quoted Russian studies of migration of the population to and from the cities, per 100 male migrants there

[18] See Carpenter, N., *Immigrants and Their Children,* Census Monographs, VII, pp. 151 ff.

[19] International Labour Office, *Migrations,* Report Series O, No. 2, 1926, p. 31 and appendix.

[20] These quotations are from Jerome, Harry, *Migrations and Business Cycles,* National Bureau of Economic Research, Study No. 9, 1926, pp. 38–40.

were only 66.5 and 56.0 female migrants.[21] In the United States, in so far as labor turnover is connected with a change in the places of work, the data show that the rate for females shifting from place to place of work are lower than those for the male workers.[22] Further, in 1922, as shown above, females constituted 51.6 per cent of all immigrants to this country.

Extraordinary conditions, like wars, revolutions, famine, or cosmic catastrophies, may change the situation very radically and cause the discussed phase of migration to deviate markedly from the approximate rule outlined. The explanation of this rule seems to be this: long-distance migration requires a great deal of energy, and capacity to do hard work at the place of migration. Further, it is generally undertaken only when there are certain chances of finding work or living in a far distant place. The male organism is more adapted to these exertions. Up to the recent time, the avenues for finding a job and living have been more numerous for males than for females. These reasons are sufficient to an understanding of the phenomenon.

The Law of Compensation of Migratory Current by Countercurrent. There is no doubt that, to some extent, every influx of migrants to an urban center is followed by outlet of the native urbanites to some other places. In so far, the law is true. We saw that a part of the native-born Berliners, Londoners, and so on, are found residing out of these cities. An influx of the rural migrants to the cities of the United States is followed by a movement of a part of the urbanites to the farms. An immigration wave to the United States is followed by the wave leaving this country for some other countries. In 1881–1890, 805 individuals per 100,000, left Sweden and 102 returned, leaving a net emigration of 703 per 100,000, per year. In 1911–1920, 207 left and 132 returned, leaving a net loss of 75 per 100,000. In 1924, 166 left the rural districts for abroad and 74 returned per 100,000. The same year 203 left urban districts and 154 returned.[23]

In Italy in 1909–1913 per 100 transatlantic emigrants, there were 56 re-emigrants from America to Italy; in 1922–1924 the number of the re-emigrants was 33.[24]

The "law" means only this and does not mean that the proportion of the countercurrent migration is in direct ratio to the proportion of migration. In the cases when an urban center is developing rapidly, its absorbing capacity may be enormous and, in spite of an enormous migration to the center such may be followed by a

[21] *Statistical Review* (Russian), 1927, September, p. 81; November, p. 87.

[22] See Brissenden, P. F., and Frankel, E., *Labor Turnover in Industry*, pp. 68, 124, 1922.

[23] *Sweden, Statistisk Arsbok*, 1925, pp. 63 and 64 for a comprehensive analysis.

[24] Livi, L., *op. cit.*, p. 15. This applies to all countries. See Jerome, Harry, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–40 and appendix.

relatively weak countercurrent. In cases when the city is developing slowly, or is not developing at all, the influx may be very moderate and the outflux may be strong enough to check the growth of the city or even to lead to its decline. The same may be said of any place of influx and outflux.

The phenomenon of the countercurrent raises an interesting problem: are those who are driven out of their places by the influx of the migrants weaker or inferior than the immigrants? Does this process of replacement of the emigrants by the immigrants mean that the immigrants are better than those driven out? The answer was already given by K. Bücher.

"Owing to the enormous division of labor at the present time, the skilled workers and qualified persons find themselves often in a more difficult situation at their native place than unskilled laborers. Therefore, these qualified persons leave their native city for some other place at least as often as unqualified persons." In 1870 and the next years marked by great economic perturbations the proportion of the skilled laborers and professionals who were driven out of the cities was especially high. In other cases the situation may be reversed. Generally, the process is very complex and manysided. For these reasons, if in Hamburg the per cent of the native born among the total population of the city is 37, and in München it is 54.3, this does not mean that the native born of Hamburg are inferior to the native born in München or that the immigrants to these cities are superior to the native born who left the cities.[25]

Conclusions Concerning the Above Theories of Migration. On the basis of the data given concerning migration, we are justified in the following conclusions. Outside of extraordinary conditions (wars, invasions, revolutions, famines, and other catastrophes) and with many exceptions, the following empirical rules are approximately general:

1. Migration is primarily for short distances (certain exceptions are noted).
2. It proceeds by waves and short jumps, so that the total amount of migration sufficient to send one person to a large city or to a foreign country is many times the migration of the individual. That is, the total of migrants to cities must be multiplied many times in order to find the number of moves necessary to secure this urban migration. The same applies to other types of migrations.
3. The process of dispersion (with some exceptions noted) is inverse to the process of absorption.
4. Each main current is always associated with a compensating countercurrent.

[25] Bücher, K., *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

5. The large industrial cities, ports, new lands, and places with newly discovered wealth, etc., have the greatest attractive power for long-distance migrants.

6. Females are more migrating than males except for long distances.

7. The section in Chapter II, devoted to inter-community mobility gives reasons for the belief that the theory that city populations are less migratory than rural populations, is invalid.

In conclusion, it must be added that due to the recent development of the means of transportation and communication, which makes territorial movement much easier and the information about various opportunities in far distant places more reliable and more rapidly disseminated; and due to the great changes in the technique of production which change the demand for the amount and the character of the labor needed in various industrial centers; it is likely that the intensity of territorial migration from and to cities and industrial centers will increase more and more; and the above "laws" of horizontal urban-rural migration will undergo considerable modifications. The fact of an increase of the amount of rural-urban migrations have indeed been taking place. People, in this respect, become more and more "nomadic" and migratory with the progress of the machine culture and urbanization.[26] How far this process will go, no one can tell. It is probable also that the above "map" or principles of horizontal migrations will undergo considerable deviations. Short-distance migrations are likely to be replaced more and more by longer-distance migrations. The relationships between the migratory currents and countercurrents are likely to become more complex. The differences between the map of migrations of the sexes are likely to be modified also.

Such expectations are probable and the time may come when the above "laws" of migration will be quite inadequate. For the past and the present, however, they correspond roughly to reality and in this sense deserve to be known.

The Map of Vertical Circulation of Rural-Urban Migrants. The preceding paragraph brings the migrants to the gate of the cities where they are ready to enter the city society or to go out of the cities toward rural parts. The next logical question naturally is: what is becoming of these migrants after they pass the city gate in either direction? In the first place, what happens to rural migrants in the city? Which social stratum do they enter, the lower, the middle, or the upper, the poor or the rich? In what kinds of occupations do they engage? What is their later destiny? Do they climb higher on the social ladder or do they sink and compose the lowest class of the city proletariat and underworld? Such are the next problems to be

[26] See the evidences in Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, pp. 381–394.

analyzed. Without such an analysis, our knowledge of the complex phenomena of migration and the mechanism of social dynamics is quite incomplete. Unfortunately, an adequate investigation of these problems of Vertical Circulation (climbing and sinking along the urban social ladder) of the rural migrants is very difficult. In addition, it has been studied very little. The necessary data are lacking. For these reasons our analysis and conclusions are purely tentative. In order to introduce ourselves into the heart of the problems, let us briefly outline two opposite types of theories in this field.

Main Theories in this Field of Vertical Mobility of Rural-Urban Migrants. The first type of these theories is represented by that of G. Hansen. He maintains that the rural migrants (representing a class innately superior) primarily enter the middle classes of the city and soon rise to the upper. This is due to the fact that the upper classes do not reproduce themselves sufficiently, and part of them degenerate, become unfit for their positions and sink into the lower classes. Through these disappearing and degenerate processes in the upper classes, a "vacuum" is incessantly created, which is filled by talented recruits from the city middle (and partly lower) classes. Rural migrants, predominantly entering the city middle class, compose the main candidates from which the recruits for the vacant positions in the upper classes are selected. But, in climbing up, they, in their turn, become less prolific, and are doomed to the same processes of dying out, or falling, as their predecessors. Such is the essence of this theory.

Another theory, upheld partly by Ammon and Weber, but especially by Kuczynski and others, maintains that, no matter what the native ability of the migrants be, they, as a rule, enter the lower classes. In some cases they even remain there. Only after a course of time (years and even generations), the offspring of the talented rural migrants advance into the middle and upper classes of urban society. The end of this story is somewhat similar to the previous theory of Hansen, already explained. The rural migrants acquire all the virtues and vices of the urban upper classes in the process of climbing up the social ladder. Step by step their fertility declines, some die out, some degenerate, and in time other vacuums are created in the upper classes, which must be filled by fresher rural migrants. Only a few keep their positions in the urban upper classes for many generations. Thus, in both cases, the essential picture is this: the migration from the country to the city is only a first part of the social dynamics; its second part is the vertical circulation of the migrants in urban society and the incessant replacement of the disappearing urbanites in various parts of the social pyramid by the migrants. The main difference between the theories discussed above

is over the problem as to which strata in cities are entered by the rural migrants in the course of a few years or one generation of urban life.

Let us examine the theories somewhat more closely. In proof of his idea, Hansen presents some maps from Booth's *Life and Labour of London* and from some continental cities, which appear to show that the influx of country born is primarily to the middle-class sections of the city. He derived this conclusion primarily by a study of the residential districts of the city in which migrants lived. They happened to reside mostly in the middle-class residential districts of the city. This argument has been answered by Ammon, who presents data to show that the majority of the migrants enter the lower, unskilled labor, class, and only climb up in subsequent generations.[27] Likewise, Kuczynski and Weber showed similar results, and also gave some proof that the migrations of the country-born to the middle-class sections of the city is a fictitious argument because it is brought about by the large number of migrants going into the class of domestic servants. These domestic servants lived as servants in the homes of the middle classes in cities, and this was the reason that Hansen found them residing in such middle-class sections of the city. A further analysis of the data on the occupational classifications of the migrants before and after coming to the cities, as given in *Life and Labour* by Smith, adds weight to Weber's criticism of Hansen's interpretation of the London study.[28]

Hansen's second argument in favor of his theory was the claim that a greater proportion of the submerged classes in cities are urbanites, composed mostly out of the failures from the middle and upper classes of several generations and, in part, of incapable rural migrants. This was Hansen's argument for the selection of superior elements by migration and the deterioration of the natives in cities. A favorite proof often used for the support of the theory is the original table presented in *Life and Labour* based upon the records of the charity organization societies of that city for a period of a year. It appears offhand that this looks like proof of the degeneration of city populations and the superior ability of the migrants. But we must recognize that his table is unstandardized according to age, which in itself shows is one of the important factors in public relief. That is, a young immigrant population is compared with a much older and a much younger native city population. Such

[27] See Ammon, Otto, *Gesellschaftsordnung*, p. 145.

[28] See Hansen's data and maps in his *Die Drei Bevölkerungsstufen*, *op. cit.*, especially the appendix; Ammon's data are summarized in "Histoire d'une Idée," *op. cit.* See also *Die Natürlische Auslese*, Ch. XII. The studies of Weber and H. L. Smith have also been cited; see especially the table on occupations of migrants, p. 140, *Life and Labour*, first series, Poverty, Vol. 3. See Kuczynski. R., *Der Zug Nach der Stadt*, pp. 95 ff.

a comparison is invalid and does not prove the point.[29] Kuczynski and Weber presented equally important data from other cities, which tend to show first, that even the standardized rates for paupers show a greater incidence among those migrating to the city than to those native born to the city.[30]

Further, as already shown in a previous chapter (Chapter III), the provision of poor relief agencies in rural districts is very lax, and some of the paupers might be forced to the cities just on account of this. The net conclusion is that there is no real proof of the fact that the rural migrants enter the city middle classes and more than any other class. Further, the same authors, and Brückner, gave data which show that the rural migrants to Berlin (in 1885) did "not enter the submerged classes with an increase of time of their residence in Berlin but, on the contrary, improved their economic situation." While among the immigrants who were in Berlin only 5 years or less, there were only 1·2 per cent of entrepreneurs, among the immigrants who were in Berlin more than 15 years, there were 40.9 per cent of entrepreneurs and a much greater per cent of important employers.[31] Without giving other data here, these are sufficient to show the one-sidedness and inadequacy of G. Hansen's theory.

Does this mean that the theory of Kuczynski and Weber is right in its contention that the rural migrants are inferior to the urbanites and enter, as a rule, the lower urban classes, occupy positions generally lower than the native-born urbanites, and, as a rule, generally remain in those low positions? Such a theory appears as one-sided as Hansen's theory. If the latter is biased in favor of the country, the former is no less biased in favor of the city.

The totality of the data existing in this field permits us to make the following generalizations concerning the problem discussed. First, *the rural migrants to the city, within one generation, infiltrate and settle in all social strata of the city, beginning with the top of the social pyramid and ending at the bottom.* That rural migrants enter the classes of the unskilled, semi-skilled labor and even the classes of criminals and prostitutes, is quite certain. Also, no less certain, is the fact that they succeed to place themselves within the very upper layers of urban society. It is sufficient to remind one of the fact that many presidents of the United States have been the farmers' sons; that of the 56 cabinet officers of the United States (from 1869 to 1903) 47 were farm boys; that among the deceased and the living generations

[29] This table is in the work cited, p. 142. Unfortunately, case records by many of the charity organization societies in America are so kept as to be of little value in discussion of this problem.

[30] *Op. cit.*, p. 383.

[31] See Brückner's paper in *Allgemeinen Statistisches Archiv*, Vol. I, p. 645.

of the multimillionaires in America, from 23 to 8 per cent were farmer sons; that among 45 state governors in 1909, 41 were farmer sons; that of 47 railway presidents, 55.4 per cent were country boys, and so on. The same is true for other countries and for past times. It is sufficient to say that the rural migrants in the past obtained even such positions as those of Roman, Chinese, or Byzantine emperors, or that of Roman-Catholic Popes, not to mention other, less prominent, positions.[32] Further, from the chapter about Rural-Urban Intelligence, we know that rural migrants contributed a certain share to men of genius, and leaders in all fields of human activity.

The same phenomenon may be seen from the following studies of the rural migrants in America. The Minnesota study by Zimmerman, already mentioned, found that 31.2 per cent of the migrants were common laborers; 36.0 per cent were skilled and semi-skilled; 10.2 were clericals; 4.4 were in business for themselves; and 18.2 were professionals or semi-professionals.

Thus two-thirds of these migrants entered as laborers and the other third went into the classes above, the middle and upper classes.

In a similar way, the study by Kirkpatrick and Hawthorne, already cited, found that of 135 Ohio farm boys who had left agriculture, 45 per cent were laborers of all grades, 23.2 per cent were in public service of all types, 20.3 per cent were in professional service of all types, and the remaining 11.5 per cent were in business as proprietors or managers. A somewhat similar study is reported by Young for New York, in which the detailed occupations of all who have left a number of New York farms are given.[33]

Other data in this same publication give the present occupations of all owners and tenants, who were operating farms in Livingston County, New York, in 1908, but who had quit farming and had gone into other occupations. Of these, 28 were laborers, 3 salesmen, and 12 in business. Retired farmers, and those not occupied, were omitted from this latter tabulation. These figures show the types of farmers who leave agriculture, once they have started farming as a serious business. Most of them represent failures for various causes, who have become laborers or small business men in towns. A few represent men who have actually improved their situation by the gradual change to urban occupations. This table bears out the previous conclusion that two-thirds of the migrants enter the lower classes in towns, but that others enter the upper urban classes.[34] A. B. Hill's study of the rural migrants from Essex, England, bears

[32] See many other data in Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, Ch. VII, and pp. 440 ff.

[33] Young, E. C., *Cornell Agr. Exp. Sta. Bulletin*, 426, pp. 17 ff.

[34] Only 8.4 per cent of the former operators of North Dakota farms who left these farms did so on account of better economic outlook elsewhere. See *North Dakota Exp. Bull.*, 214, p. 55.

out the previous conclusions.[35] Without giving other numerous data, the above is sufficient to make the proposition certain.

The second proposition may be formulated as follows: *The social stratum of the city which is entered by the rural migrants depends, to a large extent, upon the "way" of their entering urban society.* In this respect it is possible to discriminate roughly two ways of entering urban society and, correspondingly, two groups of migrants and two types of life careers in the city. A part of the rural migrants enter independent city-careers well prepared and trained, either outside of the city or in the city itself, for city activity in the middle or upper classes. Previous to their independent careers, they have obtained good—college or university—educations, or a thorough training in their prospective occupations. When they really commence their occupational career, they begin not at the bottom (unskilled labor), but at a relatively elevated position. Correspondingly, their climbing up is more rapid and they are distributed among the urban occupations in quite a different way from the other group of migrants. This other group comes to the city without any preliminary preparation or training for a definite urban occupation, and, as a rule, without any financial resources for help. All that they bring with them is, so to speak, a body and a soul and the ability to do some unskilled labor. This group, as a rule, naturally enters the lower urban class of unskilled and partly skilled labor. They begin their life-careers in the city from the very bottom, and, only in the course of time, do some of them succeed in promoting themselves up the ladder. Their distribution among the city occupations is naturally quite different from that of the first type of migrants. The above data of Zimmerman, Young, Hill, Kirkpatrick, and Hawthorne give distributions of the rural migrants which are nearer to this second type. In order to see the difference, the following figures concerning the occupations of farmer sons who obtained university educations are given. Of 84 farmer sons, University of Minnesota graduates of the years 1910–1915, by 10 years after their graduation 5.9 per cent were found engaged in farming, 2.3 per cent merchants, 16.6 per cent lawyers, 3.5 per cent ministers, 11.9 per cent doctors, 5.9 per cent engineers, 23.8 per cent teachers, and 2.3 per cent dentists. The remaining were among various professions and business occupations. Thus, in difference to the previous groups of migrants who, in two-thirds of the cases entered as laborers, this group did not contribute anything to the classes of skilled or unskilled labor. They entered the professional and business occupations. In Sorokin's other studies of the occupations of farmers' sons of Minnesota, who obtained some high-schooling or part of a college education, a similar picture is shown. Quite an

[35] Hill, A. B., *op. cit.*, p. 85. See also Smith, H. L., *op. cit.*, p. 140.

insignificant per cent of such rural migrants to the cities enter the skilled and unskilled labor classes; the great majority are in the classes of professionals and business.[36] This suggests that, in a study of the urban-life careers of rural migrants, before any generalization, it is necessary to keep in mind which of these two types of migrants is under consideration. A conclusion valid for one type is fallacious for the other, and *vice versa*.

Third, in so far as the distribution among the urban occupations of the total mass of rural migrants (both types) in the first generation is concerned, the question as to whether they enter in a greater proportion the upper, or the lower classes, of the city cannot be answered certainly on account of the lack of adequate data. *The totality of the incomplete and fragmentary data suggest that they are distributed pretty evenly, that is, their proportionate shares for the upper, the middle, and the lower urban classes are not very different from the shares of the bulk of the urban-born population.* Although, theoretically, the amount of obstacles for the social climbing of rural migrants seems to be greater than for the urbanites,[37] nevertheless, either this premise is invalid or the migrants work harder, because there are no evidences that they move upward less successfully than the urbanites of a similar social standing and opportunity. The principal basis for this statement are the data about the share of the farmer-peasant class in the production of the prominent men and various leaders who, all in all, are at the top of urban society, given in the chapter about rural-urban intelligence. We saw that this share is by no means lower than that of the bulk of the city population—the laboring classes. If this is true of such high positions of prominency, it is to be true of less elevated social positions of the city.

If the city as a whole gives a somewhat higher share of these upper groups, this is due, as we saw, to the fact that the urban upper and middle classes are contributing an enormous proportion of these leaders. As the opportunities of these classes are incomparably greater and their children, since their birth, are already placed in upper and middle positions of the society, it would be quite fallacious

[36] Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, pp. 420 and 429.

[37] Since the bulk of the rural migrants enter a new environment, in which they do not inherit the occupations of their fathers, they will be given no preference, no opportunities in the parental business, or no aid whatsoever other than a few years more schooling or the possibility of sharing in the home estate upon death of the parents. While it is evident that many city children start at the bottom of the ladder, it appears that the rural migrant is handicapped more than any other "beginner" in urban life, because, on the whole, he may expect less favors and fewer friendly helps other than those he wins on his own merit or from other rural migrants from his own community, who are often not much further advanced than himself. However, in the course of a lifetime, he will tend to find his level; if not, then his children, who will have, to a large extent, about the same amount of ability, will reach the given level in a society to which they are justly entitled, whether high or low.

to compare the life-careers of these children with those of the rural migrants. It is more accurate to compare the migrants' life-careers with those of the bulk of the urban populations. Such a comparison shows that the migrants hold their own and, contrary to Kuczynski and Weber, are, at least, as successful in the promotion as the descendants of the bulk of the city populations. Such appears to us as the most probable answer to the controversial question discussed. The answer is only tentative and it may be changed if future studies disclose a different picture. As yet, it is in a greater agreement with the existing data than the extremist theories of Hansen and Weber. It also is in agreement with the thesis developed in this book that the selection of the rural migrants by the cities is "unselective."

The Children of Urban Migrants. It has been suggested by various students, including Hansen and Ammon, that the rural migrants, handicapped by a poor start in town life, do not find their real level, and that many of their children, with the better start in urban life, are able to rise to higher positions, and within a few generations, the families make contributions to all classes of urban life not far different from the real native-born populations of longer time, if there are such. That is, that the average of the children of the migrants shows a higher status than their parents. Other than a few data collected by Ammon, no one has attempted to prove this. While it remains a plausible theory, easily explainable and understandable in the light of what has been said before, we cannot give anything certain about it here. All that we may say with certainty is that the rural migrants filter into all urban classes within one generation, and we have no real reason to assume that the average of all those leaving agriculture is higher than the bulk remaining or the bulk of the city population.

Interpretation. This section shows that, as soon as the rural migrant enters cities, he joins in the mighty struggle for social position within urban society. In other words, horizontal and vertical mobility go hand in hand. The migrants show that all classes enter cities because they distribute themselves among all social classes. They contribute their share to the paupers, criminals, and low-class groups in urban society as well as to the upper classes. What they do in the next generation is still less known. But the totality of these studies does not suggest that the migration to cities is "selective" of superior native abilities. At the same time, this increase of vertical mobility accentuates the characters in the personalities given below as correlated with horizontal mobility. The combination of these with the other variables given as the framework of the city makes the population gradually to assume the characteristics of urbanity.

The question may now be raised as to the meaning and significance of these laws of theories of the mechanism of migration. What are

the characteristics of urbanity developed out of these migrations and vertical circulations in the city? What significance does migration have for sociology, or for an explanation of differences in the behavior of rural and urban populations? *The first suggestion is that it means a tremendous increase in horizontal social mobility. Second, by giving society a thorough shaking up, somewhat similar to the process used in grain separators to separate the grain from the dirt and chaff, it opens the avenues for vertical social mobility, both up and down the ladder.* A corollary to these two propositions is that the greater mobility of urban populations is begun at an intense pace with the beginning of urbanization. As we have already shown before, urbanization is primarily a process rather than a definite state of existence. *This means that the key and central phenomena of urbanization is an intense social mobility, both vertical and horizontal.*[38] Another corollary of these propositions is that *this social mobility and migration is several (numerous) times more intense than the actual number of net migrants recorded.* Net migration to a city is achieved at the expense of moving numbers of whole layers of population by short jumps. Further, it must compensate for the reverse migration which is also of whole layers of population, by similar short jumps. As to some of the major effects of social mobility upon the personality of individuals and groups, we quote the following abbreviated summary from Sorokin's *Social Mobility.*

1. Behavior becomes more plastic and versatile. Members of a mobile society pass from one occupation and one surrounding to another quite rapidly. Each change of status and location requires a corresponding adjustment of the behavior of the individual. Rigid forms of behavior are inhibited.

2. Increase of mobility tends to reduce narrow-mindedness and occupational and other idiosyncrasies. These characteristics are the result of the lack of mobility. Such individuals live all the time in the same environment and get the same viewpoints. Mobility does away with this. The individual gets many new impressions and viewpoints so that he soon becomes rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan.

3. Mobility tends to increase mental strain. These increased adaptations required of the individual increase his mental strain. To put it shortly, mobile societies and groups are always changing and never satisfied.

4. Mobility facilitates inventions and discoveries. The chances for and the appearance of new inventions is enhanced.

5. Mobility facilitates an increase of intellectual life. In a similar manner as new inventions, new ideas appear. The same characteristics which bring about new inventions also bring out new ideas.

[38] See the discussion of mobility in Chapter II.

Historical epochs of the appearance of great men in numerous groups seem to corroborate this statement.

6. Mobility facilitates an increase of mental diseases. We have two permanent correlations which seem to justify this statement—the increase of mental disease in societies which are urbanizing and mobile, and the increase of mental disease with change from rural to urban communities.

7. Mobility tends to increase superficiality and to decrease the sensitiveness of the nervous system. By limiting the time and patience of the individuals through the increasing numbers of pressures upon their attention, mobility increases superficiality and decreases the sensitiveness of the nervous system. The individual passes through sensations so rapidly he cannot absorb them. In order to absorb those few necessary for his business or for living, he has to harden himself or steel himself against thousands of others. Thus we live in the same apartment houses every day with numerous families and know only the janitor by name.

8. Mobility favors skepticism, cynicism, and "misoneism." This increased area and volume of social contacts give the individual so many viewpoints that he becomes skeptical and cynical. Not all can be right, consequently no one has a chance of being entirely right. Individuals who have firm convictions in the existence of a personal God, or the belief that Sunday is the day of the Lord, soon take chances of losing such beliefs when they come into contact with hundreds of other experiences in a mobile society. He sees the city populations using Sunday as a day of recreation and is told that God made the Sabbath for man, not man for the Sabbath. He soon becomes a skeptic and abandons the older rural practice of Sunday observance which is best typified in the answer of Christ concerning the oxen in the ditch on the Sabbath. At the same time the less intelligent classes cannot adjust themselves readily to all these new ideas and lack of faiths. For these they substitute dogmatic beliefs in new faiths which enable them to avoid many of the perplexities of life. This is called "misoneism." It is typified by the mass adherence to numerous new faiths such as "progress," "humanitarianism," "Billy Sundayism," "fundamentalism," etc.

9. Mobility increases the hunt for sensual pleasure, increases restlessness, diminishes intimacy and increases the psychological isolation and loneliness of individuals. The increase in consumption of stimulants, increase in suicides, divorces, personal contacts among strangers such as at public dance halls,—all these point to the above.

10. Mobility facilitates disintegration of morals. The chapters on moral behavior and crime are an illustration of this.

11. Mobility facilitates atomization and diffusion of solidarities and antagonisms. The differences between the social classes are less. Many individuals have passed from one to another. Blocs and antagonisms are whimiscal, not lasting, appear and disappear very rapidly.

That is, the mobility of individuals is associated with an increase of mobility of forms of social cleavage and social organization.

12. Mobility facilitates an increase of individualism followed by a vague cosmopolitanism and collectivism. Individualism increases because individuals are continually cutting away from social cleavages and antagonisms so rapidly that nothing is fixed, and little is collective. Since individuals are not fixed to a group, either geographically or vertically, their antagonisms and social desires take the form of a general collectivism and cosmopolitanism. They do not know to which geographic or social group they will belong tomorrow. This development is the natural concomitant of the development of a society based on secondary rather than primary relationships.

This brief sketch of some of the results of social mobility upon the personality of the individual and the social organization indicates many of the rural and urban differences already discussed.[39] It is the contention of this study that *such social mobility is the characteristic of an urbanizing or an urban society.* The basic move in all mobile societies is from rural to urban districts. Societies cannot, or at least do not, exist as purely urban but must always interchange and be reinforced by recruits from rural districts. We will conclude this discussion by the statement: *An understanding of the processes and mechanism of migration and urbanization, and the social consequences of this migration and urbanization, gives the key to the understanding of many of the characteristic effects and differences in an urban versus a rural society.*

[39] See especially, Demain, H., *Les Migrations ouvriers à travers la Belgique*, Louvain, 1919, Chs. VI, VII and conclusions, for verification of some of these theories.

CHAPTER XXVII

RETROSPECT, PRESENT SITUATION, AND PROSPECT

The Mutual Need of Coexistence and Coöperation of the City and the Country. In the preceding parts of the book we have analyzed most of the essential characteristics of the rural population, rural world, and rural culture. The *first* conclusion which follows from the analysis is that there are deep and important differences between these rural phenomena and the corresponding phenomena of the urban world. The *second* conclusion is that among those differences there are several which are relatively constant in time and space: as soon as the basic differences between the rural and the urban worlds are given they are followed by a series of relatively constant differences in the physical, vital, mental, moral, and social traits of the rural-urban populations and in rural-urban cultures. The *third* conclusion is that the rural population, compared with the urban, is not worse in bodily traits, in health, in vitality, in mentality (when the bulk of the urban population is taken), in religiosity, in morality, in sociality, and in artistic sense. On the contrary, the vast body of the data existing rather suggest that the rural population is somewhat better in some of these respects than the bulk of the urban population. In so far as good health, strong vitality, sound common-sense and intelligence, manifolded direct experience, low criminality, firm religiosity, strong and clean family life, political cautiousness and sound conservatism, relative immunity to radicalism, anarchism, and revolutionism with their satellites, development of private initiative and responsibility, and developed artistic sense, are positive values for any society, the existence of agricultural life and the rural world are positive values for any society. Such are the fundamental practical conclusions given by what has been shown before. This does not mean that the urban society is a negative value. Logically, nothing prevents the recognition of both rural and urban worlds as positive values in their own way. More than that: each of these worlds needs the other and from the presence of the other each of them gains and does not lose in value. The cities need the rural world, first of all, as a reserve and source of human material. The rural parts or rural countries need the cities or industrialized countries as places where their rural surplus of population may go; and in this way the country is relieved of the pressure of overpopulation and its satellites, such as lowering of the standard of living and so on. The

cities need the rural population as a source of vitality and health; the country needs the city as a laboratory in which better and more efficient methods of health-preservation are searched for and discovered. The city or an industrial society cannot live without agricultural products—food and raw materials. The country or rural society needs the products of the city industries and commerce. Any society needs the city as an abode for the best brains of the nation; as a seat of inventions and discoveries; as a ferment in the processes of social life; as an innovator and a dynamic factor in the eternal process of social change and adaptation to ever-changing new conditions of social life. And any society needs the rural world as a factor which tempers the urban dynamism, diminishes the danger of disruption of the important social and cultural ties facilitated by the innovations of the city; gives stability to social life; and furnishes smoothness to the processes of social change. The city needs the country in order that the urban facilitation of progress should not degenerate into anarchy; the country needs the city in order that its stability and order should not degenerate into a dead stagnation. The city needs the "eternal rural source" in order that the city genius—scientists, artists, moralists, intellectuals, organizers—would have the precious patterns, excellent examples, and genuine inspiration for their creative work in all fields of human culture. The country needs these creations in order to improve its own conditions. In brief, these two worlds mutually need and mutually supplement each other. This may be said of the relations between the city and the rural worlds of the same country or between the highly urbanized and predominantly agricultural countries. This is so evident that there is no need to dwell more upon it.

If this is true, it is natural to inquire, What is going to happen in the future in this respect? Are contemporary societies moving more and more to increased urbanization and to a disappearance of the rural world? Does such a trend exist? Do the above differences between the urban and rural worlds tend to become more and more accentuated as time goes on, or do they tend to become more and more obliterated, to disappear, and to give, finally, instead of different rural and urban societies one rurbanized or urb-ruralized society? May an investigator answer these problems properly? What basic changes are these trends and tendencies going to produce in the status of the agricultural group in the future? What is the future of this class? And what is the future of a society in which one or other of the above trends is taking place? Such are the fundamental problems to be discussed in this concluding part of the book. We are aware of the great danger of any prophecy in the field of social phenomena. Nevertheless, we cannot afford to pass silently by these

problems. The theoretical and practical importance of these problems forces us to discuss them, at least, in some of their aspects, and to try to grasp some of the trends which are going on at the present moment and may continue in the future.

The "Parabola" Best Describes Historic Trends in Rural-Urban Differentiation. Do the differences between the rural and urban worlds tend to increase or to decrease as time goes on? Such is the first problem to be discussed here. The most probable answer to the question seems to be as follows. Whether we take the rural-urban differentiation in the history of one country or in the form of a differentiation of mankind into predominantly urbanized and industrialized societies (the Western nations), and into predominantly ruralized nations (the Eastern and Oriental countries), the differentiation does not tend to increase perpetually, as time goes on; on the contrary, *the historical curve of the differentiation shows something similar to a parabolic curve:* at the initial stages of mankind or of a single society the rural-urban differentiation did not exist; later on, it appeared, but at the beginning was very slight and insignificant; it continued to grow in subsequent periods of the history of a society or of all mankind; finally, having reached its climax, it has begun to become less and less sharp, less and less intensive, and, at the present moment, in several Western countries it tends to decrease. Such, in a schematical form, is the essential movement of the rural-urban differentiation discussed. Let us substantiate the statement a little more. That the differentiation into the rural-urban or purely agricultural and purely industrial societies did not exist at the earliest stages of human history or at the initial stages in the history of any single society is established quite certainly. That later on, as the history of mankind continued, the differentiation appeared in a great many societies (with the exception only of those who up to the present time have remained in pre-urban stages), is quite certain also. That the earliest stages of the differentiation were very slight and only the later stages showed conspicuous differences, is also an ascertained fact. It makes no difference whether we take the histories of ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Persia, Rome, Greece, or the histories of the European societies. Everywhere the first cities were only slightly different from the rural parts in regard to occupation, density, size, heterogeneity, system of interaction, social differentiation and stratification, in brief in all the characteristics which separate the rural and the urban worlds from each other (see Chap. II), and in all the traits of the rural and urban populations and cultures which are correlated with these rural-urban "variables." [1]

[1] See for Europe, Sombart, W., *Der Moderne Kapitalismus*, Vol. I, pp. 630 ff. See there the literature and the sources.

Only at later stages of the histories of these and many other societies, which did not remain pre-urban or slightly urban, did cities grow more and more, and the size of cities and the density of the population increased; greater and greater became the occupational differentiation between the urban and the rural populations, and greater and greater grew the other differences between the city and the country. Finally, in the histories of several past societies, for instance in the histories of Rome, Greece, Carthage, Egypt, Babylonia, Ancient Persia, the Arabian Chaliphats, or Judea, this stage was replaced by an attenuation of the differentiation, not so much in the form of an urbanization of their rural parts and the disappearance of the rural world, as in the form of a decay and disappearance of their urban worlds and a return of these countries to predominantly rural conditions. Although such a return was the result of great calamities experienced by these societies, nevertheless, it meant a decrease of the urban-rural differences or a weakening of the rural-urban differentiation, achieved in the way of a decay of the urban world and its engulfment in the rural world. In other cases the attenuation of the sharpness of the differentiation discussed may be achieved in the opposite way: in the form of an increasing urbanization of the rural parts of the country which finally results in "rurbanization,"—in an increase of the similarities between the country and the city, due to the engulfment of the country by the city. Such are the two opposite ways in which an attenuation of the rural-urban differentiation may be, and has been achieved. In spite of the opposite character of these ways, in both cases the final result is a decrease of the differences between the two worlds discussed.

There are many reasons to think that the climax of the differentiation between the city and the country, in the United States of America, and European societies, is already over and that the attenuation of the rural-urban differences in those societies will and is going on in the way of "rurbanization" of those countries (the proper term coined by Charles J. Galpin),[2] that is in the way of a more intensive diffusion of the basic characteristics of the urban world and culture among the rural parts, and, in a less degree, some of the rural traits in the urban parts of these countries. Many symptoms testify in favor of the proposition and many factors are responsible for it. Among those factors the most important are those which facilitate weakening of the rural-urban geographic isolation, growth of the cities, and an increase of rural-urban interaction, and rural-urban migration of the population. Invention of the railway and steam transportation, "domestication" of steam and electricity, development of the telephone, telegraph, press, airplanes, automobiles, and, recently,

[2] See Galpin, C. J., *Rural Life*, Ch. II, and *passim;* and *Rural Social Problems.*

radios—these and similar factors are particularly responsible for weakening of the rural-urban isolation and a more intensive diffusion of the urban traits in the rural, and some of the rural traits in the urban, world. The industrial revolution which, at its beginning, seems to have worked in favor of an increasing of the rural-urban differentiation, contained in itself the forces which, at a later period, began to work in favor of an attenuation of this differentiation and a mutual "rurbanization" of the country and the city worlds. This increase of similarities between these worlds has been proceeding more in the way of "urbanization" of the rural parts, than in the opposite way of "ruralization" of the cities. The same may be said of the differentiation between the Western (highly urbanized) societies and the Oriental (predominantly ruralized) societies (China, India, Korea, Afghanistan, Turkey, Russia, the Balkan countries, and Japan up to the end of the nineteenth century, to mention a few examples). The same factors are responsible for a breach of the isolation of the countries of these two types, and for a more and more intensive diffusion of the Western culture into the Eastern countries, and for a less diffusion of the characteristics of these Oriental countries into the Western world.

The principal symptoms of this "rurbanization" are as follows: *First, the very fact of an enormous growth of cities in the Western countries which has continued up to the present time.* This growth has reached such a proportion in many countries that the country population has become the smaller part of the whole population of the country and as such, naturally, has been more and more influenced by the cities or more and more "urbanized." In other countries, the continued growth of the cities has also reached such a degree that they have been able to exert an increasing influence on the more preponderant country population and this influence is already so great as to be felt in any part of the rural areas of these societies. Finally, in countries like Russia, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria, and in the majority of the Eastern countries, although the country population still composes the great majority, nevertheless, this majority has been continually decreasing, the urban population has been increasing, and with it, the influence of the cities has been growing steadily. The result of this growth of urbanization is that the country population has been more and more engulfed by the city. The following figures give an idea of the process discussed. The per cent of the rural population decreased: in the United States from 71.4 in 1880 to 48.6 in 1920 (rural—less than 2,500); in England and Wales from 49.8 in 1851 to 20.6 in 1921 (rural—less than 5,000); in Belgium from 67.4 in 1846 to 42.5 in 1920 (rural—less than 5,000); in France from 78.0 in 1800 to 53.7 in 1921 (rural—less than 2,000); in Germany

from 61.0 in 1875 to 35.65 in 1926 (rural—less than 2,000); in Australia from 76.7 in 1840 to 56.99 in 1921; in Canada from 68.2 in 1891 to 50.48 in 1921; in New Zealand from 60.0 in 1881 to 43.8 in 1921 (rural—less than 1,000); in South Africa from 76.8 in 1904 (both European and native populations), to 74.9 in 1921; in Japan from 84.4 in 1894 to 67.8 in 1920 (rural—less than 10,000); in India from 90.5 in 1891 to 88.8 in 1921 (rural—less than 2,000).[3] Without giving the data for other countries, it is sufficient to say that, with the exception of two or three countries, principally in South America, where the per cent of the rural population has been stagnant or fluctuating trendlessly, the above decrease of the "rural population" (in the above statistical sense), has been an universal phenomenon.

Second, parallel to this process there has been a proportionate decrease of the population engaged in agriculture in the total occupational population of the majority (not all) of the Western countries.

The per cent of the occupational population engaged in agriculture in the total occupational population of the country decreased, in the United States from 44.1 in 1880 to 32.5 in 1910 and 26.3 in 1920; in Belgium, from 44.0 in 1846 to 16.01 in 1910; in England and Wales from 12.0 in 1881 to 6.5 in 1921; in Germany from 42.5 in 1882 to 28.6 in 1907; in Sweden from 51.6 in 1870 to 38.4 in 1920; in Switzerland from 31.2 in 1900 to 25.5 in 1920; in Finland from 74.8 in 1880 to 65.1 in 1920; in Canada from 34.28 in 1911 to 32.82 in 1921; in the Commonwealth of Australia from 44.0 in 1871 to 25.8 in 1921; in New Zealand from 29.0 in 1881 to 24.5 in 1911; in Austria from 62.6 in 1870 to 59.1 in 1900; in Hungary from 70.5 in 1890 to 69.1 in 1900; in Denmark from 46.2 in 1901 to 40.3 in 1911; in Scotland from 16.2 in 1871 to 10.3 in 1901.

Thus in a great many countries the per cent of the population engaged in agriculture has been decreasing systematically. In other countries, Norway, Netherlands, Italy, France, Cuba, Bulgaria, and British India, the trend of the decrease has not been conspicuous. Nevertheless, even in those countries there has not been any clearly expressed trend in the increase of the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture in the total occupational population. This means that these countries do not compensate for the decrease of the agricultural population in the countries of the first category. Thus, all in all, the last few decades have been decades of a decrease of the population engaged in agricultural pursuits in the world.[4]

[3] Data are taken from the Yearbooks of these countries quoted further; and (for previous years) from Weber's *Growth of Cities.*

[4] The following are the sources of these data: *Statistical Abstract of the U. S.*, 1925, p. 47; *Annuaire Statistique de Belgique*, 1920, p. XXIV; *Census of England and Wales*, 1921, General Report, p. 143; *Statistisches Jahrbuch f. Deutsche Reich*, 1926, p. 14;

The conclusion which follows from these two trends is evident: *since the urban world has been growing at the cost of the rural world this means that the conditions of the urban world have been extending to a larger and larger mass of the population and, through this very fact, urbanizing the populations in a greater and a greater proportion;* since the population engaged in agriculture has been decreasing, and that engaged in urban occupations increasing, this signifies that the influence of agricultural occupation and its environment has been more and more limited in regard to the population subjected to such an influence; and the influence of urban occupations and the urban occupational milieu has been extending to larger and larger proportions of the populations. As a result, the populations have been more and more industrialized and "disagriculturalized." Thus these "symptoms" show clearly, at least, the quantitative side of the trend of the "rurbanization" discussed. This quantitative side means, at the same time, a qualitative weakening of the urban-rural differences. If some oversceptical reader would doubt this last deduction, there are many other symptoms which make such scepticism ill-founded. Indeed, take the statistics of the mileage of railroads and steam-transportation, of telephone and telegraph lines, the number of automobiles, aërial transportation, development of the press and mail-delivery, the statistics of the letters and parcels mailed, the increase of the circulation of the papers and magazines, finally, diffusion of the radio. Without giving the actual data here, on the account of its certainty, we may say that in *all countries these means of interaction and contact between the rural and the urban worlds have been rapidly increasing.* Their rapid increase means the weakening of the mutual isolation of the city and the country and a mutual infiltration and diffusion of the characteristics of each of these social worlds and their populations into each other.

Finally, *take also the process of a greater and greater "mechanization" of agriculture* in the form of progressively increasing introduction of agricultural machinery of various types, into agricultural work and of the engines powered by steam, electricity, gas, oil, and other fuels. For the sake of brevity the actual figures are not given here. But the fact of an increase of such "mechanization" or "industrialization" of agriculture is quite certain. It means again that the agricultural people have been coming more and more under the influence of the urban "machine-culture" and through that have been subjected to the influence of these and other elements of the urban

Statistisk Arsbok, 1926, p. 20; *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Zchweiz*, 1926, p. 61; *Annuaire Statistique de Finlande*, 1927, p. 48; *The Canada Year Book*, 1926, p. 674; *Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia*, 1926, p. 889; Merritt, *The Agricultural Element in the Population, Quarterly Publications of Amer. Stat. Assn.*, Vol. XV, 1916–1917, pp. 58 ff. See also some of the Yearbooks of the other countries.

world. Its result has been again "an urbanization" or "industrialization" of the agricultural population, that is an attenuation of the contrasts between the city and the country worlds and their populations.

These considerations are quite sufficient to prove the validity of the thesis discussed. They leave no doubt as to the trend in a weakening of the rural-urban differences and the progressive—quantitative and qualitative—"urbanization" of the rural world and its population, as the *predominant* method through which this weakening of the rural-urban contrasts has been going on.

On the other hand, the *weakening of the contrasts discussed has also been carried on through "ruralization" of the city world,* that is, through an infiltration and diffusion of the characteristics of the rural world, its culture and population into the urban world and its culture, and population.

From the chapter about rural-urban migration we know that the last century has been the period of especially intensive *migration from the country to the city. Millions of persons born and reared in the rural world have gone to the cities;* through this, they have "imported" into the urban world all the essential characteristics of the rural people and their culture; the health and the vitality of the rural population, its psychology, its social, moral, and cultural characteristics. In addition, among these migrants there have been men of genius—thousands of great poets, scientists, religious leaders, statesmen, artists, inventors, composers, and captains of industry—who on account of their genius have been able to shape their rural heritage into brilliant creations which have not failed to dazzle, impress, and enchant the city people or to influence the urban culture. For an unattentive observer this "importation" of rural traits through migration into the city may appear unimportant. In fact it has been of an enormous significance: if there had been no migration and "importation" as discussed, the whole physiognomy of the city world and its history would have been quite different from what they have been and are. Without it the very fact of the growth of the cities and of their influence would have been impossible; scarcely possible, also, would have been the improvement of the vitality of the city population as shown in previous chapters; the cities would not have had sufficient human material for an expansion of their industry, commerce, and other urban institutions; without growth they would have been unable to develop all the influence which they have exerted. The psychology and the culture of the cities would have been very different also, if they had not been "diluted" incessantly with rural psychology and culture which has been injected into the city all the time by the incessant flow of the rural migrants. In brief, although the "ruraliza-

tion" of the city world has not been so conspicuous as the "urbanization" of the rural world, nevertheless it has been as certain as the second. This has been one way of infiltration and diffusion of the rural characteristics into the urban world.

Another method of this rural infiltration has been the intensification of the rural-urban interaction due to the above improvement in the means of transportation and communication. If it led to a more intensive diffusion of the city traits in the rural areas, it also led to a more efficient diffusion of the rural traits in the cities. The process has been not one-sided but two-sided or mutual. As a result the city "has discovered" the country, as a whole social world with its own culture, life, and organization. Since that time we see a growth of the investigation of country culture by the city people. They "discovered" the folklore, folksongs, folk poetry, folk painting, folk ornamentation, folk beliefs, folk religion, and the special forms of social, political, economic, and other institutions of the rural people. Instead of "the pastoral rustics" or "dirty and ignorant peasants only good for payment of taxes" an incomparably more complex and rich world was opened to the eyes of the urbanites, a world from which they began to learn a great deal, and which became a source of inspiration, and a pattern for imitation by the urbanites in various fields of their activity. It is not strange, therefore, that a serious study of the rural world began with the beginning of the above more intensive contact of the city with the country called forth by the invention of the new means of transportation and communication.

Through this and an intensive migration the city world has been more and more "ruralized." At the same time the country world has been more and more "urbanized." Thus, the rural-urban differences have been undermined from both sides. The net result of such a "melting of the differences from both ends" has been a weakening of the city-country contrasts and of the city-country differentiation. Thus in the remote past the lines of the differentiation slowly and gradually began to go apart; in the course of time this going apart has been growing; finally the divergence reached its climax at different periods for different countries; for the majority of the European countries it probably coincided with the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries; since the nineteenth century, especially its second half, the lines of divergence began to approach each other more and more; the differences began to become less and less sharp; instead of rural-urban differentiation, the United States of America and the majority of the European countries have entered the period of "rurbanization"—a greater and greater obliteration of the rural-urban differences. In some countries, particularly in the United

States, this "rurbanization" has progressed already far enough to be quite certain and unquestionable. Such is the essence of the great historical process which we style by the term of "the parabola of rural-urban differentiation."

The Effects of "Rurbanization" upon the Farmer-Peasant Class. What have been the principal effects of the rurbanization on the rural class and the rural world generally? They have been very complex. Many of them possibly are unknown yet or are not clear at the present moment. But some of the effects may be grasped. They have consisted generally *in a loss or weakening of some conspicuously rural traits; in an acquisition of some of the urban traits;* and, as a result of these processes, in a tangible transformation of the vital, psychological, social, and moral characteristics of the rural population and its institutions, economy, and culture.

A. Transformation of the Farmer-Peasant Economy. The central fact of this transformation has consisted in a shift from the farmer-peasant domestic and self-sufficing economy, as is outlined in Chapter III of this work, to market, or money economy. Instead of producing with the help of his family almost all principal necessities for the consumption of the whole family, a modern farmer-peasant produces primarily for the market. Production for the market has forced him to produce not what is necessary for the family but what is demanded by the market. This has led to a series of the most important changes in the whole farmer-peasant economy. First of all, many things which previously were produced by the farmer-peasant family for the satisfaction of its needs—family clothing, family beverages, some types of food, the principal tools, furniture, carts, and so on—have been given up because the low cost of factory production of these objects has made this division of labor more profitable economically than their production by the farmer-peasant family itself. In this way many subsidiary industries which previously were carried on by the farmer-peasant family have been given up more and more. This means that the first effect of "rurbanization" on the farmer-peasant economy has been a shift from an "encyclopedic and many-folded" economy to the specialized type of economy.

The second effect has consisted in a further specialization in the production of agricultural products among themselves according to the demands of the market. The growth of division of labor and improvement of the means of transportation have forced the farmer-peasants to specialize in the production of only such agricultural products which, according to the natural conditions and the demand of the market, may be produced the most cheaply and may be sold the most profitably, regardless of their use by the farmer-peasant

family itself.[5] As a result, many places in which farming has been shown less profitable than in others, farming itself has been forsaken. Many areas which were particularly favorable for the production of a specific farm product, for instance, wheat, potatoes, flax, chickens, butter and milk, or cattle, began to specialize in such production and, to some extent, stopped the production of other agricultural products necessary even for the farm family itself.[6] Such products began to be bought by the farm family on the market with the money obtained from selling the specific agricultural product produced. At the present moment in the United States not a small number of farmers is buying "canned food" for themselves, instead of producing it on their farms. Such a specialization has naturally narrowed the manyfoldness of the farm economy and farm work still more and has led to a division of labor among farmer-peasants of various areas. If, before, almost all farmer-peasant economic enterprises were somewhat similar because all were "encyclopedic" and tried to produce, in the first place the necessities for their own living in such proportions as were dictated by the demands of the family, the modern farm economic enterprises, at the virtue of their specialization, began to be widely different in various places. Instead of an undifferentiated type of farmer, we have the dairy-farmer, the poultry-farmer, the wheat-farmer, the cattle-breeder, the cattle-feeder, the fruit-raiser, the bee-keeper, and so on. Each of these farmers produces what is demanded by the market and in such proportions as are dictated by the market. The necessities of the farm family began to be satisfied by purchasing most of the goods consumed on the market with the money obtained for the special products raised on the farm and sold on the market.

Such a change of the farm economy to money economy has naturally been followed by a series of other changes. The farmer or peasant has become involved in the money economy and world market much more closely than he was before. If, before, the conditions and changes in the demand and supply of the market only remotely concerned him, at the present moment they concern him incomparably more. He tends to become more and more an entrepreneur who produces for the world market, and, as a result, he has to study the world market conditions, their fluctuations, the essentials of money economy and of contemporary economic organization. Otherwise he is doomed to fail. Since his economic activity must be adapted to ever-changing conditions, he has to give up, more and

[5] We are not going into any analysis of the factors of choice of production. See Black, J. D., *Production Economics*, for such an analysis. This analysis here attempts to indicate only the major characteristics without reference to minor details.

[6] In a general way we have indicated the law of "first choice" without giving any conditions. See Black, *op. cit.*

more, his traditional ways of farming and "doing things" and to replace them more and more by "the rational" (new, flexible, and changing) ways advised by his knowledge and by science. Like any entrepreneur, he is in a greater need of credit than before. Such a need involves him more and more in the whole mechanism of contemporary money economy, brings him nearer to the world market and this market nearer to him, breaks his economic isolation and independence and forces him to fight for an organization of his credit facilities and for easier and better ways of obtaining it. The farmer has now entered the roundabout capitalist type of production.

Add to this the fact of a growing introduction of machinery, automobiles, threshing machines, combines, tractors, stationary gas engines, plows, and so on in agriculture. These and many other machines are produced by the city industries and are bought by farmers on the market. Thus, as a producer and as a consumer, as a buyer and as a seller, he is entangled more and more by the money economy and is depending more and more upon the world market. A portion of agricultural production (the machine production, etc.) is carried on in the mills of the city. This fact naturally urges him to create such economic organizations of farmers which can protect and promote his interests as a producer and a consumer, a buyer and a seller. Hence, the appearance and growth of many forms of farmer-peasant coöperative organizations whose objective is to serve these purposes.

In the conditions of the money economy, economics is closely connected with politics. A great many economic interests of various social groups can be promoted or checked through corresponding policies of a government. The same is true of farmers and peasants. *This explains why the transformation described has led the farmers and peasants to the necessity of a more active participation in the politics;* and to the creation of special political parties and associations which would protect their economic interests through influencing the policies of the government. Hence, we see the reason for the increase of purely political activity of the class studied in the recent years. Such is the central point of the recent transformation of the farmer-peasant economy due to the modern trend of "rurbanization." [7]

B. Transformation of the Farmer-Peasant Characteristics. This

[7] See a development of these statements in Galpin, C. J., *Rural Life;* Truesdell, L. E., *Farm Population of the United States,* Ch. 1; Beckmann, Fritz, "Der Bauer in Zeitalter des Kapitalismus," *Schmoller's Jahrbuch,* pp. 49–91, 1927; Albrecht, *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik,* IX Abteilung, I Teil, pp. 56 ff.; Sombart, W., *Das Wirtschaftsleben in Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus,* pp. 969 ff., 1020 ff. In essence this process is also a most thorough criticism of N. L. Sims' idea of the correlation between the appearance of the "isolated" farm and the progressive disfranchisement of farmer-peasants. See Sims, N. L., *The Rural Community and Elements of Rural Sociology.* See the review of the latter book by Zimmerman in the *Amer. Journal of Sociology.*

change in the character of the farmer-peasant economy and other forms of "rurbanization" has caused many changes in the characteristics of the rural population, its culture and institutions. Let us briefly enumerate the principal trends in these fields. As to the bodily and vital characteristics of the group studied, the nature of the change in this field has consisted in a weakening of the rural-urban differences or in the approach of these characteristics to the average of the urban population. The principal differences between the rural and urban populations in vital traits consisted in a differential birth-rate, mortality-rate, suicide-rate, and the amount and specificity of diseases. Since rurbanization means an increase of the urban conditions for the rural world, it is natural to expect that a growth of such conditions in the rural world must be followed by a growth of the urban vital traits. In the preceding chapters it has been shown that this expectation is supported to a considerable degree by the facts. Urbanization is correlated with the low birth-rate. *Urbanization of the rural world has been followed by a decrease of the birth-rate in the country population.* The wave of decreasing birth-rate originated by the cities has been spreading more and more over the country population for the last few decades. Urbanization is correlated with suicide. Urbanization of the rural world has been followed by an increase of suicides in the rural populations of many countries. The discrepancy in the rural-urban rates for suicide as well as for birth-rates in many countries has been decreasing. This is not because the cities have been increasing their birth-rates or decreasing their suicide-rates but because the more and more urbanized country has been following the city in decreasing its birth-rate and increasing its suicide-rate.

In the age-composition of the population the city differed from the country in that it had a lower proportion of the children and younger ages and a higher proportion of the adults. In so far as the rural population has begun to decrease its birth-rate and providing that the trend is continued, it is to be expected that the country population will decrease the proportion of the younger-aged in its total population. In other words, in this respect, it also will follow the city trend.

As to mortality-rate, we saw that for the last few decades it has become noticeably lower in the cities. The lowering has taken place also in the country population but not to such an extent as in the cities. We saw, further, that, all in all, the mortality-rates of the country have been lower than in the city. The above recent lowering of the urban death-rate in a greater degree than the rural rate means again a tendency for the attenuation of rural-urban differences in this field, not so much in the way of an approaching of the rural rate to the city rate as much as in the approaching of the city rate to the

rural rate. The net result of this is a decrease of the rural-urban differences in this respect.

As to rural-urban morbidity the differences in this field were manifolded and for this reason could not be outlined in few words. All that it is possible to say is that, on the whole, these differences probably tend to decrease also, partly because the country morbidity is tending to follow the city morbidity in some respects, and partly because the city morbidity, in other respects, is tending to approach to that of the country. For instance, an improvement of living conditions in the city tends to decrease tuberculosis and lung diseases and to bring their rates nearer to those of the country. On the other hand, an increase of the circulation of the people between the country and the city is likely to be followed by a greater spreading of venereal diseases in the country, thus decreasing the differences which existed in the rural and urban rates for these diseases. It is probable also that improvements in the sanitary conditions and the medical service in the country would be followed by a decrease of infectious diseases in the country and by a weakening of the differences in the rural and urban rates for these diseases in many countries.

Summing up the changes in the vitality of the rural population, due to an increasing urbanization of the country, we may say that in some respects urbanization has beneficial, and in some other respects negative, effects on the health and vitality of the rural people. Which of these two types of effe ts is greater we are not prepared to decide. But the net result of the urbanization discussed is a trend for the attenuation of rural-urban differences in the field discussed.

The same trend seems to exist in the field of psycho-social characteristics of the rural population. First, thanks to the progress in the school education of the rural people their indirect experience becomes wider, richer, and more manysided than before. It tends to approach the experience of the city people. Mechanization of agriculture tends to stamp the farmer-peasant mind with the same stigmata as the urban mind. This tends to decrease somewhat the animistic, and indeterministic rural attitudes and to promote the diffusion of deterministic, mechanistic, and materialistic attitudes in their place. In so far as the mechanization decreases the amount of the physical exertion of farm work, it is reasonable to expect a decrease of the sternness and some severity in the farmer-peasant character, as indicated before. An increase of the indirect experience, knowledge of the world market, contact with the city, and an increase of the mechanization of agriculture are likely to call forth many changes in the character of the thinking, and other psychological processes of the farmer and peasant.

The growing urbanization equally calls forth a series of profound

modifications in the personality of the farmer and peasant, in rural behavior, and in the rural institutions and culture. In the first place, the personality and behavior of the farmer, as an economic agent, undergo a conspicuous transformation. The modern farmer is becoming more and more *an entrepreneur* in a modern and narrow sense of the word. The modern farm is more and more becoming a real business enterprise which is to be managed according to the strict principles of any modern business. Instead of the traditional ways of farming, the modern farmer, like any efficient business man, has to *plan rationally* the whole management of his enterprise, to take into consideration and to put into operation any new important device, to be in close touch with the market and the totality of economic conditions, to follow their changes, and to be ready to introduce any modification in his production, selling, buying, and farming technique which are needed. All this affects the traditionalism in farming, helps to stop the stagnation in methods of farming and the use of farming technique and through these affects the traditionalism and stagnation in the farmer's behavior. Under the new conditions the farmer cannot go on successfully in his business if he simply follows "the ways of his fathers and the forefathers." Whether he wishes it or not, he is forced to look forward instead of backward. He is forced to drop many traditional ways of farming and to replace them by the new ways better adapted to the new conditions. And as these new conditions are incessantly changing, the adaptation to them means also an incessant process of modification of the modern farmer's ways. His behavior is forced to become more and more plastic, his activities more and more changeable, his responses less and less traditional and more and more "rational," that is, systematically thought over and incessantly and deliberately adapted to the incessant changes, instead of being conditioned by tradition. Having been shifted from the quiet pond of the isolated local community into the wide ocean of the world money economy, he is doomed to ruin if he does not change his traditional ways of doing things and behavior. Hence, a series of other changes in his economic activity. He tends to become an organizer of his enterprise on the basis of scientific recommendations and principles and not a mere continuator of the farm traditions of his forefathers. He does not "invest" the energy and labor of his whole family into the farm but often when an activity of a member of his family is more profitable outside of the farm (in industry, professions, and so on) he splits his family and sends some of its members to other, more gainful, occupations. Like any modern business man he begins to speculate, to make investments in other enterprises, to borrow money when borrowing promises some profits, and to look for the best market and the best moment to sell his prod-

ucts. In brief, the modern farmer more and more transforms himself into a business man of the modern type.

This transformation naturally is followed by a series of other changes in his attitudes, ideologies, and rural culture and rural institutions. First of all, the *farmer-peasant family begins to acquire more and more many of the characteristics of the urban family.* Its size tends to decrease because of the decreasing birth-rate. As a union of the husband and wife it tends to approach the urban fragility. Correspondingly, divorces in rural families of many countries tend to increase. The ties between the parents and the children also tend to weaken owing to the "division" of labor among its members mentioned, and that some of the members enter other than agricultural occupations. The economic functions of the family also begin to shrink owing to the transformation of the self-sufficing farmer-peasant economy into money economy. As a result of this the community of co-living in the family tends to weaken and the family tends to become less stable and integrated like the urban family. Correspondingly, the feeling of the sacredness of family unity and purity becomes weaker; the authority of the parents becomes more limited and less unquestionable; the importance of the family ties becomes less binding. In a word, the rural family tends to follow more and more the urban family in its characteristics.

A similar tendency is to be expected in the field of religious, criminality and other cultural characteristics analyzed in the preceding chapters. Since the traditionalism of rural culture is more and more undermined due to the conditions of urbanization, "*modernism*" in religion and arts, in political and moral fields, in the attitudes of nationalism, patriotism, internationalism, collectivism, and individualism tends to replace more and more the previous rural attitudes analyzed above. In all these respects the differences between the city culture and attitudes and those of the country tend to become less and less conspicuous. Old folk-art is more and more replaced by the urban arts; old dances by modern dances; old songs by jazz, and radio and victrola music; old ornamentation by the machine decorations; old country costumes by the city-made "standard" clothing; the country fashions give way to the urban fashions; the country stories are replaced by the *Saturday Evening Post* and *Liberty*. The same may be said of almost any field of rural-urban culture. The traditional forms of religious beliefs, whose sanctity was not questioned before, tend to give way to city criticism, scepticism, rationalism, and other urban "isms." The waves of city ideologies—be they socialism and communism, fascism or evolution—tend to spread more and more successfully in the country. Urban internationalism begins to find more lively response in rural districts. The urban

individualism more and more invades the area of the rural community. Solidarity based on similarity tends to be replaced by solidarity based on dependence and fixed by contractual relationships. Even the rural forms of social and political organization tend to approach the urban forms more and more. Instead of natural gatherings of country folks and neighbors, we see a rapid growth of clubs for men, women, boys, and girls in the country organized in all essential traits similar to the lines of urban clubs. (See about that Kolb, J. H. and Wileden, A. F., *Special Interest Groups in Rural Society*, 1927.) Unorganized political action gives way to farmer-peasant political parties built along the patterns of the urban political parties and associations. The technique of these modern farmer and peasant parties, in essentials, is similar to that of the city parties. This goes so far that at the present moment we already have even a Peasant-Farmer International (in the form of the International Agrarian Bureau mentioned)—a replica of the International of the urban proletariat or urban capitalists.

No matter what field of rural culture we take, everywhere the tendencies discussed are present. Their appearance and growth is comprehensible because they are correlated with urban conditions and these urban conditions are spreading more and more over the country. The urban characteristics must spread also. Such, in brief, are the essentials of the present tendencies in the rural world and its population under the conditions of increasing "rurbanization."

The Future of the Farmer-Peasant Class and of the Rural World. Does the above "rurbanization" mean that, in the course of time, the differences between the rural and urban worlds will disappear entirely and the very division of the city and the country and of the agricultural class and the non-agricultural classes, will be but a historical recollection? No one can predict what will happen in the span of time measured by thousands of years. If, however, we agree to understand by the future a span of time measured by only a few decades or a few centuries, the answer to the question is negative. *The discussed "urbanization" of the rural world means only an approach of its characteristics to the characteristics of the urban world but does not mean a complete obliteration of all differences between them.*

In order that such an obliteration become possible it is necessary for the urban and rural areas to have the same density of population, the same size of community, the same homogeneity or heterogeneity of the population, the same occupational milieu and nature of the occupation, and the same intensity and character of the interaction system. As long as there are differences in these conditions in various areas, the rural and urban differentiation will remain because, as we have seen, just the differences in these respects create the

differentiation of the communities into the city and the country community. We can admit the progress of rurbanization, and yet it is improbable that the rurbanization will go so far as to make all communities identical in regard to these conditions. In spite of the progress of rurbanization, various communities of the Western countries will probably continue to differ from one another in their size and the density of the population; in the character and intensity of their interaction systems; in the combination of the natural and artificial forms of their environment, especially in the degree of "mechanization" of their occupational activity and milieu; and finally in the nature of their predominant occupations. We may grant an enormous progress of inventions, and yet it is hard to admit that it will make possible a density for the agricultural population as great as that of New York City or London. We may admit that mechanization of agriculture will make an enormous progress in the future, and yet it is improbable that it will reach the degree of mechanization of many industries. Likewise, the environment of the cultivators in the future is likely to remain incomparably more "natural" than the environment of the city occupations, and the farm economy will probably continue to differ from urban economy in many respects. The same is to be said of other "rural-urban variables." Even for the Western countries it is improbable that in regard to all these variables all communities will be identical. When, further, the great contrast between the Western and Oriental countries is taken into consideration; when we think about the enormous predominance of rural conditions in the Eastern countries in contrast to the more urbanized Western countries, it is safe to say that if the city and the country contrasts are greatly diminished in the Western countries, they will continue to exist for a long time in the form of the contrasts between the Western urbanized countries and the predominantly rural countries of the East. Some attenuation of the contrasts is probable; their complete obliteration is an utopia. In so far, we do not have any reason to believe that in the future the farmer-peasant class will disappear entirely and the rural world will be entirely melted into the urban world. In so far, the rural and the urban sociologies will continue to exist even in the future.

A few concrete data may show more clearly the validity of these statements. First of all, for a disappearance of the farmer-peasant class it is necessary that their individual farm economies be melted into a form of big capitalist or socialist concerns similar to the big industrial corporations. As long as there is an individual farm owned and managed by an individual farmer and his family, no complete urbanization is possible. Such a farm will continue to be different from the city enterprises; and the farmer will continue to be different

from either the city hired laborer or the urban capitalist. Is such a swallowing of the small farms by large concerns—similar to the process of driving out the small industrial enterprises by the larger—economically possible and profitable? The answer is rather negative because, thanks to the peculiarities of agriculture, a large enterprise there does not have and cannot have many profitable preferences in comparison with small farms owned by farmers, which large enterprises have in other industries.[8] In so far, we cannot expect in agriculture a trend of concentration of land into fewer and fewer hands and a replacement of the small farms by big capitalist or socialized corporations. Is this proved by history? Does history show anything like a trend for the disappearance or a decrease in the number of individual farms in the course of time? Nothing, as has been shown above; it shows rather an opposite process of progressive increase of the number of the individual farmer-peasant farming enterprises. No concentration of land into fewer and fewer hands has been taking place during the last century, or particularly during the last few years. According to the approximate computation of Sombart, on the average in all European countries, at least three-quarters of the entire land is owned by the farmers and peasants. The number of the farms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has increased, especially during the last few years after the War.[9] For instance, whereas in Denmark in 1800 there were only 91,000 freeholdings, in 1916 the number was 184,000.[10] In Russia, before the Revolution, there were about 15,000,000 peasant farms; at the present moment there are about 25,000,000. A similar process has taken place almost in all European countries, especially after the War.[11]

Such a tendency does not warrant any expectation of a disappearance of the farmer-peasant class in the future or the expectation of a complete urbanization of the agricultural world.

More than that. Those who are dazzled by the shining lights of the cities and by their growth are often inclined to think that the rural world and the farmer-peasant class are already an insignificant island in the sea of the urban world and its population. Nevertheless, the data given in the preceding paragraph of this chapter do not warrant such an opinion. This planet is still predominantly a rural abode; the farmer-peasant or agricultural population is still the largest among all other occupational populations; and agriculture is still the largest and the most important industry among all the existing industries. On this planet there are still about 200 millions of independent

[8] See the reasons in Sombart, *op. cit.*, pp. 825 ff.; see there the literature and references.
[9] Sombart, W., *Das Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus*, pp. 822 ff., 968 ff.
[10] Manniche, P., *op. cit.*, p. 36.
[11] See the summarized data in Sombart's and Schiff's works quoted.

farms or agricultural economies; out of the 1,700,000,000 human population on the earth, from 1,000,000,000 to 1,200,000,000 are still engaged in agriculture and get their living through it.[12] A long time is necessary in order that such a mass of the rural population would be urbanized completely and such an enormous ocean of the rural world be swallowed by a still much smaller urban sea. It is very doubtful if such a result will generally come in the remote future.

Other considerations lead to a similar conclusion. For a complete equalization of the agriculturists and their milieu with the people engaged in the urban industry and their milieu, the agricultural industry will have to be mechanized in the same way and to the same degree as any other industry. If it remained mechanized much less, it, and its milieu would be different from the machine-culture of the city and the city industry; for this reason there would be differences between the people occupied in agriculture and in the majority of the machine industries of the city. A series of quite sound technical and economic considerations suggests that the application of machinery in agriculture, especially to the relatively small holdings of the farmers and peasants, finds much narrower limits than in many urban industries and in many ways is less profitable and efficient than in these industries.[13] We may grant that in the future there will be invented many new devices and the utilization of machines in agricultural production will increase; and yet it is very doubtful that it will develop to the same extent as in many other industries. In so far, the cultivator will remain under less mechanized conditions than the people in most of the urban industries; and this difference will be followed by differences in many attitudes and forms of behavior of the urban-rural populations.

Without mentioning other similar considerations, the above are sufficient to show that, in spite of a relative increase of urbanization of the rural parts, it does not mean, either a complete obliteration of the differences between the city and the country worlds, and between the city and the country populations or the disappearance of the farmer-peasant class in the future. In a somewhat altered, and probably attenuated, form the differences will remain. This is quite sure for the next few decades in the Western societies; it is also certain for the next century in regard to the differences between the predominantly rural Eastern and predominantly urban Western societies; it is likely to be certain for a much longer span of time, if not "forever" in regard to all mankind. Specialists in rural and in urban sociologies need not be afraid of losing their specialty

[12] Sombart, W., *op. cit.*, pp. 968–969.

[13] See Fischer, G., *Die Soziale Bedeutung der Machine in der Landwirtschaft;* Lang, A., *Die Machine in der Rohproduction;* Sombart, W., *op. cit.*, pp. 825–826.

on account of the disappearance of the differences between the city and the country.

The Future of a Highly Urbanized Society. Although the farmer-peasant class and the rural world are not doomed to disappear in the future, nevertheless, this or that single society may move in a progressive urbanization so far as to have left quite an insignificant proportion of a considerably "urbanized" rural population and only a small island of the rural world in the urban ocean. The cases of England and Belgium show something approaching to this hypothetical condition. Such a possibility makes the curiosity expressed in the questions legitimate: what is the future of such a "super-urbanized" society? What are going to be its predominant characteristics? Can it exist and prosper and be longliving by itself, without any rural hinterland, or is it doomed to crumble and decay?

The problems are interesting; but like many other interesting problems can scarcely be answered definitely. All that it is possible to say is no better than a more or less probable guess based on some more or less valid considerations. The subsequent considerations do not pretend to be anything more than probable guesses. The answer to the above questions depends greatly on whether such a highly urbanized society has, in some way, a rural hinterland of its own or of some other society with which it is in contact and interaction, or if it is without any rural hinterland. The second case is purely hypothetical because at the present moment we do not have any really urban society without any rural hinterland. Although England or Belgium are highly urbanized societies each of them has a large rural hinterland—in the form of their own rural colonies and dominions and in the form of foreign rural countries with which they are in intensive commercial and other relationships. *In regard to this second "pure urban society" it is possible to state that it can scarcely exist and be longliving.* If it does not produce itself a sufficient amount of food and other agricultural products, and does not obtain these products from other agricultural societies (which follows from the supposition that it is a "pure urban society" and is without any relationship with other agricultural societies), it cannot have food and other agricultural products without which it cannot exist. Likewise its many industries cannot have the raw material obtained by rural societies; without such its industries cannot exist. Furthermore, without a rural hinterland, the products of the industry of such a society cannot find a market sufficiently large to keep the factories running successfully. Finally, it is highly doubtful whether such a society can keep its biological balance; if there is no migration from the rural countries to such a society; and if a falling birth-rate is associated with urbanization; it is very probable that the popula-

tion of such a society will be stagnant or, what is still more probable, will be decreasing and the society itself is bound to be more and more engulfed by other and more prolific societies. These self-evident considerations are sufficient to show the impossibility of the existence of such a "pure" urban society. Let us turn now to the other type of a highly urbanized society with its own or a foreign rural hinterland.

Can such a society exist and be longliving? The answer depends upon many conditions, and particularly upon the size of the rural hinterland, its degree of rurbanization, and the intensity and the character of the relationships between the highly urbanized society and its own or foreign rural hinterland.

If the rural hinterland is too small (not necessarily in a territorial sense but in the sense of being too small to feed the urban society with its agricultural products and too small to consume the industrial products); and if the rural part is already considerably rurbanized; the stability of such a society is jeopardized to a very considerable degree. Insufficiency of agricultural products will be a permanent menace on account of lack of food and raw materials for the urban society. Every crisis may turn the menace from a potential into a real one. Such a situation is likely to be followed by disturbances in the urban population, especially if it is suffering. The disturbances in their turn can easily undermine the stability and order of the society and change the situation from bad to worse. Insufficiency of raw materials will jeopardize the successful running and development of the industries of the society. This again will contribute to the increase of unemployment in such a society. The unemployment will be caused also by a limited proportion of the rural population which, according to the supposition, cannot consume a sufficient amount of the industrial products of the society. This will (tentatively) result in an overproduction: which again will lead to business depressions and an increase of unemployment. This unemployment usually leads to an increase of social disturbances, riots, disorders, and revolutions. These, under such circumstances, aggravate the situation still more. Add to this the difficulties connected with the sufficient supply of human material. Since the rural hinterland is small it cannot yield many migrants to the urbanized part of the society. The latter is likely to have a very low birth-rate incapable of leading to an increase of the society. The small rural hinterland, being already rurbanized considerably (according to the supposition), is likely to have a very low birth-rate also. Under such circumstances the society is likely to have either a purely stagnant population or, what is more probable, a population systematically decreasing. The result is a slow or a rapid dying out of the society. Either it is doomed to a gradual engulfment

or replacement by other, more fertile and better balanced, societies, or to disorganization and chronical anarchy as a result of the disturbances mentioned.[14] The classical cases of ancient Rome and Greece during the later periods of their history or the case of contemporary Austria give real examples of situations somewhat approaching to the hypothetical case discussed. When Rome and Greece were highly urbanized; and when, owing to various conditions, their rural hinterlands were cut off and the exploitation by the mother city became difficult; and when, at the virtue of urbanization, the birth-rate of these societies decreased enormously; and when the chronical disturbances of the city populations of these societies made disorders and riots and civil wars a common phenomenon; the societies began to decline. Their native population was dying out more and more and was being supplanted by the barbarians of a different race and culture; their order and stability was shaken more and more; their productive activity was undermined more and more; their economic situation was aggravated more and more; their culture was distorted more and more; all this resulted into what is styled as the decay of Rome or Greece. Although contemporary Austria is not cut off from a vast rural hinterland of other societies, its own hinterland is disproportionately small in comparison with its city population. This fact alone is causing already great difficulties for the keeping of the social stability of Austria and the successful development or even existence of the country. Much better is the situation of England because it still has a vast rural hinterland of colonies, dominions, and other rural countries which serve as a market for the industrial products of the country. If, however, for a moment we suppose that the colonies and dominions of England develop their own industries (things are drifting that way) to such an extent that they will not need to import the industrial products of Great Britain; if the same happens with other rural countries (Persia, Russia, Afghanistan, and the rural countries of other continents) which have been the market for the British industrial products (things are drifting that way also in those countries), one can see that such a development may cause increasing difficulties for the successful development of England. Since the products of its industries cannot be consumed by the insignificant rural population of the country; and this rural population cannot supply a sufficient amount of the agricultural and raw products for the urban population and its industries, the results of such a situation may be very similar to the results of the hypothetical case discussed.

[14] See a similar and note detailed analysis of the situation in C. Gini's *I fattori demografici dell' evoluzione delle nazioni*, Torino, 1912. Charles A. Beard in his quoted paper states his urban optimism without any consideration of these and many other dangers. So far his optimism is rather emotional than scientific.

In brief, under the hypothetical conditions supposed, the long and successful existence of a highly urbanized society, with an insufficient rural hinterland, is very doubtful.

Take now the case of a highly urbanized society but with an agricultural hinterland (of its own or of some other country) sufficient to supply it with agricultural products and raw materials, and populous enough to consume, together with the urban population, the products of the urban industries. Such is the United States of America. Excluding extraordinary factors of a catastrophic character (war, cosmic catastrophes, etc.) theoretically there is nothing to hinder the long existence of such a society. It is well balanced economically. Being such, it is likely to be well balanced in other respects. The only point to be mentioned is the problem of its equilibrium under the condition of an exceedingly high "rurbanization" of its agricultural population. Does such a condition mean a serious danger for the social progress of the type of society discussed? On the basis of the preceding chapters we may think of some dangers. First of all, in so far as a low birth-rate is associated with urbanization, such a society is likely to be stagnant in its population. If other —less urbanized—societies maintain at the same time a high birth-rate and are increasing in their population, the urban society in question would tend to become a smaller and smaller minority amidst all societies,[15] and in so far as "the number" or the size of the population is a factor in the historical destinies of a society, this may affect in many ways the successful development of the society discussed. If other societies do not increase more rapidly, then this danger is absent.[16]

Another—but far from proved—danger of a low birth-rate (and low mortality rate) in such a society is this. Many authors (K. Pearson, E. C. Snow, A. Ploetz, and others) [17] claim that death is generally selective, that at a given period in a given society the constitutional weaklings tend to die in a greater proportion and at

[15] France gives an example of this. Owing to a very low increase of its population her population becomes a smaller and smaller proportion among the populations of other countries. Besides, her population itself is more and more supplanted by the migrants to France from other—more fertile—societies, as Italy, Poland, and Russia. From 1919 to 1924 at least 800,000 foreign laborers entered France and settled there; at the beginning of 1925 France had 2,000,000 (or 6 per cent of the whole population of France) permanently residing foreigners. See *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris*, pp. 162–163, May, 1925. According to L. Dublin's and A. Lŏtka's computation the population of the United States, under the present rate of births and deaths and providing that immigration is excluded, can only maintain itself. If, in the future, the natural increase falls slightly, the population of this country will begin to decrease. See Dublin's and Lŏtka's work quoted. The same is true of the urbanized European countries. See Kuczynski, *The Balance of Births and Deaths*, quoted.

[16] See corresponding theories in Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, ch. vii.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 304 ff. See there the literature and references.

earlier ages than the constitutionally stronger and more healthy people. Correspondingly, the high death-rate which usually accompanies a high birth-rate, means a more severe "natural selection" of the population, a more intensive elimination of the weaklings and a greater survival of the strong and fit people. A low birth-rate accompanied by a low death-rate means a weakening of this process of selection, a progressive multiplication of the weaklings in such a society and a progressive decrease of the proportion of the innately strong and fit persons in its population. In so far as this theory is true (though it is still not proved), and in so far as the historical destinies of a society depend upon the kind of persons out of whom it is composed, *the low birth- and death-rates of the type of society discussed may lead to a qualitative racial depletion of its population and through that to a jeopardizing of its development and long existence.* If the hypothesis of the selectivity of death be true, the above conclusion appears probable. However, as is mentioned, the hypothesis itself is still not proved. Therefore the conclusion is a mere possibility.

The racial depletion of the population of such a society may take place also in another form, *differential fertility* between its upper and lower classes. For the urban population of the Western countries, it is rather a common phenomenon that the upper—the more intellectual, the professional, and the richer—classes of the population have a lower fertility than the lower classes, especially the classes of unskilled and semi-skilled labor. Granting even that the death-rate of the laboring classes has been higher than that of the upper classes, the net survival of the offspring of the lower classes has been greater than that of the upper classes.[18] The result of such a differential survival has been that the proportion of the offspring of the upper classes has been dying out more and more and the proportion of the offspring of the lower classes has been increasing. If we agree that the upper—more qualified—classes are more qualified not only on account of their environment but also on account of their better heredity—a supposition which is strongly supported by an enormous number of very prominent investigators—then such progressive extinction of the offspring of these classes means a progressive impoverishment of the racial fund of the society or a progressive racial depletion of its population. In so far as talent, genius, and capable leadership are the important factors of progress of a society, and in so far as they are at least partly due to heredity, the above racial depletion may be one of the factors which work in the direction of the decay of such a society. This conclusion is particularly significant if the hypothesis of the selectivity of death is not entirely fallacious. The differential survival discussed, being followed by a low birth- and

[18] See the data and the references in Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, ch. xv and pp. 498 ff.

death-rate (that is by an elimination of natural selection), may still more quickly lead to racial depletion and to an extinction of the more fit stocks in such an urban society. This danger is very serious if only the premises that death is selective and that the incomparably greater richness of the upper classes with men of talent, genius, and leadership—[19] which fact is well established—is due in part at least to the better heredity of these classes, are true. The body of evidence in favor of these premises is such that, if we cannot recognize them as definitively proved, we must admit, at least, a part of truth to the premises.

Other possible dangers for the long and successful existence of the type of society discussed, under the influence of a great urbanization of its rural part, are connected with other urban and "rurban" conditions. The principal of these dangers are: a further disorganization of the *family;* a further progress of *irreligiosity;* a further increase of *criminality;* a further increase of *political instability,* disorders, and class strife; a further increase of "*mechanization*" of human thought and thinking processes in the form of a progress of the mechanistic, materialistic, atheistic, epicurean, and similar "habits of mind" and attitudes; a "*de-spiritualization*" of human beings and human personalities; and an increase of "*mechanization*" *of the arts and esthetic culture.* In the above we have seen that all these trends are more or less associated with urbanization. If this association is really causal, and, being such, it is going to exist in the future; these effects may grow more and more in the type of society discussed. Whether they are good or bad, it is up to every reader to judge. But regardless of the reader's attitudes, he must be aware of such a possibility. There is doubt that the possibility itself is quite certain: some of the traits may be associated fictitiously with urbanization; some others may be checked by the interference of new factors; the very knowledge of these trends may call forth some concentrated efforts to stop them; and finally, there may be working some unforeseen factors which, in the future will turn the trend in a different direction. All this is possible. In no way do we share the belief in the existence of "absolutely rigid social laws and of iron necessity" in the field of human relationships. Nevertheless, these suggested mitigating circumstances are mere possibilities also. Their probability is no greater than the probability of the above "dangers." For this reason it seems most plausible to indicate the possible "dangers" to such a society as above in order that they may be kept in mind and may be checked in time if they are undesirable. We wish to stress, at the same time, that these dangers are possible but not inevitable or quite certainly proved.

[19] See the data, *ibid.*, chs. x, xi, xii.

If the "rurbanization" of its rural parts is not great then these dangers are likely to be less menacing and, for this reason, such a society needs no special speculation concerning its future. According to all the evidences such a society, as long as it has a sufficient proportion of agricultural population and the rurbanization of this agricultural population is not exceedingly great, can live and progress successfully. In the light of contemporary knowledge, "other conditions being equal," such a society probably is the best from the standpoint of survival and longliving.

Such are principal possibilities and prospects. Although the danger of overurbanization is menacing only a very few of the contemporary Western societies; nevertheless, such a danger is to be kept in mind especially because some such symptoms are already in existence. The principal of those are: a trend toward a greater and greater replacement of the population of the highly urbanized societies by those of the predominantly rural, European, and Asiatic, societies. Regardless of any personal taste and estimation, the drift is in the way of a greater and greater replacement of the population of such societies by the rural peoples—in Europe the Slavic groups and the "Asiatic invaders." During the past few decades, in the total population of Europe the relative proportions of the population from or in the rural countries has been increasing more rapidly than the population from the urbanized countries. The proportion of native to the urban countries tends to become a progressively decreasing minority. The "law of a progressive replacement of the urban population by the rural and the population of the urbanized countries by that of the agricultural countries"—specifically discussed in several preceding chapters,—continues to work before our eyes. It contains a potential menace of the replacement of the populations of the more urbanized Europe by those of less urbanized Asia; of the populations of the highly urbanized European countries by those of the less urbanized countries. In order to stop this there is only one efficient way—an increase of the birth-rates in the urban societies. Without this other ways are likely to have, at the best, only temporary success. Other dangers enumerated in the preceding pages are also not absent.

Now we are not going to end with a sermon. But if national policy finds these above trends undesirable or if the populations of the urban countries wish to avoid such changes, we suggest the following remedies. A concentrated effort and a deep change in many vital, mental, and social traits of the urban populations are required to meet the dangers. There must be further improvement of city hygienic conditions, and in the vitality of the urban populations; a cessation of propaganda in favor of birth control may

help somewhat to raise the urban birth-rate or prevent or slow down its rapid decline. An improvement of the relationships between the city classes and a reinforcement of class coöperation instead of class struggle may decrease the dangers of social instability and disorders. A deep spiritual revolution should be directed towards a reinforcement and regeneration of the stoic attitudes toward life instead of the epicurean; towards regeneration of the idealistic and religious outlook instead of the purely mechanistic and materialistic faiths; towards a regeneration of the family institution, possibly in a somewhat different form, but in all essentials preserving the substantial functions of the family; and towards a decrease of scepticism, cynicism, and other similar currents of thought. In addition, urban populations should be willing to pay attention to, and spend money in, the promotion of rural health. If the infectious and endemic diseases are prevalent in the country, and if the prevention of these diseases may add to the numbers of the population without causing the quality to deteriorate through prevention of the beneficent influences of the natural selection of deaths, then considerable may be achieved through rural health programs. Further, attempts to prevent the spreading of urban birth control, family disorganization, epicureanism, and cynicism to rural districts may be of considerable value. If rurbanism means that rural communities get only the best from urban life, then all is well. But, as we have shown, the chances are that both the worst and best will go together.

Further, a fair policy toward the rural parts and rural countries on the part of the urban population and urbanized countries is necessary. Since to-day's rural population is to-morrow's urban, it is in the interests of the cities and urbanized countries themselves to have the rural migrants to the city as healthy, intelligent, social, and moral as possible. The better are the migrants in all these respects, the greater is the profit of the cities. Therefore an improvement of economic, educational, cultural, political, and other conditions of the rural world is dictated by the vital interests of the urban world itself. It is profitable also in the way of a possible decrease of migration to the cities as a result of these improvements in the rural parts. A decrease of the migration and a higher standard of living in the country means a decrease of unemployment in the city, an enlargement of the market for the city products, and a facilitation of the city prosperity.

To the rural population, we suggest to do their best in the way of taking from the city all of its real cultural values and rejecting the urban "pseudo-values." We suggest further to keep and cultivate by all means the positive characteristics of the rural world itself, regardless as to whether they are fashionable among the urbanites

or not. An active, benevolent, and fair coöperation with the city is needed as much by the country as it is needed by the city.

These and many other measures may help to check the discussed dangers of overurbanization and may lead to a better and better active adaptation of mankind to urban conditions which are relatively new in human history for the great majority of human beings. No "predetermined doom" exists to make such efforts hopeless. No "iron laws" are proved to be existing in the world of human relationships. Among many forces which shape the historical destinies of mankind and of a given society, the qualities of the population, and its knowledge and volitional efforts, have been some of the greatest factors in this field. This means that it is up to the populations of the urban societies themselves to decide where they wish to go and their historical destinies. They must decide whether, in the future, they wish to see this gradual engulfment and disintegration or whether they wish by conscientious creation to form a new social world free from some of the sinister and menacing conditions of the contemporary urban world. In the histories of societies, similar to those of individuals, a great deal depends upon the personality and the character of human efforts. If a person or a society wishes to live and to live a good life, it cannot afford to float down the current of existing conditions passively. It must be active; it must know where it wishes to go; it must be alert to the ways and means which lead to a given goal; it must be ready to work and to exert all its efforts, however discouraging the problem, in order to achieve its purpose. It must be able to bridle its epicurean impulses, to resist temptations, and to make the necessary sacrifices. When such alertness and the appropriate ability are present, its history is, to a considerable degree, in its own hands. On the contrary, it must not complain that the current of circumstances, its own carelessness and passivity, and its indolence and indulgence have carried it to a precipice or a miasmatic swamp in history. In either case, the reaping will reflect, to a large extent, the character of the sowing.[20]

[20] On account of a lack of space in this volume we had to omit a substantial analysis of some phases of rural social organization. Such an analysis, together with a history of the theories about rural life and rural-urban peoples and cultures from the ancient time to the nineteenth century, will be given in the first volume of the *Source Book* mentioned.

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